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Abstract  
 
The dramatic growth of mobile communications creates many opportunities for 
previously disconnected populations to enhance their access to information and 
resources during periods of crisis, particularly where formal services are weak. 
While numerous studies have lauded the potential benefits of mobiles, the 
potential security and crime risks and benefits associated with mobile ownership 
and use have been largely overlooked.  
This thesis is concerned with understanding the relationship between crime, the 
security of developing world populations and the increasing penetration of 
mobile telephony. The aim is to explore the security-enhancing and crime-
inhibiting benefits, and identify and analyse the crime and security threats, 
associated with mobile phones in developing world settings. The study findings 
are used to examine whether crime opportunity theories such as routine activity 
theory can be fruitfully applied to examine the relationship between mobile 
telephony and constellations of motivated offenders, suitable targets and 
capable guardians in developing world settings. Specifically, it examines the 
ways in which mobile phones inhibit crime in developing world settings by 
increasing the perceived effort and risk, reducing the rewards and provocations, 
and removing excuses for crime. It then addresses how mobile phones create 
opportunities for crime in developing world settings, investigating the social and 
situational conditions which contribute to these crime opportunities through 
reducing the perceived effort and risk, increasing the rewards and provocations, 
and contributing to excuses for crime. To support the development of theory, 
the study utilises primary data collection from two case studies: Kenya and 
Uganda. These include interviews with relevant stakeholders, focus group 
discussions and qualitative and quantitative surveys with mobile phone owners, 
users and non-users.  
The findings reveal user perceptions of a range of security and crime benefits 
and threats associated with mobile telephony. These are subsequently 
examined and classified through opportunity and situational crime analysis and 
associated prevention techniques. Mobile phones are found to inhibit crime in 
developing world, primarily through enhancing the perceived risk associated 
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with the commission of crime. However, formal uses for crime reporting and 
detection remain limited, with the majority of users reliant on informal social 
networks for support during periods of insecurity. Mobile phones also create 
new opportunities for crime in resource-poor contexts, both as crime targets and 
crime facilitators. A range of social, cultural and situational conditions are also 
found to inform opportunities for crime and crime prevention in developing world 
settings. A preliminary categorisation of crime and security threats associated 
with mobile telephony in the two case studies is developed, and the new 
category of ‘m-crime’ is proposed to incorporate, “any illegal or anti-social 
activity facilitated or committed using mobile telephony”.  Situational crime 
prevention (SCP) techniques are applied to address opportunities and 
criminogenic conditions that foster the commission of m-crimes in developing 
world settings, categorise prevention mechanisms according to effort, risk, 
reward, provocation and excuses, and propose further techniques using the 25 
techniques framework. Opportunity prevention techniques characterising IN 
SAFE HANDS (Whitehead et al., 2008) are also applied to the prevention of 
handset theft. 
Specific methodological challenges associated with the collection of data on 
perceptions of security in resource-poor, developing world settings are 
identified. These include limitations of the focus group method in contexts 
where group dynamics are characterised by inequalities of power which 
constrain participation, cultural restrictions on expressing dissent and their 
implications for Likert scale survey responses, and logistical challenges 
associated with obtaining suitable venues in contexts where privacy is limited 
and settings do not meet the basic requirements of traditional data collection 
instruments. Finally, theoretical and practical applications and implications of 
the study findings are addressed. In particular, the study addresses the 
applicability of opportunity theories of crime and situational techniques of crime 
prevention to mobile phones in developing world contexts. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Mobile phones … are the tools that most encourage crime in 
the world…  
 Congolese focus group participant, Kyangwali settlement, Uganda 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Mobile phone penetration is increasing rapidly in the developing world, 
providing unprecedented communication opportunities for traditionally 
disconnected populations (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Castells, et al., 2007; Ling & 
Horst, 2011; Porter, 2012). Africa has experienced tremendous growth in 
access to mobile telephony over the past decade, with 46% of the population of 
Africa subscribed to mobile services by the end of 2015 (GSMA, 2016). In 2015, 
mobile telephones and services were attributed with generating 6.7% of GDP in 
Africa, equivalent to around $150 billion USD, supported an estimated 3.8 
million jobs across the continent, and raised around $17 billion USD in taxation 
(ibid). 
Acknowledging continuing inequalities of access and use, mobile telephony 
heralds a revolution in inter-personal connectivity among traditionally 
disconnected populations in developing world settings. One of the oft-cited 
benefits associated with this connectivity is the role of mobile telephony in 
providing instantaneous access to, and strengthening and cementing bonds 
between, social networks (Ling, 2004; Ling & Donner, 2009). Social networks 
are essential for maintaining livelihoods in the developing world (Donner, 2009) 
and studies of the economic impacts of mobile telephony describe relationships 
between mobile penetration and increased market efficiency, enhanced banking 
opportunities, and transformations in the economic strategies of users (Aker, 
2008; Abraham, 2007; Jensen, 2007; Morawczynski, 2009; Morawczynski & 
Pickens, 2009; Mbiti & Weil, 2014; Overa, 2006). Mobile phones are 
increasingly perceived as lifelines for users around the world (Best, 2011; Coyle 
and Thornton, 2007; Dutton & Nainoa, 2002; Rotberg and Aker, 2013), but in 
contexts of information scarcity they are provide unparalleled opportunities for 
individuals and households to respond to economic shocks, access information, 
and seek emotional support during emergencies (Abraham, 2007; Aker & Mbiti, 
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2010; Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Jack & Suri, 2014; Overa, 2006; Porter, 2012). 
Studies indicate that these benefits may be particularly critical for users in weak 
states and conflict-affected settings (Best, 2011; Coyle & Meier, 2009; Coyle & 
Thornton, 2007; Morawczynski, 2009; Rotberg & Aker, 2013).  
Mobile telephony is increasingly deployed to promote development outcomes 
and humanitarian objectives, where the ubiquity of mobile phones provides a 
mechanism to address the informational needs of both responders and crisis-
affected populations (Coyle & Meier, 2009; Meier, 2013; Wall & Robinson, 
2008; Wall, 2012). Where services are available, mobile phones also provide 
users with direct access to police and security forces for reporting crime and 
requesting assistance (Senarathne Tennakoon & Taras, 2012; Shapiro & 
Siegel, 2015; Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012).  
In developing world settings, studies have focused primarily on the benefits 
associated with mobile telephony, with insufficient recognition of enhanced 
opportunities for crime that may be associated with these devices. There are 
some exceptions, particularly concerning opportunities for the organisation of 
violence and state repression. Mobile phones have been analysed as useful 
tools to facilitate the coordination of violence (Bailard, 2015; Pierskalla & 
Hollenbach, 2013; Shapiro & Siegel, 2015; Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012; 
Warren, 2015), and for the dissemination of threats and misinformation (CIPEV, 
2008; Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; Gujer, 
2011; Osborn, 2008). Mobile phones also provide opportunities for the 
surveillance of inter-personal communications (Donovan & Martin, 2014; 
Human Rights Watch, 2014; Southwood, 2011). However, at the level of 
individual users there has been limited engagement with specific benefits and 
threats of mobile telephony for crime and security, a deficit that this study aims 
to address. 
In Western settings, mobile telephony is widely associated with facilitating crime 
(Vander Beken and Balcaen, 2006; Farrell, 2015; Farrell et al., 2010; Felson, 
2002; Hall, 2009; Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007; Mailley et al., 
2008; Newman & Clarke, 2003; Wall, 2005). These include both acquisitive 
crimes of handset theft, more nebulous networked crimes, and the facilitation of 
other types of place-based crime. Little attention has been paid to the functions 
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of mobile phones for inhibiting crime, other than a broad acknowledgement that 
they enhance crime reporting opportunities. However, in Western contexts, 
mobile phones represent only one small component of a broad communications 
ecosystem characterised by widespread ownership and use of communication 
tools. These include televisions, radios, personal desktop computers, laptops, 
tablets, smartphones, and fixed line telephone services, among others. In many 
developing world contexts, mobile phones provide connectivity for previously 
disconnected populations in settings characterised by information scarcity. In 
such contexts, users may lack access to other types of communication 
technologies, and thus mobile phones create different constellations of 
opportunity for crime and crime prevention.  
As mobile penetration rates increase, mobile communications are becoming 
available to even the most disadvantaged, and potentially the most vulnerable, 
populations around the world. Furthermore, the majority of developing world 
users are ‘leapfrogging’ other forms of communication technology such as fixed 
line services (Castells, et al., 2007; Sharma & Gillet, 2014). These 
inexperienced users of mobile phones may be particularly vulnerable to 
potential threats associated with mobile telephony. While providing many social, 
economic and political functions for developing world users, it is proposed that 
the increasing availability of mobile phones simultaneously creates new 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention, and that developing world users 
may experience distinct vulnerabilities to these emerging crime threats. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The transformations in personal communicative capacities associated with 
mobile telephony provide both challenges and opportunities for academic 
research. Literature on mobile phones in Africa becomes out-dated rapidly as 
technologies, applications, and patterns of ownership and use evolve, leading 
scholars to describe the topic as a ‘moving target’ (Donner, 2010; Ling, 2012; 
Porter, 2012). Researchers are afforded unprecedented opportunities to study 
the diverse impacts of mobile phones during this historical period of profound 
communicative transformation (Baym, 2010; Ling & Horst, 2011; Ling & Donner, 
2009). This dynamic and evolving context is particularly critical for studies of 
crime and security, recognising that crime opportunities and threats evolve in 
response to changing situational conditions. It is therefore a valuable area of 
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study within the current period of rapid and widespread technological change in 
the developing world. 
This study proposes that an important corollary of increasing mobile phone 
penetration in the developing world is the associated implications for crime and 
security. These include both crime facilitating, and crime inhibiting, 
opportunities. Mobile phones provide new crime targets and can facilitate a 
range of traditional and networked crimes. Understanding the conditions and 
contexts in which the security enhancing and crime inhibiting potentials of 
mobile telephony can be maximised, while the security-reducing and crime-
facilitating impacts are constrained, is essential to reduce misuse and increase 
security benefits associated with these increasingly widespread interpersonal 
communication networks.  
1.3 Aims of the study 
This study comprises an investigation into the relationship between mobile 
telephony and crime and security among developing world populations. The 
research question is: 
What are the implications of the increasing penetration of mobile phones in 
developing world settings for opportunities for crime and its prevention? 
Specifically, it achieves the following aims:  
1. Identify the ways in which mobile phones inhibit crime in developing 
world settings, drawing on opportunity theories of crime; 
2. Identify the ways in which mobile phones create opportunities for crime in 
developing world settings; 
3. Identify social, cultural and situational conditions informing access to 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention associated with mobile 
phones in developing world settings; 
4. Identify, analyse and categorise mobile-phone related crime and security 
threats across the two case studies; 
5. Examine the application of situational crime prevention techniques to the 
prevention of crime associated with mobile phones in developing world 
settings, specifically as crime targets and crime facilitators; 
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6. Gain methodological insights into the application of opportunity theories 
of crime and situational crime prevention to mobile phone enabled crime 
in developing world settings.   
These aims are theoretically grounded in opportunity theories of crime and an 
extensive body of existing literature on mobile telephony in developing world 
settings. They are investigated through the analysis of primary data collected in 
Kenya and Uganda, in East Africa. 
1.4 Analytical framework 
According to opportunity theories of crime, broad processes of socio-technical 
change, such as the increasing penetration of mobile phones, may create 
opportunities for both crime and crime prevention (Ekblom & Tilley, 2000; 
Farrell, 2015; Laycock, 2004; Newman & Clarke, 2003). While studies have 
investigated the impact of the increasing availability of motor vehicles and the 
Internet on crime, in developing world contexts the mobile phone is the most 
rapid and widespread socio-technical change of the present generation. A 
growing body of evidence suggests that mobile phones are associated with 
rising rates of traditional and networked crime in Western settings, and with 
increasing reporting, detection and prevention (Farrell, 2015; Farrell et al., 2010; 
Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007; Mailley et al., 2008). Crime and 
security threats associated with mobile telephony are well recognised in 
Western settings, but this is an under-researched area of investigation in other 
contexts (Farrell, 2015, Sidebottom, 2015). Addressing that deficit, the 
argument that opportunities for crime may foster crime is specifically applied to 
primary case study data collected in Kenya and Uganda. 
This study examines mobile telephony through the lens of opportunity theories 
of crime. Crime opportunity theories are premised on rational choice; the 
proposition that offenders make rational decisions in their choice of target; 
deciding whether to commit crimes, and when and how to engage in them. In 
this analysis they facilitate the virtual convergence of geographically dispersed 
targets and offenders in a context where guardianship is weak, and traditional 
behavioural norms and order-maintaining mechanisms may not be effective. 
Accordingly, as mobile penetration increases in the developing world, we can 
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expect a corresponding increase in crime targets to increase the prevalence of 
crime.  
Routine activity theory (RAT) provides a theoretical mechanism to investigate 
this phenomenon. This approach is used to examine how the convergence of 
suitable targets (whether individual users, mobile phone handsets or the data 
contained therein) and motivated offenders creates conditions for crime; and 
how the real or perceived presence of capable guardians may reduce crime by 
altering calculations of effort, risk and reward (Cohen & Felson 1979). These 
theories provide the framework for the investigation, exploring opportunities for 
crime by examining changing constellations of suitable targets, motivated 
offenders and capable guardians. Mobile phones create new crime 
opportunities, and have been variously analysed as crime targets (Farrell, 2015; 
Farrell, et al., 2010; Mailley, et al., 2008; Sidebottom, 2013), crime multipliers 
(Felson, 2002) and crime facilitators (Vander Beken & Balcaen, 2006; Farrell, 
2015; Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007; Laycock, 2004; Newman & 
Clarke, 2003). They are also, in this study, investigated as crime inhibitors, 
drawing on the findings of previous studies (Klick et al, 2012; Pain, et al, 2005; 
Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012, Shapiro & Siegel, 2015; Sidebottom, 2015). 
This approach investigates perceptions of crime and security associated with 
mobile telephony, and explores how constellations of vulnerability inform the 
effort, risk and reward associated both the perpetration and prevention of crime. 
The study proposes a classification of identified crime threats, and analyses and 
classifies prevention measures according to the frameworks of situational crime 
prevention, specifically drawing on the 25 techniques (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). 
Opportunity prevention techniques characterising IN SAFE HANDS (Whitehead 
et al., 2008) are also applied to the prevention of handset theft.  
1.5 Significance of the study 
Many academic research communities engage with the economic, social, and 
political impacts of the rapid transformation of mobile telephony in the 
developing world, including communication studies, information science, 
computer science, sociology, anthropology, design, political science, public 
policy, and economics (Donner, 2008). Identifying how mobile phones may 
facilitate or inhibit crime and insecurity is a critical and understudied area of 
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research. As mobile penetration continues to expand and potential risks are 
increasingly recognised, the need for crime and security scientists to engage 
with this topic has never been greater.  
There is a clear link between poor socio-economic development and crime, 
conflict, and insecurity (World Bank, 2011). Crime contributes to income 
inequality, undermines democracy, and slows the pace of development (ibid). 
Despite this, there has been limited Western academic engagement with crime 
and crime prevention in the developing world. Studies investigating the impacts 
of mobile phones have focused on economic, social and political 
transformations, and their crime and security implications have been 
insufficiently addressed.  
The research illuminates new avenues for crime and security research in the 
developing world, investigating the applicability of opportunity crime theory in 
non-traditional, resource-poor settings and investigating the analysis of African 
crime prevention mechanisms through the frameworks of SCP. The application 
of these theories has been proposed and initially investigated by Sidebottom 
(2015), and the present study draws on these theoretical frameworks to reveal 
both the potential for, and the existing use of, innovative and effective 
situational prevention mechanisms in non-traditional settings. 
Mobile telephony is increasingly acknowledged as a vital mechanism 
contributing to global development priorities and responding to emerging crises 
(Coyle & Meier, 2009; Heeks, 2009; IFRC, 2005; Wall & Robinson, 2008; Wall, 
2012). The risks associated with mobile phones in crisis-affected contexts are, 
as yet, not fully understood (IFRC, 2013) and this study contributes to 
addressing this deficit. Insufficient awareness of the broad crime and security 
threats associated with mobile telephony in the developing world could lead 
humanitarian and development practitioners to exacerbate existing crime and 
security challenges, or introduce new vulnerabilities to populations they seek to 
support. Through increasing the knowledge base on user perceptions and 
experiences of security and crime associated with mobile telephony, and 
identifying how social, cultural and situational conditions contribute to crime 
opportunities in developing world settings, this study aims to inform the 
development of appropriate policies and mechanisms to protect mobile phone 
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users from crime and security threats. The practical implications of these 
findings may also be relevant for government bodies, police and security forces, 
and mobile operators seeking to prevent and constrain the misuse of mobile 
networks, or to leverage them for detecting and preventing crime and insecurity. 
Finally, this analysis provides insights into the methodological challenges and 
opportunities associated with both primary and secondary data on mobile phone 
crime in developing world settings, and proposes alternative methods that could 
be used to investigate this topic further in future studies.  
1.6 Research design 
The aims of this research are pursued through an extensive review of relevant 
literature pertaining to mobile phone crime and ICTD, and the analysis of 
primary data drawn from two selected case studies. These data are analysed to 
identify how mobile phones both contribute to user security and create new 
opportunities for crime. Techniques for the prevention of mobile phone related 
crime, and the prevention of crime using mobile phones, are also identified.  
The two case studies are violence-affected populations in Kenya and displaced 
populations in Uganda. Kenya is an East African country characterised by high 
rates of mobile phone ownership and use (GSMA, 2015a). Mobile telephony 
has previously been implicated in the escalation and coordination of civil conflict 
and violence during election periods (CIPEV, 2008; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; 
Osborn, 2008). The primary data were collected in Kenya during the 2013 pre-
election period for two theoretical reasons. Firstly, this timing facilitated the 
examination of the association between mobile phone networks and the 
dissemination of threats and the escalation of violence. Secondly, it provided a 
timely opportunity to investigate the effectiveness of preventative mechanisms, 
such as mobile-enabled reporting tools and platforms disseminating narratives 
of peace and coexistence (Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; Iacucci, 2013; Meier, 
2011b). The second case study comprises displaced users in Uganda, where 
the research was conducted during a period characterised by the rapid influx of 
refugees fleeing instability in neighbouring countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan. This case study provides the 
opportunity to examine the relationship between mobile phones and crime and 
security for displaced populations.  
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The primary data collection applies a mixed methods approach and instruments 
comprise semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and a 
survey collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. Analysis of the survey 
and FGD data informed the subsequent analysis of user perceptions of crime 
and security threats and benefits associated with mobile telephony, facilitating 
the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data. Additionally, semi-
structured recorded interviews were conducted with the local research 
assistants who administered the survey in both Kenya and Uganda, adding 
further interpretive depth to the findings and illuminating contradictions and 
ambiguities within the survey data. Semi-structured unrecorded interviews were 
conducted with representatives of organisations using mobile telephony for the 
prevention of crime and insecurity in these settings. The use of mixed research 
methods enabled the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data 
illuminating trends, patterns, underlying mechanisms and cultural logics to 
inform this study (Brewer & Hunter, 2006; Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011; Johnson, et al., 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
Analysis of the primary data illuminates the opportunity structures that inform 
experiences of mobile phones as crime facilitating and crime inhibiting in real-
world settings. Qualitative data are analysed using Nvivo (version 10) and 
quantitative data analysed using Excel and SPSS (Version 22). The research 
design is described in full in Chapter Four. 
1.7 Limitations of the study 
The study is limited by both methodological and theoretical constraints. 
Research examining the impacts of mobile telephony in the developing world is 
complicated by the interconnected nature of digital media, both ‘old’ and ‘new’. 
This study is no exception, and the literature review necessarily draws upon 
studies addressing the impacts of both mobile telephony and other Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs). Although personal communication 
mechanisms increasingly provide diverse and interconnected functionality, there 
are critical differences in the use, impact, and value of personal computing, the 
Internet, and online social networks compared to mobile telephony (Donner, 
2008). Accordingly, and for the sake of parsimony, this investigation is 
concerned primarily with the most basic and widely-available functions of the 
mobile phone: Voice calls and SMS, and basic data storage. This study is also 
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specifically concerned to understand user perceptions and experiences of crime 
and security. It does not address the methods and motivations of perpetrators in 
any depth. On this subject, the reader is advised to refer to Burrell (2011; 2012) 
for an examination of the morality and strategizing of young Ghanaians 
developing online scams, which could provide a starting point for further 
research on offender motivations.  
In addition to these theoretical limitations, this study is constrained by 
methodological challenges that limit the scope and reliability of data. The data 
collection instruments and administration were inevitably imperfect, and 
complications associated with cultural norms, linguistic barriers and 
geographical constraints all inform the reliability and generalizability of the data. 
This is mitigated as far as possible through the iterative and reflexive analysis of 
the findings, and critical analysis of the interviews conducted with local 
enumerators subsequent to the survey administration.   
Inevitably, the findings presented in this thesis are constrained by the scope 
and reliability of the primary data on which they are based. These limitations are 
critically analysed in Chapter Seven, and a range of measures and 
methodological approaches are proposed to overcome these challenges and 
limitations. Recognising the limitations of these data, the theoretical and 
methodological findings described herein nevertheless provide a valuable 
foundation for understanding perceptions of the crime and security impacts of 
mobile telephony, both positive and negative, and for the application of SCP 
techniques to the prevention of m-crime in resource-poor settings. 
1.8 Definition of terms 
These terms are used throughout the thesis as conceptual tools to inform 
theory-building, drawing on a wide range of theoretical foundations. 
Crime: Crime specifically concerns actions that constitute an offence and are 
punishable by law. 
Threat: Threat refers to particular events or circumstances with the potential to 
result in undesired consequences. The phrase ‘crime and security threats’ is 
used throughout this thesis to broadly delineate undesirable crime and security 
consequences associated with mobile telephony. Mobile crime and security 
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threats include events and circumstances perceived by users to be threatening, 
regardless of legality. 
Vulnerability: Vulnerability is a multi-dimensional concept widely applied to 
research in a number of fields. Adapting the definition of the International 
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC, 2015), for the purposes of this thesis 
vulnerability refers to the diminished capacity of an individual or group to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of threats. 
Resilience: This term is widely applied to both natural ecosystems and human 
societies. The definition used in this thesis is based on the central qualities 
identified by Norris et al. (2008) following a review of multiple definitions of the 
term. For the specific purposes of this research, resilience is defined as the 
capacity of individuals and communities for successful adaptation in the face of 
crime and security threats.  
Security: Security it broadly defined as a state of freedom from threat. 
M-Crime: Drawing on existing definitions of cyber-crime, the term ‘m-crime’ is 
proposed to describe any illegal activity using mobile telephony as its primary 
means of commission. 
A list of acronyms is also provided to assist the reader with abbreviations used 
throughout the thesis (see p. 17). 
1.9 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in seven chapters, as follows: 
Chapter One: The Introduction (the current chapter) grounds this study in the 
context of the rapid growth of mobile telephony in the developing world and 
increasing acknowledgment of its applications for social, economic and political 
development. It outlines critical gaps in existing literature, highlighting the 
neglect of potential crime and security threats associated with mobile telephony. 
The chapter introduces the purpose and significance of this study and presents 
the aims and conceptual framework. It then outlines the mixed method design, 
summarising the selection of the two case studies, acknowledges key 
assumptions and limitations and delineates the scope of the study.  
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Chapter Two: This chapter presents the aims of the study and examines the 
relevant academic research on the impacts of mobile telephony. The rapid and 
widespread increase in mobile connectivity in Africa is introduced first, outlining 
limitations of reliance on industry level data to estimate access and use, and 
examining the (interconnected) socio-economic and demographic contexts 
influencing mobile phone ownership, use, and sharing behaviours. This section 
also addresses the implications of the virtual extension of social networks 
facilitated by mobile phones. This is followed by an overview of studies 
addressing the relationship between mobile phones and user security, 
examining financial security, uses during emergencies and the implications of 
mobile phones for the escalation of disorder. Finally, this chapter addresses 
crime prevention applications of mobile phones in developing world settings, 
examining issues of responsibility and associated threats to user privacy. 
Chapter Three: The Frameworks of Analysis chapter introduces the history and 
origins of opportunity theories of crime, and explains how they depart from 
traditional offender-oriented approaches to crime. This includes rational choice 
and routine activity theory, and mobile phones are examined as both targets 
and facilitators of crime. The chapter also explains the application of these 
theories and related techniques of situational crime prevention to the prevention 
of crime threats associated with mobile telephony, and to the use of mobile 
telephony for the prevention of other crimes.  
Chapter Four: The Methods chapter presents the mixed methods, case study 
design of this study. It outlines the sample, instruments, and procedures 
through which primary qualitative and quantitative data were collected and 
analysed. This chapter also describes methodological limitations, examines 
sources of bias and error, and outlines the research ethics. 
Chapter Five: This chapter presents the background and findings of the first 
case study. It examines mobile telephony in Kenya and describes the measures 
adopted to prevent the dissemination of hate-speech and the misuse of mobile 
networks. The second part of the chapter analyses the primary qualitative and 
quantitative data thematically, examining the perceived security benefits and 
opportunities for crime associated with mobile phones among study participants 
in Kenya. The findings concerning the preventative measures adopted to 
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mitigate crime threats associated with mobile phones in Kenya, including SIM 
registration and monitoring, are then presented.   
Chapter Six: This chapter is concerned with the second period of fieldwork in 
Uganda, examining perceptions of mobile telephony and crime among refugees 
and migrants in Uganda. The chapter first introduces background information 
about refugees and migrants in Uganda and the use of mobile phones by 
displaced populations, and the presents the primary empirical data collected 
during the fieldwork period. The findings first present the patterns of ownership 
and use among the sample, and then address security benefits followed by 
perceptions of crime and security threats associated with mobile phones. Finally 
the chapter addresses attitudes to the prevention of crime associated with 
mobile phones.  
Chapter Seven: The discussion chapter is broadly structured in eight sections. 
After an initial chapter summary, the application of mobile phones as crime 
inhibitors and uses for crime reporting and prevention are discussed. The next 
section examines the ways in which mobile phones create new crime 
opportunities in developing world settings, and is followed by an analysis of the 
social, cultural and situational conditions which contribute to opportunities for 
crime. Identified hybrid crime and security threats associated with mobile 
telephony in the two case studies are then categorised, and the new term m-
crime is proposed to differentiate these from other types of crime. The 25 
techniques of SCP (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) and IN SAFE HANDS 
(Whitehead et al., 2008) are then applied to the analysis and prevention of 
handset theft. The 25 techniques of SCP (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) are also 
applied to identify and analyse the application of existing and future potential 
prevention techniques for uses of mobile phones as crime facilitators. Finally, 
the chapter reflects on conducting research on crime in non-Western settings, 
outlines weaknesses of the methods and tools, proposes ways these could be 
mitigated and identifies lessons for future studies.  
Chapter Eight: The Conclusions chapter summarises the investigation into 
mobile telephony as a crime target and crime facilitator in developing world 
contexts, and outlines the main contributions of the study. In short, these 
comprise an investigation of the ways mobile phones inhibit crime and create 
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crime opportunities in developing world settings, the identification of social, 
cultural and situational conditions contributing to these opportunities, the 
identification, analysis and categorisation of crime threats, and the application of 
SCP techniques corresponding with the ‘effort, risk, reward, provocations, and 
excuses’ to propose appropriate preventative strategies. This chapter also 
outlines the limitations and examines the theoretical and practical implications 
of the study.  
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Chapter Two: Mobile telephony and crime in the 
developing world 
2.1 Introduction 
This research investigates the relationship between the increasing penetration 
of mobile phones in African settings and the crime-facilitating, and crime-
inhibiting, impacts of these tools through an opportunity crime perspective. 
Previous studies associate a multitude of developmental benefits with the 
increasing penetration of mobile phones. These include the widely recognised 
social, political, economic and psychological benefits of increasing connectivity 
with both informal social networks and formal organisations and agencies 
(Abraham, 2007; Aker, 2008; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Blumenstock, et al., 2011 de 
Silva & Ratnadiwakara, 2008; Duncombe, 2012b; Jack & Suri, 2014; Jensen, 
2007; Morawczynski, 2009; Morawczynski & Pickens, 2009;  Overa, 2006; 
Souter, et al., 2005; Tenhunen, 2008). The corollary of this increasing access to 
formal and informal networks is widely assumed to be an increase in real and 
perceived security for users, and assumptions about developmental progress 
often underpin academic analyses. However, the relationship between mobile 
telephony and crime and security in African settings has been largely obscured 
by the widely-cited association between mobile connectivity and positive 
development outcomes, and applications for crime prevention are also under-
developed.  
Studies of mobile telephony in emergencies and civil conflicts provide a useful 
entry point for this analysis, as they are among the few studies investigating 
negative security impacts of these tools in developing world settings. Although 
these studies address the implications of mobile telephony for the organisation 
of violence and insecurity (Bailard, 2015; Best, 2011; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 
2013; Shapiro & Siegel, 2015; Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012), they nevertheless 
overlook wider implications for personal security that are addressed in this 
study.  As mobile telephony continues to increase rapidly in developing world 
settings, this is a critical historical moment in which to investigate this topic. As 
Ling and Donner state in the introduction of Mobile Communication, "If we 
squander this chance to study mobile use, it will not come again" (2009, p. 4). 
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Addressing next the opportunities for inhibiting crime associated with mobile 
phones, studies reviewed in this chapter reveal that mobile phones enable 
users to enhance their social and economic wellbeing and also report and 
respond to emerging crime and security threats in resource-poor settings 
(Abraham, 2007; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Best, 2011; Blumenstock, et al., 2011; 
Coyle & Thornton, 2007; Coyle & Meier, 2009; Jack & Suri, 2014; 
Morawczynski, 2009; Overa, 2006; Porter, 2012; Rotberg & Aker, 2013; Shapiro 
& Siegel, 2015; Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012). This background literature sets 
the scene for the examination of an understudied corollary of this increasing 
connectivity; the associated increase in opportunities for crime, and enhanced 
opportunities for the prevention of crime through increased reporting and 
detection capabilities.  
Recognising the complex and multi-faceted development benefits associated 
with mobile telephony in resource-poor settings, this chapter sets out the 
relationship between mobile phones, development and security in developing 
world settings. Constellations of access and use are examined in order to 
illuminate opportunities for crime threats, reveal ways in which mobile phones 
contribute to users’ security and access to crime reporting opportunities, and 
highlight social, cultural and situational conditions informing these opportunities. 
The subsequent chapter describes the theoretical frameworks guiding the 
analysis of the relationship between processes of socio-technical change 
associated with mobile phones and opportunities for crime and crime prevention 
in developing world settings.   
2.2 Mobile telephony in the developing world 
In order to understand the key differences in opportunities for crime and crime 
prevention associated with mobile telephony in African settings, it is essential to 
examine differences between access and use of mobile telecommunications in 
the developed and developing world. Overviewing the rapid and widespread 
penetration of mobile connectivity and examining industry-level user data 
demonstrates the speed and scale of these socio-technical changes. The 
social, cultural and situational conditions in developing world settings criticially 
inform the changing opportunity structures for crime and crime prevention, also 
influencing patterns of ownership and use. Accordingly, inequality, exclusion, 
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and practices of sharing are examined to inform the analysis developed in this 
thesis.  
2.2.1 Scope and scale of mobile penetration 
As a result of the rapid pace of mobile penetration worldwide, the current era is 
characterised by unprecedented global connectivity. These rapid technological 
shifts provide networked connectivity to previously disconnected developing 
world users. Mobile phones have the potential to connect entire populations 
with each other and with formal agencies, in settings where these new users 
have little experience with interpersonal communications and alternative 
sources of information may be limited and unreliable. Predicting that the 
widespread and rapid penetration of mobile phone technology has contributed 
to the emergence of new opportunities for crime and crime prevention, and 
further that developing world users are particularly vulnerable to crime threats, 
this section describes the development and use of mobile phones in developing 
world settings.  
Addressing first the functionality of the technology in question, mobile phone 
handsets function by connecting to cellular networks operated by mobile 
network operators (MNOs). Each handset requires a Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM) card microchip that stores the key used to identify and authenticate the 
user and connect to a particular network (Sauter, 2013). Many popular handset 
models in the developing world include multi-SIM capabilities to take advantage 
of preferential call rates offered by different MNOs (Eagle, 2010), enabling a 
single handset to function on multiple networks simultaneously.  
Mobile phone handsets have evolved from the most basic models, referred to 
as 1G (first generation) to the present-day 4G (fourth generation) models. Early 
models used analog cellular networks, while later generations (2G onwards) 
utilise digital cellular networks enabling SMS and data capabilities (Sauter, 
2013). 3G phones introduced mobile broadband capabilities and other 
multimedia capabilities, and finally data-optimised 4G technologies were 
developed to enable the streaming of bandwidth-intensive applications (ibid). In 
Western countries, the majority of mobile users own individual handsets and 
use advanced handsets with computing capabilities which provide access to the 
Internet, email, photography and video capabilities (Corbett, 2008). In contrast, 
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popular models in the developing world are basic handsets, although 
‘smartphones’ are increasingly common in urban centres and among more 
affluent groups (GSMA, 2013). The main focus of this research concerns the 
networked connectivity facilitated by standard features of basic handsets: calls 
and SMS and data storage. However the study does not exclude the wider 
functions of these devices, recognising that opportunities for crime and crime 
prevention are associated with different communications and storage 
capabilities.  
Mobile phone connection figures reveal the remarkable speed with which 
mobile telephony has been adopted around the world. In 2001 the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) announced that there were one billion mobile 
connections1 in the world (ITU, 2001), and by 2014 the number of mobile phone 
connections had surpassed the total population of earth (ITU, 2014). This speed 
of technological change is associated with a wide range of socio-economic and 
political transformations, but the impacts on crime and security have not 
received significant attention. Furthermore, ITU statistics reveal that over three 
quarters of these subscribers live in the developing world, where mobile 
penetration2 was estimated to exceed 90% by the end of 20153 (see figure 1). 
The speed and breadth of mobile phone penetration in developing world 
settings is likely to have far-reaching and complex consequences across a 
range of social, economic and political domains, including crime and security. 
                                            
1 Mobile phone connections refers to the number of active mobile SIM cards. 
2 Mobile phone penetration refers to the number of connections relative to the total population of 
potential subscribers 
3 Compared to the mobile penetration rate of 121% in the developed world, indicating that a fifth 
of users own more than one active mobile SIM card 
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Figure 1: Mobile penetration per 100 inhabitants in the developed and developing world (ITU, 2015) 
The rapid growth and widespread availability and affordability of mobile 
telephony are unique in the history of communications in Africa, and are 
associated with processes of socio-technical change (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Ling & 
Horst, 2011; Porter, 2012). In contrast to the developed world, mobile telephony 
in Africa was not predated by fixed-line telephones, in-car telephones, pagers, 
telegraphs and other peer-to-peer communicative tools (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Castells, et al., 2007; James, 2014; Ling & Horst, 2011). Mobile phones are 
often the first generation of ICTs available to developing world users. In the 
developing world, fixed-line telephones are rare, unreliable and expensive. 
GSMA Intelligence estimate that fixed line telephone access was available to 
less than 1% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa as recently as 2012 
(Sharma & Gillet, 2014). To contextualise this, Aker and Mbiti’s (2010) survey 
results indicate that fixed-line telephone users in Kenya experienced interrupted 
service (average 36 days per year), long waiting times to be connected 
(average 100 days) and paid bribes in return for connections (average 
US$117). Mobile phones provide a cheap and convenient means to circumvent 
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the challenges associated with fixed line telephone services. For rural 
populations living in geographically remote areas, additional infrastructure 
challenges such as the absence of paved roads and electricity coupled with 
challenging environmental conditions (flooding, landslides etc.) also contribute 
to the absence of fixed line connections (Sharma & Gillet, 2014). In contrast, 
mobile phones are not impeded by challenging terrains and sparse populations, 
as signals are broadcast through radio waves rather than fixed cables. As 
mobile penetration rates continue to increase worldwide, the popularity of fixed 
line telephony is declining in both the developed and developing world (figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2: Fixed line penetration per 100 inhabitants in the developed and developing world (ITU, 
2015) 
 
Limited communications options are available in many developing world 
settings. Particularly in rural areas, televisions and newspapers are rare, and 
radio broadcasts sporadic and poorly regulated. Mobile phones provide two-way 
communicative capabilities to societies historically starved of informational 
resources (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Ling & Donner, 2009), decentralising the 
capacity of users to transmit and receive information rapidly and across vast 
distances. In such contexts, mobile telephony facilitates unparalleled 
opportunities for users to access and exchange information and support. In 
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relation to the aims of this study, it may be postulated that mobile phones also 
provide opportunities for the commission and prevention of crime and insecurity.  
2.2.2 Patterns of ownership and use 
Recognising these broad shifts in connectivity across the developing world, it is 
essential to acknowledge differences in access to mobile telephony. While 
mobile telephony is the fastest growing communications technology in history, a 
huge connectivity gap remains across the developing world.  The terms ‘missing 
link’ (Maitland, 1984) and ‘digital divide’ (Castells, et al., 2007) have been 
variously coined to describe the socio-economic disparity between technological 
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, in which particular social and demographic groups are 
systematically excluded from ownership and use of digital technologies. 
Statistics showing the impressive growth rates of mobile phone penetration tend 
to obscure these inequalities of access and use, yet they are critical to analyses 
of the impacts of mobile phones. Merely counting subscriptions is misleading; 
data showing the number of SIM cards sold and active does not reveal anything 
about their distribution. Previous studies demonstrate that patterns of ownership 
vary between and within populations, and sharing behaviours may further 
complicate analyses that assume a one-to-one ratio between ownership and 
use (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Burrell, 2010; James, 2011; James & Vesteeg, 2007). 
This is important to acknowledge these patterns as it is likely that users’ 
experiences of crime and security threats and benefits associated with mobile 
telephony are informed by their access and use of mobile phone handsets.  
A number of factors influence access to, and use of, mobile telephony. Firstly, 
considerations of cost are likely to be critical for populations living in resource-
poor settings. The majority of mobile users in the developing world use prepay 
options4 rather than fixed contracts (ITU, 2014). Consequently, handsets are 
not subsidised by service providers as they are in the UK and elsewhere (ibid), 
and the initial costs of purchasing a handset and SIM card are high (Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010; BalancingAct, 2009; Wall & Robinson, 2008). In 2010 Aker and 
Mbiti reported that, “the cheapest mobile phone in Kenya … costs half the 
average monthly income, whereas the price of the cheapest mobile phone in 
                                            
4 Users purchase vouchers (available in a range denominations) to recharge their credit 
accounts prior to using mobile services. Vouchers typically expire a set period of time after 
activation 
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Niger is equivalent to 12.5 kilograms of millet, enough to feed a household of 
five for five days” (2010, p. 211). In addition to purchase and start-up costs, the 
relative cost of usage is also higher in developing world settings. In a BBC 
World Service Trust report on the use of mobile phones by people in crisis, Wall 
and Robinson (2008) estimate that developing world mobile users spend 17.5% 
of their income on ICTs, compared to just 1.5% in developed countries. In the 
same year, Tenhunen (2008) reported that simply making a short phone call 
cost around 8% of a labourer’s daily income in rural India. In contexts of 
widespread poverty and low disposable income, these costs inhibit both 
ownership and use by the poorest sections of society, and contribute to 
complex patterns of shared ownership and use as well as innovative low-cost 
communication strategies.  
Although the initial costs are falling as the availability of second-hand mobile 
handsets increases, the ongoing costs of mobile phone use can be 
considerable for economically disadvantaged users (ITU, 2014). These high 
costs are reflected in emerging cost-saving behaviours, such as reliance on the 
now ubiquitous ‘one bell’ technique employed by lower-income users to send a 
pre-agreed message or to request a phone call (Horst & Miller, 2006). Pre-
existing economic inequalities may also contribute to less financially 
empowered mobile users becoming passive recipients of SMS messages and 
calls instigated by more wealthy members of their social network, as Abraham 
(2009) notes in an ethnographic account of Zambian women’s rights advocates. 
In her analysis, these mobile-mediated inequalities of power embody pre-
existing socio-economic disparities, creating a “virtual class system” (2009, p. 
100) in which low income women effectively lose their voice, becoming “silent 
listeners and simply recipients of texts and alerts from more financially 
empowered members” (2009, p. 99). Examining the implications for crime and 
security, it may be postulated that financially disempowered users of mobile 
phones are likely to have less access to the security-enhancing benefits 
associated with mobile phones. The most economically vulnerable users will 
have the lowest access to both handsets and phone credit to report crime and 
seek assistance. However, these same conditions may reduce their vulnerability 
to handset theft, as low-income mobile users are less likely to own handsets.  
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The high costs associated with mobile phone ownership and use in the 
developing world have led scholars to question whether mobile telephony, by 
excluding the most marginalised, is likely to maintain and entrench existing 
inequalities (Abraham, 2009; Duncombe, 2012b; Jagun, et al., 2008; Porter, 
2012; Souter, et al., 2005). The question for this study is whether these patterns 
of access and exclusion inform crime and crime prevention. As noted, users 
who purchase a mobile phone but cannot afford to purchase credit regularly 
may be unable to report crime and seek assistance when needed. Financially 
disempowered users may be unable to actively verify incoming information by 
triangulating it through initiating outgoing phone calls. These constrained usage 
patterns, widely recognised in existing studies, may be hypothesised to inform 
the vulnerability of economically disempowered users to mobile phone crime, 
and access to crime prevention functions.  
In addition to economic considerations, inequalities of access to, and use of 
mobile phones are also influenced by several other interacting social and 
demographic factors that are likely to affect users’ risk of, and vulnerability to, 
mobile phone crime and access to security-enhancing functions. The GSMA 
(2012) report that women are 21% less likely to own mobile phones than men 
worldwide and 23% less likely in Africa. Factors affecting women’s ownership 
include household income, residence in an urban or rural location, age, 
occupation and educational levels (GSMA, 2012). Other studies report similar 
findings. Deen-Swarray, Gillwald and Morrell (2012) draw on the results of a 
2012 household survey conducted in twelve African countries to argue that 
income and education are the most significant barriers to women’s ownership of 
mobile phones. Hilbert’s (2011) findings corroborate this, indicating that 
women’s lower rates of access and use of mobile telephony correlate with their 
lower rates of employment, income and education based on data from twelve 
Latin American and thirteen African countries between 2005 and 2008. 
However, Hilbert (2011) further argues that controlling for employment, income 
and education reveals women to be more active users of digital tools than men, 
suggesting that wider socio-economic inequalities constrain their usage. 
Qualitative studies also corroborate women’s exclusion from the use of mobile 
phones in developing world settings. In an analysis of women’s advocacy 
networks in Uganda, Ngolobe (2010) describes how women’s lower levels of 
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literacy and education relative to men combine with gender-related constraints 
on time and mobility with the consequence that women are less likely than men 
to use mobile phones and access other forms of ICTs. In a review of literature 
on livelihoods and mobile phones, Porter (2012) argues that women’s access to 
mobile phones is often limited by male control and shaped by suspicion in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Porter argues that women’s mobile phone ownership can 
contribute to intra-family tension, and furthermore suggests that the impacts of 
mobile technology do not alter, "fundamental asymmetries and inequalities" 
between men and women (Porter, 2012, p. 254). This finding is echoed in 
ethnographic studies in Uganda (Kyomuhendo, 2009) and Kenya 
(Morawczynski, 2009). Kyomuhendo (2009) reports the findings of a small-scale 
study conducted through interviews and informal discussions with women in 
Hoima, Uganda, describing the ways in which mobile phones reduce women’s 
digital and physical isolation while simultaneously causing tensions within the 
family by enabling women to conceal savings and maintain secret relationships. 
Morawczynski (2009) describes similar findings in an ethnographic study 
conducted in Kenya, where women use the secure facilities afforded by mobile 
banking to conceal savings from husbands. These studies suggest that mobile 
phones provide women with the means to bypass constrained physical 
environments and enhance their independence by concealing individual 
earnings and savings and coordinating socialisation beyond traditional 
boundaries. However, these impacts are perceived to be dangerous or 
subversive for traditional social norms and patterns of behaviour. It is likely that 
these conditions also inform women’s vulnerability to mobile-enabled crime, and 
access to mobile-enabled security benefits. For example, women’s constrained 
mobile phone use may exclude them from accessing the security benefits 
associated these tools if they are unable to report crimes in progress or call for 
assistance. However, women’s constrained usage but may simultaneously 
minimise their receipt of fraudulent content and threats and reduce risks of 
handset theft.  
Another consideration that is likely to affect users’ engagement in mobile 
networks is education (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; GSMA, 2012; GSMA, 2014; 
Tenhunen, 2008), with more educated users benefiting from different 
functionality (e.g. SMS) and higher use rates. In her ethnographic account, 
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Tenhunen (2008) notes that in West Bengal SMS messages are rarely used by 
subjects as they require literacy in Latin or Hindi characters and most users are 
Bengali speaking. A report on digital inclusion published by the GSMA also 
describes illiteracy and digital illiteracy as significant barriers to mobile internet 
adoption in particular, noting that “in developing countries in particular, illiteracy 
is most prominent across rural areas and marginalised groups, such as the poor 
and youth, and causes a major challenge in accessing internet content which is 
predominately text based… even where coverage and affordability issues have 
been addressed” (GSMA, 2014, p. 4). Accordingly, less educated users may be 
excluded from text-based uses of mobile phones, such as SMS. This has 
implications for the crime and security impacts of mobile phones. SMS are a 
low-cost method of transmitting information, but recipients may be unable verify 
the identity of the sender compared to a voice call. As a consequence, illiterate 
users may actually be less vulnerable to crime committed through SMS. 
However, they also lack the option of using SMS to send or receive information 
and updates on emerging crime threats. 
These social and economic conditions also interact with patterns of handset 
sharing which are common in resource-poor settings (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Burrell, 2010; James, 2011; James, 2014; James & Vesteeg, 2007; Tenhunen, 
2008). Practices of handset sharing increase access to mobile telephony, 
leading James and Vesteeg (2007) to critique the concept of digital divide as 
predicated on false assumptions about individual ownership. Mobile 
subscription data are based on the number of individual SIM cards in use, but 
sharing behaviours may contribute to an invisible body of secondary mobile 
users in the developing world. For example, Aker and Mbiti (2010) report on 
survey data from Kenya indicating that one third of Kenyan mobile users share 
their handsets. These authors also describe the first adopters of mobile 
telephony across Africa as male, educated, wealthy and urban, suggesting that 
secondary users include more women, less educated, less wealthy and rural 
populations. James (2011) tests these assumptions by drawing on household-
level survey data from eleven African countries, arguing that when sharing is 
accounted for, inequalities of access between countries are largely negated. 
However, this analysis assumes an operational equivalence between shared 
access and ownership which is unlikely to be reflected in users’ experiences of 
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the crime and security impact of mobile phones. In practice, fundamental 
inequalities are likely to exist between owners and users of mobile phones, and 
this relationship may be mediated by wider socio-cultural and economic 
relations of power and inequality. Handset sharing is also likely to inform crime 
opportunities, vulnerabilities and access to security benefits associated with 
mobile phones. Handset owners retain authority and control over usage - 
deciding who, when, and where to use their handsets and retain access to 
information stored on the device. Secondary users remain reliant on, and 
subservient to, handset owners who retain ultimate decision-making authority 
over the handset. However, it may be postulated that mobile phone owners are 
likely to be more vulnerable to handset theft than sharers, and crime threats 
associated with the theft of data contained within handsets is also likely to vary 
between owners and sharers. 
Burrell (2010) critiques the established concept of shared use which posits a 
simple distinction between those with access to a particular technology, and 
those without. Rather, she recommends a shift in focus to examine “the rich and 
varied ways that technologies are… being informally shared within populations 
of rural regions as they cope with conditions of scarcity” (2010, p 231). Burrell 
also identifies inequalities that occur within informal patterns of sharing, 
acknowledging that sharing behaviours encompass a range of configurations 
and the level of control over shared devices cannot be reduced to binarisms. 
However, while Burrell’s argument concerns specific benefits realised through 
the phone, the present research is concerned to investigate both benefits for 
crime prevention, and associated opportunities for crime.  
Burrell (2010) investigates non-commercial sharing patterns in rural Uganda, 
noting differences between mobile phones and other technologies including 
bicycles, radios and televisions. Unlike these more ‘neutral’ technologies, 
Burrell notes that some mobile phone owners are unwilling to share their 
handsets due to secrets contained within the phone, such as contact details of, 
or messages from, lovers or girlfriends. She cites the example of a 
businessman living in a rural Ugandan community who is willing to lend out his 
motorbike (regarded as ‘public’) but not his mobile phone (contrasted as 
‘private’) due to its value as a means for protecting his professional network and 
managing resource competition. Radios and televisions provide access to 
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generic broadcast media content. In contrast, mobile phones may provide 
access to personalised content stored within the device. Mobile phones provide 
opportunities to store valuable, and potentially sensitive data within the handset. 
This may render users particularly vulnerable in contexts where access to ICTs, 
and their associated digital storage capabilities, is limited (as described 
previously). Thus mobile phone owners are likely to be vulnerable to theft of 
both handsets and the data contained within them, and secondary users may 
experience opportunities for data theft associated with practices of handset 
sharing. Burrell notes that, "this diverges from discussions of privacy in the 
domain of American or European networked computing dominantly concerned 
with protecting personal information in relation to corporate or government 
institutions" (Burrell, 2010, p. 239), as privacy threats in these settings may 
emerge from other users. Burrell suggests collating social contacts in one place 
is a novel phenomenon which renders users particularly vulnerable to the 
appropriation of valuable social contacts in the context of highly personalised 
relations with customers and suppliers. 
Practices of sharing mobile handsets add complexity to naïve interpretations of 
industry-level data on access and penetration figures, and may have 
multifaceted impacts on security and crime in the developing world. Analysing 
the implications of these practices suggests that owners and sharers of mobile 
phones are likely to experience different crime and crime prevention 
opportunities. Mobile phone owners may use their mobile handset to seek 
assistance or report crime at any time, but are simultaneously more vulnerable 
to handset and data theft. Handset sharers may not benefit from the previously 
documented immediacy of access to social networks and support functions, but 
they are also likely to be less vulnerable to acquisitive crime in resource-poor 
settings. The section has identified specific situational conditions in developing 
world settings that are likely to inform users’ vulnerability to mobile crime and 
security threats, and access to associated security benefits. These include 
patterns of access to and use of handsets, practices of sharing, and 
demographic factors including gender, income, and education.  
2.2.3 Mobilising social networks 
Mobile phone communications and access to mobile phone handsets, and their 
benefits, are informed by socio-economic factors which are inform opportunities 
45 
 
for crime and crime prevention. Furthermore, mobile phone communications 
may also be subject to different behavioural norms, both compared to those 
informing geographically situated interactions and compared to Western 
contexts. Ethnographic literature provides insights into the relationship between 
the increasing penetration of mobile telephony and the disruption of traditional 
power relations and behavioural norms in developing world settings 
(Archambault, 2013; Castells, et al., 2007; Jeffrey & Doron, 2013; Ling, 2004; 
McIntosh, 2010; Porter, 2012; Tenhunen, 2008).  
Mobile phones enable users to interact within private, networked 
communication channels. Mobile telephony also has the potential to expand 
users’ social networks beyond their geographical confines, providing access to 
new (potentially socially disruptive) information and resources. These increased 
opportunities for autonomy and socialisation can come into conflict with norms 
of culturally appropriate behaviour, particularly for traditionally marginalised 
groups such as youth and women (Archambault, 2013; Jeffrey & Doron, 2013; 
Ling, 2004; Porter, 2012; Tenhunen, 2008). The association between horizontal 
communications and the bypassing of traditional forms of social regulation 
emerges from ethnographic fieldwork conducted in traditional communities in 
particular. In India, Tenhunen (2008) describes how mobile phones enable 
users to bypass traditional power structures and village elders, facilitating the 
extension of both kin and non-kin networks beyond traditional boundaries. 
Tenhunen notes that, "The new phone networks accentuate the dispersal of 
power beyond the village, as seeking help from outside the village during 
conflicts and crises has become easier" (2008, p. 525). This extension of social 
ties, while providing a social support function for individual mobile users, 
simultaneously threatens traditional authorities, on whose patronage people 
customarily depend (ibid). Aker and Mbiti (2010) also note that in strengthening 
extended business networks, mobile telephony can simultaneously weaken 
local networks as users begin to access credit and services outside of their local 
communities. This enables mobile phone users to access preferential rates and 
competitive suppliers, but may have widespread implications for crime and 
insecurity. As sociability departs from foundations of proximity and convenience, 
users have opportunities to socialise with new social networks without the 
oversight of traditional authorities. As Tenhunen notes in India, "In extending 
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and multiplying villagers' relationships, phones are conferring on village society 
much of the diversity of connectedness that is characteristic of urban settings" 
(2008, p. 525). She describes how some users establish friendships with people 
in distant states "simply by dialling a random number and starting to chat" 
(Tenhunen, 2008, p. 525). Jeffrey and Doron (2013) report similar findings in 
India, arguing that mobile phones enable users to bypass existing social 
hierarchies, noting that these departures from previous constellations of social 
ties, obligations and power structures result in a perceived association between 
mobile telephony and moral degeneration. Mobile telephony bisects traditional 
relationships and fragments their associated norms and values, enabling new 
opportunities for crime.  
Examining attitudes to mobile phones and traditional behavioural codes in 
Kenya, McIntosh (2010) describes concerns expressed by elders and 
community leaders around issues such as promiscuity, disrespect of traditions, 
access to pornography, and even mental illness. McIntosh notes, "one elder, for 
instance, remarks that the strange qualities of the mobile phone provoke young 
people to ‘speak alone on the roads just like madmen do’” (2010, 349). Mobile 
phones benefit users by enabling them to access (and strengthen) social 
networks, but these studies demonstrate that they may simultaneously disrupt 
traditional behavioural norms. Mobile phones also provide a channel for 
ordinary citizens to communicate informally in African contexts, where state 
owned media monopolies may constrain formal channels such as broadcast 
media (Spitulnik, 2002). Examining the contrast between formal 
communications and the transmission of humorous anecdotes, jokes and 
gossip through graffiti, leaflets, and informal communications, Spitulnik (2002) 
coins the term ‘small media’ to describe these informal communications. Mobile 
phone networks provide opportunities for the transmission of informal 
communications, bypassing formal communications channels. 
Burrell (2011) draws on ethnographic data from Internet café users to 
investigate rumours about Internet scams in Ghana. There are both similarities 
and differences between crimes committed through the Internet and through 
mobile phone networks, as the subsequent chapter addresses. However, 
examining attitudes to Internet crime in developing world settings may provide 
useful insights into the relationship between developing world users and 
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networked crimes. Burrell’s (2011) findings suggest that users regard scamming 
as a mechanism for the rapid accumulation of wealth, rather than a lifestyle 
choice, and furthermore that their experiences contrast with the rumours about 
successful, and unsuccessful, scammers. Burrell argues that, “rumours are… 
used by users to reinterpret and reinvent technology” (2011, p140), focusing on 
user agency both in interpreting the utility of technology, and propagating those 
interpretations to others. Burrell (2011) describes Internet crime as a high stake 
activity, “that held the promise of unlimited financial opportunity… [and] 
represented a dangerous entanglement that could damage the morality and 
finances of those involved” (2011, p141). 
In Burrell’s (2011) analysis, scammers utilise new opportunities presented by 
the Internet to access wealthy foreign crime targets, and extract resources 
through various forms of deception. While this clearly differs from crime 
targeting developing world users, it provides a useful way to examine the 
motivations and decision-making of offenders utilising networked technologies 
for crime in developing world settings. Burrell notes that Internet users often 
cast victims as, “affluent Westerners who would not be harmed by scamming 
activities” (2011, p152), referencing foreign celebrities and sports stars as 
famous, wealthy examples of the kinds of victims targeted by scammers. This 
type-casting functions, in Burrell’s (2011) analysis, to maximise distance from, 
and non-identification with, victims of scams as a “strategy of moral justification” 
(2011, p148). It would seem these strategies are not applicable to scams which 
are both perpetrated by, and target, developing world victims as addressed in 
the present study. However, Burrell (2011) also notes that some study 
participants distanced themselves from scammers, casting them as others, or 
as marginalised minority groups. Interestingly, during interviews with members 
of these groups (e.g. slum-dwellers, Muslims, etc.) Burrell (2011) notes that 
these minority Internet users re-framed scamming as a strategy of self-
preservation or self-sufficiency, creating moral justifications for their actions. In 
contexts where tribal loyalties and ethnic affiliations create strong bonds, 
mobile-enabled crimes targeting member of other groups may seem morally 
justifiable by their perpetrators. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, 
future studies could fruitfully investigate the processes of moral justification 
applied to scams both perpetrated by, and targeting, developing world users. 
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For the purposes of this study, reflecting on the implications of tribal and ethnic 
divisions is valuable for understanding experiences of mobile enabled crime and 
crime prevention, and for developing preventative strategies.  
Archambault (2013) also notes that mobile telephony opens up new, private 
social spaces through which users can network discretely. In this way, they 
have become associated with subversive or anti-social activities. For example, 
mobile phones are used by some young women to coordinate multiple sexual 
partners in order to access resources, leading Archambault to comment that, 
"the phone thus allows young women to better juggle what would otherwise be 
irreconcilable ideals of respectability with economic emancipation" (2013:96). 
Similar to Jeffrey and Doron’s (2013) analysis of mobile telephony in India, 
emerging networked connectivity offers developing world users a new space in 
which traditional norms and values are not regulated or enforced.  
The ethnographic analyses add interpretive depth to the large-n studies and 
reveal that the widespread penetration of mobile telephony in traditional 
communities may contribute to changes in social relations, traditional roles and 
behavioural norms. By providing a virtual communications arena unconstrained 
by traditional practices and relationships, horizontal mobile-enabled connectivity 
may simultaneously liberate users from traditional constraints, and expose them 
to new opportunities for crime.  
2.3 Mobile phones and user security 
The most widely recognised benefits associated with mobile telephony in the 
developing world are informal and economic, ranging from increased access to 
market information (Abraham, 2007; Aker, 2008; de Silva & Ratnadiwakara, 
2008; Jensen, 2007; Overa, 2006) to enhanced banking and savings facilities 
(Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Duncombe, 2012a; Morawczynski, 2009; 
Morawczynski & Pickens, 2009). Through reducing communication costs and 
increasing the speed of information transfer, mobile phones also enhance 
responses to economic shocks and reduce market uncertainty and business 
risks (Abraham, 2007; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Jack & 
Suri, 2014; Overa, 2006; Souter, et al., 2005; Tenhunen, 2008). Through 
demonstrating links between increase mobile telephone usage and increased 
efficiency in rural markets, these studies show how informal uses of mobile 
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phones increase user resilience and reduce vulnerability to threats to their 
economic security. They also reveal some of the crime and security risks 
associated with the use of mobile phones for the informal communication of 
market information. While mobile telephony facilitates transactions based on 
interpersonal trust, this simultaneously creates opportunities for crime.  
2.3.1 Mobile phones and economic security 
Examining the impact of mobile telephony on the fisheries sector in India, 
Abraham (2007) draws on interviews, fieldwork, FGDs and questionnaires to 
conclude that mobile phones make rural and underdeveloped markets more 
efficient by enhancing interpersonal communication and thereby reducing 
information asymmetries, risks, and uncertainties. Overa (2006) uses 
ethnographic data to demonstrate similar improvements in yam markets and the 
wholesale fish trade in Ghana, describing how mobile telephones facilitate 
transactions, enable the calculation of supply and demand logistics, and negate 
the need for time-consuming and expensive road journeys to access market 
information. The findings reported by Abraham (2007) and Overa (2006) are 
corroborated by quantitative research such as Jensen’s (2007) analysis of 
micro-level survey data collected weekly from a sample of 300 fishing outfits 
over a period of five years. Using these data, Jensen examines the impact of 
mobile telephones on fisheries markets in Kerala, India, concluding that the 
introduction and expansion of mobile coverage in the region ultimately resulted 
in welfare benefits for both consumers (reducing fish prices by 4%) and 
producers (increasing profits by 8%). While Jensen’s study examines a 
particularly perishable commodity, fresh fish, the real-time communication 
opportunities enabled by mobile telephony are revealed to provide benefits 
across a range of markets. For example, in another quantitative study 
conducted in Niger, Aker (2008) tests a theoretical model predicting a 
correlation between mobile phone coverage and reductions in price distribution 
across grain markets using data on prices, transport costs, rainfall and grain 
production. Aker finds evidence that mobile phone coverage reduces price 
dispersion across markets by a minimum of 6.4%, which she attributes to the 
reduced search costs, increased market information and increased efficiency 
enabled by mobile telephony.  
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Other mobile-enabled mechanisms are also used to secure assistance from 
distant social networks. Mobile banking (hereafter termed m-banking) has also 
emerged as a key mechanism through which mobile telephony facilitates 
economic risk sharing (Jack & Suri, 2014). M-banking allows users to conduct 
financial exchanges through mobile phones and provides users in the 
developing world with previously unavailable access to financial services (Mbiti 
& Weil, 2014). The popularity of m-banking services is reflected in the rapid 
rates of uptake. In Kenya, Safaricom reported over 1.1 million users within eight 
months of launching m-banking in March 2007 (Safaricom, 2007 ). By March 
2013, this figure had burgeoned to 15.2 million users and Safaricom reported an 
annual revenue of Ksh10.43 billion5 (CISCO, 2013).  
Access to traditional banking is limited and expensive in Africa, in contrast m-
banking enables users to access and transfer financial resources within social 
networks using a wide network of agents located across the continent (Mbiti & 
Weil, 2014). These m-banking services enable mobile users to conduct 
interpersonal financial transfers with distant contacts rapidly and at low cost, 
enhancing the informal insurance function through which developing world 
populations share economic risks (Mbiti & Weil, 2014). Drawing on data from a 
household survey administered in Kenya over a three-year period, Jack and 
Suri find that households using m-banking services, “are more likely to receive 
any remittances, they receive more remittances, and they receive a larger total 
value… [and] users receive remittances from a wider network of sources and a 
larger fraction of their network” (2014, p. 185). In this way, mobile phone 
networks support vulnerable users to draw on social networks for economic 
support, and may contribute to perceptions of security for users. M-banking is 
also increasingly employed by development and humanitarian initiatives around 
the world to facilitate financial transfers to beneficiaries (Smith, et al., 2012), 
and also enables individual users to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks 
by facilitating access to financial assistance from existing social networks (Jack 
& Suri, 2014; Mbiti & Weil, 2014).  
These studies demonstrate that mobile phone penetration correlates with 
increased economic security, and suggest that increasing market information 
                                            
5 Over £74million 
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flows are likely to improve market efficiencies, while m-banking provides 
opportunities to make direct financial transfers through mobile phones. 
However, the effectiveness of mobile phones is grounded in pre-existing trust-
based relationships between individuals, which enable users to capitalise on the 
communications opportunities they provide. The importance of mobile phones 
for increasing users’ financial security may have overshadowed rigorous 
engagement with the opportunities for crime associated with these economic 
transactions. As increasing numbers of naïve users engage with these 
opportunities, criminal opportunities are likely to abound. Users who are 
unfamiliar with both ICTs and with formal banking services may be particularly 
vulnerable to scams. In contexts where corroborating sources of information are 
not available, mobile communications provide largely unregulated sources of 
information from distant sources. While facilitating financial transactions and 
access to trusted social networks, mobile phones also provide an open 
communication channels for users to interact with an increasing pool of both 
known - and unknown - individuals. These individuals may adopt false identities, 
impersonate trusted individuals, disseminate false or misleading information, or 
perpetrate financial scams and fraudulent practices. While the potential of 
mobile telephony for facilitating the rapid transfer of information and financial 
resources is well documented, the accompanying risks associated with the 
virtual convergence of trusted social networks and anonymous individuals are 
often overlooked in existing studies.  
2.3.2 Mobile phones in emergencies 
The value of mobile telephony for facilitating access to social and economic 
networks is particularly critical during periods of crisis, as these tools enable 
users to respond rapidly to economic shocks and access resources through 
their social networks, sometimes described as informal insurance policies (Aker 
& Mbiti, 2010; Jack & Suri, 2014). Drawing on mobile operator and consumer 
survey data in their analysis of the economic benefits associated with mobile 
telephony in Africa, Aker and Mbiti note, “mobile phones can facilitate 
communication among social networks in response to shocks, thereby reducing 
households’ exposure to risk” (2010, p. 214). By sharing resources and 
information during periods of vulnerability, mobile phones enable users to seek 
and provide immediate support to members of their social networks. Jack and 
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Suri describe similar findings in Kenya, reporting that, “informal networks 
provide an important means by which individuals and households share risk” 
(2014, p. 183) by increasing the size and constitution of interpersonal networks 
and enabling users to access a wider pool of resources. During an earlier study 
conducted in India, Mozambique and Tanzania, Souter et al. (2005) also 
describe survey findings indicating that users consider mobile phones to be 
critical for livelihoods during emergencies, 
…the most substantial value of the telephone in terms of 
livelihoods is in its impact on overall vulnerability, particularly in 
emergencies. The telephone here has exceptional added value 
compared with other communications media, in particular 
because of its immediacy, interactivity and ability to secure 
assistance from afar. (Souter, et al., 2005, p. 17)  
Mobile telephony provides users with a mechanism through which they can 
secure their own wellbeing by drawing on informal personal networks, 
accessing resources, information and emotional support from distant friends 
and relatives. Meier (2011a) argues that ICTs, including mobile phones, enable 
individuals to respond to natural and political disasters through facilitating a 
distributed, bottom-up network to share information and provide support. Meier 
analyses this as an informal early warning system that can enhance disaster 
response through empowering the resilience of communities to manage threats. 
Using everyday technologies such as mobile phones, according to Meier, “can 
empower at-risk communities by enhancing their immediate situational 
awareness, allowing them to make more informed decisions about how best to 
get out of harm’s way” (2011a, 13).  
In the developed world, Dutton and Nainoa’s (2002) analysis of the role of 
mobile telephony during the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA is also relevant for 
this analysis. During these terrorist attacks, mobile phones were used both to 
coordinate attacks by the hijackers and to coordinate responses by passengers 
of the hijacked planes. Dutton and Nainoa describe passengers using mobile 
phones to contact their families for emotional support and to access information 
about contemporaneous attacks elsewhere in the US. This information enabled 
passengers on Flight 93 to overwhelm their captors and prevent one of the 
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planned target attacks (ibid). Dutton and Nainoa (2002) suggest that after the 
events of 9/11, mobile phones became regarded as essential lifelines in the 
USA:  
In reconfiguring access to information and people, wireless 
media supported the formation of flexible and spontaneous 
networks of communication on September 11, while they 
circumvented and undermined more formal hierarchical 
systems of communication. (2002, p. 243) 
Dutton and Nainoa suggest that in this context, mobile phones provided a 
valuable benefit to users, allowing them to communicate and share information 
about the emerging security threat with family and friends and with security 
agencies. Thus similar benefits are associated with mobile telephony during 
emergencies in developed and developing world contexts, although the social, 
cultural and situational conditions in which they are used are likely to be highly 
variable. 
In developing world settings, the informal connectivity provided by mobile 
telephony may be particularly valuable when state service provision is weak. 
Mobile telephony enables users to access informal assistance and support 
when formal assistance is unavailable. Examples of these benefits emerge in 
studies from several country contexts. In India for example, Abraham (2007) 
notes mobile phones are associated with reducing feelings of isolation and 
enhancing the security of users in high-risk occupations, such as fishermen. In 
Ghana, Overa (2006) describes users’ reliance on mobiles phones to call for 
help during frequent vehicle breakdowns and road traffic accidents. Rafael 
describes this relationship is his examination of user perceptions of mobile 
telephony in the Philippines, 
Like many Third World countries recently opened to more 
liberal trade policies, the Philippines shares the paradox of 
being awash with the latest communication technologies, like 
the cell phone, while being mired in deteriorating 
infrastructures: roads, postal services, railroads, power 
generators, and land lines. With the cell phone, one seems able 
to pass beyond these obstacles. And inasmuch as these 
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broken, state-run infrastructures represent government 
ineptitude, passing beyond them gives one the sense of 
overcoming a state long beset by corruption. (Rafael, 2003, pp. 
402-403) 
Rotberg and Aker also argue that access to information is particularly critical in 
weak and failed states, “(t)he weaker the state, the greater the need for ordinary 
citizens to gain access to and control information that directly affects and 
impacts their lives” (2013, p. 114). Quantitative studies provide evidence in 
support of this argument, demonstrating correlations between mobile phone 
penetration and poor provision of formal services. For example, Best (2011) 
asserts that recognition of the valuable benefits associated with mobile 
telephony contributes to their high rates of penetration in crisis-affected 
countries such as Iraq and Liberia where, “people cling to their mobile phones 
as tools for security and safety. They use phones to combat crimes, sexual 
violence, and to help in medical emergencies” (2011, p. 25). Best argues that 
mobile phones are of particular value for populations lacking access to basic 
rights and services and living in contexts characterised by weak infrastructure 
and institutional corruption, supported by their widespread penetration in 
conflict-affected areas. Other quantitative studies of mobile phone use during 
periods of crisis in specific country contexts corroborate this argument. Coyle 
and Thornton (2007) examine mobile phone call rates in Lebanon between July 
and August 2006, during a period of intense conflict between Hezbollah and 
Israeli government. They describe an increase in call volumes of almost 40% in 
the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities, under challenging 
physical conditions in which roads, bridges and buildings were bombed and 
23% of population migrated away from Beirut. In this crisis-affected setting, 
mobile networks were used to communicate evacuation plans, locate food and 
other essential resources and to reunite families (Coyle & Thornton, 2007).  
These functions likely contribute to the association between mobile phone use 
and perceptions of security. Examining user perceptions of this relationship in 
Canada and Sri Lanka, Senarathne Tennakoon and Taras (2012) argue that 
mobile phones contribute to users’ peace of mind, particularly women. In the 
absence of a public emergency service system (available through the 911 
emergency call service in Canada), mobiles are highly valued in Sri Lanka for 
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facilitating personalised emergency response as they enable users to call for 
help from their personal networks. Their findings also indicate that in both 
Canada and Sri Lanka, “the mere presence of the communication device seems 
to bring comfort and peace of mind” (Senarathne Tennakoon & Taras, 2012, p. 
305), regardless of their actual effectiveness.  
As these examples demonstrate, mobile phones are valued for providing 
access to informal networks of support around the world. However, in 
developing world contexts where formal service provision is weak or absent, 
mobile telephony provides particularly valuable security functions for users.  
2.3.3 Mobile phones and disorder 
In developing world settings, studies have focused on the relationship between 
mobile telephony and the organisation and escalation of collective action, both 
violent (Bailard, 2015; Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013; Warren, 2015) and 
non-violent (Benkler, 2006; Diamond, 2010; Rafael, 2003; Rheingold, 2002). 
Just as these tools enable users to organise their social and economic affairs 
and mobilise resources during emergencies, the corollary of these functions is 
the increased opportunities for the organisation of political action and violence.  
Drawing on GIS data on mobile phone coverage and conflict events in Algeria, 
DRC, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Pierskalla and Hollenbach 
(2013) examine the relationship between mobile telephony and violent collective 
action. Their analysis reveals a correlation between mobile telephony and 
outbreaks of violence. They suggest that areas with mobile phone coverage are 
significantly more likely to experience violent events than those without, 
controlling for potential confounds such as population density. Pierskalla and 
Hollenbach (2013) argue that mobile telephony increases the likelihood of 
outbreaks of violence through reducing organisation and communication costs 
associated with them.  
Bailard (2015) further analyses Pierskalla and Hollenbach's (2013) findings 
using data from 2007 to 2009 on 599 ethnic groups across 121 countries, to 
examine whether the availability of mobile phones increases opportunities for 
violent conflict by reducing communication and organisation costs. Bailard tests 
the effect of geographic territory (weighted by population density) covered by 
mobile phone signals on the probability of violent conflict between ethnic groups 
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and governments, producing findings that corroborate Pierskalla and 
Hollenbach’s conclusions and demonstrate a correlation between mobile phone 
coverage and violence. Specifically, she finds that, 
…with each unit increase in the percentage of an ethnic group's 
territory that is covered by a mobile signal (weighted by 
population density), the odds that group will engage in violent 
conflict against its government increases by .02. (Bailard, 2015, 
p. 331).  
According to this study, the likelihood of violent conflict increases where landline 
telephone availability is low, and is also affected by population size, rural 
location and population density, leading Bailard to conclude that “mobile phones 
increase the likelihood of violent collective action by decreasing specific types of 
barriers to organization” (2015, p. 13). This relationship between mobile phones 
and opportunities for crime is central to the present analysis, in which mobile 
phones are understood to transform opportunity structures for crime, and for 
crime prevention, in developing world settings. 
Further evidence for the association between mobile phones and violence is 
provided by studies that suggest that certain violent organisations exert 
pressure on mobile network operators to enhance or restrict mobile coverage in 
particular contexts (Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012; Vodafone, 2011). For example, 
in Iraq insurgents have reportedly threatened to take violent action against 
mobile network operators in response to poor maintenance of mobile networks, 
while in Afghanistan Taliban insurgents threaten operators to decommission 
mobile networks at night in order to prevent informants reporting their activities 
to military forces (Shapiro & Weidmann, 2012). In other contexts, mobile 
network disruption is deployed strategically to decrease groups’ capacity to 
coordinate their actions (Gohdes, 2015; Morozov, 2011; Richtel, 2011; 
Southwood 2011), as addressed in 2.4.3.  
Reflecting on studies of the association between mobile telephony and violence, 
Dafoe and Lyall (2015) identify a widespread weakness in these studies, noting 
the risk of measurement bias associated with data on incidences and rates of 
violence. While Bailard (2015), Warren (2015) and Pierskalla and Hollenbach 
(2013) all find positive associations between mobile coverage and violent 
57 
 
attacks based on media reporting of violence, these findings could plausibly 
demonstrate that mobile coverage increases reporting of violence rather than 
incidences of violence. For the purposes of this study this issue is critical. 
Mobile phones transform both opportunities for the organisation and facilitation 
of crime (and are crime targets), but they also provide opportunities to increase 
crime reporting and contribute to crime prevention.  While these tools may 
facilitate the organisation of violence, they simultaneously enable the 
coordination of responses to it.  
Few studies have engaged with the relationships between mobile phones and 
individual experiences of crime in developing world contexts. An exception is 
the ethnographic study conducted by Hahn (2012), which sheds light on these 
relationships, examining the perceived ambiguities associated with mobile 
telephony in the developing world context of Burkina Faso. Hahn examines 
perceptions of security associated with the convergence of mobile 
communications and road networks within the country, arguing that the 
intersection of physical and virtual connectivity through these two essential 
network infrastructures is, “perceived as threatening and subversive" (Hahn, 
2012, p. 188). Providing specific examples of the interconnection between these 
networks, Hahn describes how mobile telephony is widely associated with the 
coordination and perpetration of highway robberies. Hahn’s findings suggest 
that public perceptions of this association are widespread, 
There is no precise information about mobiles found in the 
possession of highway robbers who have been caught. Public 
opinion, however, holds firm to the idea that mobile phones are 
the key to the recent increase in this crime. (Hahn, 2012, p. 
186) 
Hahn describes how perpetrators are believed to identify their victims and 
coordinate plans in real time using mobile communications, then commit crimes 
in ‘blind spots’ where mobile network coverage is weak. Exploiting mobile 
connectivity enables criminals to organise their physical convergence with 
victims, prevent victims from calling for help, and escape undetected. This 
analysis of the relationship between mobile telephony and highway robbery in 
Burkina Faso provides an interesting example of the ambiguities with which 
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mobile telephony is viewed in environments perceived to be insecure, and of 
the ways digital and physical conditions interact to create new opportunities for 
crime. 
2.4 Mobile telephony, security and crime prevention 
Crime contributes to income inequality, undermines democracy, and slows the 
pace of development across Africa and other developing world contexts (World 
Bank, 2011). Violent crime rates are particularly high across the African 
continent, and the homicide rate is double the global average (Livingstone, 
2013). Mechanisms which enhance crime reporting and prevention are 
therefore likely to be particularly valuable in these settings, and may have broad 
impacts on processes of development. Despite this, there has been limited 
academic engagement with everyday experiences of crime in Africa (Arthur, 
1991; Livingstone, 2013; Marenin, 1997). As Livingstone notes, "with so much 
attention given to violent rebellions and extremist groups, crime in Africa is often 
overlooked, both by governments on the continent and others" (2013, p5).  
Mobile telephony has been widely associated with reductions in crime in many 
contexts, including African settings (Klick, et al, 2012; Shapiro and Siegel, 2015; 
Shapiro and Weidmann, 2012). Specifically, mobile telephony provides 
increased opportunities for crime detection, reporting and prevention. In part, 
these benefits derive from the opportunities associated with mobile phones for 
users to directly coordinate responses to, and report on, emerging threats and 
anti-social activities in real time. Formal agencies that may contribute to crime 
prevention using mobile phones include the agencies of the state such as police 
and security forces, NGOs and church organisations, and also external military 
groups such as the US government forces. Informal responses to crime and 
security threats may be mobilised through the enhanced connectivity with social 
networks facilitated by these tools.  
2.4.1 Mobile phones enable crime reporting 
The growth of mobile telephony in the developed world is widely associated with 
falling crime rates for many types of crime, particularly violence against 
individuals. For example the reductions in violent crimes such as rape and 
assault during the 1990s in the USA have been associated with the increased 
surveillance and reporting opportunities (Klick, et al., 2012). In African settings, 
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these applications are understudied, yet are likely to be of critical importance. 
Sidebottom (2013) has hypothesised that increased access to phones is likely 
to lead to increases in the proportion of victims reporting crime to the police in 
Malawi. Media reports also suggest that the increasing availability of mobile 
communications is widely expected to increase the ability of security forces to 
combat crime across Africa (Livingstone, 2013; Quarshie, 2014).  
While some studies find evidence for an association between mobile telephony 
and violence (e.g. Bailard, 2015; Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013), others 
suggest that mobile phone coverage correlates with reductions in levels of 
violence in non-Western settings. Shapiro and Weidmann (2012) draw on 
mobile phone coverage data provided by network operator Zain6 and event data 
on incidents of violence7 to argue that mobile phone coverage correlates with a 
decrease in insurgent attacks in Iraq. They argue that the benefits of mobile 
telephony for surveillance by Western and Iraqi forces and for local populations 
reporting on insurgent activities outweigh the uses of these technologies by 
insurgents for the coordination of group activities and attacks. Shapiro and 
Weidmann argue that the information-enhancing effects of improved network 
coverage are more effective at limiting violence than they are at enhancing 
insurgents’ ability to organise.  
Acknowledging this dual potential for mobile telephony to increase or reduce 
levels of violent conflict, Shapiro and Siegel (2015) develop game theoretic 
models of anti-government collective action to test two competing effects of 
mobile phones: They enable anti-government actors to coordinate collective 
action and increase violence, and conversely they enable pro-government 
civilians to collaborate with security forces to suppress rebels and decrease 
violence. Shapiro and Siegel test these models under a range of conditions and 
find that, 
When information channels to government are strong relative to 
gains to rebels’ collective action, we expect to see the 
                                            
6 One of the five mobile operators in the country, Zain Iraq operates the majority of towers in 
central and southern Iraq. Data from 2,416 mobile phone towers are included in the analysis  
7 ‘Incidents of violence’ were defined as attacks against Coalition and Iraqi government forces 
based on 193,264 ‘significant activity’ (SIGACT) reports by Coalition forces, without reference to 
the scale of the attack, damage or casualties 
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introduction of cell phones reduce violence even if not much 
more information is shared. (Shapiro & Siegel, 2015, p. 331) 
They argue that the availability of low-risk (i.e. undetectable by rebels) 
communication channels between civilians and government forces is critical, as 
under these conditions the intelligence-gathering potential of mobile telephony 
outweighs its benefits for insurgent groups. Critically however, Shapiro and 
Siegel argue that the threat of this information sharing can function to reduce 
violence even when information is not shared, suggesting that in certain 
contexts, the presence of mobile telephony functions as a deterrent to violence.  
This suggests that where mobile phones are available, and mobile 
communications are perceived to risk-free, populations report insurgent 
activities and actively contribute to the suppression of rebel actions, reducing 
crime and insecurity. Reporting of crime is therefore contingent on 
considerations of the associated risks, whether they are perceived to originate 
from the perpetrators of crime of from the state.  These calculations are 
informed by similar considerations which are likely to inform offenders’ 
decisions to use mobile phones for the commission of crime. According to these 
analyses, where the risk of detection is low, criminals (rebels, in this case) act 
with impunity. However, where users fear negative implications of reporting 
crime or rebel action (or by extension, crime), this is likely to reduce reporting 
rates and compromise the benefits of mobile phones for reporting crime.  
2.4.2 Responsibility for security and crime prevention  
A key consideration when examining mobile phones for crime prevention 
concerns the response component of the crime prevention mechanisms. Mobile 
phones are likely to facilitate crime reporting, but a robust response mechanism 
is a necessary pre-condition for crime reporting to translate into crime 
prevention. In the absence of formal emergency response mechanisms such as 
999 calls in the UK, users in the developing world are being provided with 
mobile-enabled information dissemination and helplines which connect with 
humanitarian and development agencies rather than the response mechanisms 
of the state, with implications for their security. While these organisations may 
have adequate capacity to establish and monitor these helplines, the alignment 
of emergency helplines with response mechanisms is more problematic. 
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Furthermore, Crowe (2013) expresses concern regarding the collection of 
personal data by humanitarian actors. She states, “despite being a widely 
popular development tool, the human rights implications of using mobile phones 
in development initiatives are not well understood” (2013, p. 4). Crowe identified 
risks associated with privacy and the protection of personal data, using the 
example of m-health initiatives collecting and disseminating sensitive personal 
data through unsecured SMS channels. These risks can also be applied to the 
use of mobile phones for reporting and responding to crime and insecurity if 
users’ personal data is insecure. 
It is valuable to examine uses of mobile phones during disasters, as these 
applications have been the subject of considerable research in developing world 
settings. In 2005, the World Disasters Report acknowledged that, “people need 
information as much as water, food, medicine or shelter. Information can save 
lives, livelihoods and resources. Information bestows power” (IFRC, 2005). 
There are several mechanisms through which ICTD initiatives seek to leverage 
mobile telephony to enhance communication with populations affected by crises 
and complex security threats. Perhaps the simplest approach uses mobile 
phones to facilitate broadcast-style information dissemination. This approach is 
similar to a radio broadcast, using SMS as a one-to-many model of information 
dissemination to transmit packets of information directly to each individual 
mobile user. This approach was widely used after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In 
a report detailing best practice, Wall and Chery (2012) describe this as a 
response to the huge demand for information from affected communities. This 
formal mechanism was subsequently associated with several negative 
consequences, including potential security threats. Wall and Chery describe 
public perceptions of these broadcast-style SMS in Haiti, 
The information from NGOs… quickly – and unintentionally – 
became perceived as ‘spamming’ by subscribers. There was 
little consistency in content and technical glitches led to an 
overloaded system, delivery of the same SMS multiple times 
and long delays in message transmission. (2012, p. 16) 
These broadcast-style messages are also criticised for raising false 
expectations of assistance among recipients and overloading mobile networks 
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affected by infrastructure damage (Munro, 2012; Wall & Chery, 2012). In recent 
years, the broadcast-style information dissemination approach initially popular 
in ICTD initiatives has been replaced with a two-way information exchange 
model, potentially increasing the agency of crisis-affected populations (Coyle & 
Meier, 2009; Wall, 2012). The implications for users’ security are likely vary 
according to the model adopted; disseminating information introduces issues of 
recipient interpretation in addition to the credibility of the source and accuracy of 
content. However, where a two-way response component is introduced, users 
themselves are relied upon to provide accurate information to guide the 
allocation of resources and responses to identified threats, whether these are 
natural disasters or conflict situations. A 2012 briefing published by BBC Media 
Action8 also describes the growing demand for interactive, two-way 
communications using mobile telephony during crisis response. In this briefing, 
Wall raises the question, “Are humanitarian agencies prepared to respond to, 
help and engage with those who are communicating with them and who 
demand better information?" (2012, p. 2). This is a key question if humanitarian 
or development organisations are involved in providing services associated with 
crisis response, or potentially crime prevention, in developing world settings. 
Responsibility for addressing crime threats associated with mobile phones in 
developing world settings is likely to be complicated by considerations of 
responsibility and capacity. Examining public safety problems in Western 
settings Scott and Goldstein note, "…every problem stems from a variety of 
sources, each of which can plausibly be said to bear some responsibility for its 
remediation. Much depends on who possesses the skills, knowledge, authority, 
and resources to implement changes that will effectively reduce or control the 
problem" (2005, p. 3). They further caution that, “The challenge... (with using 
mobiles phones to enhance police surveillance) is that greater police 
accountability is needed to prevent these tools from becoming the source of 
more efficient extortion or brutality by the police" (Scott & Goldstein, 2005, p. 
40). Formal uses of mobile telephony for crime prevention are likely to be 
informed by user perceptions of the state and its organs. This is particularly 
relevant in contexts where the state has previously been implicated in the 
coordination of violence against populations, and the Kenya case study 
                                            
8 Originally called the BBC World Service Trust, renamed BBC Media Action in December 2011 
63 
 
provides a means to investigate this in depth. Supporting literature and analysis 
are presented in Chapter Five. 
Examining responsibility for leveraging mobile phones for crime prevention and 
for enhancing public security in developing world settings reveals that many 
stakeholders are currently engaged in this sector. While crime prevention is 
theoretically the business of government and state, in African settings crime 
prevention and security-enhancing services using mobile phones encompass a 
wide range of organisations, as demonstrated in the case studies. Crime 
prevention services are provided by a range of organisations and agencies, 
including organs of the state such as police forces, but also NGOs, 
humanitarian organisation, government agencies, mobile network operators 
(MNOs) and religious organisations. The roles and responsibilities of these 
organisations are diverse, and their capacities for responding to incidents of 
crime and insecurity are also variable. Where formal reporting and response 
mechanisms, such as the 999 emergency service hotline in the UK, are absent, 
it is essential to question who is responsible for responding to identified threats. 
This is particularly critical if mobile telephony increases opportunities for crime 
in physical places as well as within digital networks.   
2.4.3 Mobile phones, security and surveillance 
The previous sections have examined the use of mobile phones for crime 
reporting and prevention. Despite these potential benefits, apprehensions 
remain over the privacy and surveillance implications of mobile phone use in 
settings where privacy laws are weak. The literature on the extent and 
effectiveness of monitoring in Kenya and Uganda is largely speculative 
(Freedom House, 2013), although media reporting promotes the view that 
monitoring is widespread across mobile networks (BBC News, 2013; Mukinda, 
2013; Mulupi, 2012). Human Rights Watch (2014) describes a similar situation 
in Ethiopia, noting that perceptions of monitoring are more pervasive than the 
current monitoring capabilities.  
The mandatory registration of SIM cards has been widely introduced across 
Africa as a measure to reduce the misuse of mobile phones, in response to the 
increasing involvement of mobile phones in crime on the continent (Donovan & 
Martin, 2014; Jentzsch, 2012). In 2006, no African countries had implemented a 
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requirement to register mobile SIM. By 2012, SIM registration was either 
implemented or planned in over 30 African countries, including both Kenya and 
Uganda (Jentzsch, 2012). By 2014 this number increased to encompass 49 of 
the 55 countries in Africa (Donovan & Martin, 2014). Donovan and Martin 
(2014) raise concerns around the lack of public debate and awareness of the 
potential implications of SIM registration for surveillance and privacy 
infringements, describing it as a, "key modality of Africa's emerging mobile-
centric surveillance society" (2014, p. 1). Jentzsch (2012) draws on analysis of 
a dataset of 32 sub-Saharan countries between 2000 and 2010 to argue that 
SIM registration depresses mobile phone penetration growth. Jentzsch’s 
examination of the relationship between registration and mobile phone 
penetration growth comprises only a preliminary study, controlling for a range of 
variables (e.g. GDP growth, market governance), but critically neglecting 
indicators pertaining to the crime and security context in which SIM regulation is 
implemented. Nevertheless, the foundational assumption underlying SIM 
registration is that it increases the accessibility of identifiable customer data for 
law enforcement agencies seeking to detect crime and fraud (Gow & Parisi, 
2008; Jentzsch, 2012).  
Critics of SIM registration often focus on the ease with which is can be 
bypassed and the capacity of the state to use the data collected. For example, 
Gow and Parisi (2008) argue that mandatory SIM registration is likely to be an 
ineffective crime deterrence mechanism, and furthermore is not enforceable 
due to the use of false documentation and a lack of standardisation in its 
implementation. Jentzsch (2012) makes a similar argument after the 
widespread implementation of SIM registration, describing how weak identity 
verification procedures and widespread use of false or invalid identity 
documentation are likely to reduce the effectiveness of this measure. She 
further notes that, “at this stage, there is no convincing empirical evidence that 
mandatory registration in fact systematically lowers crime rates” (Jentzsch, 
2012, p. 609). However, mandatory SIM regulation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the developing world, and studies have yet to systematically 
address the effectiveness of this measure for the reduction of crime.  
An emerging corollary of the increased connectivity to public and private 
agencies, particularly law enforcement and security forces, previously examined 
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in relation to users’ opportunities for reporting anti-social activities, is the 
increasing vulnerability of mobile users to formal surveillance (Diamond, 2010; 
Morozov, 2011; Southwood, 2011). Even in Diamond’s euphoric analysis of 
mobile phones as a ‘liberation technology’ capable of transforming the 
relationship between citizen and state, he cautions that, "In the end, technology 
is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes" (2010, p. 71). 
Ultimately, these technologies may render users vulnerable to surveillance and 
repression while simultaneously providing opportunities for collective action. 
Morozov (2011) extends this argument, citing examples of state repression in 
the Arab world, arguing that assumptions regarding the inevitably liberating 
potential of ICTs are dangerous and must be situated in specific contexts, 
…despite the reductionist models that have made many in the 
West believe that information can destroy authoritarianism, 
information also plays an instrumental role in establishing 
propaganda, censorship and surveillance; the three main pillars 
of Orwell-style authoritarian control (Morozov, 2011, p. 82)  
Such authoritarian control has also been employed in Africa. Southwood 
describes how the Ethiopian government banned the use of SMS after the 
contested elections of 2005, despite their peaceful (albeit political) use,  
In Ethiopia, the opposition party Kinijit was particularly effective 
at using text messaging to mobilise its supporters and get them 
to the polling booths. When the election result was announced 
the government took fright, contested what had happened and 
then moved quickly to shut down SMS service to ensure that 
the opposition party could not use it again to oppose them. 
(Southwood, 2011, p. 8) 
This ban remained in force for two years, facilitated by the state ownership of 
the mobile network operator. Based on interview data and secondary sources, a 
recent Human Rights Watch report notes that, as a result of the legacy of 
surveillance, 
…ordinary Ethiopians commonly view mobile phones and other 
new communications technologies as just another tool to 
monitor them. As a result, self -censorship in phone and email 
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communication is rampant as people extend their long-held 
fears of government interference in their private lives to their 
mobile phone use. These perceptions of phone surveillance are 
far more intrusive than the reality, at least at present. (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014, p. 3) 
The report calls for action from the government of Ethiopia and from 
international technology and telecommunications companies, suggesting that 
companies should, "inquire about the end use and end users of the products 
and services being provided, especially for 'dual use' products including 'lawful 
intercept' surveillance software and equipment" (Human Rights Watch, 2014, p. 
6). The authors draw attention here to the question of responsibility and 
legitimate use, calling on the private sector to act in accordance with ethical 
judgements about the actions of foreign states. The question of responsibility 
and governance emerges again, and is particularly relevant in light of 
widespread government practices of monitoring and/or suspending mobile 
phone networks in Africa. For example in Mozambique, where mobile service 
providers are also state-owned and regulated, SMS were suspended during 
food price riots in 2010 in an effort to control dissent (Southwood, 2011). In 
other contexts, such as during anti-government protests in Egypt in 2011, 
governments have instructed network operators to suspend services (Richtel, 
2011) prompting network operator Vodafone to release a statement in defence 
of its actions noting that, “the sanctions for non-compliance with such an 
instruction are imprisonment and/or suspension of Vodafone's operating 
license” (Vodafone, 2011)9 in order to defend their actions against allegations of 
complicity with the repressive Egyptian regime. Mobile phones provide hitherto 
unimaginable mechanisms for surveillance in the developing world. These 
devices may interfere with freedom of expression and undermine the privacy of 
individual users, particularly in contexts where data protection laws are weak 
(Crowe, 2013; Hosein & Nyst, 2013; Hussain, 2013; Munro, 2012; Nyst, 2013).  
                                            
9 Vodafone (2014) recently released a report detailing state surveillance in twenty-nine countries 
in which it operates; describing how governments are able to monitor and track mobile users 
through direct-access wires tapped into the network in several countries. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter grounds the scope and scale of mobile phone penetration in 
developing world settings, investigates patterns of ownership and use, and 
explores the extension of traditional social networks into virtual, networked 
environments. Examining the relationship between mobile phones and the 
security of developing world populations reveals the particular value of these 
tools during emergency and crisis situations, and examples are provided to 
substantiate this argument. The anti-social applications of mobile phones are 
also addressed in this chapter, such as uses for the escalation and organisation 
of violence and other types of crime. This chapter has also addressed the 
relationship between mobile phones and crime reporting and prevention in 
developing world contexts, arguing that informal information sharing behaviours 
facilitated by mobile phones can reduce the vulnerability of populations to crime 
and insecurity. Formal applications of mobile telephony to enhance security and 
reduce crime are also investigated, including use by humanitarian and 
development organisations in crisis-affected settings. Finally, this chapter has 
addressed the implications of the increasing penetration of mobile phones for 
surveillance and user privacy, particularly in contexts where access to rights 
and data protection measures are limited.  
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Chapter Three: Frameworks of Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
Recognising the rapid and widespread expansion of mobile telephony in the 
developing world, the previous chapter examined the ways in which the 
increasing prevalence of mobile telecommunications creates new opportunities 
for both crime and crime prevention. In this chapter, the theoretical frameworks 
and analytical tools informing this study are systematically presented. Analyses 
of the increasing opportunities for mobile-enabled crime, and its prevention, are 
rooted in the crime opportunity theories guiding situational crime prevention 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986), particularly routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 
1979). These frameworks subsequently inform the analysis of the case study 
findings in Chapter Seven, examining the ways in which mobile phones inhibit 
and facilitate crime, analysing and classifying specific crime and security threats 
affecting developing world users, exploring the social, cultural and situational 
conditions which facilitate opportunities for mobile-related crime in these 
settings, and identifying opportunities for crime prevention. 
It is first necessary to introduce the history and origins of opportunity theories of 
crime, and to explain how they depart from traditional offender-oriented 
approaches to crime and crime prevention. This includes an overview and 
explanation of the application of situational and opportunity theories to the 
analysis of crime and crime prevention within the mobile network environment.  
Mobile phones are associated with crime and security in a range of ways. 
Specifically, it is proposed that mobile phones; 
1. Increase opportunities for crime, both as crime targets and crime 
facilitators; and, 
2. Inhibit crime by increasing opportunities for reporting, detecting and 
preventing crime 
Examining first the increased opportunities for crime, two main categories of 
crime opportunity are addressed. Firstly, mobile phone handsets provide a 
popular target for traditional acquisitive crimes (Farrell, 2015; Farrell et al., 
2010; Hall, 2009; Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007; Mailley et al., 
2008). Secondly, like other socio-technical innovations, mobile phones are 
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associated with transforming crime opportunities and facilitating the commission 
of both traditional crimes and new networked crimes (Ekblom & Tilley, 2000; 
Farrell, 2015; Laycock, 2004; Newman & Clarke, 2003). Crime prevention 
associated with mobile phones is investigated through the application of 
situational crime prevention techniques (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), and anti-theft 
measures using the characteristics of IN SAFE HANDS (Whitehead et al., 
2008). 
3.2 Opportunity theories of crime and mobile telephony 
This thesis draws heavily on opportunity theories of crime and crime prevention, 
examining the criminogenic, and crime-inhibiting, implications of the increasing 
penetration of mobile phones in developing world settings. Introducing 
opportunity crime perspectives, this section also sets out the related rational 
choice perspective, routine activity theory (RAT) and situational crime 
prevention (SCP). These are examined here in relation to mobile phone-related 
crime, setting the scene for the subsequent analysis of the study findings 
presented in Chapter Seven. The related design against crime approach 
(Ekblom, 1997) is not addressed here as this thesis does not identify design 
characteristics associated with mobile phones directly; for this the reader is 
advised to refer to Mailley (2011). Opportunity and situational theories of crime 
provide a relevant and solution-oriented framework for the subsequent analysis 
of the study findings. However, these are by no means the only theories of 
crime that could be applied to this analysis. For that reason, this section lays out 
the reasons for the selection of opportunity theories of crime, and describes the 
core concepts that inform the theory building developed subsequently. 
3.2.1 The general theory of crime 
Traditional, offender-oriented approaches to criminology and crime prevention 
examine criminality rather than criminal behaviour, focusing on the traits and 
tendencies that are assumed to predispose particular individuals towards 
criminality. These criminological approaches draw heavily on sociological, 
psychological and biological theories, and regard criminal tendencies as the 
challenge to be solved in order to achieve a reduction in levels of crime. The 
general theory of crime, otherwise known as self-control theory (Gottfredson 
and Hirshi, 1990) posits that poor parenting leads to weak self-control, 
contributing to criminal and anti-social conduct. Such theories have been 
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developed to better understand what motivates offenders to behave in a 
criminal manner. This is a valuable approach and one that has been fruitfully 
applied to a wide range of crime problems. However, for the purposes of this 
study, the general theory of crime has limited relevance. Understanding and 
addressing offender motivations cannot explain the emergence of new threats 
associated with processes of socio-technical change, nor contribute to our 
understanding of social, cultural and situational conditions contributing to crime 
opportunities. Furthermore, the general theory of crime is not concerned with 
the identification of methods of prevention that may be applied to minimise 
vulnerability to particulate crime threats, which is a key aim of this thesis. 
3.2.2 Opportunity theories of crime 
Opportunity theories of crime, in contrast with traditional offender-oriented 
approaches, do not attempt to understand the underlying dispositions of 
offenders. Rather, they focus on the immediate situation in which crime occurs, 
and are prevention-oriented. For example, opportunity crime approaches seek 
to identify key situational conditions that increase the likelihood of a crime 
occurring in a particular place at a particular time, with the purpose of 
transforming these conditions to reduce crime. Specifically, the focus of 
opportunity and situational theories is on, 
…the immediate situations in which criminal dispositions, from 
wherever they may derive, translate into criminal actions; 
(asking) what social and environmental conditions are 
conductive to the commission of crime and what makes people 
liable to commit crime in these conditions? (Tilley and 
Sidebottom 2015, p332) 
The argument that opportunities for crime may foster criminality, therefore, 
represents a radical departure from traditional dispositional approaches. It was 
first systematically proposed by Mayhew et al. (1976) in Crime as Opportunity. 
Mayhew et al. proposed that crime and deviance may be a response to 
particular situational conditions, citing Hartshorne and May’s (1928) study in 
which children are given the opportunity to lie, cheat and steal, the findings of 
which suggest that honesty is an inconsistent trait. In this study it was 
demonstrated that under certain conditions, the majority of children would 
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behave in an anti-social manner if they believed that their actions were 
anonymous and no consequences would result. Extending this to its logical 
conclusion, Mayhew et al. (1976) recognised that particular stimulus conditions, 
or crime opportunities, provide the inducements for criminality. They therefore 
proposed that crime prevention could benefit from an increasing focus on the 
immediate environment in which crime occurs. This shifted the focus from 
internal predispositions and socio-cultural factors to the situational conditions in 
which crime occurs. This focus has the benefit of enabling researchers to 
investigate the effectiveness of specific measures aimed at reducing or 
preventing crime, viewing the commission of crime as a response to particular 
stimulus conditions, or opportunity structures. Opportunity crime theory 
therefore provides a suitable framework for studying opportunities for both the 
commission, and prevention of crime associated with the penetration of mobile 
telephony in developing world settings.   
3.2.3 Rational choice 
The rational choice perspective has been central to the shift in focus from the 
criminal to the crime event that characterises opportunity theories (Clarke & 
Cornish, 1983). Crime opportunity theories are premised on the assumption that 
individuals make rational decisions in their selection of target; deciding whether 
to commit crimes, and when and how to engage in them. Thus there is no clear 
distinction between offenders and non-offenders, rather crime opportunities 
create conditions in which individuals decide to commit particular types of crime.  
The rational choice approach views offenders as reasoning agents drawing on 
information from the potential crime scene in order to make cost-benefit 
assessments about crime. This information is inherently bounded and imperfect, 
but nevertheless informs their perceptions of the real and perceived effort, risk 
and reward associated with the commission particular crimes in particular 
contexts, which structures their decision-making process (Cornish & Clarke, 
1986). Although offenders are not assumed to make perfect calculations, nor to 
have access to full information about any given situation, they can generally be 
expected to act rationally. This includes being open to dissuasion if perceived 
risks become too high, and reacting to temptation to commit a crime where 
perceived effort is low and expected reward high. This approach is at the heart 
of opportunity crime approaches, and forms a foundational theory guiding the 
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development of techniques of SCP. It also provides a pragmatic lens through 
which to interpret the study findings, accepting that both crime-facilitating and 
crime-inhibiting features of mobile phones are operationalized according to the 
rational calculations of reasoning individuals. 
Examining the perceived effort associated with mobile phone crime, the 
commission of these crimes is currently characterised by relatively low effort in 
relation to the anticipated risks and rewards. Crime can be committed through 
mobile phone networks with low start-up and administration costs. Motivated 
offenders with access to mobile phone networks need only to select a victim 
and compose a convincing narrative, enabling them to transmit violent or 
fraudulent content with ease. The effort entailed is minimal compared to 
planning and committing a crime in a physical environment. Similar to other 
networked digital technologies, mobile phones act as a force multiplier (Yar, 
2013), enabling individuals with minimal resource to create crime impacts on 
numerous victims. No physical hardship is entailed in the commission of crime 
within mobile networks, and even the effort associated with concealing crimes is 
nominal: compromised handsets or identities may be discarded after use.  
Mobile telephone networks provide a relatively low-risk environment for the 
commission of crime for several reasons. Offenders are physically disconnected 
from their victims and may conceal or assume false identities reducing the risk 
of detection. Handsets may be easily destroyed or disposed of to conceal 
evidence of wrongdoing. Mobile phone related crimes are also characterised by 
relatively high rewards. Mobile handsets may be characterised as ‘hot’ products’ 
which fulfil the CRAVED criteria for popular crime targets, addressed 
subsequently in 3.2.8. 
3.2.4 Routine activity theory 
Developing the argument that increasing opportunities for crime increase crime, 
routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) proposes a deceptively simple 
account of the crime event. RAT posits that three essential components are 
needed for direct contact, predatory crime to occur. These comprise the 
convergence in space and time of a likely or motivated offender and a suitable 
target in the absence of a capable guardian. Moreover, these three elements - 
offender, target, and the absence of a guardian - can be brought together as a 
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side effect of the rhythm of everyday life. RAT provides a theoretical framework 
for analysing spatio-temporally situated crime events. While this formula is 
simple, it provides an elegant explanation for the way that changes in any of 
these three elements can change the frequency and patterns of predatory 
crime. 
RAT was developed to explain the increasing crime rates in the US in the 
aftermath of World War II by Cohen and Felson (1979), who attributed the post-
war rise in crime to the accompanying societal changes that increased 
opportunities for crime. Cohen and Felson (1979) suggested that that the 
economic prosperity and consumerism which characterised the post-war period, 
combined with the increasing engagement of women in the workforce, created 
conditions in which valuable possessions were left in unattended homes. This 
transformed the dynamics of the offender, target and guardian by increasing 
crime targets and reducing guardianship, increasing opportunities for crime. 
These environmental conditions were conducive to increasing burglary, as 
offenders reacted to new opportunity structures. Although the underlying logic of 
RAT is simple, it nevertheless has important implications for understanding the 
distribution of crime and developing preventative strategies which focus on the 
target, offender or guardianship of the space, particularly during periods of 
socio-economic transformation when changing patterns of daily life herald new 
opportunities for crime.  
Since the original conceptualisation of RAT, Felson and Clarke (1998) and 
Felson (1992) have demonstrated that even crimes of emotion, and crimes 
which appear irrational or senseless, can be fruitfully examined in terms of 
routine activity theory if the details of the events leading up to the crime offence 
are known, and if crimes are viewed from the perspective of the offender. For 
example, gangs are more likely to attack other gangs with fewer members than 
their own, taller people are more likely to attack shorter people, and aggressive 
responses to insults become more likely as the proportion of observers 
increases (Felson & Clarke, 1998). Thus even seemingly random outbreaks of 
violence broadly adhere to rational assessments that can be interpreted the 
effort, risk, reward framework.  
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RAT is therefore a useful framework through which the traditional acquisitive 
crime of mobile handset theft can be conceptualised. Applying this approach, 
the rapid and widespread penetration of mobile phones in developing world 
settings (described in the previous chapter) creates an increase in crime targets 
in physical and digital spaces, and is therefore likely to increase opportunities 
for acquisitive crimes. It may be further postulated that in resource-poor settings 
characterised by low availability of other suitable crime targets, the widespread 
growth in availability of mobile phones is particularly likely to cause an increase 
in crime, addressed in Section 3.2.8.  
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, mobile telephony is widely 
acknowledged to have catalysed shifts in users’ routine activities and 
transformed access to information and resources in developing world settings. 
Furthermore, examining individual users as crime targets, the increasing 
connectivity facilitated by mobile telephony increases opportunities for social 
interaction and provides potential offenders with access to users in contexts of 
limited guardianship. These interactions may occur in digital or physical spaces, 
as mobile phones provide a mechanism through which physical encounters can 
be coordinated. RAT may therefore be adapted to analyse the increasing 
access to virtual connectivity and networking enabled for mobile phone users, 
who may be variably conceptualised as suitable targets and as likely or 
motivated offenders. In this regard, RAT also provides a framework for 
examining the protection of mobile phone users by capable guardians, an 
argument developed further subsequently. 
Although Cohen and Felson (1979) originally focused on the role of guardians in 
protecting targets, Felson (1986) added the category of handlers who are in a 
position to influence the behaviour of the potential offender. Handlers, who may 
be parents, friends, teachers or colleagues, represent individuals whose social 
bond with the offender may be able to influence their behaviour and can divert 
criminals from committing crime. Guardians may include police officers and 
security staff, but also individuals may provide informal guardianship for each 
other. Thus a handler may be able to prevent crime events from occurring even 
in situations where a potential offender comes into contact with an insufficiently 
guarded suitable target (Felson, 1986). Place managers comprise guardians 
who function to protect places against crime. SCP techniques are generally 
75 
 
applied by place managers (Eck and Eck, 2012). Recognising that the spatial 
distribution of crime demonstrates consistent patterns, it is predictable that 
crime is concentrated at particular high-crime locations. These have been 
variously termed crime generators, crime attractors (Brantingham & 
Brantingham; 1981; 1984; 2008), and crime hotspots (Eck et al., 2005). Studies 
have also shown that crime concentrations generally remain stable in particular 
locations, and furthermore that reducing crime in these locations can effectively 
reduce crime overall (Weisburd et al. 2004). Recognising that, traditional 
opportunity and situational crime studies examine crime concentrations in 
physical places such as streets, high schools and subway stations. This is likely 
to be relevant for handset theft that occurs in physical settings, where place 
managers or handlers may effectively function to reduce crime opportunities. 
However, these spatially oriented approaches may be of less relevance for the 
analysis and prevention of networked crimes, unless the location of offenders is 
known.  
RAT is often presented as a crime triangle, which provides a useful conceptual 
tool to organise the necessary elements of the crime and the factors that may 
inhibit or protect each of these elements (see figure 3). There are two layers to 
the triangle. The inner triangle comprises the necessary conditions for a crime 
to occur; one face of the triangle represents the likely offender, another the 
suitable target or victim, and the third the place bereft of a capable guardian. 
The outer triangle includes components whose presence might inhibit or 
prevent crime from occurring; a guardian to protect the target, a handler to 
restrain or inhibit the offender, and a place manager to provide security in 
physical settings that may otherwise facilitate crime.  
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Figure 3: Problem analysis triangle, Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing (2017) 
Chapter Two presented evidence from studies demonstrating that mobile 
phones provide opportunities for socialisation which may not be regulated by 
traditional behavioural norms and enforcement mechanisms. For example, in 
this private, digital environment, young women in Mozambique may coordinate 
sexual relationships to access economic resources (Archambault, 2013). In 
India mobile phones facilitate access to alternative sources of information 
beyond traditional authorities and enable users to bypass social hierarchies 
(Jeffrey and Doron, 2013), and in Kenya they contribute to physical isolation as 
users retreat to virtual environments unstrained by traditional behavioural codes 
(McIntosh, 2010). In these analyses, mobile telephony provides new 
opportunities for socialisation beyond traditional boundaries (Archambault, 
2013; Castells, et al., 2007; Jeffrey and Doron, 2013; Ling, 2004; Porter, 2012; 
Tenhunen, 2008). These new, digitally-enabled routine activities are also likely 
to create new opportunities for crime. Where mobile phones provide a private 
communication channel in traditional societies, the absence of guardians and 
handlers who regulate or control the behaviour of users may facilitate, and even 
catalyse crime events as crime targets are unprotected and motivated offenders 
unrestrained. In these digital settings, furthermore, the inter-personal nature of 
communications may provide conditions in which the digital environment, or 
virtual place, is not directly protected by a place manager. As Eck explains, “a 
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crime is highly likely when an offender and a target come together at the same 
place at the same time, and there is no one nearby to control the offender, 
protect the target, or regulate conduct at the place” (2003, p88). Mobile phone 
networks enable the convergence of offenders and targets in an invisible, 
largely unregulated terrain; lacking informal and formal surveillance 
mechanisms.  
Within mobile network terrains, routine activities theory provides a useful 
conceptual framework for analysing the transformations in the patterns and 
dynamics of user interactions heralded by the increase in mobile connectivity. 
Thus, while the increase in handsets may catalyse crime by increasing the 
availability of crime targets, while the associated connectivity heralds a rapid 
and fundamental shift in users’ routine activities, in both physical and digital 
environments. In this analysis, mobile phones provide new criminogenic digital 
environments that interact with social, cultural and situational conditions to 
create new opportunities for crime.  
3.2.5 Crime facilitators  
Returning to the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter, existing studies on 
the relationship between mobile telephony and insecurity, particularly outbreaks 
of violence and civil unrest, may also be analysed with reference to changing 
opportunity structures for the commission of crime. For example, Pierskalla and 
Hollenbach (2013) and Bailard (2015) argue that the penetration of mobile 
phones increases the prevalence of outbreaks of violence. From an opportunity 
perspective, these studies demonstrate that the increasing penetration of 
mobile telephony provides new opportunities for crime, enhancing the ease of 
communication and coordination and financial transfers (Hahn, 2012; Shapiro & 
Weidmann, 2012; Vodafone, 2011). Mobile phones even provide a mechanism 
for the anonymous payment of kidnapping ransoms, and have been associated 
with increased opportunities for organised crime and terrorism (Shaw and 
Reitano, 2013). Examining the association between mobile phones and social 
disorder, an emerging body of research identifies correlations between mobile 
telephony and outbreaks of violence and crime in the developing world (Bailard, 
2015; Best, 2011; Dafoe and Lyall, 2015; Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013; 
Shapiro and Weidmann, 2012; Shapiro & Siegel, 2015; Warren, 2015). 
Although these authors do not explicitly draw on opportunity crime theory in 
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their analysis, they argue that the increased horizontal coordination enabled by 
mobile telephony facilitates the organisation of activities (e.g. protests) that can 
escalate into violence. Furthermore, they suggest that rebels and insurgents 
exploit mobile networks to recruit, motivate and discipline followers and to 
facilitate violent activities. Thus mobile phones may be analysed to reduce the 
effort associated with the organisation and commission of traditional types of 
crime and insecurity, in this case violence and insurgency, while also increasing 
the awareness space of users and facilitating the commission of a wide range of 
crimes. Examining these applications through the lens of opportunity theories of 
crime, mobile phones may be variously regarded as crime multipliers (Felson, 
2002) and as crime facilitators or crime resources (Vander Beken & Balcaen, 
2006; Farrell, 2015; Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007; Laycock, 2004; 
Newman & Clarke, 2003; Wall 2005; Wall, 2007), in addition to crime targets.  
For the purposes of this study, the term crime facilitators is used to encompass 
the various ways that mobile phones may facilitate the commission of a wide 
variety of crimes. Crime facilitators, proposed by Clarke (1992), are a further 
development of the RAT approach that has particular relevance for this 
analysis. These fall into three categories; physical, social and chemical. 
Chemical facilitators such as drugs and alcohol, are beyond the scope of this 
analysis. Likewise social facilitators, such as peer pressure, are not explicitly 
addressed here. Mobile phones, along with objects such as cars and weapons, 
may be regarded as physical facilitators of crime (Clarke, 1992). Cars may be 
used to transport offenders to and from the location of an offence, while 
weapons may be used to threaten or injure victims. Thus mobile phones may be 
regarded as physical facilitators of crimes and the increasing number of mobile 
phones is therefore likely to increase their availability for offenders. It is worth 
acknowledging that Roman and Chalfin (2007) propose the term ‘iCrime’ to 
address the increasing convergence of new information communication 
technologies, including mobile phones, smartphones, tablet computers, laptops 
and similar electronic goods. However, the proprietary implications of this term 
preclude its use here, and furthermore this study addresses the use of both 
advanced and basic model handsets. In light of this, mobile phones and motor 
vehicles may be analysed analogously. Both cars and mobile handsets 
represent popular crime targets, but they may also be utilised as crime 
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facilitators or multipliers inasmuch as they create new opportunities for the 
commission of a wide range of crimes. However, information communication 
technologies (ICTs) provide a wide range of crime opportunities, and provide 
conditions of anonymity and immediately which render them particularly suitable 
for would-be offenders.  
3.2.6 Process of socio-technical change and crime opportunities  
According to crime opportunity theory, processes of socio-technical change are 
likely to create new opportunities for crime (Ekblom & Tilley, 2000; Farrell, 2015; 
Laycock, 2004; Newman & Clarke, 2003). The most self-evident manifestation 
of this associated with the increasing penetration of mobile phones is the 
increase in crime targets; in this case mobile phone handsets. However, 
technological developments also create situations in which crime opportunities 
emerge, and which present new challenges for law enforcement. As Laycock 
explains,  
"… it is clear that the rapid development of new products and 
services ... provide new opportunities for crime. These new 
products may be the targets of theft but they may also facilitate 
offending by making offences easier to commit or making 
detection more difficult" (2005, p41) 
Mobile phones are a particularly salient example of such a product, although the 
relationship between situational theories of crime and crime prevention and 
technology is well established.  
It is only possible for offenders to exploit potential opportunities for crime when 
they are in possession of the necessary resources. Ekblom and Tilley (2000) 
highlight the importance of considering offender resource needs, availability, 
development, and distribution with particular attention to social-technical 
change. This approach proposes that practitioners should examine the 
conjunction of the immediate situational conditions and factors that facilitate 
change, and the immediate conditions in which an offender is likely to offend. 
Mobile phones may both increase the scope and scale of crime (e.g. providing 
access to high numbers of victims) and increase opportunities for the 
commission of a wide range of crimes (e.g. facilitating the coordination of 
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robberies). Thus they provide a valuable resource for offenders, beyond their 
attractiveness as a crime target.  
For example, the increasing availability of motor vehicles transformed 
opportunities for crime; providing a new target for acquisitive crimes and 
simultaneously facilitating the commission of a wide range of traditional crimes 
(Newman & Clarke, 2003). Cars may be used to rapidly transport offenders to 
and from the scene of a crime, to evade authorities, and to transport stolen 
items that may be too large, heavy or cumbersome to remove on foot. 
Addressing the acquisitive crime is relatively straightforward; crime prevention 
measures which make cars more difficult to steal (such as immobilisers, alarms, 
etc.) have reduced the suitability of cars as targets for crime and have been 
found to reduce rates of car theft (Farrell, Tseloni, & Tilley, 2011). However, the 
installation of steering column locks on new vehicles did not change reported 
rates of car theft overall. Rather, theft rates for older vehicles increased 
corresponding with reductions in the number of new cars stolen (Mayhew et al, 
1979). The success of the car industry in preventing vehicle theft is widely 
presented as a leading example of the importance of involving industry in crime 
prevention. Improvements in vehicle security have led to falling levels of car 
theft in many developed countries, often by around 75% (Farrell et al., 2011). 
Farrell (2015) further notes the need both to regulate and to incentivise industry 
to overcome market failures and encourage their engagement in crime 
prevention. 
Newman and Clarke (2003) argue that the revolution in information technology 
is at the apex of societal change, ascribing it a significant role in spawning new 
opportunities for crime. These authors describe the origins of this revolution in 
socio-technical change as the invention of writing, a development that 
transformed opportunities for information storage and transmission. Personal 
computing, and later the networked structure of the Internet, introduced as a by-
product yet more opportunities for crime (Newman & Clarke, 2003). In 
developing world settings, as the previous chapter demonstrates, mobile 
phones are the most widely available technological device. Accordingly, it may 
be postulated that these tools are likely to comprise crime facilitators in 
providing a wide range of new opportunities for crime in these settings.  
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Specifically, mobile phones facilitate the extension of both potential victims’ and 
offenders’ digital presence into new virtual arenas, providing new crime 
opportunities with distinct characteristics from those associated with physical 
environments (Clarke, 2004; Ekblom & Tilley, 2000; Newman & Clarke, 2003). 
Mobile phones, like other networked technologies, facilitate the commission of a 
wide range of networked crimes, including fraud and deception, spam, sending 
obscene or offensive content, pornography, information theft, concealment of 
criminal activities, cloning handsets and SIM cards to mask activities or access 
free calls, premium rate service fraud, and even the use of mobile phones for 
the remote detonation of bombs (Vander Beken & Balcaen, 2006; Wall 2005; 
2007). Thus, as mobile phone access and use continues to expand, so too do 
opportunities for crime associated with these socio-technical transformations.  It 
is also likely that crime, and crime prevention, associated with mobile phone 
networks is dynamically evolving as more advanced technologies and 
increasing numbers of novice users contribute to transforming crime 
opportunities in these settings (Farrell, 2015). 
Whitehead and Farrell (2008) argue that the relationship between technology 
and crime is so widely recognised that engineers and designers should work to 
design out crime risks associated with new technologies. They call for 
participatory planning to pre-empt the potential crime wave associated with new 
technological developments. Examining the use of mobile phones as ‘smart 
wallets’, Whitehead and Farrell argue that … “A mobile phone wallet is a mobile 
phone handset that incorporates some means of making electronic payments 
for goods and services” (2008, p212). While increasingly popular in Western 
countries (ibid), these applications are unlikely to become popular in the 
majority of developing world settings where electronic payments remain 
uncommon and large populations are unbanked, as addressed in Chapter Two. 
However, the increasing popularity of m-banking may offer related opportunities 
for crime. Whitehead and Farrell (2008) acknowledge both the increasing value 
of handsets which use ‘smart wallet’ technology, and concomitant opportunities 
for the theft of user ‘identity’ and financial information contained within the 
handset. In developing world settings where mobile handsets are perceived as 
valuable tools for the storage of personal information, the theft of user identity 
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and personal information, including financial information, is a relevant concern 
regardless of the technical capabilities of the handset.  
3.2.7 Crime in networked environments 
Analyses of cyber-crime provide a useful entry point into the investigation of the 
networked crime facilitated by mobile telephony, particularly as they incorporate 
a broad spectrum of crimes committed through electronic means. These range 
from fraud to cyber-stalking, and encompass purely electronic crimes as well as 
those that combine physical and digital components. Tilley and Sidebottom 
argue that cyberspace provides a rich agenda for future situational crime 
research as,  
“…a novel location for crime, with novel crime opportunities through 
new types of risky space, new types of awareness space, new forms 
of crime, and new challenges for guardianship and handling” (2015, 
p.345) 
This thesis extends this argument, drawing on primary case study data, to 
investigate crime threats, vulnerabilities and prevention mechanisms associated 
with mobile telephony in the developing world 
Scholars note that cyber-crime lacks a standardised, accepted academic 
definition (Gordon & Ford, 2006; Wall, 2005; 2007; Yar, 2013), but a widely-
accepted working definition is, “any crime that is facilitated or committed using a 
computer, network, or hardware device” (Gordon & Ford, 2006, p. 14). Wall 
provides an alternative definition, regarding cyber-crimes as “criminal or harmful 
activities that are informational, global and networked” (Wall, 2007, p. 4). These 
definitions share a common set of assumptions; that the digitally networked 
terrain of cyber-space provides new opportunities for criminal and anti-social 
behaviour. The inclusion of both crimes facilitated and those committed using 
cyber-technology is critical for the present analysis. This inclusive definition 
acknowledges the overlap between digital and physical terrains, and this 
overlap is particularly important for this analysis of mobile phone-enabled crime. 
However, both of these definitions may, to some extent, be applied to crimes 
committed through mobile phone networks. A particular value of Wall’s (2007) 
definition is that it acknowledges both activities specifically defined as illegal as 
well as those deemed to be deviant but lacking formal legal definitions and 
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sanctions, recognising that crime and deviance cannot always be separated in 
criminological enquiry. This is particularly useful in the context of mobile phone 
crime and security, where transformations in both the technology and the 
associated opportunities for crime are likely to be dynamic and fast-changing, 
and the legal classification of particular activities as ‘crime’ may be outpaced by 
the speed of their development.  
Although some critics argue that the cyber-environment merely provides new 
tools for the perpetration of traditional crimes, characterised as old wine in new 
bottles (Grabosky, 2001), more compelling arguments suggest that the unique 
environment provided by networked technology has a profound impact on social 
interactions, creating fundamentally new types of crime (Gordon & Ford, 2006; 
Wall 2005; 2007; Yar, 2013). One popular method of classification distinguishes 
between cyber-crimes according to the role played by technology in their 
perpetration (Wall, 2005; Yar, 2013). Wall proposes an elimination test to 
distinguish between three types of cyber-crime, suggesting that traditional 
crimes are those, “in which the internet is used, usually as a method of 
communication, to assist with the organisation of a crime (for example, by 
paedophiles, drug dealers etc.)” (Wall 2005, 311). Critically, these types of 
crime are likely to persist in the absence of cyber-technologies. The second 
category comprises hybrid crimes such as fraud and deception. In the absence 
of the Internet, hybrid crimes persist but in reduced numbers. The final category 
concerns true cyber-crimes whose perpetration are fundamentally reliant on 
digital technologies, such as spamming. These broad categorisations provide a 
useful way to distinguish between traditional crimes and cyber-crimes, 
recognising the emergence of hybrid crimes facilitated but crucially not 
determined by networked technologies. Despite the popularity of this model, the 
separation of traditional, cyber and hybrid crime types creates a system of 
classification utilising broad categories with limited analytical application. 
Nevertheless, this model provides a means to conceptualise different crime 
types associated with mobile phones as networked technologies, and is 
examined in light of the identified crime threats in Chapter Seven.  
3.2.8 Crime targets as CRAVED 
Arguably the most straightforward crime associated with mobile telephony is the 
acquisitive crime of handset theft. The majority of existing studies investigating 
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the relationship between mobile phones and acquisitive crime have emerged 
from Western settings, where a growing body of evidence demonstrates 
positive correlations between mobile phones and rising rates of acquisitive 
crime (Farrell, 2015; Farrell et al., 2010; Hall, 2009; Harrington & Mayhew, 
2001; Hoare, 2007; Mailley et al., 2008). Handset theft has been included in the 
British Crime Survey (BCS) following Harrington and Mayhew’s (2001) Home 
Office research study, which first illuminated the prevalence of this phenomenon 
in the UK. Data on mobile phone theft in the UK is therefore widely available, 
compared to other country contexts (Farrell, 2015).  
Studies also suggest that mobile phones are a popular crime target elsewhere. 
The increasing prevalence of mobile phones is associated with increasing rates 
of thefts and robberies across Europe and the USA (Farrell, 2015; Farrell, et al., 
2010; Mailley, et al., 2008), and mobile phones are now one of the most 
frequently stolen items in Western countries (Mailley et al., 2008). It has been 
demonstrated that despite the overall ‘crime drop’ phenomenon in Western 
industrial countries during the 1990s and early 2000s, there has been a 
simultaneous increase in mobile phone theft and Internet-related crimes 
(Farrell, et al., 2010).  
Various approaches have been proposed to identify the characteristics and 
attributes that inform target suitability. Felson (1998) proposes these key 
characteristics to be value, inertia (portability), visibility and access, using the 
acronym VIVA. Felson demonstrates how changes in temporal patterns of theft 
targets correspond with the availability of consumer goods with these 
characteristics. This simple model was subsequently replaced by the CRAVED 
criteria. The CRAVED model characterises ‘hot’ products according to the 
attributes of being Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, 
and Disposable (Clarke, 1999). These criteria have been proposed to classify 
particularly attractive crime targets as ‘hot’ products (Clarke, 1999), and have 
become a popular heuristic within crime science. CRAVED emerged from RAT 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) and the rational choice perspective (Cornish & Clarke, 
1986), of which a core component is the availability of a suitable target.  
It may be hypothesised that in developing world settings there are fewer 
consumer goods fulfilling the CRAVED criteria. Mobile phone handsets are 
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lightweight, portable, high value goods satisfying the CRAVED criteria 
associated with ‘hot’ products (Sidebottom, 2013).  Limited research has been 
conducted on CRAVED goods in developing world settings, with the notable 
exception of Sidebottom’s (2013) examination of livestock theft in Malawi. 
Recognising that mobile phone handsets fulfil the characteristics of CRAVED 
goods, they are likely to be even more popular crime targets than in Europe and 
the USA. Unlike Western Europe and the USA, reliable data on handset theft in 
developing world settings is scarce (Farrell, 2015; Sidebottom, 2015), and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to address that deficit. However, as mobile 
handsets are classic CRAVED goods in resource-poor settings characterised by 
limited crime targets, it is relevant to acknowledge that this type of crime is likely 
to occur frequently, and to examine the constellations of opportunity which 
create facilitating conditions for this.  
Newman and Clarke (2003) have extended the application of the CRAVED 
characteristics to examine how information may be regarded as a hot product 
within the e-commerce environment. They provide a range of examples such as 
software piracy and counterfeiting which targets intellectual property within 
software, videos and music, and identity theft that targets personal data 
contained within databases or customer records. They also identify crimes 
which may also affect users of mobile phones such as electronic funds transfer 
fraud, stalking, fake lotteries and prizes, and harassment. The authors’ note that 
the information contained within a product such as a personal computer (or a 
mobile phone) may be characterised by attributes similar to the hot products 
defined by Clarke (1999). Newman and Clarke note that this information is, “a 
constantly moving target” (2003, p70) which exists in space during the process 
of its transmission. They acknowledge that the concept of information as a 
product is analytically complex, but argue that it is vulnerable to criminal 
misuse. They note, however, that “the complexity and variety of information, 
unlike a simple consumer item, makes it especially difficult to suggest specific 
design changes, such as safety locks on handguns, that could eliminate or 
reduce its inherent vulnerability” (Newman & Clarke, 2003, p73). Newman and 
Clarke’s focus is on e-commerce crime, and they do not address mobile 
telephony directly. However, examining information as a crime target is useful 
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for this analysis, and is particularly relevant in light of the development of m-
banking services gaining in popularity in developing world settings.   
3.3 Opportunity theory and crime prevention 
Recognition that offenders respond to changing situational conditions (including 
processes of socio-technical change) that facilitate, or impede, the commission 
of crimes has significant and far-reaching implications. Examining crime as a 
function of circumstances, rather than particular social or psychological traits 
and tendencies associated with criminal dispositions and behaviours, provides 
opportunities for the development of crime prevention approaches that target 
these situational conditions (Clarke, 1980). As Tilley and Sidebottom note, 
The applied focus of situational criminology lies in identifying 
situations where crime is commonplace and figuring out ways to 
change them so that crime is reduced (2015, p332-333) 
In support of crime opportunity theory, Mayhew et al. (1976) compiled and 
analysed a range of examples in which reduced opportunities for criminal 
behaviour led to reductions in crime. These examples include the effectiveness 
of steering column locks on reducing opportunities for car theft in newer 
vehicles, and increasing surveillance as a mechanism to reduce opportunities 
for vandalism on public buses (ibid). Arguing that changing opportunity 
structures can even prevent (some) individuals from committing suicide, Clarke 
and Mayhew (1988) present evidence that a specific change in opportunities 
contributed to a reduction in the number of suicides in in the UK. They 
demonstrate a relationship between that changes in domestic gas supply, in 
which (toxic) coal was replaced by (non-toxic) natural gas, and reduced rates of 
suicide. Clarke and Mayhew argue that by removing a convenient and painless 
method of suicide, this shift in gas supply actually contributed to an overall 
reduction in the number of suicides committed in the UK.  Although of course 
alternative methods for committing suicide remained available, and determined 
individuals are not prevented from taking their own lives, the removal of the 
domestic gas option nevertheless led to a substantial reduction in the total 
number of suicides. Drawing on the effort, risk, reward structure, we see that by 
removing a relatively low effort, low risk, high reward (cheap, painless, 
available, effective, etc.) method of committing suicide, the conversion to non-
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toxic natural gas adjusted the effort-risk-reward ratio sufficiently to reduce the 
overall suicide rate (Clarke & Mayhew 1988). 
The argument presented in this thesis is that while mobile phone networks can 
increase opportunities for crime, under particular conditions they may also 
provide opportunities for crime prevention. Klick, MacDonald and Stratmann 
(2012) argue that mobile phones provide a crime deterrence effect by 
increasing the costs associated with committing crime. This ‘underappreciated 
link’, they suggest, is responsible or the decline in cases of assault and rape in 
the 1990s, during which period mobile phones increased opportunities for 
surveillance and the risk of apprehension. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the 
uses and applications of mobile phones in developing world settings are 
diverse, with far-reaching implications for social, economic and political 
development. It is therefore unclear whether these same crime-inhibiting 
functions associated with mobile phones in Western settings are also likely to 
be manifest in non-Western settings. In particular, it is important for 
interventions designed to capitalise on the benefits of mobile phones to 
recognise, and integrate, design features which maximise the crime-inhibiting 
potential of mobile phones while reducing their crime-facilitating potential.  
Other studies examined in Chapter Two also demonstrate crime reduction 
mechanisms associated with mobile phones that may be fruitfully analysed 
through the lens of crime opportunity. For example, Shapiro and Weidmann 
(2010) describe how Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have threatened mobile 
operators to force them to decommission mobile networks at night in order to 
prevent informants from reporting their movements to law enforcement. This 
suggests that the Taliban recognise the crime prevention opportunities provided 
by these networks, and seek to alter the effort, risk reward balance associated 
with reporting crime. Shapiro and Siegel’s (2015) arguments about the 
relationship between mobile telephony and insurgency may also be interpreted 
through this lens. Specifically, they note that mobile phones are valuable tools 
for members of the public to report rebel action specifically because they are 
undetectable by rebels. Accordingly, mobile phones may be analysed as low-
risk communication channels that increase reporting and therefore contribute to 
crime detection and prevention. Mobile phones therefore may be analysed as 
changing the risk-effort-reward ratio associated with reporting crime. 
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3.3.1 Situational crime prevention 
SCP aims systematically to reduce specific crimes by focusing on their near 
(situational) causes. This approach emerged during the 1960s and 1970s in the 
UK Home Office Research Unit, and was developed as a practical alternative to 
traditional offender-oriented approaches to crime prevention (Clarke & Cornish, 
1983). In a radical departure from crime prevention mechanisms targeting ‘root 
causes’ of crime, SCP focuses on modifying the conditions in which specific 
crimes occur in order to reduce rates of crime through a range of techniques 
(ibid). SCP is defined by Clarke as, 
…opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly 
specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design or 
manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic 
and permanent a way as possible, (3) make crime more difficult 
and risky or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide 
range of offenders. (1997, p. 4) 
Tilley (2010) defines successful SCP mechanisms as those that create a 
sustained impact through increasing cost or effort in relation to the anticipated 
rewards. He notes, “success is achieved if a wide range of offenders find the 
balance of effort, risk and reward sufficiently altered that they decide not to 
commit the offense” (Tilley, 2010, p. 106).  
The roots of SCP approaches have been traced back, among others, to the 
increasing disenchantment with the ‘pathological’ models of offender behaviour 
and an increasing interest in the environmental causes of crime (Clarke, 1995; 
1997). Transforming the environmental conditions in which crime occurs offers 
further opportunities for successful crime prevention, as an alternative to 
addressing the inclinations and proclivities of individual offenders. Ekblom and 
Tilley associate this shift with the recognition that; 
…changing offenders, or potential offenders, was seen as too difficult 
to achieve; changing immediate crime situations promised easier, 
more circumscribed implementation and better prospects of short-
term, measurable success (2000, p 376) 
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Crime prevention initiatives that increase the perceived risk or effort or reduce 
the anticipated rewards, may alter the calculations of potential offenders, and 
function to reduce or prevent crime. The perceived benefits associated with a 
particular crime may take many forms, including thrills, power and sexual 
gratification as well as material gain. Moreover, Clarke and Homel (1997) 
include internal psychological processes as a component of reasoning, 
including feelings of shame and guilt. Recognising that offenders are motivated 
by very different goals to commit car theft, burglary or rape, changing the 
environmental conditions of crime to alter offender calculations can 
nevertheless offer effective prevention mechanisms for particular types of crime. 
The model of risks, efforts and rewards associated with the rational choice 
perspective provides the foundation for the classification of a wide range of 
specific situational techniques, augmented by the subsequent inclusion of the 
additional categories of removing excuses (Clarke & Homel, 1997) and reducing 
provocations (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Wortley, 2001). 
Although the model of SCP may appear simple, this simplicity belies impressive 
success rates. Reviews of SCP case studies addressing crime threats ranging 
from robbery and assault to fraud and domestic violence have demonstrated 
that the majority of initiatives utilising these methods of crime control are 
effective. For example, Smith et al.’s (2002) review 142 SCP case studies 
across 211 sites, found the majority to have been effective. Guerette and 
Bowers (2009) found a 75% success rate among 206 SCP evaluations, while 
Bowers and Johnson (2016) demonstrate that SCP initiatives have had a 
positive impact on crime across 63 studies. SCP provides a valuable framework 
through which to investigate and categorise crime prevention opportunities and 
techniques associated with mobile phones in developing world contexts. 
3.3.2 Techniques of SCP 
Within the five main categories of increasing effort and increasing risks and 
reducing rewards, provocations and excuses, sub-categories of opportunity-
reducing techniques have been added. These are detailed in table 1 below, 
providing examples for each of the sub-categories of crime reducing technique. 
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Table 1: 25 Techniques of SCP (drawing on Cornish & Clarke 2003) 
Increase perceived effort Increase perceived risks Reduce anticipated rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
1. Target harden 
 Steering column locks and 
immobilisers  
 Anti-robbery screens  
 Tamper-proof packaging 
6. Extend guardianship 
 Take routine precautions: 
go out in group at night, 
leave signs of occupancy, 
carry phone  
 “Cocoon” neighbourhood 
watch 
11. Conceal targets 
 Off-street parking 
 Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
 Unmarked bullion trucks 
16. Reduce frustrations and 
stress 
 Efficient queues and polite 
service  
 Expanded seating 
 Soothing music/muted lights 
21. Set rules 
 Rental agreements 
 Harassment codes 
 Hotel registration 
2. Control access to facilities 
 Entry phones 
 Electronic card access  
 Baggage screening 
7. Assist natural surveillance  
 Improved street lighting 
 Defensible space design  
 Support whistleblowers 
12. Remove targets 
 Removable car radio 
 Women’s refuges  
 Pre-paid cards for pay 
phones 
17. Avoid disputes 
 Separate enclosures for 
rival soccer fans  
 Reduce crowding in pubs  
 Fixed cab fares 
22. Post instructions  
  “No Parking”  
 “Private Property” 
 “Extinguish camp fires” 
 3. Screen Exits 
 Ticket needed for exit  
 Export documents  
 Electronic merchandise tags 
8. Reduce anonymity  
 Taxi driver IDs  
 “How’s my driving?” decals  
 School uniforms 
13. Identify property 
 Property marking  
 Vehicle licensing and parts 
marking 
 Cattle branding 
18. Reduce emotional arousal 
 Controls on violent 
pornography  
 Enforce good behaviour on 
soccer field 
 Prohibit racial slurs 
23. Alert conscience 
 Roadside speed display 
boards 
 Signatures for customs 
declarations 
 “Shoplifting is stealing” 
4. Deflect offenders  
 Street closures  
  Separate bathrooms for 
women  
 Disperse pubs 
9. Utilise place managers 
 Restrict spray CCTV for 
double-deck buses  
 Two clerks for convenience 
stores  
 Reward vigilance 
14. Disrupt markets 
 Monitor pawn shops 
 Controls on classified ads 
 License street vendors 
19. Neutralise peer pressure 
 “Idiots drink and drive”  
  “It’s OK to say No” 
 Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
24. Assist compliance  
 Easy library checkout  
 Public lavatories 
 Litter bins 
5. Control tools 
 “Smart” guns 
 Disabling stolen cell phones  
 Restrict spray 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
 Red light cameras 
 Burglar alarms 
 Security guards 
15. Deny benefits 
 Ink merchandise tags 
 Graffiti cleaning  
 Speed humps 
20. Discourage imitation 
 Rapid repair of vandalism  
 V-chips in TVs  
 Censor details of modus 
operandi 
25. Control drugs and alcohol 
 Breathalyzers in pubs  
 Server intervention  
 Alcohol-free events 
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These twenty-five SCP techniques facilitate the development of crime 
prevention measures that increase the perceived difficulty (effort), increase 
perceived risks, and reduce anticipated rewards, and remove provocations and 
excuses associated with particular crimes. These measures are designed to 
reduce or prevent highly specific forms of crime, and aim to transform the 
immediate environment in a systematic, and ideally permanent way as 
perceived by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1983). Accordingly, in this study 
these categories are applied to examine mechanisms for the prevention of 
handset theft and crime associated with mobile phones. They subsequently 
provide the framework for the analysis presented in Chapter Seven.  
The first, and most basic, category of situational measures seeks to increase 
the real or perceived effort associated with committing a particular crime. For 
example, Clarke (2007) described a measure introduced to remove the theft of 
cash donations from a church in Spain, addressed through the introduction of a 
debit and credit card reader machine that allows worshippers to make their 
donations electronically, removing the cash target from the Church premises. 
This proved to be an effective strategy to reduce the theft of donations. The 
second category of techniques includes measures that aim to increase the real 
or perceived risks associated with committing particular crimes, for example by 
increasing the chance of apprehension and punishment. Techniques in the third 
category aim to reduce the reward associated with the commission of crime, 
and is likely to be particularly relevant for reducing handset theft. The fourth 
category of techniques is concerned with reducing provocations that may 
encourage offenders to commit particular crimes in particular locations. Wortley 
(2001) has argued that the relevance of situational variables is not limited to 
their role in creating conditions conducive to the commission of crime. In some 
circumstances, he argues situational conditions may also induce or prompt 
illegal or anti-social behaviour to occur. Wortley (2001) terms these precipitating 
factors, and includes in this classification situations that prompt, permit or 
provoke illegal or anti-social behaviour and situations which exert social 
pressure on potential offenders, inducing criminal behaviour. Thus altering the 
perceived costs and benefits of the commission of crime may be insufficient; it 
is also necessary to acknowledge the role of situations in inducing criminal 
behaviour, and to address these. The role of precipitators is likely to inform 
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offender motivation and the structuring of offender decision-making, increasing 
incentives for particular types of offending. However, as Cornish and Clarke 
(2003) note, this informs the ‘motivated offender’ component of the crime 
triangle, but the crime opportunity is still required for an offence to be 
committed. The argument proposed by Wortley (2001) nevertheless informed 
the development of new crime prevention techniques, and provides a useful 
framework for understand the context of ethno-political violence in Kenya which 
characterises the first case study addressed in this thesis. During the election 
period in Kenya, it may be postulated that the context of widespread leveraging 
of ethnic identities to garner political support, coupled with the implications for 
the allocation of resources and opportunities associated with the outcome of the 
election, provide precipitating factors which prompt and provoke hate-speech 
and outbreaks of violence.  
3.3.3 SCP techniques to reduce offending in digital spaces 
SCP techniques may be applied to increase the effort and risk, and reduce the 
reward, provocation and excuses associated with the commission of crime in 
digital spaces. However, SCP techniques are developed to address specific 
crime threats in particular contexts, and existing techniques may or may not be 
relevant to address the ways in which mobile phones are used to facilitate crime 
in developing world settings. Nevertheless, crime prevention techniques which 
correspond with the effort, risk, reward, provocation, and excuses categories 
are provided here to situate the analyses presented in Chapter Seven of the 
crime threats identified in this study.  
Examining existing techniques for the prevention of crime associated with 
networked technologies (primarily computers, but also applicable to mobile 
phones), measures seeking to increase the effort associated with accessing 
digital data have focused on ‘target hardening’. These include technical 
measures such as firewalls and phishing filters, and removing loopholes in 
security which provide access to digital data to reduce e-commerce crime 
(Newman & Clarke, 2003). Measure which ‘control access’ and ‘authenticate’ 
the identity of users have also been proposed, such as the use of passwords 
and PINs, and encouraging users not to open suspicious content (ibid) in a bid 
to reduce crimes associated with deception.  
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Measures aiming to increase the risks of crime include initiatives aiming to 
‘extend guardianship’, such as the Neighbourhood Watch scheme (Clarke, 
1997) in physical spaces. On the Internet, online moderators monitoring the 
content of submissions to particular forums or websites may be regarded as 
‘guardians’ of these digital spaces, ensuring the publication of appropriate 
content and preventing anti-social behaviour. In mobile phone networks, 
guardianship may be more diffuse, although MNOs and national security 
services are broadly responsible for crime prevention and may fulfil the function 
of guardians. Other SCP techniques to reduce the risk of crime aim to ‘assist 
natural surveillance’ by enlisting the help of the public (Clarke, 1997). Such 
techniques capitalise on the presence of other community members who are 
aware of, and recognise, suspicious behaviour in a particular location and 
function as impromptu guardians. Initiatives designed to capitalise on natural 
surveillance include, for example, enhanced street lighting to increase the 
visibility of offenders, which has been found effective in reducing crime (ibid). 
The previous chapter outlines some of the challenges associated with 
guardianship of mobile phone networks, and the ways in which mobile phone 
communications may transform traditional behavioural norms and bypass 
formal authorities and forms of regulation in developing world settings (see for 
example Section 2.2.3). These conditions may present challenges for the 
application of SCP techniques associated with guardianship, and are addressed 
in relation to the study findings in Chapter Seven. 
Mobile phones enable users to conceal their identities, and even adopt false 
identities, to increase anonymity in their interactions with other users. 
Techniques aiming to ‘reducing anonymity’ are therefore likely to be relevant, 
and have previously been demonstrated to reduce offending in virtual 
environments in the developed world. Clarke (1990) demonstrates that the 
introduction of caller-ID in New Jersey reduced the rates of obscene phone calls 
by reducing anonymity and increasing the risks associated with this crime. 
Similar functions may reduce crime threats associated with deception facilitated 
by mobile phones in developing world settings, and may also increase 
opportunities to detect and punish offenders if aligned with formal crime 
prevention mechanisms.  
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Techniques implemented to reduce the reward associated with the commission 
of crime are also relevant for this analysis. These may include ‘target removal’ 
of valuable crime targets, such as encouraging users not to store valuable data 
(PIN codes and passwords, important documents, etc.) in mobile phone 
handsets. Encouraging users to resist offers which seem to be ‘too good to be 
true’ may also be classified as a technique aiming to ‘reduce temptation’ for 
potential offenders, previously identified in relation to e-commerce crime 
(Newman & Clarke, 2003). Other measures may ‘deny benefits’, for example 
through encrypting or otherwise protecting valuable stored data (ibid). 
SCP techniques aiming to reduce provocations are founded on the assumption 
that certain feelings stimulate criminal acts, and that these feelings are 
stimulated by particular conditions. The particular, and peculiar, conditions 
associated with mobile communication enable mobile users to transmit anti-
social content, or perpetrate scams, with low risk of detection. Receipt of such 
messages may provoke users to send further anti-social messages. Anger and 
emotional arousal can be expressed anonymously, for example through threats 
or false information. Provocations may contribute to the misuse of mobile phone 
communications, including criminal uses, and may in turn provoke the 
commission of further crimes. Traditionally, techniques that ‘reduce frustrations 
and stress’ aim to address outbursts of anger which lead people to commit 
crimes. Violent crime can be minimised by reducing the potential for conflict 
associated with particular conditions, such as segregating rival football fans or 
introducing standard taxi fares to avoid overcharging on common routes 
(Clarke, 1997). The presence of particular objects can also encourage criminal 
offences. This ‘weapons effect’ (Berowitz & LePage, 1967) emphasises the way 
in which the mere presence of a gun can incite aggression in some people. The 
link between individuals witnessing and committing crimes is also well 
established. For example, the presence of vandalism can encourage further 
anti-social behaviour within the environment (Kelling & Coles, 1998). Kelling 
and Coles identified a causal link between disorder, fear and serious crime, 
arguing that anti-social behaviour creates criminogenic conditions that threaten 
social order and encourage impunity, reflected in the title Fixing Broken 
Windows. This argument undermines previously widely held assumptions that 
dealing with disorder is inconsequential and that the purpose of law 
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enforcement is to address serious crimes. Kelling and Coles suggest that foot 
patrols reduced the fear of crime in urban American neighbourhoods by 
providing a highly visible signal of the maintenance of order. Within mobile 
phone networks, signs of disorder are dispersed and individualised. It is 
challenging to envisage technical prevention techniques which may function to 
reduce provocations. Accordingly, techniques aiming to reduce provocations 
may need to focus on wider sensitisation campaigns to promote the 
maintenance of social order.  
The final category of situational techniques, remove excuses, addresses the 
guilt and shame associated with criminal behaviour, aiming to remove the 
excuses made by offenders to ‘neutralise’ their actions (Clarke & Homel, 1997). 
Tilley suggests that this category of techniques relate, “…to the perceived moral 
status of the act at the point of its commission” (2010, p113), and provides the 
example of illuminated speed limit signs encouraging drivers to reduce their 
speed and obey these limits. Rules provide a framework for the conduct of 
behaviour. When rules are unclear or ambiguous, individuals are more likely to 
commit crimes. As previously described, mobile telephony has experienced 
rapid growth in developing world settings. It is therefore unsurprising that laws, 
rules, and behavioural codes informing the use of this emerging technology are 
not yet fully developed. Furthermore, governing this environment is problematic 
when we consider that mobile networks facilitate personal, private 
communications; they are not a visible, accessible public space amenable to 
traditional forms of governance.  
‘Rule setting’ and ‘posting instructions’ are SCP techniques designed to 
unambiguously delineate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour within 
discrete settings in order to reduce crime (Clarke & Homel, 1997). ‘Alerting the 
conscience’ of potential offenders at the point of committing the offence is 
another example of this category of SCP techniques, such as providing clear 
signage alerting drivers when they are exceeding speed limits, or by providing 
litter bins to ‘assist compliance’ with anti-littering laws. Originally termed 
‘controlling disinhibitors’ (Clarke, 1997), this category of techniques also seeks 
to control substances that undermine social and moral inhibitions or impair 
judgement, and initially included propaganda (dehumanising target groups) and 
television violence (normalising violence). Establishing clear legal frameworks 
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governing the behaviour of mobile phone users corresponds with the remove 
excuses category of SCP techniques. 
Examining crime in mobile phone networks in developing world settings, some 
SCP techniques may be effectively applied to reduce offending in these digital 
environments. However, it is necessary to first identify the specific crime threats 
associated with mobile phones, and the conditions and contexts informing 
opportunities for these crimes in developing world settings, in order to fully 
investigate the applicability of relevant situational prevention techniques. These 
are thoroughly addressed in Chapter Seven.  
3.3.4 SCP techniques to reduce handset theft 
Handset theft is a specific crime threat which occurs in both the developed and 
developing world. A range of techniques have been developed to prevent or 
reduce handset theft in Western settings. Addressing techniques applicable to 
acquisitive crimes, concealing, removing and replacing frequently targeted 
items with more unwieldy or non-transferrable objects may reduce theft, while 
marking property can reduce its resale value. Denying the benefits of crime to 
offenders is also an effective technique for crime reduction. For example ink 
tags may be used to prevent shoplifters from benefitting from stolen goods, 
which become less valuable once indelibly marked (DiLonardo & Clarke, 1996). 
For addressing theft of mobile handsets, several techniques are also available 
which increase effort and risk while reducing anticipated rewards. For example, 
Mailley (2011) describes the common practice of ‘blacklisting’, the disabling of 
stolen mobile phones, as an industry-level response designed to reduce the 
rewards and increase the effort of with handset theft. Remote locking and the 
remote recovery of airtime from stolen handsets denies thieves the use of SIM 
cards and phone credit respectively, while handset security features such as 
PIN numbers and other digital locks provide barriers to accessing handsets 
(Farrell, 2015). PIN numbers restricting access to handsets can be 
circumvented by formatting handsets. Thus such measures may prevent access 
to data temporarily stored in handsets, but once formatted the mobile handsets 
can be used again. Remote locking and deactivation features are also available 
on later generation mobile phones, but not on basic handsets. However, as the 
penetration and availability of handsets increases, costs associated with later 
generation handsets are likely to fall and their availability increase (GSMA, 
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2013), potentially increasing the availability of embedded crime prevention 
mechanisms such as remote locking.  
Property marking, when permanent and conspicuous, may reduce the resale 
value of mobile handsets thus reducing the rewards associated with their theft. 
All GSM mobile handsets are inscribed with a unique 15 digit IMEI number 
behind the battery. If this is obscured, it can also be accessed by dialling *#06# 
from most phones. Websites are available online which can be used to identify 
registered stolen handsets by their IMEI numbers (Farrell, 2015). Police also 
use IMEI numbers to blacklist stolen mobile phones (Mailley et al., 2006). 
However, IMEI numbers must first be recorded, reported and registered as 
stolen on online databases. In contexts where Internet access is limited, this 
mechanism is likely to be of reduced value. Second-hand goods markets are 
widespread in East Africa, and in contexts where the price of purchasing a new 
handset remains unaffordable for many users, second hand models are likely to 
remain popular. Regulating markets is likely to be extremely challenging in 
developing world contexts, although it has proven an effective technique for 
reducing the rewards associated with offences targeting stolen goods 
elsewhere (Sutton & Simmonds, 2004). Addressing handset theft by strategies 
that both increase the risks, and decrease the rewards, associated with the 
resale of stolen handsets may be effective. Sutton and Simmonds (2004) 
suggest several ways this may be approached, which are adapted here for 
application to mobile handsets. Raising awareness among the general public 
about the relationship between buying stolen goods and crimes such as 
burglary and robbery may encourage them to resist purchasing stolen handsets 
and potentially report information to security agencies. Encouraging licensed 
traders to check the IMEI numbers of second hand handsets online prior to 
purchasing them may also be an effective means to disrupt the markets for 
these stolen goods, in combination with campaigns encouraging users to 
register their mobile handsets.  
Kaplankiran et al. (2008) estimate (extrapolating from survey data) that around 
5% of handsets may have been reprogrammed in the UK. Handsets are 
reprogrammed to alter the unique identity number of the handset, masking its 
origin and facilitating illegal resale. The authors note that the industry is 
dynamic, with demand stimulated by the continual integration of new 
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technologies into mobile handsets. In the context of this hybridization (e.g. the 
incorporation of cameras, MP3s, SatNavs etc.), “the reprogramming of stolen 
mobile phones is a key facilitator of mobile phone theft” (Kaplankiran et al, 
2008, p. 727). Kaplankiran et al. (2008) suggest several prevention 
mechanisms, including etching or marking valuable components to prevent 
stolen handsets being used for parts. In a more comprehensive analysis of 
handset theft, Whitehead et al. (2008) review and propose a range of mobile 
phone anti-theft designs including visual deterrents, owner-identification and 
handset tracking. They propose characteristics that promote anti-theft designs 
using the acronym IN SAFE HANDS: identifiable, neutral, seen, attached, 
findable, executable, hidden, automatic, necessary, detectable, and secure. 
These include physical aspects of handset design which influence the way they 
are carried and used, and those which convey visual cues to potential 
offenders. They also include electronic components and built-in anti-theft 
technology (e.g. biometric scanning devices), add-on measures which securely 
store handsets (e.g. safe pockets), and systems that manage mobile phone 
networks (e.g. the policy and practices of MNOs). Drawing on early work 
examining characteristics which promote the theft of items, specifically VIVA 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979) and CRAVED (Clarke, 1999), Whitehead et al. (2008) 
address characteristics which reduce the theft of products. These are 
particularly relevant for the analysis of handset theft in developing world 
settings, and are applied to this in Chapter Seven. 
3.3.5 Crime displacement and offender adaptation 
The most prevalent critique levelled at opportunity and SCP methods is that of 
the displacement of crime. Displacement is defined as, “the relocation of a 
crime from one place, time, target, offense, tactic or offender to another as a 
result of some crime-prevention initiative" (Guerette & Bowers, 2009, p. 1333). 
This definition draws on the typology used by Felson and Clarke (1998) that 
described several types of displacement; 
1. Geographical displacement in which crime is moved from one location to 
another 
2. Temporal displacement in which crime occurs at a different time 
3. Tactical displacement in which one method of committing crime is 
substituted for another method 
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4. Crime type displacement in which reductions in one type of crime 
catalyse increases in another 
SCP focuses on the near causes of crime and the immediate situation that 
leads a particular offender to commit a particular offence, leading critics to 
argue that the offender is likely to simply change the target or type of crime. 
Using the example of vehicle crime, vehicles that are less protected are more 
likely to be targeted than more highly protected ones. ‘Target’ displacement is 
widely recognised in studies examining the effects of crime prevention 
(Guerette & Bowers, 1999). Several reviews of the empirical literature have 
investigated displacement, concluding that although crime displacement is 
possible, in the calculation of overall outcomes, accounting for both 
displacement and diffusion effects, the crime reduction effects of SCP 
measures outweigh the displacement effects (Barr & Pease, 1990; Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986; Eck, 1994; Guerette & Bowers 2009). In a systematic review of 
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and Bowers (2009) find that crime displacement is less common than is widely 
assumed. Rather, diffusion of benefits is more common, wherein the 
preventative measures implemented in places often have unintended positive 
outcomes through protecting nearby places from crime.  
An alternative explanation to account for changes in patterns of crime resulting 
from the implementation of SCP initiatives is adaptation to the changing 
opportunity structures. Ekblom describes adaptation as,  
…part of a wider, evolutionary, process in which offenders 
adapt their methods of attack to circumvent current 
preventative measures, and preventers in their turn readjust by 
creating new devices or employing new methods of defence. 
The offenders in their turn make further countermoves and the 
process spirals on indefinitely (1999, p. 28)  
Ekblom (1999) characterises this process as an ‘arms race’ in which crime 
prevention initiatives must constantly adjust and adapt to keep pace with the 
adaptive methods of offenders seeking to evade detection, developing 
analogies between the biological co-evolution of predator-prey relationships and 
the adaptive behaviour of criminals in the face of changing crime opportunities. 
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Noting that the rate of technological change is accelerating, Ekblom calls for 
foresight and preventative adaptation to protect against forthcoming crime 
threats. In developing world settings, different constellations of access and use 
of mobile phone technology are likely to contribute to different opportunities for 
crime and different adaptive behaviours. In recognition of these differences and 
on the potential of mobile phones to enable users to adapt their behaviour to 
commit crimes in digital networked terrains, it is therefore essential to 
investigate existing and potential crime threats, and identify suitable techniques 
for their prevention. 
3.3.6 Responsibility for preventing crime associated with mobile phones  
In physical spaces, responsibility for the prevention of crime is more clearly 
defined than in virtual networks. Within mobile phone networks, this new virtual 
environment is not characterised by traditional patterns of guardianship that 
constrain or prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. Roman and Farrell (2002), 
Farrell and Roman (2006) and Newman (2011) have argued that crime at 
places can be effectively analysed through the analogy of pollution, examining 
the cost of crime as a negative externality created by poorly regulated crime 
places. In this analysis, crime is an unintended negative side effect of 
developmental processes that promise overall benefits. Eck and Eck argue that, 
“places can emit crime just as a coal fired power plant can emit sulphur dioxide 
(2012, p283), proposing that place managers can decrease crime by changing 
place management practices, just as regulation externalising the costs of 
pollution can function to decrease pollution. They further argue that regulatory 
approaches and policies are needed to address crime in particular high-crime 
places, and propose “a portfolio of regulatory policies designed to encourage 
owners of crime places to prevent crime” (2012, p283), suggesting that 
problem-oriented policing approaches increasingly promote shifting the 
responsibility from crime prevention in places back to the organisations 
responsible for those spaces (Scott, 2005). 
Examining mobile phone networks through the analogy of pollution, Roman and 
Farrell (2002) propose that mobile phone theft can be analysed as a form of 
pollution, suggesting that poor design by the mobile phone industry externalises 
of the costs associated with mobile phone handset theft. Grabosky and Smith 
(2009) also argue that weak regulation of the mobile phone sector contributes to 
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crime opportunities, while Farrell (2015) notes that problems associated with the 
detection and prevention of these crimes are compounded by the globalised 
nature of digital communications that may span multiple regulatory terrains. 
Mailley (2011) proposes that the mobile phone industry has resisted calls from 
the UK government to increase the security of handsets to design-out crime, 
effectively prioritising increased profits and externalising the costs associated 
with mobile phone crime onto individual users and governments. 
In developing world settings, responsibility for the detection and prevention of 
crime threats associated with the increasing penetration of mobile phones is 
diffuse, and has been examined in Section 2.4 of the previous chapter. It is 
important to investigate the existing and potential crime prevention mechanisms 
in these settings, and examine questions of responsibility for the prevention of 
mobile phone-related crime. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Chapter Three has addressed the theoretical frameworks through which mobile 
phone crime is investigated in this thesis. Opportunity theories of crime are 
presented and applied to the new conditions associated with mobile telephony 
in developing world settings. Mobile phones are variously examined as 
attractive crime targets and effective crime facilitators. Routine activity theory 
provides a theoretical foundation for the investigation of the crime and security 
implications of these tools, examining the ways in which the new patterns of 
daily life associated with these socio-technical changes, which create new 
opportunities for crime in contexts characterised by weak personal and 
communal security. 
This chapter also described crime prevention mechanisms associated with 
opportunity theories of crime, specifically drawing on techniques of SCP which 
aim to increase the effort and risk, and reduce the reward, provocation and 
excuses associated with mobile phone crime. SCP techniques are applied to 
handset theft and networked crime facilitated by mobile phones. Critiques of 
SCP are also addressed, including displacement and offender adaptation.   
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Chapter Four: Method 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters review the existing literature and theoretical 
frameworks, and identify knowledge gaps around crime and security threats, 
vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with mobile telephony in the 
developing world, grounding the aims of this research. This chapter describes 
the methodological approach employed to investigate mobile phone crime in the 
selected developing world settings, explains the research design, and describes 
the methods used for collection and analysis of primary qualitative and 
quantitative data. It also examines the selection of two case studies and the 
thematic focus on crisis-affected populations in East Africa. This chapter 
describes the sample, procedures and research instruments used for the in-
depth interviews, FGDs and questionnaire surveys, discusses methodological 
challenges, and outlines the research ethics. 
4.2 Aims of the Study 
In this thesis, the relationship between mobile telephony and crime and security 
in the developing world is investigated through the lens of crime-as-opportunity. 
The thesis addresses the research question,  
What are the implications of the increasing penetration of mobile phones in developing 
world settings for opportunities for crime and its prevention?  
Specifically, the thesis is structured around the following aims:  
1. Identify the ways in which mobile phones inhibit crime in developing 
world settings, drawing on opportunity theories of crime; 
2. Identify the ways in which mobile phones create opportunities for crime in 
developing world settings; 
3. Identify social, cultural and situational conditions informing access to 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention associated with mobile 
phones in developing world settings; 
4. Identify, analyse and categorise mobile-phone related crime and security 
threats across the two case studies; 
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5. Examine the application of situational crime prevention techniques to the 
prevention of crime associated with mobile phones in developing world 
settings, specifically as crime targets and crime facilitators; 
6. Gain methodological insights into the application of opportunity theories 
of crime and situational crime prevention to mobile phone enabled crime 
in developing world settings.   
This chapter sets out the methods through which these aims are investigated.  
4.3 Researching mobile phone crime in the developing world 
The rapidly emerging, multi-disciplinary studies presented in Chapter Two are 
primarily concerned with social, economic, and political impacts of mobile 
telephony, and are complicated by the speed and breadth of its’ penetration. 
Focusing on the socio-economic outcomes of particular ICTD initiatives, or 
examining how information sharing facilitated through mobile networks 
contributes to constellations of social and economic wellbeing for particular 
groups, these studies are informed by the approaches and analytical styles of 
the academic departments from which they originate; including anthropology, 
development studies, geography, information systems, and political science.  
The existing body of literature on the impacts of mobile telephony in the 
developing world draws on data collected through a diverse range of methods, 
ranging from in-depth ethnographic studies of specific communities to macro-
level, multi-country analyses of broad trends and patterns. Some fields, such as 
ICTD, are characterised by high volumes of evaluations, reports and case 
studies published by international organisations and response agencies while 
others, such as analyses of mobile financial services, are dominated by 
industry-funded statistical analyses of operator data which may ignore the 
broader impacts of mobile telephony at the community level (Duncombe & 
Boateng, 2009; Duncombe, 2012b). Research commissioned by international 
development and humanitarian organisations has also contributed to the 
emerging body of knowledge around mobile telephony in the developing world, 
but has largely focused on positive development outcomes, overlooking 
unintended consequences for crime and security associated with the use of 
these tools. These particular theoretical and practical orientations have largely 
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obscured the associated and interconnected crime and security impacts 
affecting mobile users in the developing world. 
The limited body of academic research on mobile phone related crime in 
developed world settings may be informed by this poor availability of data. It 
may be postulated, however, that in resource-poor, developing world settings, 
the increasing availability of mobile handsets and network accessibility 
introduces both new crime targets and new opportunities for crime and crime 
prevention. This study aims to overcome the challenges associated with 
accessing crime data in the developing world through the collection and 
analysis of primary data on the perceptions and experiences of mobile phone 
users and their communities. 
4.4 Research design  
SCP approaches typically use an action-research approach (Clarke 1997), 
following Ekblom’s (1988) ‘preventative process’ this method aims to 1) gather 
data on the crime problem of interest, 2) analyse and interpret the data, 3) 
formulate preventive strategies based on the data analysis, 4) implement 
prevention strategies, and 5) monitor the impact on the outcomes of interest. In 
SCP, the data analysis guides the subsequent development of preventative 
methods. Sidebottom (2013) uses Ekblom’s (1988) preventative process to 
examine the transferability of the action-research approach to a specific 
developing world context, Malawi, identifying limitations in the broader 
application of SCP techniques in resource-poor settings. Sidebottom (2013) 
concludes that challenges associated with data collection in resource-limited 
settings inform the feasibility of the application of SCP techniques beyond the 
industrialised settings in which it has hitherto been applied. In particular, he 
notes that gathering reliable data on crime and security issues in the developing 
world is impeded by the poor crime data, high rates of underreporting, and 
access restrictions (ibid). Accordingly, an interactive, mixed methods research 
design was employed to facilitate the data collection and analysis presented in 
this thesis, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data. Despite the 
breadth of qualitative and quantitative studies of the economic, social and 
cultural impacts of mobile telephony in the developing world documented in the 
previous chapters, specific interpretive analyses of the relationship between 
mobile telephony and security are essential to inform theory-building on this 
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topic. Although widespread anecdotal evidence of ambiguities surrounding the 
use and impacts of mobile telephony emerges throughout this literature, limited 
systematic analyses are available on user perceptions of crime and security 
threats associated with mobile telephony in the developing world, or on the 
social and situational conditions affecting vulnerability to these threats. This 
dearth of background information on mobile phone-related crime and insecurity 
precludes the systematic development, operationalization, and analysis of 
variables necessary for purely quantitative analysis of this topic. Mixed methods 
research entails the collection, analysis, and integration of both quantitative and 
qualitative data, facilitating a more thorough analytical and exploratory 
engagement with the research domain than either method alone (Brewer & 
Hunter, 2006; Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson, et al., 
2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009), and is well suited to this research. 
Qualitative research was conducted to explore users’ perceptions and 
experiences (Creswell, 2009) of mobile telephony for crime and security, 
recognising the centrality of users’ interpretations for this analysis. The 
qualitative approach also facilitated the development of study questions and 
procedures, building from the themes identified as important to participants 
(ibid). During this study a number of crime and security threats emerged which 
had not previously been identified in existing studies. The qualitative methods 
used were flexible enough to enable study participants to introduce these new 
themes, and facilitated engagement with unexpected findings. 
In the conclusion to a recent special edition of the Journal of Peace Research 
on Communication, Technology and Political Conflict, Dafoe and Lyall (2015) 
note that the reliance on large-scale analyses of quantitative secondary data to 
examine the relationship between mobile phones and conflict events may 
obscure mechanisms and dynamics informing this relationship which qualitative 
methods could reveal. These authors reflect that interpretive data are valuable 
for the elaboration of theory and for informing the development of statistical 
models. Wasserman (2011) also critiques the prevalence of speculative 
assumptions underpinning quantitative, macro-level studies on the impacts of 
mobile telephony on insecurity in Africa, highlighting the need for qualitative 
data to inform analyses of the relationship between access figures and 
particular development and democratisation outcomes. While official census-
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level data on mobile phone ownership are available in East Africa, these official 
statistics are complicated by the sharing practices described in the previous 
chapter. As Chapter Two demonstrates, commercial estimates of mobile 
penetration may also obscure culturally specific patterns of mobile use. These 
include secondary users who access mobile telephony through shared 
handsets, patterns of multiple-SIM ownership and use and differences in use 
habits between and within social and demographic groups (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Burrell, 2010; James, 2011; 2014; James & Vesteeg, 2007; Tenhunen, 2008). 
Furthermore, as Gill notes in developing world contexts,  
Official statistics are often most unsatisfactory. They are 
characterised by unreliability, gaps, over-aggregation, 
inaccuracies, mutual inconsistencies and lack of timely 
reporting. (1993, p. 3) 
Furthermore, official figures describe only mobile phone penetration and do not 
collect data on experiences of crime and security associated with these tools. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no data are available on the crime and 
security impacts of mobile phone use in developing world settings. Agencies 
disseminating anti-violence messages through mobile networks have not 
published data on their recipients or scale of operations beyond anecdotal 
commentary, and industry-level data for individual users are unavailable.  
In order to address these weaknesses, primary quantitative data were collected 
to facilitate statistical analysis of patterns and correlates of crime in developing 
world settings. However, quantitative research is reliant on the accurate and 
systematic identification, operationalization and measurement of the variables 
of interest (Creswell, 2009). In this study, it was not possible to fully 
operationalize the variables of interest in advance due to the limited availability 
of existing studies addressing this topic. Therefore, a mixed methods approach 
provides the opportunity to draw out and interrogate the relevant conditions and 
contexts that influence both crime and crime prevention associated with mobile 
phones, and to iteratively investigate these variables throughout the period of 
data collection. 
Critically for this study, mixed methods research is also recommended for 
research addressing dynamic, emerging processes, paradoxes, and 
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contradictions as they provide a means to explain findings generated by one 
method with the other (Bryman, 2006; Greene, et al., 1989). It is anticipated that 
user experiences of the crime and security impacts of mobile phones are likely 
to be complex and dynamic, as mobile penetration increases and new users 
adopt these technologies. These conditions necessitate a flexible and iterative 
research design. Mixed methods therefore facilitate a deeper engagement with 
the aims of the research, as quantitative tools enable the collection of numerical 
data illuminating trends and patterns, while qualitative methods provide study 
participants with opportunities to elaborate and explain their experiences and 
perceptions of mobile tools, and describe their value in relation to both personal 
and communal wellbeing. In this study, examining perceptions of threats 
vulnerabilities and mitigation mechanisms required a nuanced and iterative 
analysis of data from a range of sources; the perceptions of individual users, 
communities and agencies inform the analysis of the findings. The qualitative 
and quantitative data reveal contradictions in users’ attitudes to mobile 
telephony and provide mechanisms through which to interactively analyse 
different data types and interrogate their contradictions. The perceived 
ambiguities associated with mobile telephony are a recurring theme emerging 
from the primary data, which is triangulated and interrogated through analysis of 
the qualitative and quantitative data collected.  
Another benefit associated with mixed method research is the utility of using the 
findings derived from one method to develop research tools for use with the 
other (Greene, et al., 1989). In this study, this methodological interactivity is 
valuable. For example, the qualitative interviews provided a means to access 
local knowledge that subsequently informed the identification of suitable survey 
data collection locations. Information provided by interviewees also contributed 
to the development of suitable survey question formats, appropriate 
terminology, and FGD discussion topics, and illuminated sensitive topics with 
the potential to cause offense. The iterative design facilitates interaction 
between and within methods and phases, each method and phase influenced 
recursively by each other.  
The philosophical framework adopted for the design of this research is 
pragmatism, which is described by Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner as, “a 
well-developed and attractive philosophy for integrating perspectives and 
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approaches” (2007, p. 125). Pragmatism provides an epistemological 
justification and logic for mixing approaches and methods. Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011) note that pragmatism, unlike other theoretical frameworks, focuses 
on the consequences of research. It uses both inductive and deductive analysis 
to accommodate multiple perspectives on reality and accepting that both 
objective and subjective knowledge are valuable for research. Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie and Turner argue that pragmatism provides, “a philosophy that 
supports paradigm integration and helps mixed research to peacefully coexist 
with the philosophies of quantitative and qualitative research” (2007, p. 125). 
Thus pragmatism serves to bridge the gap between the empirical, scientific 
approach and subjective, qualitative methods of inquiry used in this study. 
Pragmatism is also well suited for this analysis of the application of opportunity 
theories to new types of crime in the mobile network. The methods most 
commonly associated with SCP are problem-oriented, action research 
approaches (Clarke, 1997), through which data are gathered and analysed, 
preventative strategies formulated, monitored and reviewed (Ekblom, 1988). 
The pragmatic approach encourages the application of research methodologies 
that ‘work’, for which mixed methods are eminently well suited. As Howe 
concedes, “in the end, a philosophical perspective is valuable just to the extent 
that it helps to shape practice” (2003, pp. 44-45).  
Recognising the multiple influences affecting mobile phone ownership and use, 
and the ambiguous interpretations of these communications tools for personal 
and social wellbeing and harm, pragmatism provides a suitable theoretical 
framework for exploring and explaining these complexities through the use of a 
mixed method interactive design. The pragmatic approach was also adopted in 
responses to methodological challenges; access to the refugee populations 
researched in Uganda was facilitated through partnership with GSMA and the 
support of UN OCHA and UNHCR. Collaboration with these organisations 
provided a unique opportunity to collect primary data on mobile telephony and 
perceptions of security and to potentially influence policy decision-making to 
enhance the protection of vulnerable populations. As Jacobsen and Landau 
assert, "Studies on forced migrants should aim to meet the dual imperatives of 
scholarship and impact: both to satisfy the demand of the academy, and to 
ensure that the knowledge from studies is used to improve refugees’ welfare 
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and protection” (2003, p. 11). Collaboration with agencies offered an opportunity 
to disseminate the study findings more broadly, and to inform the theory and 
practice of ICTD through enhancing the knowledge base on crime and security 
threats and vulnerabilities affecting vulnerable populations.  
4.5 Selected methods 
Three research methods were employed for the collection of the primary data 
informing this study: in-depth interviews, FGDs, and surveys. This section 
describes each of these methods, outlines sampling procedures and describes 
the data collection instruments (provided in Appendices 1-4).   
4.5.1 In-depth interviews 
In-depth interviews were selected in order to collect qualitative data from key 
stakeholders responsible for responding to crime threats and using mobile 
phone networks to prevent outbreaks of violence. This method enabled the 
researcher to engage with these key informants though a flexible, discursive 
format (Kvale, 1996) and to examine their experiences and attitudes to mobile 
phones as crime-enhancing or crime-reducing tools. Guion, Diehl and 
McDonald note that in-depth interviews, “are most appropriate for situations in 
which you want to ask open-ended questions that elicit depth of information 
from relatively few people” (2011, p. 1), and interviews were useful in this study 
for several purposes. Some interviews were conducted to facilitate the 
methodological design of the study. These occurred prior to the FGDs and 
survey administration, in order to collect feedback on the planned data 
collection instruments and survey implementation methods. This included 
soliciting advice on the local context, culture, research etiquette, and attitudes to 
surveys amongst the general public. The data informs the subsequent analysis 
of the guardianship of mobile phone networks, responsibility for the prevention 
of mobile phone crime and mechanisms designed to enhance the reporting and 
prevention of other types of crime utilising mobile phone networks. 
The sampling method chosen for the in-depth interviews was purposive. The 
initial identification of interview participants was based on a thorough review 
and analysis of the available literature and institutional publications in order to 
identify information-rich individuals, a technique termed ‘critical case sampling’ 
(Patton, 1990) in which researchers select, “…those (individuals) that can make 
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a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important in the 
scheme of things” (Patton, 1990, p. 174). Each informant was then asked for 
recommendations of other individuals who might be able to provide valuable 
information. Patton describes this snowball sampling as, “an approach for 
locating information-rich key informants or critical cases” (1990, p. 176).  
Each potential interviewee was first contacted by telephone or email, informed 
of the research aims and affiliations, and asked if they were willing to meet to 
discuss their views and experiences on the use of mobile telephony for 
enhancing or reducing the perceived security of users. Interviews were then 
arranged and conducted with willing participants, face-to-face in their 
workplaces. In Kenya, the interviews were semi-structured using an interview 
guide provided in tables 2 and 3. The semi-structured interview method was 
used in order to, “help the interviewer focus on topics that are important to 
explore, maintain consistency across interviews with different respondents, and 
stay on track during the interview process” (Guion, et al., 2011, p. 2). In 
Uganda, the interviews were unstructured in order to facilitate a flexible 
approach to the collection of data from a diverse range of study participants, 
conducted under challenging logistical conditions within Kyangwali Refugee 
settlement.  
De-briefing interviews were also conducted with each of the research assistants 
involved in the administration of questionnaires (transcripts are included in 
Appendix 5). These data are used in part to critically engage with the reliability 
and content of the survey data collected, and in part to facilitate critical 
reflection on the methodological approach, instruments, and sample (Araali, 
2011). 
Key characteristics of the in-depth interviews were open-ended questions (often 
beginning why or how) which encouraged respondents to expound on a 
particular topic, a semi-structured format which allowed a conversational flow to 
develop, and the use of active listening skills to interpret and seek clarity 
(Guion, et al., 2011). Particular questions, termed probes, were asked to 
encourage respondents to add detail, elaborate on or clarify their responses 
(Patton, 1990) when necessary. For example, participants were asked to 
explain their meaning if responses were unclear, to provide more information 
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about a particular topic of interest, or to add more detail about particularly 
relevant comments and responses. 
Concerning the structure of the interviews, following Guion, Diehl and McDonald 
(2011) initial introductions included a clear explanation of the study purpose. 
This aimed to put the participant at ease, and furthermore Walsham (2006) 
notes that understanding the researcher’s agenda increases openness and 
willingness to participate. Based on interpretive research conducted in sixteen 
countries, Walsham suggests that interview participants are generally willing to 
discuss their personal and professional experiences with,  
…reasonable openness and honesty, provided that they 
perceive the researcher’s sincerity of  interest, feel that they 
understand the researcher’s agenda, and trust the researcher’s 
statements on confidentiality. (Walsham, 2006, p. 323) 
Accordingly, clarifying the purpose and boundaries of the research prior to 
conducting interviews was critical, and respondents were given the opportunity 
to ask questions and engage with the topic of the research at the beginning of 
each interview. The discussion topics and prompts developed in the interview 
guide were introduced in a flexible manner according to the flow of each 
discussion, with the sequence largely guided by interviewees’ responses. 
The question of whether or not to record interviews is also a relevant 
consideration for this study. Guion, Diehl and McDonald (2011) suggest 
obtaining permission for audio recording, recommended in combination with 
written field notes containing observations of both verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour as well as personal reflections about the interview. However, there 
are benefits and costs associated with recording interviews. Recording ensures 
the collection of a true record of the interview, frees the researcher to 
concentrate fully  and enables the researcher to return to the transcript later and 
select direct quotes (Walsham, 2006). However, recording devices are likely to 
reduce trust and make respondents less open and honest, and only provide a 
partial record of the full spectrum of verbal and non-verbal cues (ibid). 
Nevertheless, where participants granted permission interviews were digitally 
recorded. These recordings were subsequently transcribed and supplemented 
by written field notes.  
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4.5.1.1 Interview Guide 
Two interview guides were developed for use in Kenya: one for interviewing 
representatives of organisations using mobile tools for peace-building and 
violence prevention (see table 2) and one for local research assistants after the 
administration of questionnaires (table 3). As stated previously, interview guides 
were not used in Uganda. 
 
Table 2: Interview discussion themes in Kenya 
No. Discussion Theme 
1. Background information about their organisational affiliation and 
objectives in using mobile phones to prevent, mitigate or de-escalate 
violence 
2. Reasons for using mobile phones for peace-building 
3. Users and scope of the mechanism 
4. Reflections on the impact and effectiveness of the mechanism 
6. Community responses and informal communication of message content 
7. Core concerns and priorities of organisation 
 
Table 3: Interview discussion themes with local research assistants in Kenya 
No. Discussion Theme 
1. Background information about the locations of data collection  
2. Overall impressions relating to administering the questionnaires 
3. Impression of participants’ responses to the questionnaires 
4. Surprising or unexpected experiences 
5. Effect of administering the questionnaires on personal attitudes  
6. Most memorable experience  
7. Challenges  
4.5.1.2 Limitations 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews provide a method through which to access 
detailed information from a small sample of respondents. The interview 
participants were selected according to their relevance for the present study, 
and provide valuable data about the relationship between mobile phones, crime 
and crime prevention. However, they do not provide a representative sample of 
relevant organisations, nor do the individuals selected represent their 
organisations in any formal capacity. Furthermore, the participants’ responses 
are likely to be informed by a number of factors, ranging from the timing and 
location of the interview, their personal opinions and attitudes, their 
organisational mandate, perceptions of the purpose of the interview and 
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expectations regarding the use of the data collected, and the demeanour and 
non-verbal signals of the interviewer. These limitations are addressed in part 
through the use of an interview protocol including clear and standardised 
introductions (Kvale, 1996). Primarily however, these are mitigated through 
maintaining awareness of, and sensitivity to, these potential biases. For 
example, conducting interviews in comfortable locations during a convenient 
time for the participant, explaining clearly how the data are analysed and used, 
and providing assurances regarding anonymity for any sensitive content 
provided.  
Three recorded interview transcripts are included in Appendix 8, and the issue 
is discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. The remaining interviews were 
recorded by hand, supplemented by additional notes recorded immediately after 
each interview. Accordingly, the interview quotes provided in the Results 
chapter may not be precise verbatim reproductions of the interviewee’s 
statements as they are based on these hand-recorded notes. 
Despite these challenges, interviews nevertheless provide opportunities to 
collect in-depth information from key stakeholders, both to inform the study and 
to contribute to refinements to the other data collection instruments.  
4.5.2 Focus Group Discussions 
This study draws on data from focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted with 
mobile phone owners, users and non-users to investigate experiences of mobile 
phone crime and crime prevention. FGDs comprise a form of group interview in 
which both the content of the discussions and the in-group interaction are 
valuable sources of data (Kitzinger, 1995; Redmond & Curtis, 2009). The aims 
of this research are well suited to this method as it enables the observation of 
interactive debates about ambiguous perceptions of both threats and benefits 
associated with mobile telephony.  
Generating and collecting data within a group setting provides opportunities for 
the researcher to observe group dynamics, non-verbal communication, jokes, 
anecdotes and teasing. As Kitzinger notes, "gaining access to such variety of 
communication is useful because people's knowledge and attitudes are not 
entirely encapsulated in reasoned responses to direct questions" (1995, p. 299). 
In this study, the interpersonal dynamics of the FGDs provides additional 
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insights into participants’ attitudes to topics such as the effectiveness of crime 
control mechanisms. 
FGDs are generally regarded as unsuitable when seeking a consensus, or for 
the discussion of sensitive or personal information, when the environment is 
emotionally charged, or when there is conflict between group members 
(Krueger & Casey, 2000). Furthermore the lack of confidentiality associated with 
the group setting can be problematic in some circumstances, for example when 
information is sensitive (ibid). However, in this study the investigation of the 
topics of interest was founded on expectations of differences of opinion, and the 
group dynamics therefore presented a useful mechanism for comparing 
responses and attitudes among group members, and identifying topics of 
dissention. The content of the discussions does not include personal or 
sensitive information, but nevertheless required a degree of engagement that 
was more easily obtained through the format of a group discussion rather than 
an individual interview.  
The topics addressed during the FGDs were not personal or sensitive, and the 
group format of this method was well suited to examining both individual and 
communal experiences associated with mobile telephony. Furthermore, a 
related benefit of the interactive style of FGDs is the potential for creating a 
‘cascade effect’ of ideas and information recall, through which memories are 
triggered and opinions developed with reference to the experiences shared by 
others in the group (Lindlof & Taylor, 2010). This technique was particularly 
effective as participants were asked to recall past events, such as the previous 
election period. During these discussions, the contributions of some group 
members reminded other participants of their own experiences, prompting their 
contributions to the discussion. However, it is recognised that group discussion 
of past events may contribute to recall biases, as shared stories may affect 
participants’ memories of personal experiences.  
FGDs are regarded as particularly valuable for the collection of exploratory or 
background information on a topic where little is known or previously published 
(Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999; Stewart, et al., 2007). This research seeks to 
illuminate the understudied security implications of mobile penetration, a new 
area of investigation well suited to the exploratory nature of the FGD method. 
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Furthermore, as a result of the shared nature of mobile phone use discussed in 
Chapter Two (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Burrell, 2010; James, 2011; 2014; James & 
Vesteeg, 2007; Tenhunen, 2008), FGD discussions revealed interesting themes 
and dynamics between participants regarding communal practices of sharing. 
FGDs were also particularly appropriate for this research because they do not 
discriminate against illiterate participants, and also encourage participation from 
those who may be unwilling to be interviewed alone (Kitzinger, 1995). This was 
particularly valuable in Uganda where FGD participants comprised rural 
populations with low literacy rates. Ultimately, FGDs provided a data collection 
mechanism which was well suited to the conditions and topics of this study.  
4.5.2.1 Sampling Method  
In Kenya, FGD participants were recruited using a purposive sampling method, 
in which, “certain predetermined criteria and characteristics are identified for in-
depth, qualitative analysis” (Patton, 1990, p. 177). Three conditions were 
specified: These participants were required, 1) to own or use a mobile 
telephone, 2) to have resided in Kenya during the 2007/8 post-election period, 
and 3) to be over the age of 18. In Uganda, due to logistical challenges 
foreseen in relation to conducting FGDs in refugee villages, only adults were 
invited to participate in the FGDs; no other constraints were imposed on 
participation.  
Opinions are divided regarding the ideal of homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
FGD participants. Redmond and Curtis (2009) argue that commonalities 
between group members are beneficial, as homogeneity "permits free-flowing 
discussions among participants" (2009, p. 63), citing sex, age, race and social 
class as attributes commonly considered. Acknowledging that the goal is 
homogeneity in background and not homogeneity in attitudes, they argue that, 
 …in selecting group participants, it is necessary to ensure that 
every member of the group is able to contribute. Moreover, 
participants must feel comfortable talking to each other and a 
huge disparity in social background may prevent this. 
(Redmond & Curtis, 2009, p. 63)  
In contrast, Kitzinger (1995) argues that while most researchers aim to facilitate 
homogenous FGDs, diverse groups can facilitate the exploration of different 
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perspectives and provide more interesting data for analysis. Vaughn, Shay 
Shymm and Sinagub (1996) also suggest that heterogeneous groups may be 
appropriate in some contexts, such as when a diverse group may reveal 
different explanations for observed phenomena, acknowledging that dissimilar 
participants may stimulate interesting dynamics and differences of opinion. 
Recognising the benefits associated with both homogenous and heterogeneous 
FGDs, for the present study a heterogeneous group of between seven and ten 
men and women of various ethnicities were invited to participate in FGD 
discussions. As the topics under discussion were not deemed to be gender-
sensitive, a heterogeneous sample was appropriate to facilitate the observation 
of relevant intergroup dynamics, enabling the experiences of both male and 
female respondents to be introduced and discussed within the mixed group. In 
order to facilitate the collection of a diversity of data, FGDs were composed of 
both community members and ‘community leaders’. This composition provided 
interesting perspectives and further stimulated group discussions. Kitzinger 
cautions that, particularly among heterogeneous FGDs, "it is important to be 
aware of how hierarchy within the group may affect the data" (Kitzinger, 1995, 
p. 300). The impact of the intra-group power dynamics is examined in Chapter 
Seven.  
Finally, opinions vary on the ideal size of a FGD (Redmond & Curtis, 2009; 
Kitzinger, 1995).  For Kitzinger (1995), a FGD ideally consists of between 4 and 
8 participants, although she describes examples ranging from 6-50, depending 
on the purpose of the discussion. Redmond and Curtis (2009) recommend 
inviting between 3 and 14 participants, cautioning that small groups are more 
easily dominated. Redmond and Curtis note that, "…whatever the decision 
regarding the size of the group, it is important to recruit more people than are 
required" (2009, p. 65), and suggest informing participants in advance of the 
possibility that they may be asked to leave if numbers exceed the planned 
target. It was anticipated that between seven and ten participants would be 
invited to participate in each of the FGDs, assuming that some invited 
participants would not attend. This is discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. 
4.5.2.2 Procedures 
Vaughn, Shay Shymm and Sinagub (1996) provide an outline for the 
implementation of FGDs. They suggest the prior development of a FGD guide 
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to serve as a map. In terms of order, they suggest first an introduction to the 
group and the research, some gentle warm up questions (e.g. regarding 
travelling to the site) and the clarification of key terms to be discussed. They 
then suggest beginning the session with easy, non-threatening questions before 
introducing more difficult ones, summarising the session, checking in with 
participants and finally providing a closing statement.  
Two FGDs were conducted in Kenya in the regional capital Nakuru and in the 
town of Naivasha, both of which experienced high rates of violence during the 
2007/8 election period (KNCHR, 2006). FGDs were conducted in a college hall 
in Naivasha and a hotel conference room in Nakuru. Information was collected 
on the age, sex, occupation and ethnicity of these FGD participants, and is 
provided in the Kenya chapter. In Uganda, three FGDs were conducted in 
villages within the Kyangwali refugee settlement. The locations were in the 
shade of a partially constructed building in Kisonga, under a large tree in 
Malembo and in a church in the long-established village of Kentome. In Kenya, 
participants were provided with refreshments during the FGD. However, in 
Uganda refreshments were not provided, a decision informed by the interviews 
conducted with staff at UNHCR and other service providers, and in line with 
accepted institutional practices. It was critical to align the research procedures 
with the accepted practices of organisations operating within Kyangwali 
settlement, as Walsham cautions, "Stories about researchers pass rapidly 
around an organization, and being a nuisance is not only a morally dubious 
practice, but is instrumentally foolish" (2006, p. 322). Acknowledging and 
respecting local practices was essential for this fieldwork.  
The FGDs were hosted during weekday afternoons, lasting one to one and a 
half hours. In Kenya, each FGD followed a similar format. Chairs were arranged 
in a circle (Kitzinger, 1995). Group members were welcomed and introduced to 
the researcher, research aims and the scope of the project. Participants were 
then informed about their rights to decline to comment on the topics discussed 
and to withdraw at any time, and informed consent for participation was gained 
from each participant. Following these introductions, a structured format was 
followed (see table 4). FGD discussions and interactions were recorded in 
handwritten note form and later transcribed into digital format. FGDs were also 
intended to be digitally recorded, following initial testing of the recording 
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devices, but the locations and sizes of the groups precluded this, and the 
recordings were of insufficient quality to enable transcriptions. Accordingly, the 
quotes provided in the Results chapter are based on the handwritten FGD notes 
taken during each session. 
In Uganda, the FGDs were intended to be gender-segregated, with separate 
groups for men and women to account for power imbalances and encourage 
open participation from all group members. Attempts to control the gender 
composition and group size were foiled by exigencies: The public locations of 
the FGD sessions rendered it impossible to restrict access or participation, 
examined in depth in 7.7.  
4.5.2.3 FGD Tool 
The FGD tool in Kenya included a summary of the introductions and aims of the 
research and eight core topics for discussion (see table 4). A full list of 
questions is included in Appendix 3. 
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Table 4: FGD Topics in Kenya 
No. Topic 
1 Importance of mobile phones:  Participants were asked about the 
uses of mobile phones, access and availability by different community 
members and particular situations when they may be most useful. 
2 Communication habits and attitudes to appropriate uses of mobile 
phones: Communication methods were discussed, including the 
relative trustworthiness of different methods, and the use of mobile 
phones in particular for the communication of political information. 
3 Hate-speech and coordination of violence using mobile phones 
during the 2007/8 Elections: Participants were asked to recall how 
mobile phones were used during this period, including hate-speech and 
rumour, and whether they were also used to contact police, security 
forces, etc.    
4 Receipt of peace SMS or hate-speech during the 2013 election 
period: Participants were asked if they had received particular types of 
messages and from whom they originated. 
6 Effectiveness of peace SMS campaigns and mobile-enabled 
violence prevention mechanisms: Participants were asked to 
discuss peace SMS and violence prevention campaigns using mobile 
phones 
7 Potential of mobile telephony: The general impact of increasing 
access to mobile phones on peace, violence, crime and security was 
discussed. 
8 Regulation and Monitoring: Attitudes to government regulation and 
monitoring and their impact on mobile phone use were sought. 
 
In Uganda, the FGD instrument addressed eight topics, as shown in table 5. A 
full list of questions is included in Appendix 4. 
  
120 
 
Table 5: FGD Topics Uganda 
4.5.2.4 Limitations  
Several disadvantages have been identified in relation to FGD discussions. 
These include the small sample sizes that preclude the collection of 
representative data from larger populations, while moderating and controlling 
group discussions is challenging and participants may digress into irrelevant 
topics (Kitzinger, 1995; Redmond & Curtis, 2009). Participants’ responses may 
also be influenced by the responses of others in the group, and the use of 
heterogeneous participants exacerbates the potential biases associated with 
peer pressure and conformity to the norms of the group (Kitzinger, 1995). In 
particular, the inclusion of respected community leaders may bias participant 
responses if group members agree with their views even if they contrast with 
their own opinions. Further to this, participants may align their responses with 
answers they perceive to be desired by the moderators, informed by the 
No. Topic 
1 Communication methods: Respondents were asked to explain the 
methods they used for communicating with other refugees in the 
settlement, with service providers, and with distant families. 
2 Priority Communications Needs: Participants were asked about who, 
when and what they most needed to communicate. 
3 Ownership and Use: Group members were asked about access to 
mobile phones within the group and the wider community, and 
discussed the challenges associated with mobile ownership and use. 
4 Challenges: Challenges and impediments to mobile ownership and 
use were discussed. 
5 Benefits: Participants were asked about perceived benefits of mobile 
telephony compared to other forms of communication. 
6 Trustworthiness: Participants were asked about the reliability of 
information received through mobile channels. 
7 Safety and Security: The impact of mobiles on perceptions of security 
were discussed. 
8 Privacy: Participants were asked about any potential privacy concerns 
around mobile calls and SMS content.   
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phrasing or sequencing of questions or non-verbal cues such as body language 
and gestures. 
These risks were mitigated as far as possible by maintaining an awareness of, 
and a commitment to, adopting a neutral, unbiased tone and body language 
during group discussions, encouraging participants to speak freely, and 
remaining sensitive to the non-verbal cues and body language of group 
members. These strategies may illuminate group dynamics informing participant 
responses, enabling the facilitator to probe more deeply into particular topics. 
Finally, the FGD data were also triangulated with the data collected from the 
surveys and interviews to cross check the content and identify the emergence 
of contradictory, contrasting, and connecting themes.  
4.5.3 Survey 
The final data collection method used in this study, which facilitated the 
collection of both qualitative and quantitative data, was the survey. Survey 
research involves the collection of information from a sample of a wider 
population based on responses to questions, generating standardised data from 
a (relatively) large number of individuals (Creswell, 2009; Groves, et al., 2004). 
Recognising the limitations associated with the available secondary data 
described previously, the survey was designed and conducted to collect the 
primary data required for this study, and included both open and closed 
questions.  
4.5.3.1 Sampling Method 
In both Kenya and Uganda, survey participants were selected through non-
probabilistic sampling methods. Acknowledging the benefits associated with 
probability sampling for generalising findings to broader populations, the 
absence of suitable sampling frames precluded the use of probabilistic methods 
for this study. Patton notes,  
The logic and power of probability sampling depends on 
selecting a truly random and statistically representative sample 
that will permit confident generalization from the sample to a 
larger population. The purpose is generalization. (Patton, 1990, 
p. 169) 
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Probability sampling reduces sources of error, defined as, “random variation 
from the true characteristics of the population” (Fowler, 2009, p. 13), by giving 
each member of the target population an equal chance of selection. In practice, 
degrees of error are inevitable in any sampling method as, “surveys are 
conducted in the uncontrolled settings of the real world and can be affected by 
those settings” (Groves, et al., 2004, p. 33). This study was conducted in 
particularly complex settings, and in order to access a sample of the target 
population it was necessary to employ a flexible approach to survey data 
collection.  
Firstly, door-to-door and postal surveys were rejected as inappropriate. Within 
slum areas and refugee settlements, streets lack signage and even names, 
housing is ad-hoc, and all residents may not be officially registered (Grabska, 
2006). In refugee settlements these issues are compounded by the temporary 
nature of dwellings and high turnover of residents (UNHCR 2015). These 
challenges have previously been documented, for example Jacobsen and 
Landau (2007) describe the difficulties of ensuring random selection of 
participants in the absence of available sampling frames, noting that most 
researchers studying migrants and refugees rely on snowball sampling and 
small sample sizes, increasing risks of bias. 
Online surveys and online digital data processing are gaining popularity in 
Western contexts and offer cost and scale benefits. However, online sampling 
excludes all but the wealthiest participants in developing world settings (Munro, 
2012), and was therefore inappropriate for this study. A telephone survey was 
inappropriate as the study draws on data from users and non-users of mobile 
phones, and fixed line telephony remains uncommon in both Kenya and 
Uganda (Sharma & Gillet, 2014). Furthermore, literacy and language barriers 
were a consideration when designing the survey strategy. Self-completion 
surveys inevitably exclude illiterate and poorly educated respondents. 
Conducting questionnaires in person provided a means to access otherwise 
inaccessible respondents, increasing opportunities for participation.  
Recognising the challenges associated with accessing a probabilistic sample, 
the sampling strategy of this research was opportunistic, targeting adult mobile 
users and non-users in target areas affected by crisis and violence in Kenya 
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and Uganda. Surveys were conducted in public areas characterised by high 
footfall during working hours, inviting every 6th passer-by to participate to reduce 
selection bias. This opportunistic method was appropriate for this study given 
the aims and constraints of the research and target sample, acknowledging that 
the strategy precluded the generalisation of statistical findings to wider 
populations. Despite this, the survey data collection strategy enabled the 
identification of patterns and trends to inform the development of theoretical and 
analytical generalisations. 
4.5.3.2 Local Research Assistants 
The survey questionnaires were designed to be administered by local research 
assistants. In a study of Sudanese refugees in Cairo, Grabska notes that using 
local researchers enhanced the security of both respondents and researchers 
as, “precarious security conditions made it difficult for western (white) foreigners 
to access the households of those refugees” (Grabska, 2006, p. 291). 
Accordingly, the majority of Grabska’s interviews were conducted by Sudanese 
refugee research assistants (six men and two women). Donner (2006) also 
reports using six trilingual research assistants to collect survey data on mobile 
phone use in markets in Rwanda. Reflecting on the use of local assistants when 
conducting research among multi-ethnic groups, Grabska notes, 
As the refugee community is quite diverse and there are certain 
levels of mistrust and tensions between different tribes and 
ethnic groups, research assistants were selected from a variety 
of backgrounds and from different regions in Sudan. (Grabska, 
2006, p. 291) 
Acknowledging that working with locals is widely believed to improve the ease 
of conducting field-based research, Jacobsen and Landau note that it can also 
introduce ethical and methodological issues. They note that in highly sectarian 
countries the, "research assistant may be associated - by name, appearance, 
access, style of dress - with a group the respondent either fears or despises" 
(Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 9). They caution that involving local people in the 
data collection, "risks transgressing political, social or economic fault-lines of 
which the researcher may not be aware" (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 9). This 
risk is acknowledged in the present research, but it was determined that the 
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benefits outweighed these potential risks. Logistically, local researchers were 
better equipped to navigate the areas and relate to local respondents than a 
white European researcher. Local fieldworkers were also fluent in local 
languages and familiar with appropriate behaviours and customs, increasing the 
ease with which respondents were able to relate to them. As a reliability check, 
the questionnaires were coded to include the name of each administrator in 
order to enable the identification of systemic biases which may be associated 
with any particular individual. 
Research assistants were recruited according to several criteria. They were 
required to have previous research experience, be fluent in at least one local 
language, be over the age of 18 and be comfortable working in the selected 
areas. They also reflected a range of ethnic affiliations. This was particularly 
critical in Kenya where ethnicity was identified as a crucial factor in the post-
election violence (CIPEV, 2008). Both male and female fieldworkers were 
recruited. Local translators, both male and female, were also recruited within 
the Kyangwali settlement according to UNHCR recommendations, chosen for 
their fluency in the numerous local Congolese dialects.  
Survey administrators were provided with thorough training prior to their 
deployment in the field. Fowler and Mangione describe the importance of 
survey interviewer training, noting that, "the evidence is clear that a lack of 
standardized interviewing procedures will produce significant, identifiable 
interviewer-related error" (1990, p. 30). They argue that maximising the 
consistency with which survey is administrated reduces interviewer-related 
error, and suggest providing standardised procedures for interviewers to follow. 
These include requiring interviewers to read the questions precisely as they are 
worded, to record answers precisely as they are spoken, probe for clarification 
(if required) in an unbiased manner, and to communicate a neutral, non-
judgemental stance. They prescribe that,  
…the interviewer should not provide any personal information 
that might imply any particular values or preferences with 
respect to topics to be covered in the interview, nor should the 
interviewer provide any feedback to respondents, positive or 
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negative, with respect to the specific content of the answers 
they provide. (Fowler & Mangione, 1990, p. 33) 
While it has been demonstrated that seemingly small changes in the wording of 
questions can result in differences of interpretation and response (Shuman & 
Presser, 1981), other studies suggest that standardisation may actually 
increase measurement errors by limiting interviewers’ ability to clarify meaning, 
resulting in differences in interpretation (Suchman & Jordan, 1990). Suchman 
and Jordan (1990) propose a more conversational survey interview style, in 
which meaning, rather than wording, is standardised as far as possible, arguing 
that this style produces more accurate responses than standardised interviews. 
However, Schober and Conrad (1997) acknowledge that while the 
conversational style increases accuracy, it also increases the duration of 
interviews. For this research a conversational survey interview style was 
adopted. Accepting that this style can increase the duration of interviews and 
introduce additional bias, the heterogeneity of the research participants and 
variety of languages and cultures required a flexible approach. This style of 
survey administration facilitated clarification of both the aims of the research 
and the questions included in the survey instrument. 
Survey administrators attended a half-day training session prior to conducting 
the surveys. The team was first introduced to the aims and scope of the 
research, and invited to share their previous experiences in conducting 
research and administering questionnaires. The methodology was introduced, 
including the sampling method and the need to record response rates. Practical 
and security considerations were discussed including suggestions regarding 
how to respond to questions about the survey and research project, appropriate 
responses to those not wishing to participate, and broader safety 
considerations. The team were encouraged to ensure that their appearance and 
dress was appropriate, and to maintain a pleasant demeanour and a neutral 
tone and manner throughout the survey administration in order to minimise the 
risk of interviewer bias. The questionnaire was discussed in depth, including 
procedures for framing and standardising the question formats, methods to 
clarify questions, and appropriate prompts. This was followed by a discussion of 
research ethics, particularly focusing on participants’ rights to anonymity and to 
withdraw at any time, and the need to obtain their informed consent prior to 
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participation. The team were then invited to review the participant information 
sheet and provided feedback on its clarity and design. They also offered 
suggestions for the refinement of the survey tool, including the replacement of 
terms for commonly-used local terminology (e.g. describing electoral candidates 
as ‘aspirants’). An outline of the training session is provided in Appendix 6.  
4.5.3.3 Procedures 
Prior to deploying questionnaires in the field, a pilot study or pre-test is 
recommended in order to identify potential issues and sources of 
misunderstanding (Fowler, 2009). An initial pilot study was conducted 
immediately after the training period using a convenience sample of passers-by 
in order to reveal inconsistencies and design weaknesses in the questionnaire 
and any other concerns or issues around its administration.  
Feedback was sought from questionnaire administrators on their impressions 
and experiences during the process of administration and the completed 
questionnaires were carefully examined, identifying ways in which the 
instrument could be refined, including clarifying the structure of questions and 
adding guidance information for the survey administrators. Logistical challenges 
were identified and addressed at this pilot stage. Following training and the pilot 
study, questionnaires were revised and administered by local research 
assistants in each of the selected locations. 
In Kenya, fieldwork sites were selected according to the reported occurrence of 
violence during the 2007-8 election period. Within Nairobi, target areas were 
disadvantaged suburbs characterised by slum-style dwellings. Two of the 
selected areas, the informal settlement of Kibera and the Somali-dominated 
suburb of Eastleigh, were violent hotspots during the 2007/8 post-election 
period (CIPEV, 2008; Deacon, 2013; Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2008). The 
other two selected areas, Mathare, one of Africa’s largest urban slums and 
Kawangware, another slum area, were less seriously affected by violence 
during this period (CIPEV, 2008).  
The cities of Naivasha, Nakuru and Eldoret along the Rift Valley (see figure 4), 
were also selected as they also experienced high levels of inter-ethnic violence 
during the 2007/8 post-election period (Deacon, 2013; Livingstone, 2013; 
Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2008). Within each area, public locations were 
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chosen for the administration of the questionnaires. These were characterised 
by high footfall, access to public transport, and selected to maximise the safety 
of the research team. 
 
Figure 4: Map of Kenya marked with data collection locations 
 
A total of 297 adults were surveyed in Kenya: 202 in Nairobi over two week-
days between the hours of 7am and 7pm, and 95 in the cities of Nakuru, 
Naivasha and Eldoret in the Rift Valley, during similar times over a three day 
period.  
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Figure 5: Map of Uganda marked with data collection locations 
Kampala is home to the second highest concentration of refugees in Uganda, 
after Nakivale settlement. In 2012 there were an estimated 50,000 refugees 
residing in Kampala (Omata & Kaplan, 2013). In Kampala, the low-income 
areas of Nsambia, Kibuye, Katwe, Nakulabye and Kisenyi were selected as 
they are inhabited by majority migrant and refugee populations (Krause-Vilmar, 
2011; Omata, 2012; Omata & Kaplan, 2013; Urban Refugees, 2014). Kyangwali 
settlement is a large refugee camp protected by UNHCR in Hoima District, near 
to Lake Albert in the West of Uganda (see figure 5). It is home to around 25,000 
refugees, scattered across 14 villages in an area of around 90km². In Kyangwali 
settlement, questionnaires were administered in the villages of Malembo, 
Kentome, Kasonga and Kagoma.  
129 
 
In Uganda the survey was conducted in each of the target areas over two 
weekdays in Kampala between 7am and 7pm, and four weekdays in Kyangwali 
settlement between 11am and 4pm10, with 194 respondents.   
4.5.3.4 Survey Instrument 
The survey questionnaires are provided in Appendices 1 and 2. The 
questionnaire administered in Kenya comprises four sections and consists of 57 
open and closed questions. Several styles of questions were used, including 
multiple choice, checklists (allowing the selection of multiple responses) and 
Likert style attitude scales. The survey also included interpretive components, 
providing space for explanations of attitudes and actions, for example sub-
questions asking, “how did you feel about that?”, and aimed to collect data on 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, including 
gender, income, age, education and marital status. Questions were also 
included about various aspects of mobile phone use, including whether the 
respondent had access to or owns a mobile phone, the number and type of 
handsets and SIM cards owned, the number of outgoing and incoming calls, 
frequency of SMS sending and receipt, and average spending on mobile phone 
use. Administration of the final section of the questionnaire was preceded by a 
reminder that participation was voluntary and respondents could decline to 
answer particular questions. Respondents were then asked about their 
communication habits and methods of accessing information, including political 
information, their role in the community, political activities and trusted leaders, 
as well as their receipt of hate-speech and pro-peace SMS, and attitudes to 
regulation and monitoring of mobile phone use.  
The questionnaire administered in Uganda contained 42 open and closed 
questions covering demographic information, mobile phone ownership and use 
habits, preferred methods of communicating, means of accessing information 
during periods of crisis, and benefits and risks of mobile phone use. 
                                            
10 As there were no available accommodation options in or near the Settlement it was 
necessary to commute there each day from Hoima: the district capital located 80km away, three 
hours’ drive away along poor roads. It is not advisable to drive during the hours of darkness in 
Uganda due to the high risk of accidents, and accordingly working hours were unavoidably 
reduced. 
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4.5.3.5 Limitations  
The survey data collected are inevitably constrained by a number of limitations 
including scale, generalisability, and reliability. Examining first the scale of the 
survey sample, a total of 297 participants were sampled in Kenya and 194 in 
Uganda. These small sample sizes are insufficient to provide representative 
data on the populations of interest. Furthermore, the selection of a random 
sample was precluded by the absence of a reliable sampling frame, and the 
logistical considerations outlined previously in this chapter. Although the 
selection of a non-probabilistic sample reduces the broader generalisability of 
the data collected, these survey data are nevertheless valuable to inform the 
development of theory for this exploratory study. 
Considering next the generalisability of the survey findings, the selection of 
public locations for the collection of survey data may systematically exclude 
certain demographic groups (e.g. the elderly, disabled, new mothers) from 
participation. Chambers (2008) acknowledges this as a recurring bias 
particularly affecting developing world research studies. Chambers notes, 
“...within villages, the poorer people may be hidden from the main streets and 
the places where people meet” (2008, p. 32). Another particular bias in the 
sampling frame concerns participants engaged in commercial activities. This is 
described by Omata (2012) during the conduct of semi-structured interviews 
with refugees in Uganda, where many interviewees were engaged in ongoing, 
informal business transactions which affected their participation through 
constant interruptions from customers. Recognising that this and similar 
challenges inform participation in both the survey and FGDs, overcoming these 
is challenging and beyond the scope of this study, within the financial and time 
constraints. Furthermore, as it comprises an exploratory study, these limitations 
may be addressed in further extensions of the research to examine the 
perceptions and experiences of these particular demographic groups. 
In Kenya, the survey targets participants in urban centres previously affected by 
election violence, excluding rural populations from the survey sample as 
election violence occurred primarily in urban areas. In Uganda, rural populations 
were specifically targeted through the collection of data in both urban Kampala 
and rural Kyangwali settlement. Logistical considerations played a part in the 
selection of the settlement for data collection, a common bias in research 
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conducted in the developing world according to Chambers (2008). He describes 
how vehicular access is a critical factor mediating academics’ understanding of 
the developing world noting, “…overlapping urban, tarmac and roadside biases” 
(Chambers, 2008, p. 31) resulting from data collection privileging urban 
populations and those living along major roads and excluding those living in 
inconvenient, inaccessible locations. Acknowledging that certain systematic 
biases are likely to occur within the non-probabilistic survey sample, the 
convenience sampling method employed in this study provided a means to 
access primary data in challenging conditions which precluded the use of 
probabilistic methods. 
Another limitation of this study concerns the reliability of the data collected. As 
these data comprise users’ perceptions and experiences, there exist no 
objective criteria against which to assess their consistency. Self-reported 
information about past events is inevitably subject to recall bias (Baddeley, 
1979; Eisenhower, et al., 1991), which may distort the survey data collected in 
this study. Eisenhower, Mathiowetz and Morganstein note that, 
To the extent that an individual is not able to recall the 
occurrence of an event or details about past events, or is 
affected by his or her present psychological state or 
environment, the quality of the data becomes questionable. 
(1991, p. 128) 
Eisenhower, Mathiowetz and Morganstein (1991) further argue that episodic 
memories, those associated with spatially and temporally situated events, are 
subject to three potential biases: Accuracy, incompleteness and distortion. 
Based on several psychological studies they argue that memories are likely to 
be malleable and subject to change over time. Recognising the potential of 
these biases to influence the data provided by participants about their 
experiences and perceptions of past events, the use of multiple methods 
facilitates the triangulation of FGD responses with those of survey and interview 
participants. 
Numerous potential sources of error have been identified in surveys, defined by 
Groves et al. as, “deviations from the true values applicable to the population 
studied” (2004, p. 4). Groves et al. further note that, “which questions are 
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asked, how answers are collected, and which people answer the questions – all 
affect the quality (or error properties) of survey results” (ibid). Bias can also be 
introduced at several stages including survey design, data collection and data 
analysis. Data are said to be biased if, "in some systematic way the people 
responding to a survey are different from the target population as a whole" 
(Fowler, 2009, p. 13). The design and implementation procedures of the survey 
were intended to minimise bias, although inevitably some biases remain.  
Participants may not answer honestly for a number of reasons, including 
interviewer effects. While the use of local research assistants may mitigate 
these risks in part, there remains the potential for ethnic and political differences 
to inform interpersonal dynamics and introduce bias into the data. Recruiting 
educated, literate, experienced survey administrators is essential for the 
effective conduct of social research in settings where insurmountable language 
or cultural barriers prevent the direct collection of data by the researcher. 
However, these essential selection criteria may preclude the recruitment of 
equal numbers of male and female survey administrators and translators. While 
this methodological challenge may be commonplace, it is rarely acknowledged 
by other field-based studies (Gill, 1993). This gender imbalance may introduce 
an additional source of interviewer bias: Study participants may respond 
differently to male and female administrators, both in terms of response rates 
and in the content of the responses they provide.  
Further reflections on the challenges and limitations associated with the survey 
administration are provided in Chapter Seven. 
4.6 Case Study Design 
The research design entailed the in-depth investigation of the relationship 
between mobile telephony and crime and security in the developing world, 
utilising primary data collected from two East African case studies. Case studies 
were particularly relevant for this research topic as they facilitated the 
investigation of this relationship within real-world settings  (Yin, 2009). The 
triangulation of data from these case studies enables the analysis of a 
potentially widespread phenomenon within specific instances. Furthermore, this 
approach benefits from high ecological validity as data are drawn from real-life 
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settings and enables the researcher to develop theoretical propositions from 
empirical evidence (ibid). As Eisenhardt and Graebner note, 
The central notion is to use cases as the basis from which to 
develop theory inductively. The theory is emergent in the sense 
that it is situated in and developed by recognizing patterns of 
relationships among constructs within and across cases and 
their underlying logical arguments. (2007, p. 25) 
As this suggests, case studies are a valuable research tool for theory-building. 
In this study, the case studies provide opportunities to examine user 
perceptions and experiences of the crime threats, benefits and vulnerabilities 
associated with mobile telephony in particular settings. Furthermore, they 
provide real-world settings in which to explore the applicability of SCP 
approaches to address the specific security threats identified. This aligns with 
Yin’s (2009) proposition that the case study method is particularly suitable for 
research addressing a descriptive or explanatory question which seeks to 
explain what, how or why something is happening, and are most appropriate for 
the study of contemporary events over which the researcher has little control. 
The rapid and widespread increase in mobile telephone penetration in the 
developing world, and the associated crime and security threats and benefits, is 
therefore well suited to case study analysis.  
The selected case studies comprise violence-affected mobile phone users in 
Kenya, and users affected by displacement in Uganda. These case studies 
were selected to provide opportunities to examine, the applicability of the 
general theoretical principles of opportunity crime perspectives in these specific 
contexts. These case studies were chosen instrumentally, as they provide a 
useful entry point to this emerging issue (Stake, 2003). Thus, they illuminate the 
general theoretical principle under investigation, and were not selected for their 
typicality (Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 2009). The two case studies addressed in this 
study are selected according to their theoretical relevance, providing real-world 
contexts in which to examine the perceptions of security associated with mobile 
telephony among crisis-affected populations. The rapid and recent increase in 
mobile ownership in both case studies, Kenya (2015a) and Uganda (GSMA, 
2015b), provide timely opportunities to examine these emerging issues. 
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Specifically, the widespread dissemination of hate-speech in Kenya, and the 
importance accorded to mobile telephony for refugees and migrants, informed 
their selection. These issues are discussed in depth in the initial sections of 
Chapter Five and Six respectively.  
Recognising the weakness associated with case study research concerning 
restrictions on the generalizability of findings (Yin, 2009), these case studies 
nevertheless provide a valuable entry point in the analysis of crime and security 
issues associated with mobile telephony in developing world settings. Although 
data collected from these particular populations cannot be statistically 
generalised beyond the population from whom they were collected, the findings 
of this study generate theory that can be analytically generalised (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Thus these case studies provide evidence about 
the security impacts associated with mobile telephony, and facilitate the 
exploratory development of theory and classificatory systems to the specific 
threats identified, and identifying SCP measures to address them. 
4.6.1 Kenya 
The use of mobile telephony during election periods in Kenya was selected as 
the first case study. An equatorial East African country bordering the Indian 
Ocean, Kenya is home to approximately 45 million inhabitants from a diverse 
range of religions and ethnicities (Yin, 2009). The capital Nairobi is a regional 
commercial hub and the country is the largest economy in East Africa, although 
levels of unemployment are high at around 40% (ibid). In 2012, roughly two-
thirds of the population of Kenya were reported to use mobile telephony (CIA, 
2014a), while GSMA Intelligence estimates that in 2014 SIM penetration 
reached 72% (GSMA, 2015a). Emerging technological innovation has resulted 
in the dubbing of Kenya as the ‘Silicon Savannah’, and the attribution of its 
reputation for leading Africa in the development and use of digital applications 
and platforms for development and humanitarian agendas (Meier, 2013). For 
example, Kenya is widely regarded as the global leader in mobile-money 
transfers as a result of the success of M-Pesa, a mobile-money service 
introduced by Safaricom in 2007 with 15 million registered users (GSMA, 
2015a). 
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Kenya and its neighbouring East African countries (particularly Somalia and 
South Sudan) have been plagued with periodic natural disasters, civil conflict 
and terrorist attacks (Davis, 2010; FCO, 2014). Kenya has also experienced 
periodic episodes of terrorism and violence and unrest around election periods, 
including elections in 2005, 2007 and 2010, exacerbated by viral mobile 
campaigns (CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Goldstein & 
Rotich, 2008; Okumbo, 2011; Osborn, 2008). Experts predicted that violence 
would occur during or after the 2013 Presidential elections (Cheeseman, 2008; 
Hubbard, 2010; Somerville, 2011).  
A range of national and international organisations use mobile telephony to 
communicate with, and seek to influence the attitudes and behaviours of, the 
general public in Kenya; particularly promoting peace and security (Goldstein & 
Rotich, 2008; Iacucci, 2013; Meier, 2011b) including NGOs, government 
agencies and MNOs. With a presidential election in 2013, Kenya provided a 
timely opportunity to examine the conditions and contexts in which mobile 
telephony is used for the escalation and de-escalation of political violence, and 
its perceived impacts on individual safety and security. Literature pertaining to 
this case study is presented in Chapter Five. 
Data were collected in Kenya between 1st and 17th February 2013, in the period 
immediately prior to the elections in order to minimise the risks associated with 
potential election violence. This initial period of fieldwork was designed and 
implemented in anticipation of further theory development and hypothesis 
testing on the relationship between mobile telephony and violence in the post-
election period. However, the first period of fieldwork revealed that preventative 
measures had effectively prevented hate-speech transmission through mobile 
phone networks, due in part to the stringent new regulations on hate-speech 
that precluded the use of mobile networks to promote or facilitate violence and 
disorder during the 2013 election period. Analysis of the data collected in Kenya 
revealed that as a result of these regulations, new channels were being 
exploited to communicate hate-speech, particularly online media (see Chapter 
Five).  
The data collected in Kenya nevertheless yielded fruitful data for theory 
building, illuminating the wide-reaching crime and security threats, 
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vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with mobile ownership which the 
second period of fieldwork sought to examine in more depth. The initial 
fieldwork period also illuminated the relevance of the research findings to 
humanitarian and development practitioners and the private sector, and offered 
an opportunity to explore the challenges associated with the implementation of 
the selected methods in developing world settings, informing the design of the 
second period of fieldwork.  
4.6.2 Profile of study participants in Kenya 
 
4.6.2.1 Survey 
A total of 297 adults were surveyed in Kenya: 202 in Nairobi and 95 in the Rift 
Valley. The recorded response rate in Nairobi was 87% and 88% in the Rift 
Valley province. Of these 297 respondents, 291 (98%) were mobile phone 
owners and a further three (1%) described sharing access to a mobile phone. 
Only three (1%) were not mobile phone users. Of the 291 mobile phone owners, 
116 (40%) reported owning more than one SIM card and 33 (11%) more than 
one handset. Just under half of the survey sample (n=140) described being 
affected by political violence during the 2007-8 post-election period. 
Almost two thirds of the survey sample (n=189) was male and one third (n=107) 
female. The sex ratio of the Kenyan population was roughly equal (CIA, 2014a), 
suggesting that this unequal distribution among study participants (twice as 
many male respondents as female) is indicative of a non-representative survey 
sample. Examining the survey sample also suggests a bias towards more 
youthful participants. More than two thirds of the sample (n=207) was aged 
under 35 and none of the sample reported ages above 65 years. The 
distribution of the sample across age and sex categories is presented in figure 
6. 
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Figure 6: Age pyramid of the Kenya survey sample 
The age pyramid demonstrates a wide base in the lower age groups with a 
narrowing as age increases, characteristic of a youthful developing world 
population with low life expectancy. The median age in Kenya is 19.1 years 
(CIA, 2014a) compared to 40.4 in the UK (CIA, 2014c). The average life 
expectancy in Kenya at the time of the study was around 62 for men and 65 for 
women (CIA, 2014a)  compared to 78 for men and 83 for women in the UK 
(CIA, 2014c). As participants below the age of 18 were not sampled, this 
excluded more than 42% of the population of Kenya (CIA, 2014a). 
Participants also provided information about their educational level (presented 
in figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Educational profile of survey respondents in Kenya 
The self-reported education information provided by respondents suggests that 
they were relatively highly educated, with more than one third reporting tertiary 
education (college or university). Although specific data on tertiary education in 
Kenya are unavailable, it seems unlikely that these high rates are 
representative of the wider population. These data are therefore likely to be 
indicative of bias within the survey sample and may be a function of the 
locations of data collection in urban centres, proximate to university campuses 
and colleges.  
Categorical data were collected on respondents’ income, presented in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Reported income of survey respondents in Kenya 
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Respondents self-identified as members of 27 ethnic groups, reflecting the 
diversity of ethnicities in Kenya reported in Census data (CIA, 2014a). Ethnic 
group categories with sample sizes smaller than five are aggregated and 
categorised as ‘other’ (figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: Ethnicity of survey participants in Kenya 
4.6.2.2 Focus Groups 
The profile of FGD participants are provided in tables 6 and 7 below.  
Table 6: Profile of FGD participants in Naivasha, Kenya 
Age Sex Occupation Ethnicity 
49 Male Community Leader Luo 
18 Female Student Kisii 
29 Male IT instructor Kuria 
30 Male Driver Kikuyu 
25 Female Secretary Kisii 
25 Male Student Luhya 
33 Female Business woman Kikuyu 
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Table 7: Profile of FGD Participants in Nakuru, Kenya 
Age Sex Occupation Ethnicity 
38 Female Church Leader Kikuyu 
23 Male Student Luo 
27 Male Student  Kikuyu 
45 Male Driver Luo 
31 Female Shop Attendant Luhya 
31 Female Radio Presenter Kikuyu 
34 Female Head Teacher Kisii 
  
4.6.2.3 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with representatives of nine organisations using 
SMS for peace building and violence prevention (see table 8). 
 
Table 8: List of interviewees in Kenya 
Role  Organisation 
Chief Executive 
Officer  
PeaceNet 
Country Director  Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 
Coordinator   Creative Artists for Change 
Platform for Citizens Voices 
Vice-Chairman PeaceNet 
Programme Officer  National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response. 
Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and 
Internal Security 
Project Manager iHub Research 
Humanitarian 
Reporting Officer 
UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs) 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Frontline SMS 
Regional Manager GSMA 
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4.6.3 Uganda 
The second case study examines the crime and security impacts of mobile 
telephony perceived by migrants and displaced populations in Uganda. Field 
research was conducted between 17th and 27th October 2013. In Uganda, the 
research was conducted during a period characterised by the rapid influx of 
refugees fleeing instability in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) as a result of the 2013 M23 rebellion (Beck, 2013). This case study 
provides the opportunity to examine the perceptions and experiences of mobile-
facilitated crime and security impacts on displaced populations. 
A landlocked East African country bordered by Kenya, South Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania, Uganda is home to 
a population of around 35 million inhabitants (CIA, 2014b), including over 
350,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2015). The majority of the refugees in Uganda 
originate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and 
Somalia, nearly two-thirds of whom arrived between 2010 and 2015 following 
conflict and insecurity in their countries of origin (UNHCR, 2015). Mobile 
penetration in Uganda is estimated at 64% (GSMA, 2015b), although 
disaggregated data are unavailable on access and use rates among migrants. 
Like Kenya, Uganda is affected by crime and terrorism threats (Davis, 2010). As 
a result of instability in the East African region, Uganda is home to over 350,000 
refugees (UNHCR, 2015).  
4.6.4 Profile of study participants in Uganda 
4.6.4.1 Survey 
A total of 194 questionnaires were completed during the fieldwork period, 
including 101 in Kampala and 93 in Kyangwali. The recorded response rate in 
Kampala was 66% and in Kyangwali was 96%. The sample was fairly evenly 
divided between male (56%, n=108) and female (44%, n=86) respondents. Of 
the survey sample, 71% (n=137) reported owning a mobile phone and a further 
quarter of non-owners (n=15) reported sharing access to one. Disaggregating 
this figure reveals discrepancies between the two fieldwork sites. Mobile 
ownership was reported by fewer than half of the survey sample in Kyangwali 
(n=43) compared to around 90% (n=94) in Kampala. 
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Survey respondents’ ages were recorded categorically. None of the sample 
reported ages above 65, and categories above this age were removed prior to 
analysis. Around two thirds of the sample (n=130) were aged under 35. The 
distribution of the sample across age and sex categories is presented in figure 
10. 
 
Figure 10: Age Pyramid of the Uganda Sample 
The age pyramid shown in figure 10 demonstrates the age and sex distribution 
of the sample, with a skew towards youth consistent with the Kenya survey 
sample. The median age in Uganda is 15.5 years (CIA, 2014b) compared to 
19.1 in Kenya (CIA, 2014a) and 40.4 in the UK (CIA, 2014c), while the average 
life expectancy in Uganda is around 53 for men and 56 for women (CIA, 2014b). 
As participants below the age of 18 were not sampled, around half the Ugandan 
population were excluded (ibid). 
The educational profile is presented in figure 11, disaggregated by fieldwork 
site. The data reveal distinctly different educational profiles for participants in 
Kampala and Kyangwali, with higher educational qualifications described by 
participants in urban Kampala.  
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Figure 11: Educational profile of survey participants in Uganda 
Respondents’ incomes in Uganda were also recorded categorically (figure 12).  
Almost half (48%) of the respondents reported a monthly income in the lowest 
category of 0-200,000UGX. A further 25% answered ‘prefer not to say’. In 
Kyangwali, 82.2% of respondents reported being in the lowest income category.  
 
Figure 12: Reported income of survey participants in Uganda 
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Demographic information collected on participants’ countries of origin reveal 
that over two thirds of the survey sample are Congolese and a further 10% 
report originating from South Sudan. Participants from eleven countries are 
represented in total, including all neighbouring East African countries (figure 
13). 
 
Figure 13: Country of origin of survey participants in Uganda 
These demographic data demonstrate that the survey sample in Uganda 
includes a diverse range of participants, with particular differences emerging 
between participants in urban and rural fieldwork sites. The majority of the 
sample is Congolese refugees and migrants, with some representation of other 
ethnic groups. These survey data provide a valuable resource for the analysis 
of the crime and security threats associated with mobile telephony amongst 
displaced populations.  
4.6.4.3 Focus Groups 
Three FGDs were conducted in Uganda, although for reasons described in the 
previous chapter and analysed in 7.7, a profile of the FGD participants is 
unavailable. 
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4.6.4.2 Interviews 
In Uganda, informal interviews were conducted with members of organisations 
providing services within Kyangwali settlement and with local leaders (see table 
9).  
Table 9: List of interviewees in Uganda 
Role  Organisation 
Youth Leader Kentome Village 
Chairperson Kentome Village, Convoy 2 
Bishop   Malembo Village 
Programme Officer UNHCR 
Programme Officer American Refugee Committee 
 
4.7 Data Analysis  
After the qualitative and quantitative data were collected, they were analysed to 
explore the relationships between mobile telephony and a range of crime and 
security threats.  
This section describes the methods through which these data were organised 
and interrogated in order to reveal patterns and relationships and to contribute 
to theory development. Table 10 summarises the methods of analysis used for 
each type of data. 
Table 10: Data Analysis of Different Methods 
Research Method Data Type Method of Analysis 
Questionnaire (closed 
questions) 
Nominal, ordinal and 
continuous quantitative 
data 
Descriptive statistics 
Questionnaire (open 
questions) 
Transcribed text Thematic content 
analysis 
FGDs Transcribed text Thematic content 
analysis 
In-depth Interviews Transcribed text Thematic content 
analysis 
 
The qualitative and narrative survey, interview and FGD findings were 
transcribed, annotated and analysed using thematic content analysis in Nvivo 
(Version 10).  
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The quantitative survey data were coded into SPSS (Version 22) datasets and 
analysed using SPSS and Excel tools. Descriptive analyses were performed to 
examine the characteristics of the sample in terms of age, gender, education, 
income and ethnicity, and to identify patterns in user experiences and 
perceptions of security threats and benefits associated with mobile telephony.  
4.8 Research Ethics 
The research accords with UCL Research Ethics Framework. All participants 
were fully informed about the aims and scope of the research. During the data 
collection, participants were given opportunities to ask questions, and the 
contact information of the researcher was provided in case any follow-up 
information was required. The research involved no forms of deceit or coercion, 
and all research subjects were asked for informed consent prior to participation. 
All participants were over the age of 18, and were provided with, or read, the 
participant information sheet (Appendix 7).  
Participants were informed that all involvement in the study was voluntary, they 
retained the right to withdraw at any time, or to decline to answer any or all 
questions. Participants were invited to share only as much as they feel 
comfortable with, particularly when questions were asked which could cause 
emotional responses such as recalling political events that had occurred several 
years previously. Every possible effort was made to manage potential risks to 
participants and survey administrators during the fieldwork, and administrators 
were encouraged to use their judgement and terminate any interviews in which 
respondents appeared uncomfortable.  
During the study no personally identifying data were collected, all survey 
responses were anonymous, and FGD participants’ personal information was 
not recorded. Interview participants were given the option to remain anonymous 
in this thesis and subsequent publications. All primary data is securely stored on 
password-protected computers. The researcher accepts responsibility for 
ensuring that the research data are securely handled and stored.  
In order to ensure the safety of the local research assistants and participants 
engaged in the study, the research team conducted the survey in teams of two, 
in pre-identified well-lit areas of high footfall during daylight hours and were 
encouraged to remain in regular contact with the researcher. The team was 
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invited to debrief at the end of each working day to ensure that concerns were 
addressed promptly. 
Every possible care was taken during this study to ensure that participants were 
treated with respect and dignity. The UCL ethical guidelines were followed 
closely. The researcher also assumed responsibility for sharing any relevant 
data analysis with the relevant service providers within the settlement, in order 
to facilitate improvements to future ICTD programming.  
The final section of Chapter Seven comprises reflections on the logistical and 
ethical challenges experienced during the collection of data for this study. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the challenges and opportunities associated with 
researching crime associated with mobile phones in developing world settings. 
It describes the research design and selected methods of the study, comprising 
in-depth interviews, focus groups and surveys. The two case studies, 
populations affected by violence in Kenya and displacement in Uganda, are 
described and the profile of study participants in each country presented. The 
chapter also explains the methods of data analysis, and overviews the ethical 
considerations of the study.   
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Chapter Five: Kenya  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the background and findings of the first case study are 
presented, examining the risks and benefits associated with the use of mobile 
telephony for crime and security in Kenya. The chapter commences with an 
introduction to the background literature grounding this case study, examining 
the viral dissemination of hate-speech through mobile phone networks and its 
implications for crime and security in Kenya. Preventative legal and institutional 
measures inhibiting the misuse of mobile phones are examined, and 
mechanisms designed to leverage mobile phone networks crime prevention and 
reporting are also identified.   
The second part of this chapter presents the analysis of the primary qualitative 
and quantitative data collected. The research findings reveal users’ ambiguous 
perceptions of the relationship between mobile telephony, security, and 
insecurity. The chapter present users’ experiences of interconnected security 
benefits and threats, while also illuminating experiences of, and attitudes to, 
crime prevention mechanisms.  
5.2 Mobile telephony, crime and security in Kenya 
Mobile phones have been widely associated with the large-scale organisation of 
political violence in Kenya, and policy responses and prevention mechanisms 
have emerged from both governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
Kenya therefore provides a useful case study through which to investigate the 
relationship between mobile telephony, crime and security. 
5.2.1 Mobile phones and crime 
Kenya has experienced a tumultuous political history (Branch, et al., 2010). 
Since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992, election periods have 
been characterised by violent clashes between ethno-political groups and 
widespread evidence of corruption (Branch, et al., 2010; IREC, 2008). Kenya is 
ethnically, linguistically and culturally diverse, and politicians have exploited 
tribal loyalties and historical grievances to mobilise voters in exchange for 
rewards of land and public services, resulting in inter-ethnic conflict and 
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outbreaks of violence (Branch, et al., 2010; Cheeseman, 2008; Dercon & 
Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Ghoshal, 2011). This political history, characterised by 
cross-cutting tribal loyalties, provide fertile grounds for inter-ethnic tensions 
which can escalate into violence. Mobile phones provide a powerful tool for 
mobilising groups, and in this case for the organisation of violence and the 
dissemination of rumours and threats. 
Mobile phones were used during both the 2005 constitutional referendum 
(KNCHR, 2006) and the 2007/8 presidential elections (CIPEV, 2008), when they 
were implicated in the orchestration and incitement of widespread inter-ethnic 
violence. Following the 2007 election, rumours of electoral fraud abounded in 
mobile phone communications, and violence erupted across Nairobi, Rift Valley, 
Western, and former Coast Provinces, encompassing areas of the capital city 
and regional capitals Eldoret and Nakuru as well as smaller towns (CIPEV, 
2008; KNCHR, 2006; Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2008). Mobile phones have 
been widely associated with insecurity in Kenya, as a consequence of their use 
for the escalation of violence.  
A subsequent inquiry commissioned by the Government of Kenya recorded 
1,133 deaths and 117,216 instances of property destruction during the 2007 
election (CIPEV, 2008). Drawing on analyses of media reports and pre- and 
post-violence surveys, Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) report even more 
widespread impacts of the post-election violence than those detailed in the 
formal inquiry, suggesting that, “violence affected one out of three Kenyans in 
terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, 
loss of jobs or earnings, or having a friend or relatives that died in the elections” 
(2012, p. 732). In this context, mobile phones were implicated in the escalation 
of crime and disorder as they provided networked opportunities to disseminate 
rumours and misinformation and coordinate outbreaks of violence. As a large 
percentage of the population has been affected by this mobile phone-enabled 
violence, this is likely to inform users’ attitudes to mobile phones and their 
implications for crime and security. 
A key feature of these periods of organised political violence in Kenya was the 
communications context in which they occur. The official report published by the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence describes radio 
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broadcasts and the circulation of malicious hate-speech, “poisoning an already 
tense political environment” during the 2007/8 post-election period (CIPEV, 
2008, p. 216). False and inflammatory rumours, incitements to violence and 
hate-speech disseminated through radio broadcasts and mobile phone 
networks were widely implicated in escalating tensions between ethnic groups 
during the 2005 (KNCHR, 2006) and 2007 election periods (CIPEV, 2008; 
Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; Osborn, 2008). It 
can be conjectured that the increasing prevalence of mobile telephony provided 
opportunities for users to organise and coordinate violence and anti-social 
activities, and to transmit threatening and offensive messages, at low cost and 
with little risk of being apprehended.  
The previous chapters investigated the relationship between the utilisation of 
mobile phones for crime and crime prevention, and user perceptions of their 
crime-facilitating and crime-inhibiting potential. Examining the case of Kenya, a 
key aspect of the 2007-8 post-election violence was the involvement of state 
security agencies and political parties in its organisation and perpetration 
(CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Ghoshal, 2011; Rawlence & 
Albin-Lackey, 2008). According to formal government reports and interviews 
with victims, the post-election violence was widely regarded as a political tool 
sponsored by politicians and perpetrated by the organs of the state, including 
police and military forces (Cheeseman, 2008; Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 
2012; Ghoshal, 2011; KNCHR, 2006; Murunga, 2011; Rawlence & Albin-
Lackey, 2008). A subsequent government investigation found evidence of 
serious failures by state security agencies, particularly the police who were 
deemed responsible for around one third of all recorded deaths11 (CIPEV, 
2008).  
In contexts where the government is perceived to be unwilling or unable to 
support its citizens, mobile phones have been shown to provide valuable 
benefits for users by enabling them to mobilise horizontal networks and access 
informal sources of support (Best, 2011; Coyle & Meier, 2009; Coyle & 
Thornton, 2007; Morawczynski, 2009; Rotberg & Aker, 2013). In the case of 
Kenya, the police were not merely unable or unwilling to protect citizens from 
                                            
11 Of the 1,133 recorded deaths, 405 were caused by gunshot wounds. The Waki Report 
attributes all gunshot-related deaths to the police.  
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crime, they were convincingly implicated in its perpetration. The involvement of 
police and other security forces in the 2007/8 post-election violence was not 
anomalous: A Human Rights Watch report published after the 2007-8 post-
election violence describes the absence of accountability and a culture of 
impunity as characteristic of the Kenyan security forces (Ghoshal, 2011). These 
allegations of corrupt and even complicit security forces described in existing 
studies, whether true or not, are likely to inform users’ calculations of the risks 
and benefits associated with reporting crime to formal authorities. Where formal 
security forces are associated with the commission of crime, rather than its 
prevention, citizens are likely to rely more heavily on informal networks for 
support and assistance during times of need. Mobile phones fulfil a valuable 
informal security function in such settings, enabling users to communicate and 
coordinate horizontally, and respond to emerging threats in real time. However, 
in contexts where the police force are regarded as predatory, or a potential 
offender rather than a capable guardian providing security against crime 
threats, the formal crime-inhibiting functions of mobile phones may be seriously 
impeded.  
5.2.2 The prevention of mobile phone crime 
Despite the limitations described in the previous section, the recognition of the 
crime and security threats associated with mobile telephony in Kenya, and the 
crime detection and prevention opportunities provided by these networks, has 
catalysed responses from the public and private sector. These include new 
regulation and the criminalisation of digital forms of hate-speech, the mandatory 
regulation of SIM cards, the development of early warning mechanisms reliant 
on user information, and the transmission of unifying messages of peace 
through mobile phone networks. 
Despite the reported prevalence of hate-speech SMS in mobile communications 
networks during Kenyan election periods, few concrete examples are available 
in existing studies (IHRB, 2013; Osborn, 2008; Somerville, 2011). Assessing 
corporate responses to hate-speech during the 2007-8 post-election period, a 
report by the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) asserts that this 
dearth of evidence results from recipients’ fear of implicating themselves in the 
transmission of illegal content, compounded by the ‘toxic’ content of hate-
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speech messages that encouraged recipients to delete them upon receipt 
(IHRB, 2013). Two widely-cited examples recur in existing literature,  
No more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter 
them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of 
Luos you know...  
Fellow Kenyans, the Kikuyus have stolen our children’s 
future… we must deal with them in a way they understand ... 
violence. (Goldstein & Rotich, 2008, p. 4) 
These messages specifically incite violence against particular ethnic groups 
(Luos and Kikuyus respectively) and justify violent actions as revenge for 
alleged prior attacks and historical land theft. In addition to messages directly 
inciting violence such as the two examples provided here, SMS were widely 
used to spread rumours, threats, incitements and misinformation, all variously 
termed hate-speech (Osborn, 2008). 
In Kenya, policy responses to the use of mobile phones for the organisation of 
violence and transmission of threats have largely focused on the prevention and 
punishment of the transmission of hate-speech. While the Constitution of Kenya 
(2010) guarantees the right to freedom of expression (Article 33), this does not 
extend to incitement to violence or advocacy of hatred. Article 24(1) describes 
“the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by 
any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others” (2010, p. 22). Several legal instruments also address the issue of hate-
speech in Kenya. Section 77 of the Penal Code prohibits incitement to violence 
and the promotion of hatred between communities or races, while Section 96 
prohibits uttering, printing or publishing words that may cause injury or death 
amongst a particular community, although Odongo (2012) notes that neither 
specifically refers to the term ‘hate-speech’. 
In response to the widespread misuse of mobile networks during the 2007-8 
post-election period and the security threat posed by the circulation of hate-
speech, the Government of Kenya also passed the National Cohesion and 
Integration Act which defines hate-speech as content,  
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…which is threatening, abusive or insulting or involves the use 
of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior (National 
Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008, p. 16) 
This definition is vague, and the boundaries between legal and illegal electronic 
content are not clearly delineated. Analysing hate-speech in radio broadcasts 
during the 2007/8 election period, Somerville notes that, “journalists and 
academics seem to have an instinctive feel for what is meant by the term ‘hate 
radio’ or by ‘hate speech’, but there is an absence of rigour in the way it is 
described and defined.” (2011, p. 85). Somerville (2011) suggests that the lack 
of specificity in legal definitions, combined with the absence of available 
examples of hate-speech, limits academic engagement with the topic and 
precludes analyses of the scale of hate-speech dissemination, and of the 
connection between hate-speech and violence. Where users are unclear about 
what they can and cannot legally transmit, his ambiguity may also influence the 
effectiveness of the laws governing hate-speech and associated preventative 
mechanisms. Furthermore, it is illegal for newspapers and other media bodies 
to reprint alleged hate-speech, further reducing the availability of examples of 
illegal content (IHRB, 2013). Discussing hate-speech during an interview, NCIC 
Commissioner Odongo explains,  
Not all abuses and insults are hate speech. Words only 
become hate speech if the intention of the maker of the 
statement is to stir up hatred. The intention of the person can 
be construed from the context, circumstances, environment and 
audience. (Odongo, 2012, p 1)  
The attribution of malicious intentionality to the originator of hate-speech 
content is inevitably subject to interpretation, and reveals the complexities 
entailed in identifying specific content as hate-speech.  
In addition to ambiguity around the categorisation of particular content as ‘hate-
speech’, the personalised nature of mobile communications introduces a further 
challenge for research on this topic. According to the IHRB, mobile operators 
are legally precluded from collecting evidence of hate-speech sent by individual 
users at the risk of violating user privacy, although the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2012 permits mobile regulators to intercept mobile communications with a 
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specific court order (IHRB, 2013). Formally, the National Steering Committee on 
Media Monitoring, established by the Communications Commission of Kenya 
(CCK) under the Ministry of Information and Communications and working in 
tandem with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), is 
responsible for identifying abusive messages inciting violence, and consulting 
on legal mechanisms for the prosecution of offenders by the Department of 
Public Prosecutions (CCK, 2012). During the 2013 election period, this 
Commission focused “on social media, FM (radio) stations, and blog postings 
deemed to be spreading tribal hatred” (IHRB, 2013, p. 21), identifying and 
prosecuting six bloggers accused of using hate-speech. Social media, blog 
postings and radio broadcasts all provide publicly accessible channels for the 
dissemination of anti-social content, unlike mobile telephone networks that 
provide a direct, inter-personal channel concealed from public scrutiny. The 
increasing prevalence of mobile telephony in Kenya is therefore likely to provide 
opportunities for users to disseminate content widely, and at low cost.  
One of the challenges associated with networked crime such as cyber-crime 
(Newman & Clarke, 2003), and in this case mobile phone crime, is the trans-
national nature of the associated threats. In a report examining corporate 
responses to hate-speech by Safaricom12, IHRB note that the bulk SMS 
packages used to disseminate hate-speech widely in Kenya originated from 
abroad, lacked identifying caller ID information and enabled senders to bypass 
internal vetting processes and transmit hate-speech anonymously (IHRB, 
2013). Thus, national mobile phone networks may be the instrument for the 
commission of crimes originating from perpetrators beyond the country’s 
borders. This presents particular challenging for policy and prevention 
mechanisms, although it is beyond the scope of the present study to investigate 
in depth here. 
Responding to the use of bulk packages for mass transmission of hate-speech, 
the CCK implemented Guidelines for the Prevention of Transmission of 
Undesirable Bulk Political Content via Electronic Communications Networks 
(CCK, 2012) requiring mobile operators to block mass SMS deemed likely to 
                                            
12 The largest mobile operator in Kenya, Safaricom originated as a state-owned 
telecommunications corporation and was incorporated as a private limited liability company in 
1997 
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incite violence during the election period. These guidelines require political 
parties to provide mobile operators with the content of political SMS for vetting 
48 hours prior to dissemination. They also introduced requirements concerning 
the content of political messages, obligating mobile operators to prevent the 
transmission of SMS which are “inflammatory, inciting, hateful or otherwise in 
violation of the law” (CCK, 2012, p. 5). According to these guidelines, political 
messages must be written in English or Kiswahili only, and must be 
disseminated between 8am and 6pm (ibid). Although this mechanism aims to 
reduce the bulk distribution of inflammatory content, controlling messages sent 
by individual users is more problematic. Despite the stringent requirements on 
bulk SMS issued by the CCK, The Kenya Information and Communications Act 
(CCK, 2009) prevents mobile operators from accessing or vetting private 
messages sent by individual users. Although an amendment to this Act 
providing access to some private content was subsequently passed into law in 
December 2013 (CA, 2013), during the fieldwork period this Act provided a legal 
framework preventing network operators from disclosing the content of 
individual SMS, “due to the risk of violating user privacy” (IHRB, 2013, p. 10). 
Despite this, media reporting around the 2013 election period suggested that 
monitoring of SMS was widespread (BBC News, 2013; Mukinda, 2013; Mulupi, 
2012). Freedom House reports that, 
During and after the March 4 (2013) elections, the authorities… 
asked mobile phone providers to block any text messages that 
could incite violence.  To do so, service providers installed a 
firewall that could detect messages containing particular words, 
such as “kill,” which were automatically flagged for further 
scrutiny (Freedom House, 2013, p. 8) 
The Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation reported on an interview with permanent 
secretary of the Ministry of Information and Communication, suggesting that 
300,000 SMS containing hate-speech were blocked each day prior to the 2013 
elections (Mukinda, 2013). However, it is unclear to what extent these 
mechanisms were effectively implemented, and whether or not these blocked 
messages comprised bulk SMS or content from individual users. Besides 
anecdotal commentary and media reporting, no formal information has been 
published on the number and content of blocked messages during this period.  
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Another key legal mechanism adopted in Kenya to reduce the misuse of mobile 
networks and increase user accountability is mandatory SIM card registration. 
This was implemented in Kenya on 31st December 2012 and requiring all mobile 
users to register active SIM cards using personal identity documents (IHRB, 
2013). SIM card registration has been widely implemented across Africa as a 
mechanism designed to inhibit the misuse of mobile phone networks (Donovan 
& Martin, 2014; Jentzsch, 2012), as described in Chapter Two. 
Several mechanisms have been identified that are designed to limit or prevent 
the misuse of mobile phone networks for criminal and anti-social purposes. The 
subsequent section investigates mechanisms that have been developed to 
leverage the crime prevention opportunities provided by these networks. 
5.2.3 Mobile phones for crime prevention 
In addition to these legal preventative mechanisms requiring MNOs to monitor 
and control content of mobile networks, various organisations sought to actively 
leverage mobile networks to prevent the predicted recurrence of violence during 
the 2013 Presidential election (Hubbard, 2010; Cheeseman, 2008; Somerville, 
2011). The official UWIANO13 Platform for Peace aimed to address and counter 
the misuse of mobiles, and was developed as a collaboration between the 
National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict 
Management, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and PeaceNet Kenya, in 
partnership with Kenyan mobile network operators. The multi-level UWIANO 
strategy enabled mobile users to anonymously report hate-speech, rumours, 
and misinformation communicated via SMS (NCIC, n.d.), and also disseminated 
mass SMS broadcasts to promote peace and discourage mobile users from 
disseminating hate-speech, sending messages such as, 
The Ministry of Internal Security urges you to please desist 
from sending or forwarding any S.M.S. that may cause public 
unrest. This may lead to your prosecution. (Corbett, 2008) 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Kenya also developed initiatives 
designed to disseminate peaceful messages in an effort to counter violent 
                                            
13 A Swahili word meaning ‘cohesion’ 
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discourses, such as the PeaceTXT initiative developed by SiSi Ni Amani 
(Heinzelman et al, 2011; Martin-Shields & Stones, 2014; Meier, 2011b). Sisi Ni 
Amani disseminates messages designed to de-escalate tensions and provide a 
counter-narrative to hate-speech, such as: 
When we maintain peace, we will have joy & be happy to spend 
time with friends & family but violence spoils all these good 
things. (SiSi Ni Amani, 2013). 
Working in collaboration with mobile operator Safaricom, SiSi Ni Amani were 
provided with 50 million free SMS to disseminate pro-peace messages to 
registered users of their service prior to the 2013 election (Mutai, 2013). These 
messages were designed, “to leverage mobile messaging to catalyse behaviour 
change around peace and conflict issues” (Meier, 2011b), although SMS were 
disseminated only to mobile users who pre-registered for the PeaceTXT 
service. This service may function to remind mobile users of both appropriate 
behavioural norms and legal sanctions, aiming to alert the conscience of users 
and encourage them not to commit criminal and anti-social activities. 
In recognition of the widespread misuse of mobile networks for the escalation of 
political violence, and in response to predictions of the recurrence of political 
violence during the 2013 Presidential election (Cheeseman, 2008; Hubbard, 
2010), the measures and mechanisms described here were developed to 
reduce the dissemination of hate-speech in Kenya.  
5.3 Research findings 
This section presents and analyses the primary data collected in Kenya, 
including qualitative and quantitative survey (n=297), FGD (n=14) and interview 
(n=9) data. The methods are discussed in the previous chapter, and research 
instruments are provided in Appendices 1 and 3. Transcripts of interviews with 
survey administrators are provided in Appendix 5, while transcripts of recorded 
interviews conducted with key stakeholders are provided in Appendix 8. 
This presentation of the results is structured in three core sections. The first 
section describes the range of security benefits and crime prevention 
applications of mobile phones recognised by study participants, and reflects on 
their particular value for vulnerable groups. The second section examines 
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threats associated with mobile telephony in Kenya, addressing first the 
dissemination of ‘hate-speech’ and introducing methodological challenges 
associated with researching this type of crime, addressed in more depth in 
Section 7.7. This section also examines the data concerning the evolution of 
new, networked crime threats and the associated crime opportunities provided 
by mobile phones and mobile networks. The third section then overviews actual 
prevention techniques designed to reduce mobile phone crime, and investigates 
public support for these techniques, perceptions of their effectiveness and 
unintended consequences.  
5.3.1 Security benefits of mobile phones: reducing crime 
The findings of the survey, FGDs and interviews suggest that mobile phones 
are highly valued for their security-enhancing benefits.  
5.3.1.1 Typology of security benefits 
Analysis of the FGD data in particular illuminates several critical security 
benefits associated with mobile phone ownership and use. Study participants 
were asked to discuss the benefits associated with mobile telephony, and 
identified a wide range of security-enhancing and crime-reducing impacts of 
mobile phone ownership and use.  
i. Access to informal support networks 
The most common benefits identified by FGD participants are concerned with 
access to emotional, physical and financial support from social networks. These 
informal networks of support are widely recognised in existing studies, as 
described previously in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
In addition to general benefits such as access to friends, family, customers, and 
employment opportunities, FGD participants in Kenya describe specific security 
benefits of the increased connectivity to informal social networks. For example, 
this connectivity was described as an effective mechanism to verify information 
received through other sources, and thus reduce tension associated with 
rumour and false information. For example, one participant in Nakuru 
commented, “If you increase the amount of communication or friendship 
between tribes, that would reduce the potential for violence. ‘Cause if you get a 
rumour from one tribe, you can call your friend from another tribe”. 
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In addition to enabling users to verify information and counteract rumours, 
mobile phones also provide users with an informal emergency response 
mechanism. Users can call for assistance during times of need, and specifically 
associated this functionality with reductions in crime. For example, in Naivasha, 
one female FGD participant commented that mobile telephone ownership “has 
reduced the rate of crime, because you can call someone like your neighbour 
for help... you don't need to scream”, indicating that she felt connectivity to 
personal networks to be a valuable security benefit. Thus mobile telephony may 
be regarded as an informal mechanism to reduce disorder by sharing 
information to overcome rumours and misinformation.  
The security benefits outlined above were described by FGD participants as 
particularly important for certain vulnerable groups, particularly the young and 
the old. FGD participants reflected that children and the elderly were not among 
the earliest adopters of mobile phone technology, and indicated that they are 
generally the most recent demographic groups to own personal handsets. They 
also suggested that both children and the elderly often lack financial resources 
to initiate mobile phone communications, and use mobile phones as primarily 
recipients of calls and messages. Despite these restricted patterns of use, 
mobile phones were regarded by participants as a powerful mechanism through 
which the particular vulnerabilities of these groups could be mitigated. 
Participants emphasised the importance of mobile phones to enable parents to 
contact lost children, describing this as a form of safety tether. For example, 
one female participant in Naivasha stated, “most kids over ten [own a mobile 
phone]… if they get lost they can be contacted”, reflecting on mobile 
connectivity as a means to assuage parental concerns for the safety of their 
children. 
ii. Secure storage of information 
The second most common benefit identified by FGD participants concerned the 
value of mobile phones for the secure storage of information. In Naivasha a 
FGD participant explained, “you can scan documents into a mobile phone, to 
store things in draft.” Another participant responded, “I keep my CV in my 
phone, then I can always have it with me when I need it”. Although this benefit 
was not addressed in the survey nor discussed in the interviews, the FGD 
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findings suggest that mobile phones are valued by users in Kenya for providing 
secure storage of a range of documents and photographs, as well as the 
contact information of other users.  
Information storage has previously been identified as a benefit of mobile phones 
in Uganda by Burrell (2010), and simultaneously as a source of risk among 
handset sharers. Among study participants in Kenya, handset sharing was not 
widely reported (around 1% of the survey sample, and none of the FGD 
participants reported shared use of a handset). In this context, participants 
described storage functionality as a key security benefit that enabled them to 
securely store information, photos and documents within their personal 
handsets. 
iii. Access to other modes of communication 
Participants widely described the value of mobile phones for ‘keeping them in 
the loop’ with other modes of communication. The inter-operability of mobile 
phones and other modes of communication was regarded as a security-
enhancing function of these tools. In particular, they commonly mentioned the 
radio function offered by even basic handsets as a useful feature for enabling 
them to access and verify information about current affairs, and potentially 
about security threats such as outbreaks of violence. For example, FGD 
participants in Naivasha described, “listening to the electoral debate using 
radio” and “getting access to ‘hot’ news from different places”, and “mobile 
phones have radio and even TV inside of them”. Most participants reported 
owning basic handsets, and the majority of these provided access to radio 
broadcasts. Access to other forms of media, such as television, remained 
limited but participants clearly recognised the potential of mobile phones to 
enhance their access to other forms of media. In Nakuru, one participant 
explained, “it is common to watch the election with friends on the phone, like the 
presidential debate, so to know what is happening and to be informed”. Thus a 
key security benefit of mobile phones is the connectivity with traditional 
broadcast media, from which information received through mobile networks can 
be verified. Participants also mentioned potential connectivity with online 
platforms such as Facebook, but in practice none of the FGD participants 
personally owned or used mobile phone handsets with Internet capabilities. 
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Previous studies have identified similar multi-functionality associated with 
mobile phones in developing world contexts (Batchelor and Scott, 2005; 
Corbett, 2008). For the purposes of this study, the key benefit is the security-
enhancing potential of accessing information from a range of sources to verify 
or triangulate information received from users’ social networks, and furthermore 
to access information beyond these networks.  
iv. Financial transfers 
The economic benefits of mobile phones are well documented in existing 
studies (Abraham, 2007; Aker, 2008; de Silva & Ratnadiwakara, 2008; Jensen, 
2007; Overa, 2006), as Chapter Two demonstrates. Participants in Kenya 
described mobile money services as a powerful security benefit associated with 
mobile phone use, and none of the FGD participants reported access to formal 
banking other than m-banking. The ability to instantly and security make 
financial transfers, in particular to kin in distant villages, was described as a key 
benefit. For elders, mobile phones were described as a mechanism to increase 
economic security, facilitating financial transfers from wealthier family members, 
as described by a FGD participant in Naivasha who stated, “Older people have 
them in the village, so we can send money and help them out”. Participants 
discussed the savings in time and money associated with m-money transfers, 
contrasting these with the costly and inconvenient journeys previously 
undertaken to provide economic support to distant rural kin. They also noted the 
risk of acquisitive crime associated with carrying large sums of money, or 
reliance on couriers to transfer cash sums to distant recipients, and described 
m-money transfers as ‘safer’. 
v. Other benefits 
A range of other benefits were described by participants, ranging from the 
facilitation of business transactions and providing access to employment 
opportunities to the organisation of romance. While these benefits may be 
argued to enhance users’ security (financial and emotional respectively), they 
are not directly related to the focus of the present study on the crime-inhibiting 
and crime-facilitating opportunities associated with mobile phones. Accordingly 
they are not addressed here. 
162 
 
5.3.1.2 Crime reporting and crime prevention 
In addition to the informal benefits described above, participants in Kenya also 
identified connectivity to formal security forces as a key security benefit 
associated with mobile phone ownership. During FGDs, participants initiated 
discussions about the value of mobile phones to increase the ease of reporting 
crimes and locating criminals even before the topic had been introduced. This 
suggests that the relationship between mobile phones and crime prevention and 
detection is important to users.  
In Naivasha, one female FGD participant stated with satisfaction, “Now every 
person is connected to a security agent”. Another responded affirmed this, 
commenting, “Mobiles have reduced the rate of crime by increasing (victims’) 
ease and (offenders’) fear of reporting crimes to security forces”. Thus not only 
the opportunities for reporting were regarded as valuable, but the concomitant 
increase in the risk of detection was also perceived to have reduced offending. 
For the purposes of this analysis, this is a key finding and is investigated in 
greater depth in Chapter Seven. FGD participants also discussed the use of 
geo-location software to track mobile handsets, particularly smartphones. One 
female participant commented, “…security can use phone trackers to catch 
people, like, if a child is kidnapped”. The group warmed to this theme and 
discussed high profile news reports about mobile phone location data and call 
records being used in criminal investigations and prosecutions, expressing hope 
that mobile phones would provide increasingly sophisticated means to detect, 
solve and prevent crimes. 
The findings suggest that study participants view mobile phones as potential 
crime inhibitors, providing opportunities to report and respond to a wide range of 
crime and security threats. However, despite describing the benefits of mobile 
phones enhancing connectivity to the police, cynicism regarding the relationship 
between the public and police emerged during both FGDs. In Nakuru, FGD 
participants discussed historical mistrust and even fear of the police, describing 
this as a general trend in Kenya. One female participant explained, 
“People still fear the police and you wouldn’t take refuge at a police 
station… for a long time the police were never looked at as being 
friendly to people, you know, it’s a stigma thing…” 
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FGD participants in Nakuru also expressed disdain (based on their facial 
expressions and other non-verbal signals) during discussions of a local 
campaign encouraging people to forward hate-speech SMS to the police: The 
entire group initially asserted that they would not report concerns about hate-
speech to the authorities. When pressed for an explanation, one female 
participant in Nakuru shrugged and commented, “I might send the message to 
them [the police], but I don’t believe there will be action, normally it doesn’t work 
that way”. Participants in this group also dismissed tracking of mobile 
telephones as ‘fictitious’, with one woman asking “where will they get the funds 
to do this? Because Kenya operates on a tight budget”. This FGD seemed 
particularly suspicious of the police and formal security forces, but described 
benefits associated with the increased connectivity to informal social networks 
as an effective mechanism to access support, reduce tensions and increase 
security.  
Interviews were conducted with representatives of several organisations using 
mobile networks to promote peace and prevent hate-speech during the 2013 
elections such as PeaceNet, a coalition of over 500 peacebuilding organisations 
across Kenya. During an interview conducted with the Chief Executive Officer of 
PeaceNet, he explained the purpose of the UWIANO project as, 
…designed to get information from the public. They can send 
SMS to 108, which is interfaced with a software programme. 
The SMS is received in a Situation Room for early warning, 
aimed to prevent violence. Reports received are analysed, 
triangulated, verified and second opinions are gathered. Then 
reports and recommendations are generated for the 
appropriate response. 
When questioned about appropriate responses, this interviewee described, 
“police intervention or organized community dialogues in which mediators 
around the country coordinate dialogues and come up with solutions”. He 
explained that the project had received 20,000 SMS from members of the public 
during the 2010 referendum, containing both pro-peace and violent content. 
An interview was also conducted with a Programme Officer in the NSC 
Secretariat, a partner in the UWIANO project. He explained,  
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We use a shortcode - 108 - and people can send alerts about 
incidents of violence that occur. We are getting a lot of 
messages from people who fear to approach the police. This 
system enables them to send anonymous information which 
can then be verified 
This verification is essential because the anonymous nature of the platform 
results in the receipt of occasionally misleading information, according to this 
interviewee. Working in collaboration with mobile operator Safaricom, he 
explained, enables the project to “send out bulk SMS to a particular area to 
clarify rumours and misinformation”. He explained that messages received, 
…are sent to the district and provincial Peace Committees on 
the ground, and to CSOs14 and the police. If we get hate-
speech messages, they go to the NCIC15. Also IEBC16 and the 
police, if the messages we get are about electoral malpractice, 
they go to them.  
These warning and response mechanisms harness mobile telephony to 
enhance security during the election period, although they are reliant on users’ 
reporting of misuse. While mobile telephony offers potential benefits in terms of 
increasing the reporting of crime, the FGD evidence suggests that users in 
Kenya remain cautious of formal security agencies and may be reluctant to 
make use of these functions.   
5.3.2 Mobile phones, insecurity and crime 
The study in Kenya initially intended to examine one specific type of mobile 
phone crime; the transmission and receipt of hate-speech SMS during election 
periods. Hate-speech was widely associated with the escalation of violence, as 
the previous section demonstrates. However, a number of challenges prevented 
the robust analysis of rates of dissemination and receipt of hate-speech SMS. 
Instead, the findings reveal deeper ambiguities in the interpretation and 
perception of mobile phone content, and a range of further crime threats 
associated with mobile phones.  
                                            
14 Civil Society Organisations  
15 National Cohesion and Integration Commission 
16 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
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5.3.2.1 Hate-speech 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, during the 2007/8 election period mobile 
phone networks were widely implicated in the dissemination of threats and 
incitements to violence, and viral hate-speech SMS were associated with 
outbreaks of physical violence during this period. It was therefore anticipated 
that study participants would describe widespread receipt of hate-speech 
messages during both the 2007 and 2013 election periods, and the survey 
questionnaire aimed to capture these trends to enable comparative analysis of 
the type of messages received, the origin of these messages and the factors 
associated with receipt and non-receipt. 
Although the participants provided responses to the quantitative survey 
questions, the data about the receipt of hate speech revealed surprising 
findings. Reflecting back on their experiences during the 2007 election, survey 
participants were asked whether they received SMS inciting violence, SMS 
containing threatening content about their own ethnic group, or SMS containing 
threatening content about others. Participants who reported non-ownership of a 
mobile phone in 2007 were excluded from analyses of these responses. Two 
thirds of the sample reported ownership of a mobile phone in 2007, during the 
previous election period. In light of the findings of previous studies, it was 
anticipated that the majority of the mobile-owning participants would report 
receipt of hate-speech during previous election periods. These responses were 
intended to provide a robust dataset for analysis. However, of the 185 
participants who reported owning a mobile phone during the 2007 election 
period, over 90% reported not receiving any type of hate-speech SMS during 
this period. Of study participants who reported receipt of hate-speech, the 
majority declined to provide any further information about the type, content, or 
origins of these messages. Less than 1% of recipients of hate-speech in the 
survey sample provided any information about these messages. These findings 
are surprising as the data were collected in areas affected by previous election 
violence, where the viral dissemination of hate-speech was reported to have 
been widespread, and previous studies report that many mobile phone users 
were affected (CIPEV, 2008; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; KNCHR, 2006; 
Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2008). 
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As a result of the low levels of reporting of hate-speech, the sample was too 
small to facilitate the planned statistical analysis. However, the findings are 
analytically valuable as they reveal different findings to those reported in the 
studies described earlier in this chapter. In order to investigate these findings 
further, they are therefore triangulated with the FGD and interview data to 
examine whether; 
1. Participants genuinely did not receive hate-speech SMS during the 2007 
election; 
2. The survey design was inadequate to capture receipt of hate-speech 
SMS; 
3.  Participants received hate-speech but were unwilling to discuss these 
experiences with the survey enumerators.  
The interviews conducted with the local survey enumerators are particularly 
useful to understand these anomalous findings. Triangulating these interview 
data with the survey findings indicates that, according to the enumerators’ 
interpretation, systematic biases may have informed participant responses. 
Reflecting on the challenges experienced while administering the 
questionnaires, administrators commented on participants’ reluctance to divulge 
information about their receipt of hate-speech and speculated that they may not 
have been candid in their responses to these question. For example, one 
survey administrator commented,  
…about the SMS, I cannot say they were really coming forth 
with the right information. Some percentage were still not 
disclosing what is going on, or went on in 2007 mostly… 
During a separate interview another local administrator acknowledged that he 
observed similar reluctance in respondents’ body language, suggesting that in 
particular fieldwork sites (e.g. Naivasha), some respondents paused 
thoughtfully before answering questions about receiving threatening content 
through mobile phones,  
…people were not so open and most of them were reserved 
with their answers, but according to their expression when you 
asked such kind of question, the question to do with ‘have they 
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received threatening SMS’ they would, like, hang back a little, 
they would say “no”…which, that didn’t come out so convincing. 
So, according to my opinion, I think they had or they have 
received such kind of SMS but they are not so willing to talk 
about it to strangers… 
These comments suggest that selective underreporting may explain the low 
reported rates of hate-speech among survey participants, and add weight to 
speculations of under-reporting of hate-speech described by previous studies 
(IHRB, 2013; Osborn, 2008; Somerville, 2011).  
Analysis of the FGD data also indicates that the survey data may not accurately 
reflect the experiences of study participants. In contrast to the low reported 
receipt rates detailed in the survey data, seven FGD participants (half of the 
total number of participants, both male and female) described in detail SMS 
they had personally received containing false rumours, incitements and threats 
during the 2007 election period. All fourteen FGD participants confirmed that 
hate-speech SMS were widely disseminated through mobile networks during 
2007, although several (number unrecorded) did not own mobile phones during 
that period. Three FGD participants in Nakuru described receiving SMS 
informing them that the government had been overthrown in a coup during the 
2007 election period. One participant in this group also described receiving an 
anonymous SMS informing him that, “five hundred Kalenjins have been killed, 
calling on Kikuyus to seek revenge”. He described feeling “alarmed”, later 
realising that this message was a false rumour inciting violence. One male 
participant in Nakuru described receiving an SMS stating simply, “we are 
coming for you”, which caused him to feel “afraid”. In Naivasha, two FGD 
participants mentioned receiving SMS threatening violence against themselves 
and their families on the basis of their ethnicity during the previous election 
period, although they declined to discuss the content of these messages further. 
FGD participants appear to have been more forthcoming with information about 
their receipt of hate-speech than survey participants, perhaps as a result of the 
more informal, conversational setting and the presence of other group members 
sharing similar experiences. 
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Interviewees also described more widespread patterns of hate-speech 
dissemination than indicated by analysis of the survey data. The Country 
Director of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) in 
Nairobi described the dissemination of hate-speech through mobile phone 
networks during the 2007-8 election period as “endemic”, with mobile phones 
receiving messages, “like a switchboard”. He acknowledged personally 
receiving numerous threatening and insulting messages during the 2007-8 
period, although declined to describe their content. The vice-chairman of 
PeaceNet in Eldoret also revealed that he was a victim of hate-speech during 
the previous 2007-8 election period. In addition to receiving several hate-
speech SMS, this interviewee described one threat transmitted in an 
anonymous phone call wherein, “someone called and said ‘we are just outside 
your gate, we want to come in and kill you’”. It transpired to be an empty threat, 
according to this interviewee, designed, “just to scare me and make me have 
fear”. These interview data, coupled with the FGD findings and the speculations 
of survey administrators, call into question the validity of survey participants’ 
responses to questions concerning the receipt of hate-speech in 2007.  
The interview and FGD data support the argument that survey respondents 
selectively under-reported their receipt of hate-speech, and it may be 
speculated that they were influenced by both the format of the survey and the 
method of administration, and by considerations of risk associated with 
admitting receipt of content now deemed illegal. Extrapolating from the finding 
that half of all FGD participants received hate-speech, this informal discussion 
format may be a more appropriate forum to discuss content perceived as 
sensitive and potentially risky. It is also possible that the survey design was 
inadequate to capture these past experiences as it did not include techniques 
designed to improve participant recall, and this is investigated in depth in 
Chapter Seven including suggestions for future research. Furthermore, it may 
be the case that the dissemination of hate-speech was less widespread than 
previous studies have suggested, although the study findings do not provide 
evidence for this hypothesis. 
Analysis of the survey data on the receipt and origins of hate-speech SMS 
during in the 2013 election period reveals similar patterns of reporting, but 
triangulation of the data suggests that these findings may be more reliable than 
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the patterns of receipt reported for the 2007 election period. Only 2% (n=7) of 
surveyed mobile phone owners reported receiving threatening SMS in 2013. 
These responses are unlikely to have been affected by recall bias as the survey 
was conducted in 2013. Furthermore, all participants who reported receipt of 
hate-speech provided further narrative information on either the content of these 
messages, or their feelings upon receipt of them. When analysed in light of the 
FGD and interview data presented subsequently, it seems likely that the 
findings about hate-speech receipt in 2013 are more reliable than the findings 
about hate-speech receipt in 2007. 
Six survey participants who reported receiving hate-speech provided qualitative 
data on the content of the threatening messages, and all seven recipients 
described their feelings associated with it. Recognising the limited analytic value 
of these data, and acknowledging that these few responses are unlikely to be 
representative of a wider population, they are nevertheless the only survey data 
collected on attitudes to hate-speech SMS. Accordingly, they are presented in 
full in table 11 below. 
Table 11: Threatening SMS reported by Kenya survey respondents in 2013 election period 
Content of threatening SMS Feeling associated with receipt  
Vote for a specific leader Scared remembering what happened in 
2007 
The election will be rigged 
 
You can't feel positive because they say 
computer error 
To vote in peace Not to trust anyone 
I prefer not to say Very unsafe 
We should vote according to the 
majority who are here 
Very provoked 
 
Dear customer, If you don't vote for 
Uhuru (Kenyatta) you should vacate 
Kenya 
I felt bad and even switched off my 
phone for a while 
If you support a certain party you will 
go 
Not bad because sender was a drunkard 
 
Inevitably, it is not possible to draw conclusions from such a small sample, 
particularly as these respondents did not replicate the message content 
precisely and instead provided summary outlines of the content. These cannot 
be compared with primary data on hate-speech received in 2007, as study 
participants did not provide any concrete examples of these. However, 
compared to the examples of hate-speech in 2007 described in previous studies 
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(e.g. Goldstein & Rotich, 2008), these messages appear considerably less 
threatening. Nevertheless, this content was categorised as ‘threatening SMS’ by 
survey participants. One message advises the recipient, “to vote in peace” and 
appears to have been intended as a pro-peace SMS. Another message 
indicating that, “the election will be rigged”, appears to be an item of gossip 
rather than a direct threat. The rest of these reported ‘threatening SMS’ 
encourage recipients to vote, or not vote, for a particular party in the 
forthcoming election. These represent a departure from the violent threats 
described by FGD and interview participants in the 2007 election period, and 
those detailed in previous studies. However, this may be due to participants 
describing threats received in more neutral language than the original content of 
the message. Access to the original message was neither requested nor 
provided, and therefore the original content cannot be verified. Despite this, the 
survey data suggests that few survey respondents received threatening SMS in 
2013, and threats received were more neutral than those reported during 
previous election periods.  
The small quantity of survey data collected on the receipt of hate-speech SMS 
during both the 2007 and 2013 election periods is insufficient to facilitate the 
planned comparative or statistical analyses. However, triangulating these data 
with the qualitative findings illuminates interesting patterns. Analysis of the 
qualitative interview and FGD data corroborates the survey findings concerning 
low rates of receipt in 2013, as demonstrated subsequently. Furthermore, these 
data are useful as they provide several possible explanations for the low rates 
of receipt and the relatively inoffensive content compared to previous election 
periods.  
During the FGDs, participants were unanimous in asserting that mobile 
networks were no longer used for the dissemination of hate-speech in 2013. 
Participants broadly attribute this shift to the increasing use of other 
communication channels, suggesting that the transmission of hate-speech has 
not fundamentally declined, but rather the method of transmission has changed. 
For example, FGD participants described leaflet campaigns, word-of-mouth, 
and social media as popular mechanisms for the dissemination of threats and 
other anti-social political content. A FGD participant in Naivasha explained, 
“leaflet campaigns are now safer ways to spread hate-speech. They are 
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anonymous. There are some here in Naivasha”. Others in the group concurred 
with this statement, nodding and commenting that leaflets are “more 
anonymous” than mobile phones, and therefore more suitable for use by 
“troublemakers”. This theme also emerged in the survey data, although 
questions did not aim to elicit this information. Examining responses to a 
question about attitudes to the monitoring of SMS content, nine survey 
participants specifically state that monitoring is likely to be ineffective at 
preventing hate-speech, as a consequence of the shift to more anonymous 
communication platforms such as leaflet campaigns. For example, they stated, 
“it will be a waste of time because mostly people use leaflets to spread 
threatening SMS and incitements” and “most criminal offenders or inciting 
messages are arranged and spread using leaflets but not SMS via the phone”.  
Recognition of this shift also emerged during the interviews. For example, the 
Country Director of EISA stated, “now, it’s the social media, Twitter, Facebook, 
that should be watched. The tone is still very sharp. Not in SMS though”. 
Describing changes in the communication of hate-speech since 2007, a local 
peace activist interviewed in Eldoret explained, 
SMS has gone down. After the registration process, people 
stopped sending messages to the SMS lines and now they are 
using social media, with pseudonyms, instead. You just click on 
‘share’ and it spreads rapidly to everyone. If you’re not on 
social media, you’re left behind… 
The regional Vice-Chairman of Peacenet, also interviewed in Eldoret, also 
suggested that hate-speech was likely to shift onto social media platforms, but 
qualified this by stating, “Twitter and Facebook are not as effective as mobile 
phones, as not every Kenyan has access to these”. This is reflected in the 
difference between FGD and survey responses, which focus on the use of 
leaflet campaigns, and the interviewees’ concerns regarding the use of online 
media. Regardless of the replacement mechanisms, the shift of hate-speech 
away from mobile networks to other communication channels was widely 
reported by study participants. By extension, this indicates hate-speech was 
initially more prevalent in mobile networks than the quantitative survey data 
shows, lending support to the theory that the low reported receipt rates reflect 
172 
 
under-reporting by survey participants. Whatever the reasons, this under-
reporting presents a challenge for the analysis of the survey data. With low 
responses to key survey questions, the survey data were insufficient to examine 
patterns in the receipt of hate-speech as initially intended. However, 
triangulation of the qualitative and quantitative data illuminates possible reasons 
for these findings, and reveals interesting ambiguities and interpretations of the 
changing patterns of use of mobile phones for the transmission of threatening 
content.  
In addition to selective under-reporting in past elections and low rates of receipt 
in 2013, ambiguity associated with defining and classifying hate-speech may 
also contribute to the low rates of hate-speech reported by survey participants. 
The qualitative responses to survey questions about the content of hate-speech 
SMS presented in table 11 hints at these ambiguities, which are further 
illuminated by analysis of the FGD data. Despite widespread acknowledgment 
of the prevalence of hate-speech during previous election periods, FGD 
participants remained divided about precisely what constituted hate-speech. To 
examine these differences of opinion, participants in both groups were asked to 
develop and discuss their definitions of hate-speech, and ultimately reach 
agreement on a specific definition. The results of this exercise were illuminating. 
In Nakuru, participants were ultimately unable to reach agreement on a 
comprehensive definition of the term. Differences emerged in particular 
between older and younger participants. The three older group members 
comprised a head teacher, a church leader, and a professional driver. These 
participants asserted that jokes and humorous political insults constitute hate-
speech, and furthermore that such content is inappropriate for communication 
through mobile phones. The four younger group members comprised two 
students, a shop attendant and radio presenter. These participants refused to 
define humorous messages as hate-speech, despite prompting from the church 
leader in particular. The participant who self-identified as a radio presenter 
stated, “making fun of politicians is not hate speech, in fact it is good... but when 
you go to the tribes it becomes personal”. All participants in this group 
eventually agreed that hate-speech is political content that “crosses the line”, 
although the ‘line’ was not precisely delineated and dissent was evident within 
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the group. One participant, seeming somewhat exasperated with the topic, 
explained, 
…there was a warning issued by the government (on TV) about 
messages, about using anything that could make you feel bad 
about your candidate, even if it’s comical. Because what could 
be funny to you could not be to someone else. It could have a 
hidden message. 
This theme of a ‘hidden message’ permeates the qualitative data, as 
participants describe layers of meaning that may communicate different 
messages according to the interpretation of the recipient. Examining next the 
FGD data from Naivasha, participants expressed more uniform opinions than 
the Nakuru group in demarcating the boundaries of acceptable content for SMS. 
Nevertheless, the same interpretive component was at the core of their 
definition. All participants agreed that messages must be discriminatory to be 
considered hate-speech. They broadly affirmed (nodding, making noises 
indicating agreement) a comment made by one participant that, 
Hate speech is any message that can cause negative emotion 
to different people. It may not be necessarily tribe… it could be 
the rich, the poor, working class, jobless… it always depends 
on the receiver. 
This participant was identified as a respected community leader, the oldest 
group member, who led the group to agreement on the definition of hate-speech 
as, “discriminative information alienating other people”.  It is plausible that other 
group members felt compelled to agree with his definition despite personal 
reservations, or perhaps that his opinion influenced their attitudes towards the 
definition of the concept. However, the definition agreed upon by FGD 
participants in Naivasha aligns with comments made in the Nakuru group, 
emphasising that the interpretation rather than the content contributes to the 
categorisation of a particular message as hate-speech. One participant in 
Naivasha explained, “every message you send is hate-speech if you send it to 
the wrong receiver”.  
In Naivasha, participants competed to invent humorous examples of hate 
speech, such as “if you told someone you love them and maybe they don’t want 
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your love then it’s hate-speech”, and “‘our president’ (using gestures to indicate 
ownership) can be termed as a hate-speech because you can be alienating 
other people if it is sent only to your tribe”. Although light-hearted, these 
comments reveal the underlying tensions between perceptions of particular 
SMS content as acceptable or unacceptable, legitimate self-expression and 
anti-social behaviour. The data also suggests that the interpretation of 
messages received is critically informed by contextual cues and the 
interpersonal relationships between sender and recipient.  
The interview and FGD data reveal ambiguities in the classification of SMS as 
hate-speech and those considered threatening, anti-social and humorous by 
recipients. The phrase ‘hidden message’ or ‘hidden meaning’ recurred during 
FGDs discussions about hate-speech, revealing contradictions between the 
apparent content of a message and the underlying meaning interpreted by 
recipients. This lack of clarity may have been a further contributing factor to the 
low rates of reporting of hate-speech by survey respondents, as the survey may 
have been too ‘blunt’ an instrument to capture these ambiguous messages. 
Survey questions specifically asked about inciting or threatening SMS: those 
containing hidden meanings may have been interpreted differently by recipients 
and therefore gone unreported.  
The interview data correspond with the findings of the FGD discussions in 
acknowledging the changing nature of hate-speech transmitted through mobile 
phone networks, and the increasing indirect language used. For example, the 
Country Director of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 
(EISA) explained that hate-speech messages are frequently sent with the 
intention, “to damage the character of candidates”, describing a recent 
comment seen on social media as an example, “how can you vote for an 
uncircumcised candidate?” noting, “in some tribes this is not a real man”. 
Similarly, a community leader participating in the Naivasha FGD described 
discriminatory content against candidates as hate-speech, such as a 
hypothetical SMS asserting, “a woman cannot lead us”. A representative of the 
National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict interviewed also 
described hate-speech as increasingly indirect. He described a shift in the 
content of SMS inciting violence,   
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…from hate-speech to more personal information, rumours. 
They trigger attacks, like when a girl was abducted and 
murdered, and then people used it to manipulate ethnic 
hatred… 
This broad shift, and associated reduction in the transmission of anti-social 
content through mobile phone networks, was widely recognised by interviewees 
and FGD participants, and may also be inferred from analysis of the survey 
findings. The transmission of threatening and anti-social content was found to 
have reduced, with messages containing ‘hidden meanings’ rather than explicit 
threats, in the period between the 2007 and 2013 elections.  
The transmission of humorous SMS was also anecdotally reported to be 
widespread during the 2013 election period. During the pilot study and initial 
interviews, an interviewee and several survey administrators suggested 
including a question about the receipt of humorous messages and funny 
political content during the 2013 election period. Survey administrators in 
particular indicated that these messages were widespread, and informally 
described sharing jokes and political satire through SMS. The survey was 
therefore amended to include a question asking, have you received any SMS 
containing funny political content around the forthcoming election? However, 
the quantitative survey data did not support these expectations, with less than 
ten percent of mobile phone owners in the sample (n=28) reporting receipt of 
political humour by SMS. The majority of these (24 of 28 recipients) provided 
qualitative data about the content of these humorous messages, and about their 
feelings on receipt of them. These responses were coded into four categories 
according to their content. Respondents reported feeling amused, insecure, 
reflective, or neutral in response to receipt of messages they categorised as 
‘funny’. 
These qualitative responses are indicative of the subjectivity with which SMS 
are interpreted. Only half of the recipients reported feelings of amusement on 
receipt of messages which they classified as ‘funny’, while 12% reported feeling 
reflective and 17% reported neutral emotional responses. Around a fifth (21%) 
of recipients described feelings of insecurity or psychological harm associated 
with their receipt, such as feeling, “unsafe”, “very embarrassed” and “isolated 
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from all Kenyans”. Although the sample size is too small to draw generalizable 
conclusions, the association of feelings of insecurity with the receipt of SMS 
classified as ‘funny’ provides further corroboration for the hypothesis that users’ 
interpretation of meaning is more complex than a simple analysis of the content. 
Furthermore, it supports the proposal that categorical slippage around the 
classification of hate-speech hinders analyses of this topic. While survey 
participants report higher receipt of humorous SMS than threatening ones, their 
emotional responses to ‘funny’ SMS indicate that they may have actually 
categorised offensive content as humour. The feelings of insecurity, 
embarrassment and isolation associated with ‘funny’ SMS reported by one fifth 
of recipients demonstrates this categorical slippage, and it is interesting 
therefore that participants were more willing to discuss offensive SMS with a 
humorous component than offensive SMS purely containing threats.  
Study participants expressed a range of opinions about the transmission of 
humorous content that could be interpreted as offensive, reflected for example 
in the definitions of hate-speech developed during the FGDs. Considering hate-
speech to be content that ‘crosses the line’ or ‘alienates people’, this interpretive 
component may have emerged as a consequence of the experience of political 
violence associated with these types of communications, which reports suggest 
affected as many as one third of all Kenyans (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 
2003). During an interview with the country director of EISA, for example, this 
interviewee indicated that, “people initially found them (some hate-speech 
messages) humorous in 2007. The reality check was the post-election 
violence”. This shift in perceptions may reflect the increasing acknowledgement 
of the risks associated with mobile communications for the transmission of 
potentially sensitive content, and the subsequent caution with which they are 
approached by users.  
Beyond the content of the message and the interpretation of the recipient, 
another key consideration in the interpretation of the meaning and intentionality 
behind particular SMS appears to be the source of the message. Survey 
participants who reported receiving hate-speech SMS were asked about the 
source of these messages. However, few participants reported receipt of hate-
speech in general, and even fewer provided any additional information about 
the source. Again, this may reflect participants’ unwillingness to discuss 
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sensitive messages, or it may reflect poor recall of SMS received several years 
previously. Accordingly, these data have limited analytical value, and are 
presented here to demonstrate this point rather than as a reliable source of data 
on the sources of threat. Table 12 below details the reported sources of 
threatening SMS during the 2007 election period. As rates of reporting were 
low, participant numbers are reported rather than percentages in this table. 
Table 12: Sources of violent and threatening messages during 2007 according to survey 
respondents in Kenya 
 Source of SMS 
 Close 
Friends 
and 
family 
Friends Political 
Party 
NGO Community 
Leader 
Prefer 
not to 
say 
Other 
SMS inciting 
violence 
0 3 0 0 0 9 13 
Threatening 
SMS 
1 1 1 1 0 5 5 
SMS 
threatening 
others 
2 5 0 0 0 10 0 
Total 3 9 1 1 0 24 18 
 
As table 12 shows, the majority of survey participants who reported receipt of 
one or more types of hate-speech SMS during 2007 did not provide information 
about the source the message. Three quarters of participants who answered 
this question (n=42) were recorded as ‘prefer not to say’ or ‘other’. Responses 
recorded as ‘other’ either did not provide further information, or attributed the 
message to an unknown sender. Twelve recipients attributed messages to the 
categories ‘friends’ or ‘close friends and family’, indicating that they may have 
been sent as informative or seeking reassurance, rather than intended as a 
threat. Furthermore, these responses undermine the credibility of the remaining 
data, as they suggest that the question may have been poorly worded or 
respondents may have misunderstood. It seems unlikely that threatening hate-
speech SMS would originate from friends and family, and therefore participants 
may have been referring to the receipt of warnings about threats, rather than 
threatening message.   
Examining the FGD data further illuminates these issues. The majority of FGD 
participants expressed uncertainty about the source of messages interpreted as 
hate-speech. Analysing these data suggests that when the originator of the 
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message is known, messages are generally not regarded as threatening. For 
example, one participant in Naivasha explained, “no [I have not received hate-
speech by SMS], but it depends on the source. I have received something but it 
came from a friend so it is a joke”.  Here it seems that the participant has 
chosen to categorise the message as ‘safe’ precisely because it originates from 
a friend; while acknowledging that if it originated from an alternative source it 
could be regarded as hate-speech. Similarly, two FGD participants in Naivasha 
described receiving SMS containing rumours forwarded to them by friends 
seeking verification of their content; these were not interpreted as threatening. 
Another participant in the same group then described receiving an SMS warning 
him to vacate his property as armed men were coming that night to attack. He 
was unsure whether this message originated from a friend as a warning, or from 
an enemy as a genuine threat or as a rumour designed to instil fear. In this 
particular case, the uncertainty around the origin of the message increases the 
likelihood of it being regarded as a genuine threat.  
These ambiguities are likely to contribute to study participants’ reluctance to 
discuss their receipt of hate-speech messages, for fear of implicating particular 
senders. The lack of clarity around what constitutes hate-speech, combined 
with categorical slippage between humour, rumour, and hate-speech also 
increase the challenges associated with the study of hate-speech. Surveys are 
therefore likely to be inadequate tools for the collection of data on hate-speech, 
as mobile phone users’ experiences of hate-speech are subject to layers of 
interpretation according to the perceived intention of the sender. 
When the sender of threatening or anti-social SMS is unknown, the data 
suggests that recipients are more likely to interpret the message as hate-
speech. In Naivasha, participants expressed suspicion that threatening SMS 
originate from mischievous incarcerated offenders in local prisons. For example, 
two FGD participants in Naivasha who described receiving anonymous 
threatening SMS in 2007 believed these originated from prisoners in the local 
jail. Other participants in this group expressed both verbal and non-verbal 
support for this assumption, nodding and discussing the widespread use of 
mobile phones by criminals for coordinating and committing crimes during 
periods of incarceration. One participant stated, “Inmates from prison would call 
you and demand money”. Like the FGD participants in Naivasha, the vice-
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chairman of Peacenet in Eldoret also attributed threatening SMS to convicted 
criminals using mobile phones inside a nearby prison, commenting, 
Prisoners are using unregistered SIMs to send messages from 
inside prisons. I was a victim. Someone called and said we are 
just outside your gate, we want to come in and kill you. 
These findings suggest that mobile phones are perceived to enable prisoners to 
overcome their confinement and remotely access victims. The use of mobile 
phones by incarcerated prisoners reveals a further ambiguity associated with 
the virtual connectivity of mobile telephony. These tools render physical 
boundaries permeable, with prisoners able to overcome their physical 
confinement and target their victims remotely through mobile phone channels.  
5.3.2.2 New crime opportunities 
In addition to the dissemination of threatening and offensive content widely 
termed ‘hate-speech’, the research findings reveal several further security 
threats associated with mobile telephony in Kenya. These threats emerged 
throughout the fieldwork period, as the relationship between communications 
and social disorder was revealed to extend beyond the dissemination of hate-
speech. Accordingly, this section draws primarily on the FGD data, and 
presents exploratory findings from the primary data. 
A key security threat identified by study participants was SMS scams, which 
emerged without prompting during both FGDs and proved to be of great interest 
to participants. All but one FGD participant in both groups described receiving 
scam messages, and the majority of recipients attributed these messages to 
unknown senders. Although they reported receiving fraudulent scam SMS, none 
of the FGD participants reported falling victim to mobile-perpetrated scams. 
Three participants in Naivasha mentioned rural family members being tricked by 
mobile phone fraudsters.  
FGD participants described a range of types of scam SMS. These include 
generalised or generic content, such as SMS that falsely informed recipients 
that they had won prizes in competitions to entice them to transfer money to 
collect their prize. Other participants described personalised scams, such as the 
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receipt of SMS purporting to originate from family members and requesting 
urgent assistance. For example, one FGD participant in Nakuru explained,  
People message and say “I’ve been arrested. Send money”, or 
you are told you’ve won the lottery and must send some money 
to collect your winnings… 
Another participant in Nakuru described a popular scam in which the victim 
receives a message informing them of a transaction made in error, and 
requesting the return of the funds. He stated,  
…they would say “Mpesa has sent money into your account”, 
but it is fake money, and “you are to send it to this person”. 
When they get the money they destroy the SIM card. 
Many of the scams described by participants were reliant on m-money services 
to facilitate financial transfers. In addition to the virtual platform of mobile 
communications enabling users to assume false identities, m-money services 
also facilitate the transmission of instantaneous financial transfers between 
these disconnected users, introducing new opportunities for the perpetration of 
fraud and scams.  
All of the scams reported utilised the anonymity of mobile networks to assert 
false identities; whether purporting to be credible formal organisations such as 
mobile network providers or government agencies, or informal connections such 
as family members. The majority of scam messages described by study 
participants were generic in nature and did not include personal information 
targeting a particular victim, such as those describing winning prizes or 
transaction errors to encourage recipients to make financial transfers to the 
originator of the message. Some messages were reported to be personalised 
and targeted specific individuals, for example those claiming to originate from a 
named family members.  
Participants described mobile phones in terms of creating new opportunities for 
crime and anti-social behaviour. For example, an FGD participant in Naivasha 
explained,  
…mobiles also bring some mischievousness. Someone calls 
you and says they are arrested by police, can you send me 
181 
 
some money... it’s a game.... they are conning you over the 
phone... so in that way, crime rates have increased. But now 
that they are registered it’s easier to trace… 
The notion that mobile phones encourage ‘mischief’ proved to be a recurring 
theme for FGD participants. FGD participants described how mobile phones, 
“enlarge your territory of knowing people”, and bring people “into one village”. 
However, they also expressed unease about this increasingly interconnected 
network of invisible users, and particularly around the verification of identities. 
Participants repeatedly asserted that criminals destroy the SIM card after the 
completion of successful scams, as though this physical act severs the 
connection between victim and perpetrator and permanently conceals the 
identity of the offender.  
Having identified a range of crime threats associated with mobile phones, the 
subsequent section presents the findings relating to the prevention of crime 
facilitated through mobile phone networks in Kenya. 
5.3.3 The prevention of mobile phone crime  
The findings demonstrate that users perceive the crime threats associated with 
mobile phones to have fundamentally changed as a result of a number of 
preventative strategies. These findings emerged during the survey, FGD and 
interviews, in which study participants expressed support for preventative 
strategies implemented, while also describing ways in which offenders are able 
to adapt to circumvent or bypass preventative measures.  
5.3.3.1 Peace SMS and the de-escalation of violence 
As this study was initially designed to investigate the dissemination of hate-
speech SMS, questions about the receipt and interpretation of peace SMS were 
included in the survey instrument. According to these data, around half of 
survey participants reported receiving SMS promoting peace around the 2013 
election (n=128). These participants were asked to describe their feelings about 
the receipt of peace SMS, and the qualitative responses were subsequently 
coded into ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘neutral’ and ‘ambivalent’ categories (see figure 
14).   
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As figure 14 demonstrates, the majority of peace SMS recipients described 
positive emotional responses such as feeling “calm”, “patriotic” and “secure”.  
Neutral feelings associated with the receipt of peace SMS included, “nothing” 
and “just ok”, while ambivalent feelings were, for example, “a little bit safe – 
though fear of unknown is still in me about the coming election”. Only two 
recipients reported negative feelings associated with their receipt of pro-peace 
SMS. One commented, “it made me feel that I don’t belong here” and the other 
explained, “I felt bad because they kept sending it many times and I already know 
we should be peaceful”. These findings suggest that the majority of recipients of 
peace SMS felt more secure as a consequence of receiving the messages. Adding 
interpretive depth to these findings, FGD participants were also asked to discuss 
how they felt about receiving pro-peace SMS, and analysis of these discussions 
provides more detailed interpretation of their impact.  
During the FGDs, participants both described peace SMS as contributing to 
feelings of security, and also expressed scepticism about their tangible impact 
on conditions of peace and violence. For example, in Nakuru one participant 
commented that he felt “relieved” when he received peace SMS, to which 
female participant responded that peace SMS, “…will contribute to calming the 
tensions” and “remind people to be mindful”. Several other members of this 
FGD expressed scepticism with body language and facial expressions, and it 
could be inferred from non-verbal cues that they disagreed with this 
 
Figure 14: Feelings associated with receipt of pro-peace SMS according to survey respondents in 
Kenya 
 
Positive
86%
Neutral
8%
Negative
2%
Ambivalent
4%
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interpretation of the potential impact of peaceSMS.  A male respondent 
countered that peace SMS are, “just like spam”, predicting that they are unlikely 
to have any impact. Another respondent commented that their impact depends 
on the origin of the message, and whether or not they are sent by “legitimate 
bodies”. This topic elicited considerable debate and disagreement among FGD 
participants, with some defending the value of peace SMS for helping mobile 
phone users to feel more secure, and others describing them as having no 
tangible effect on insecurity. FGD participants broadly dismissed suggestions 
that SMS peace campaigns could reduce violence. “Positive impact,” one 
participant in Naivasha stated to general agreement, “is achieved by sensitising 
people through institutions like church and schools, they are the legitimating 
bodies”. Another participant in the group concurred, commenting, “Peace 
programmes, particularly through churches, have been most effective to 
sensitise people”. FGD participants also discussed alternative peace initiatives 
they considered to be effective in Nakuru, commenting that, “they [peace 
initiatives] are effective… we normally have meetings every week and we talk 
about peace and most of the organisations come to talk… even the youths are 
involved in the activity of peace”. Participants in this group expressed the 
opinion that face-to-face contact was essential for building trust and that mobile 
telephony is an ineffective mechanism to catalyse behavioural change, unless 
messages originate from trusted sources such as religious leaders. This is 
consonant with the findings of previous studies, such as Rafael’s (2003) 
argument that mobile phones were an effective catalyst of change in the 
Philippines only when calls for collective action were supported by respected 
religious leaders. FGD participants were also adamant that campaigns 
implemented through churches were likely to have the most impact on peace, 
and were also unanimous in stating that religious leaders are the most trusted 
source of information in local communities. Participants were able to describe 
two recent peace initiatives in the local sports stadium and mentioned ‘many’ on 
TV that they considered to be more effective than mobile phone campaigns. 
Interestingly, religious leaders were not mentioned in any of the interviews with 
organisations using mobile phones for peace and violence prevention, and it is 
notable that none of the organisations researched formally encourage religious 
leaders to participate in their activities. 
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5.2.2.2 SIM Registration  
As noted earlier, SIM card registration was implemented in Kenya on 31st 
December 2012 to reduce the misuse of mobile networks. During FGDs and 
interviews, SIM registration emerged as a critical mechanism through which the 
security threats associated with mobile telephony has been effectively 
mitigated. The Country Director of the EISA associated SIM registration with 
peaceful elections in 2013, stating, “the registration of SIM cards has been very 
successful in preventing recurrence of violence”. The vice-chairman of 
Peacenet in Eldoret also attributed the reduction in threats and hate-speech to 
SIM registration commenting, “since registration, many SIMS have been 
switched off, by Safaricom for example. The government took good steps”. In 
Eldoret, a local peace activist interviewed also attributed the shift in hate-
speech communication from mobile networks to online social media to SIM 
registration, commenting, “after the registration process, people stopped 
sending messages to the SMS lines and now they are using social media, with 
pseudonyms, instead”. During the interviews with high-level stakeholders, SIM 
registration was widely described as an effective mechanism through which 
hate-speech and the organisation of violence using mobile phones have been 
mitigated in Kenya. However, as interviews were primarily conducted with 
representatives of organisations seeking to reduce the dissemination of hate-
speech during the 2013 election period, it is perhaps unsurprising that these 
interviewees expressed support for SIM registration. It is more surprising that 
support for SIM registration was also unanimous among FGD participants. FGD 
participants were not asked specifically to discuss their attitudes to SIM 
registration, but nevertheless it emerged frequently. For example, in Nakuru a 
female FGD participant commented, “It’s because of this [SIM registration] that 
people are not sending hate speech this election”. A participant in Naivasha 
also attributed reduced misuse of mobile networks to SIM registration asserting, 
“…now phones are all registered it is easy to track them, mobile crime has 
reduced.” A participant in Naivasha affirmed, “I have not had bad messages 
since registration, you can be prosecuted [for sending hate-speech] so people 
are careful now”. One participant in Naivasha attributed this reduction directly to 
the Communications Commission of Kenya (the government body responsible 
for the prevention of hate-speech), asserting, “CCK has reduced drastically the 
number of hate messages, and brought a lot more care”. This motif of mobile 
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phone users ‘taking care’ to transmit appropriate content in their 
communications recurred during both FGDs and several interviews. Almost half 
of the FGD participants (five in Naivasha and one in Nakuru of a total of 
fourteen participants) described mobile users as more ‘careful’ following SIM 
registration. These findings suggest that study participants widely support the 
SIM registration process, and furthermore that they perceive it to be an effective 
disincentive for the transmission of anti-social content through mobile phone 
networks. Specifically, they attribute its effectiveness to reducing the anonymity 
of mobile users, which is deemed to encourage users to behave in a 
responsible manner.  
Based on widespread media reporting in Kenya, it is popularly believed that SIM 
registration is associated with the monitoring of individual SMS to detect and 
punish users who send inappropriate content, a view expressed by participants 
in FGDs, interviews and during the survey. Perceptions of SMS monitoring were 
examined through each of the data collection methods. During the surveys, both 
open and closed questions were used to gauge respondents’ attitudes towards 
the monitoring of mobile networks.  
Survey participants were asked, do you think the government should monitor 
SMS content? Three quarters of the survey sample (n=223) responded that 
they believed the government should monitor SMS content, while one fifth 
(n=57) responded that the government should not. The remainder (n=17) were 
recorded as non-respondents to this question. Survey participants were asked 
to substantiate their answers with an open question asking for further 
information about their response. They provided a range of reasons both in 
support of, and against, monitoring. These were coded into nine categories, 
with each response coded according to the main reason provided. Categories 
and examples of messages are provided in table 13, and the frequency of 
responses is provided in figure 15. 
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Table 13: Reasons for attitudes to SMS monitoring provided by Kenya survey sample 
Attitude Category Examples 
 
Pro-
monitoring 
General Security For security reasons 
To avoid election violence 
Prevention of 
Hate-Speech 
To prevent spread of hate speech 
through SMS  
To prevent people from passing SMS 
that are inciting and cause havoc 
Identification of 
Perpetrators 
Those sending inciting messages 
and threats can be easily spotted 
So that they can catch conmen and 
people who incite violence through 
SMS 
Protection of 
Victims 
To protect citizens from violence 
To see those being threatened to 
assist them 
Neutral Neutral They can if they think it’s ok 
Anti-
Monitoring 
Privacy 
/confidentiality 
Privacy is important 
Private SMS sent to loved ones, the 
government should have no business 
in 
Rights/Freedom Interference in people’s rights 
Freedom of expression is essential 
Monitoring is 
Ineffective 
It will be a waste of time because 
mostly people use leaflets to spread 
threatening incitements 
People are no longer using SMS 
 
Of survey participants who expressed support for monitoring, around half 
(n=107) cited the prevention of hate-speech as the reason. General security 
and the identification of perpetrators of crime were also popular reasons given 
by survey respondents.  
Privacy concerns was the most frequent reason provided by respondents who 
did not believe that the government should monitor SMS use, although it is 
interesting to note that some respondents premised their objections on the 
pragmatic assumption that monitoring is likely to be ineffective. Most 
respondents who cited the ineffectiveness of monitoring as a reason for their 
response elaborated their comments by asserting that hate-speech has shifted 
away from mobile channels.  
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Figure 15: Reasons provided by study participants in Kenya for supporting or opposing SMS 
monitoring 
Further details on participants’ attitudes to monitoring were elicited with survey 
questions asking whether they were personally concerned about being 
monitored, and whether this affected their mobile phone use habits. More 
survey respondents stated that they were personally concerned than objected 
to monitoring in general, suggesting that these concerns were not sufficiently 
serious to cause them to object to monitoring. Of mobile users who responded 
to this question, (n=276), around one third (n=79) expressed personal concern, 
compared to around one fifth (n=52) who stated that they did not support 
monitoring. Participants’ reasons for being concerned, or not being concerned, 
about monitoring were coded and categorised according to the main reason 
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provided, as shown in figure 16. Although a wide range of justifications were 
anticipated, in practice all participant responses could be coded into four core 
categories. 
As figure 16 shows, the most popular response provided by participants was 
that they had no reason for concern because their mobile phone use was 
legitimate. Examples of responses coded as ‘nothing to hide’ include, “I don’t 
participate in dirty political hate speech”, “I only send good things to people”, or 
indications that their SMS messages are “clean”. The other reason for 
participants reporting a lack of concern about monitoring was the attribution of 
priority to public safety over personal privacy. These participants made 
comments such as, “my country will be peaceful, that is what matters”, “it's just 
a good way to improve the security”, and “it’s the government and they are 
protecting me”.  
One third of the survey participants reported being concerned about monitoring, 
and as noted previously this does not necessarily result in a lack of support for 
 
 
Figure 16: Reasons provided by study participants in Kenya for being concerned or 
unconcerned about SMS monitoring 
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monitoring. These participants provided reasons that were coded into two core 
categories; privacy concerns and pragmatic issues associated with changing 
behaviour. Participants expressing privacy concerns stated, for example, “it will 
interfere with my privacy” and “I am entitled to my privacy”. Participants who 
described concerns around behavioural change provided responses such as, “I 
cannot discuss anything private via the text message”, “it makes me cautious of 
what messages I should send”, and “I have to be careful now on what I say 
since we have registered our phones”. Open responses to this question 
therefore illuminate the contradictions described previously concerning the 
‘hidden meaning’ within messages. Users expressed concern about the 
interpretation of messages that could be considered as hate-speech but were 
not intended as such by the sender, and originate from trusted, credible 
sources. For example, one survey respondent commented, “I receive many 
messages from my friends including bad messages. I think they can take it 
wrong”. The findings suggest that the lack of clarity over definition of hate-
speech, in combination with the contextual interpretation of content received 
according to interpretations of the motivations of the sender, have altered the 
communication habits of individual users. 
FGD participants in Kenya also expressed little concern about the privacy 
implications of mobile phone surveillance, and widely reported valuing public 
security and the maintenance of order over personal privacy. Clear distinctions 
were identified between the personal and collective implications of monitoring 
during both FGD discussions. One participant in Nakuru stated, “being 
monitored is not good for me, but it is good for all of us” and another in 
Naivasha commented, “it is an infringement of rights if it doesn't reach them [the 
intended recipient] but we are just being monitored without the person who is 
the sender being accused of anything so in that way their rights aren't being 
affected because we aren't being accused”. The majority of both FGD and 
survey participants expressed the opinion that passive monitoring is not a threat 
to innocent users. 
During the survey, participants were specifically asked if monitoring affects their 
mobile phone use habits. One fifth of respondents (n=58) reported altering their 
mobile phone use as a result of expectations of monitoring, commenting for 
example, “I don't call or text freely” and, “I am conscious of what I send”. This 
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constitutes around half of respondents who previously described concern about 
monitoring, and one tenth of those who stated they were not concerned about 
monitoring. The survey data suggests that regardless of the reality of SMS 
monitoring in Kenya, expectations of SMS surveillance affect user behaviour. It 
also indicates that, at least among the survey sample, support for SMS 
monitoring is widespread, despite recognition that it affects users’ 
communication habits.  
FGD participants in both Naivasha and Nakuru also discussed the ways in 
which expectations of monitoring affect their mobile phone use, describing 
altering their behaviours to ensure that sensitive information was not sent over 
mobile phone channels. One politically active male FGD participant in Naivasha 
explained, “The regulation has affected how you communicate with fellow party 
members – we don’t know exactly what constitutes hate speech”. A community 
leader in Naivasha also described how the legislation affected his political 
engagement with other party activists, commenting, “…we now communicate 
directly, we meet up to mobilise and communicate.” The FGD participants in 
Nakuru were less open, describing broad behavioural change among the 
general public rather than discussing their own behaviour. None of the 
participants discussed their political communication habits, making general 
statements instead. For example, one FGD participant commented, “…people 
find new ways [to communicate]. If it’s a sensitive message, they don’t send it 
through the mobile phone anymore”. In 2007, he continued, “everyone was free 
to say what they wanted on radio, TV and SMS. Now everyone is preaching 
peace, so it has restricted political opinion to face-to-face communication”.  
Interestingly, respondents in both FGDs expressed opinions that the current 
controls over mobile phones are insufficient to prevent security threats 
associated with mobile networks. In Nakuru, three participants defended the 
proposition made by one group member that mobile operators should be 
empowered to block the transmission of hate-speech messages in order to 
prevent incitements and hate-speech from contributing to violent outcomes. 
Similarly in Naivasha, a FGD participant explained, 
Even though they are being monitored, at the end of the day 
the message is still being received… the message still will 
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reach the destination… it just confirms SMS are sent and 
received, if the SMS could be stopped from being delivered, 
then it would be better.  
Other participants in Naivasha concurred, with one commenting “they should 
block it [hate speech], not just monitor it”, and another asserting, “…these 
[mobile phone] companies can block the hate speech from reaching its 
destination”. 
This theme of shifting sensitive communications to alternative channels also 
emerged during the interviews. During one interview, the Country Director of the 
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa described the deterrence 
effect of SIM registration and the monitoring of mobile networks, commenting 
that it effectively encourages users to adapt their behaviour as,  
The leading network providers have software that can trace 
hate-speech. It has a deterrence effect… People are aware 
they are being watched. It was not a crime in 2007, so they 
were not recorded then. 
During an interview with a local peace activist and journalist in Eldoret, the 
interviewee commented,  
Monitoring is bringing about sneaky behaviours. People are 
meeting in person in hotel rooms and late at night to discuss 
strategies, for example for expelling particular communities. As 
a journalist, this is what I am hearing.  
According to this interviewee, while monitoring is effective at reducing hate-
speech through mobile networks, it does not address deeper issues and 
therefore encourages people to conceal anti-social behaviour, rather than 
effectively preventing it. For example, he notes,  
Violence is starting in Eldoret, but the only evidence is now 
verbal. People are marking the houses of certain tribes, people 
are being told to leave certain areas, and leaflets are being 
distributed warning people to leave; if they don’t vote for 
particular parties they must vacate. But no one will submit the 
leaflets [to the police], no one will give this evidence.  
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Interviewees identified both the deterrence effect, and the displacement of hate-
speech onto other, more anonymous platforms, as side effects of perceived 
SMS monitoring. These themes are revisited in the Chapter Seven.  
5.3.3.3 Prosecution and deterrence 
The FGDs illuminate an additional factor mitigating the misuse of mobile 
networks, and potentially affecting the behaviour of mobile users. This concerns 
the widespread reporting of the use of mobile phone data as evidence in 
criminal trials. FGD participants in Naivasha described the high-profile 
prosecutions of people accused of spreading hate-speech as credible evidence 
that practices of SMS monitoring are widespread. For example, one participant 
commented, “Three people have been arrested for spreading hate speech, 
which confirms that they are monitoring us” and another noted, "using mobile 
phones to send hate messages is reduced because it is being monitored". 
Others in the group expressed non-verbal agreement with this, and similar 
opinions were expressed by the high-level interviewees. During an interview 
with a Programme Officer in the NSC Secretariat, the interviewee mentioned 
this deterrence effect, describing the indictment of several (unspecified) political 
figures as “the elephant in the room”. He commented, 
It’s a great lesson to politicians that they will be held 
responsible for their actions. Regardless of the outcome, it’s a 
lesson that sinks in with every citizen in this country: You will be 
held responsible for your actions. 
The Country Director of the EISA also notes that, “there have been abuses 
brought to the high courts which use evidence from SMS, like tracking, to 
prosecute”. This indicates that awareness is increasing of the risks of utilising 
mobile phone communications for the commission and organisation of crime. 
With increasing awareness of these risks, public perceptions suggests that the 
misuse of mobile phone networks is declining. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the background and primary data associated with the first 
case study investigated in this thesis: Kenya. First examining the political 
background of the association between mobile phones and crime in Kenya and 
the emergence of crime threats associated with mobile communications, the 
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chapter then overviews existing preventative techniques developed to address 
specific threats associated with mobile phones, and the leveraging of mobile 
phones for broader crime prevention in this setting. The research findings are 
presented thematically, examining first the security benefits associated with 
mobile phones according to research participants. These comprise access to 
informal networks of support, the secure storage of information, access to other 
modes of communication to triangulate or verify information and rumour, and 
the facilitation of financial transfers. A range of other benefits were identified, 
including facilitating business transactions, providing access to employment 
opportunities, and organisation romantic affairs. The chapter also investigates 
unexpected findings concerning attitudes to formal connectivity to security 
forces, identifying deep-rooted ambiguities and mistrust in the organs of the 
state which reduce the effectiveness of formal applications of mobile phones for 
crime prevention. 
The chapter also examines the data concerning the relationship between mobile 
phones, insecurity and crime, with particular focus on the dissemination of hate-
speech through mobile phone networks. New crime opportunities for scams and 
other forms of ‘mischief’ were identified, and finally the chapter examined 
attitudes to mechanisms for the prevention of crime associated with mobile 
phones, such as PeaceSMS and SIM registration. 
 
  
194 
 
Chapter Six: Uganda 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the background and findings of the second case study are 
presented, examining the risks and benefits associated with the use of mobile 
telephony for crime and security in Uganda. The chapter commences with an 
analysis of relevant literature on migration and mobile telephony, 
contextualising the primary data analysis that follows. The specific context of 
refugees and migrants in Uganda is addressed first, followed by an analysis of 
the importance of mobile telephony for the social and economic wellbeing of 
migrants, and the security benefits and threats associated with these tools for 
displaced users.  
In the second part of this chapter, the primary data collected among displaced 
mobile phone owners, users and non-users in Uganda are presented and 
analysed; including content analysis of qualitative data collected through 
interviews (n=5) and FGDs (n=3) and statistical analysis of quantitative survey 
data (n=194). These analyses reveal both benefits and threats associated with 
formal and informal uses of mobile telephony, including the coordination of 
violence and crime, fraud and financial scams, the dissemination of false 
information and theft of handsets. Specific vulnerabilities affecting the study 
participants in Uganda are identified through analysis of the FGD data in 
particular, setting the scene for the subsequent analysis in Chapter Seven. This 
chapter concludes with an overview of study participants’ attitudes to mobile 
phone crime prevention mechanisms, and crime prevention mechanisms 
leveraging mobile phone networks.   
6.2 Mobile telephony, crime and security for migrants in Uganda 
Studies suggest that mobile phones have particularly important security benefits 
for users during periods of emergencies. Migrants and refugees have received 
particular attention, and it has been demonstrated that mobile phones provide 
unparalleled advantages for users to share and access information and 
resources during times of need. These benefits are associated with connectivity 
to both informal social networks and formal organisations. Studies of crime 
victimisation among refugees focus on physical crime in refugee settlements, 
with digital crimes receiving little attention. Migrants in Uganda therefore provide 
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a useful case study through which to investigate the relationship between mobile 
telephony, crime and security. 
6.2.1 Refugees and migrants in Uganda 
The second case study investigated in this thesis comprises the situation of 
refugees and migrants in Uganda. It is therefore important to introduce some 
background information about the scale and context of migration in East Africa, 
and to situate the specific populations investigated in this study.  
It is estimated that Uganda hosts over 350,000 refugees, residing in both urban 
and rural parts of the country. Uganda provides specific refugee settlements 
with basic services, and also provides free transportation for refugees fleeing 
conflict in neighbouring counties. Uganda is perceived as a safe destination for 
refugees in a region plagued by instability. The majority of refugees in Uganda 
originate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and 
Somalia, where outbreaks of conflict frequently result in high levels of instability 
and violence (UNHCR, 2015). Nearly two-thirds of the refugees residing in 
Uganda in 2015 arrived in the previous five years, fleeing the escalating violent 
conflicts in their countries of origin.  
Uganda’s refugee policies are widely regarded as progressive, and refugees 
are granted similar freedoms and opportunities as Ugandan citizens. These 
policies have been described as, “a model for Africa” (Akello, 2009). In 2006, 
legislation was adopted recognising the rights of refugees to work, freedom of 
movement, and the right to live outside of refugee camps (The Refugees Act , 
2006). Uganda is therefore a popular destination for East African refugees, 
many of whom settle in Kampala (Krause-Vilmar, 2011; Omata, 2012; Omata & 
Kaplan, 2013) as well as refugee settlements across the country.  
The Government of Uganda allocates land for designated refugee settlements 
in rural areas, which are coordinated by the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR, 2015). In these settlements UNHCR provides access to 
basic needs and relief items including healthcare, nutrition, and shelter, as well 
as support for the establishment of livelihood activities to support resilience and 
self-sufficiency. Refugee settlements in Uganda are nevertheless extremely 
resource-poor environments. Materials provided include a container for water, 
basic cooking utensils, and a tarpaulin with which to construct shelters 
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(UNHCR, 2015). With these materials, and the provision of basic foodstuffs (rice 
and beans) and clean drinking water, refugees are encouraged to farm the land 
and become self-sufficient.  
Despite the protective legal framework and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to address basic needs, refugees in Uganda arrive into resource-
constrained environments with few possessions, and many still face social and 
economic discrimination by local populations (Krause-Vilmar, 2011). This socio-
economic marginalisation is compounded by disconnection from traditional 
social networks, and displaced populations value mobile phones accordingly for 
the connectivity they provide (ICRC, 2011).   
6.2.2 Displacement and mobile phones 
An emerging body of literature suggests that mobile phones are particularly 
valuable for migrants and displaced populations who are disconnected from 
their traditional social networks (ICRC, 2011; Horst, 2006; Moloney, 2012; 
Wilding & Gifford, 2013). A range of studies suggest that mobile telephony 
provides socio-economic benefits for crisis-affected populations, particularly for 
the maintenance of social support networks enabling users to share information 
and call for assistance (Abraham, 2007; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Blumenstock, et al., 
2011; Jack & Suri, 2014; Overa, 2006; Souter, et al., 2005; Tenhunen, 2008, 
contributing to economic welfare benefits (Aker, 2008; de Silva & 
Ratnadiwakara, 2008; Jensen, 2007; Overa, 2006) and maintaining 
transnational familial bonds (Horst, 2006; Horst & Miller, 2006). However, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the security implications of mobile 
telephony for displaced users, both positive and negative. This case study was 
selected in order to address this knowledge gap. 
Refugee livelihoods is a popular area of academic investigation, and mobile 
telephony is widely regarded is a powerful tool for refugees to enhance their 
livelihood opportunities. The protracted nature of refugee crises is associated 
with declining donor interest in providing long-term support for refugees, leading 
to the promotion of policies designed to empower them as active economic 
agents and increase their self-sufficiency (Jacobsen, 2001; 2005). Mobile 
telephony provides a powerful mechanism for dispersed social networks to 
communicate, share resources, and establish successful livelihood strategies. 
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As Moloney notes in the editorial to a special edition of the Journal for 
Information Technology for Development on human mobility,  
Whatever the motivation for migration - whether voluntary or 
involuntary - it is here that the very mobility of the mobile phone 
comes into its own, enabling migrants to remain in 
communication with existing contacts, and to communicate 
within new networks as they develop. (2012, p. 88) 
Previous studies widely document the importance of social networks for 
enhancing refugee livelihoods. For example, in a working paper prepared for 
UNHCR, Amisi (2006) draws on interviews and participant observation to 
examine the livelihood strategies of Congolese refugees in Durban, South 
Africa, questioning why some adapt and integrate into South African society 
while others migrate to refugee camps. Amisi finds that social networks are 
critical to the success or failure of refugee livelihood strategies: access to 
employment, capital, and opportunities depend on these networks. Porter et al. 
(2008) describe similar findings in an analysis of Liberian refugees in 
Buduburan refugee camp in Ghana. Based on data from FGDs, interviews, 
photo diaries and participant observation, Porter et al. (2008) describe a 
complex interplay of social networks and economic strategies through which 
remittances provide a source of economic security for camp-dwelling refugee 
communities, particularly in the absence of alternative economic opportunities. 
Mobile phones, in these analyses, enable migrants to maintain social networks 
even when these networks are geographically dispersed. Furthermore, these 
networks facilitate access to resources and opportunities for refugees living in 
resource-poor settings with limited opportunities for social or economic 
advancement, such as refugee settlements. 
Studies of the use of mobile phones by diaspora also demonstrate their 
importance for the maintenance of social networks, and for members of 
diaspora communities to provide informal support to less fortunate members of 
their social networks (Collins, 2009; Horst, 2006). For example, Collins (2009) 
investigates the importance of mobile communications among Somali diaspora. 
For residents of Somalia, poor state provision of services and unpredictable 
living conditions create an unstable environment. However, transnational 
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migration patterns coupled with mobile connectivity with distant kin enable 
social networks to provide support and assistance during times of need, 
providing a valuable mechanism to overcome this instability. Collins notes that 
for transnational Somali communities, “connections – rather than one’s bank 
account or asset holdings – provide the underlying safety net” (2009, p 213).  
Social networks have also been identified as critical for refugees and migrants 
in Uganda specifically (Krause-Vilmar, 2011; Omata, 2012; Omata & Kaplan, 
2013;). Based on interviews conducted in Kampala, Omata (2012) describes 
the economic strategies of refugees and migrants extending across a wide 
range of business activities. Classifying them according to their relative 
economic success, Omata notes that struggling refugees and migrants 
(categorised as ‘surviving’) have fewer connections, whilst those classified as 
‘thriving’, “are usually equipped with extensive business networks” (2012, p. 15). 
A report published by the Women’s Refugee Commission on refugees in 
Kampala also argues that economic security is critically facilitated by social 
support networks (Krause-Vilmar, 2011). Based on over two hundred and fifty 
qualitative interviews combined with participant observation, the report states, 
“refugees rely on social networks as their informal safety net” (Krause-Vilmar, 
2011, pp. 10-11). In a subsequent study of refugee livelihoods both in Kampala 
and in two rural refugee settlements, Nakivale and Kyangwali, Omata and 
Kaplan (2013) also highlight the significance of social networks for livelihoods 
and economic security, noting that refugees value transnational networks in 
particular for accessing remittances and exchanging information. In addition to 
these informal benefits, formal applications of mobile telephony for crisis-
affected and displaced populations are also increasingly recognised and 
promoted (Coyle & Meier, 2009; ICRC, 2011; IFRC, 2005; Wall & Robinson, 
2008; Wall, 2012), as addressed in Chapter Two.  
Although the social and economic benefits of mobile connectivity for refugees 
and migrants are widely recognised in existing studies, limited attention has 
been paid to the benefits for users’ personal security. Although the economic 
security associated with livelihoods comprises an element of this, this case 
study is used to investigate users’ security to crime threats specifically.  
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6.2.3 Mobile connectivity and risks for migrants 
Given the established connection between mobile telephony and livelihoods 
(Aker, 2008; de Silva & Ratnadiwakara, 2008; Jensen, 2007; Jensen, 2007; 
Overa, 2006) and access to support during crises (Abraham, 2007; Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010; Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Jack & Suri, 2014; Overa, 2006; Souter, 
et al., 2005; Tenhunen, 2008), the benefits of mobile telephony for displaced 
populations are numerous.  Recognising these benefits, there remains limited 
acknowledgement of potential risks introduced by mobile telephony. Where 
security risks associated with mobile phone use are acknowledged, they tend to 
focus on high-level risks associated with increasing opportunities for 
surveillance and privacy concerns. For example, in the introduction to a special 
issue of the Journal of Refugee Studies on Forced Displacement, Refugees and 
ICTs, Wilding and Gifford acknowledge that ICTs, particularly mobile phones, 
both provide new opportunities and introduce new risks for migrants and 
refugees,  
…even as they create opportunities for empowerment, they 
simultaneously open up new prospects for the management, 
control and exploitation of populations and individuals on the 
move. This is what makes attention to the relationship of ICTs 
to refugees, asylum seekers, the internally displaced and 
undocumented migrants so urgent. This intersection requires 
specific attention precisely because of the precariousness of 
forced migration and the capacity of ICTs to be used for both 
good and harm. (Wilding & Gifford, 2013, p. 496) 
Examining how ICTs (including mobile phones) intersect with processes of 
globalisation, Wilding and Gifford focus on the connection between identity and 
territory, border control and surveillance in Europe and Australia. In these 
developed world contexts, mobile phones are now ubiquitous, “… so common 
as to be taken almost for granted, playing an important role as a simultaneously 
personalized and social technology” (Wilding & Gifford, 2013, p. 497).  The 
recognised threats associated with these tools are not concerned with individual 
experiences of crime and insecurity, but rather with the potential for mobile 
telephony to increase opportunities for surveillance and control. While these 
potential impacts are important, this focus may obscure user-level experiences 
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of crime and insecurity associated with these tools. For migrants and displaced 
populations who rely on mobile telephony for access to emotional, financial, and 
physical support and assistance from diverse social networks, any crime and 
security risks associated with these tools are likely to be particularly critical. 
6.3 Research findings 
This section presents and analyses the primary data collected in Uganda, 
including qualitative and quantitative survey (n=194), FGD (participant numbers 
unrecorded, see 7.7 for analysis) and interview (n=5) data. The methods are 
discussed in the previous chapter, and research instruments are provided in 
Appendices 2 and 4.  
The research findings presented here are structured in four core sections. The 
first section provides an overview of the study findings concerning mobile phone 
ownership. The survey data are presented, and a summary provided of reported 
mobile phone ownership among FGD and interview participants. The next 
section presents the findings of the survey and FGDs concerning both informal 
and formal security benefits associated with mobile telephony from the 
perspective of displaced mobile phone owners, users, and their communities, 
triangulated with responses from interview participants. The third section draws 
on survey, FGD and interview data to investigate the range of crime and 
security threats identified during the study, including the transmission of threats 
and violence, fraud and financial scams, false information and the theft of 
mobile handsets. The fourth and final section discusses survey, FGD and 
interview data relating to existing crime prevention methods using mobile 
phones in Uganda.  
6.3.1 Mobile phone ownership and access among participants in Uganda 
While access among the urban survey sample in neighbouring Kenya 
(according to data from the sample of 297 survey participants) was around 
98%, the urban and rural samples in Uganda demonstrate considerable 
variability, and the following overview is therefore needed to contextualise the 
subsequent analysis of owners’, users’ and non-users’ perceptions and 
experiences of crime and security threats and benefits.  
Analysing ownership across the survey sample, 71% (n=137) of survey 
participants reported owning one or more mobile phones. This figure exceeds 
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the official estimate of 64% mobile penetration in Uganda, based on country-
level data collected from national mobile operators (GSMA, 2015b), although 
the constitution of the survey sample was not anticipated to be representative of 
the population of Uganda, since it comprises non-Ugandan citizens.  
However, disaggregating the sample reveals differences between mobile 
ownership rates reported by participants in the two locations where surveys 
were conducted. Around half (48%) of survey respondents in the rural villages 
in Kyangwali settlement reported owning one or more handsets compared with 
90% of respondents in Kampala. Reinforcing the survey findings, participants in 
two of the three FGDs in Kyangwali also described low rates of ownership of 
mobile phones. Of around 70 FGD participants in Malembo, 15 self-identified as 
mobile phone owners. In Kentome, 11 participants out of a total group size of 
around 70 reported owning mobile handsets. In the third FGD conducted in the 
long-established refugee village of Kisonga, 14 of 19 participants reported 
owning mobile phones. This contrast between low rates of ownership among 
FGD participants in Malembo (21%) and Kentome (16%) and high ownership in 
Kisonga (74%) invites further reflection. One possible explanation is the 
difference in the duration of their residence in the settlement. FGD participants 
in Kisonga described living in the village for between 7 months and 17 years, 
with over half the group residing there for over a decade. In Malembo and 
Kentome, the majority of FGD participants described residing in the settlement 
for less than one year. Another possible explanation concerns the gender 
balance of these FGDs. In Malembo and Kentome, the numbers of men and 
women were roughly equivalent; while in Kisonga, the majority of participants 
were men.  
Although no differences were found in mobile ownership between men and 
women in Kenya, the GSMA estimates that women in Africa are 23% less likely 
than men to own mobile phones (GSMA, 2012). Previous studies support this, 
correlating factors such as employment, education and income with women’s 
lower use rates of ICTs, including mobile phones (Hilbert, 2011; Deen-Swarray, 
et al., 2012). In addition to highlighting differences in mobile phone ownership 
between Kampala and Kyangwali, further disaggregating the survey data 
suggests that differences between men’s and women’s ownership in Kampala 
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are negligible compared to those between participants in Kyangwali settlement, 
as figure 17 shows.   
 
Figure 17: Mobile phone ownership by sex in Kampala and Kyangwali 
Analysis of the FGD discussions corroborate these survey findings concerning 
differences between men’s and women’s mobile ownership in Kyangwali. Two 
of the FGDs (Malembo and Kentome) were composed of approximately equal 
numbers of male and female participants, but ownership of mobile phones was 
reported predominantly by men. In Malembo only one female participant 
acknowledged owning a mobile phone, which she wore consciously on a 
lanyard around her neck. In contrast, fourteen male participants identified 
themselves as mobile phone owners. In Kentome, only two women owned 
handsets (which they also displayed conspicuously, one on a lanyard and one 
holding it on her lap throughout the discussion), compared to nine men. In 
Kisonga the FGD contained more men (n=16) than women (n=3). Of these 
participants, 13 men and one woman reported ownership. Due to the high 
numbers of participants in the FGDs it proved difficult to collect data about 
sharing behaviours among the groups. However, the survey data indicate that 
overall, one quarter of survey participants reporting non-ownership of a handset 
describe sharing access to one (n=15). Eleven of these sharers reside in 
Kyangwali, although the small number of responses to this survey question 
precludes detailed analysis of these differences. 
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Of three refugee representatives (youth leader, convoy chairperson, and 
religious leader) interviewed in the settlement, two did not own a mobile 
telephone and had no means to contact service providers in the settlement, 
despite formally representing their communities to these providers. During an 
interview, the youth leader in Kentomi village in Kyangwali explained, 
“communication is done using megaphones when the food trucks arrive, or by 
walking around. Sometimes we leave notes with passing trucks to get to 
people”. Within Kyangwali settlement the use of hand-written messages on 
scraps of paper and megaphones was prevalent at the time of the fieldwork: 
One participant contacted the researcher using a handwritten note on a scrap of 
paper torn from an old newspaper (see figure 18). 
Mobile phones provide users with several communicative options. Basic 
handsets offer both call and SMS functions. Ostensibly, SMS are more cost-
effective and may be used in contexts where signal coverage is weak, such as 
in Kyangwali settlement. The study findings indicate that mobile phone calls are 
more widely used during crises. This may be a consequence of the low literacy 
rates among the sample, or it may be that the value associated with verifying 
the source or recipient of a message associated with mobile phone calls 
outweigh the benefits of cost and convenience associated with SMS, making 
users more likely to make calls than send SMS during crises. This is explored 
further in the Chapter Seven. 
The data suggest that mobile phone ownership is highest among refugees and 
migrants living in the urban capital, and amongst male refugees in established 
rural villages. These inequalities of ownership and access intersect with crime 
 
 
Figure 18: Handwritten note left for the author by the roadside in Kyangwali 
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and security risks and benefits associated with mobile ownership, contributing 
to different patterns of vulnerability as discussed subsequently.  
6.3.2 Security benefits for displaced populations 
Analysis of the fieldwork data collected in Uganda reveals that mobile telephony 
is broadly associated with economic, physical and emotional wellbeing and 
provides several critical security benefits for displaced populations. Previous 
studies described earlier in this chapter, and in Chapter Two, acknowledge a 
range of benefits for socio-economic wellbeing and enhancing user livelihoods. 
The study findings reveal, however, a wide range of security-enhancing 
benefits, many of which are specifically concerned with the prevention of crime.   
6.3.2.1 Mobile phones and personal security 
Examining security benefits associated with mobile phones, analysis of the 
survey data provides an introduction to the study findings. The FGD data 
provides more detailed, qualitative data through which these broad findings can 
be examined and triangulated.  
During the survey, participants were asked to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement, “having a mobile phone contributes to my 
personal security”. Three quarters (n=101) of mobile phone owners and users 
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responded that they ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with this statement. The spread 
of responses is shown in figure 19 below.  
 
These data correspond with responses to another survey question, which asked 
mobile phone owners and sharers the hypothetical question, “How secure 
would you feel in your everyday life without a mobile phone?” and provided 
them with a range of options from ‘very secure’ to ‘very insecure’. Their 
responses are presented in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 19: Levels of agreement with the statement, "Having a mobile phone contributes to my personal 
security" among mobile phone owners in Uganda 
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Figure 20: Responses to survey question, "how secure would you feel in your everyday life without 
a phone?” 
More than three quarters of survey participants who reported owning or sharing 
a mobile phone responded that they would feel somewhat insecure or very 
insecure without their mobile phone (n=107).  Participants were asked to 
provide further qualitative information to explain their answers, although none of 
the respondents who reported feeling very secure or quite secure provided 
further qualitative information about their feelings. Respondents who reported 
feeling neither secure nor insecure without a phone provided neutral comments 
such as, “I need it, but when I don't have it, it's ok”, “I use it for business but it 
has no effect on me” and, “I can do without it and I won't feel bad”. 
Respondents reporting feelings of insecurity provided a range of responses, 
subsequently coded into five categories. The distribution of responses in each 
of these categories is shown in figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Reasons for feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very insecure’ without a mobile phone according to 
survey participants 
  
These responses are examined in relation to FGD discussions and quantitative 
survey data in the subsequent sections.  
It is noteworthy that the ‘security’ benefits described by study participants 
include a range of social, psychological and economic benefits. The majority of 
these do not directly relate to experiences of crime or crime prevention. It is 
likely therefore that either the survey questions were unclear, or that the 
meaning of ‘security’ was either interpreted, or translated, differently than 
intended. These issues are discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, 
the data analysis reveals users’ attitudes and perceptions of the benefits of 
mobile phones that can be fruitfully analysed in relation to the crime and 
security threats and preventative mechanisms identified, and are therefore 
presented here.  
In the previous case study, the first and most critical security benefit associated 
with mobile phones was access to informal networks of support, particularly 
during emergencies and periods of insecurity. In Kenya, these were found to be 
particularly important for vulnerable groups such as young people and the 
elderly. Similar findings emerged in Uganda among displaced populations, 
where survey participants described their ‘addiction’ to the connectivity provided 
by mobile phones. The most common explanations for feeling insecure without 
a phone, as described by over half of all survey participants, were categorised 
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as ‘addiction’ and ‘connectivity’. Participants’ responses categorised as 
addiction, comprising a third of the sample, include, “because of addiction to my 
mobile phone”, “it’s part of me” and, “I am used to a phone, I can't stay a day 
without a phone. It's like a guardian to me”. These responses demonstrate the 
strength of feeling associated with mobile phones, indicating that these tools 
provide a psychological function for displaced populations. Responses coded as 
‘connectivity’, comprising a quarter of the sample, describe the maintenance of 
communication with family and friends as a key security concern. Examples 
include, “I always want to know that my relatives are ok, so it would make me 
feel uneasy” and, “I have to communicate to my parents every day”. Both 
responses categorised as ‘addiction’ and those categorised as ‘connectivity’ 
express users’ perceptions of the psychological or emotional benefits 
associated with mobile phones, and their value for maintaining connectivity with 
loved ones. Furthermore, in comments provided at the end of the survey for 
example, migrants frequently described the value of mobiles for maintaining 
connectivity with dispersed family members noting, “When we hear or watch 
news of our country Somalia, my parents make a phone call to Somalia”, 
“Mobile phones were rare in the Sudan civil war. Now we can use mobile 
phones to communicate easily with our people. We Sudanese are refugees 
everywhere, but through mobile phones we can talk to each other”, and “It 
keeps me in touch with some family who went as refugees in another country, 
to Tanzania”.  
These responses emerged with equal frequency among respondents in 
Kampala and those in rural Kyangwali settlement. Analysis of the FGD data 
from Kyangwali suggests that for these users, a key aspect of this connectivity 
was access to information about family members. However, participants 
mentioned accessing information about death more frequently than about health 
or wellbeing. For example, several female FGD participants in Kisonga 
mentioned valuing mobile phones for getting information about their families, 
particularly ‘difficult’ information about deaths. Similarly, in Malembo one female 
participant stated that mobile phones are valuable, “for getting difficult 
information directly”. Responding to these comments about the value of mobile 
phones in Malembo, another female participant commented, “Since our arrival 
here after many months, we have heard nothing from our relatives, we have no 
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way to hear from them.” Female FGD participants in Kyanwali frequently cited 
access to difficult information as a key security benefit of mobile phones, 
although their reported rates of mobile phone ownership and use were low. 
Among the survey sample, less than one fifth of female participants in 
Kyangwali reported owning a mobile phone, with most reporting access through 
male family members.  
Financial security also emerged as a common theme in the Uganda data. One 
quarter of survey participants described financial or business-related reasons 
(coded as ‘business purposes’) for feeling insecure without a phone such as, “I 
do business, so I need my phone on always”, “I call my business customers 
daily, so it makes me feel secure for money - it's a must” and, “In case I am 
broke, [mobile phones] can be borrowed and in scarcity, can connect to a friend 
who can help out”. Migrants residing in Kampala commonly described 
accessing financial resources as a key benefit of mobile connectivity, both in 
terms of everyday transactions and during economic emergencies.   
Similar economic benefits were described by male FGD participants in 
Kyangwali, although women participating in FGDs did not mention financial 
benefits or mobile money. A male participant in Malembo explained, “If we had 
mobile money, we would use it to receive money from our relatives. We have no 
way of making money here, we are stuck”. This remark met with general 
agreement amongst men in the group, as did a comment made by a male 
participant in Kisonga who explained that mobile telephony enabled him, “to get 
money from people far away, to save on transport costs”. In the Kentome FGD, 
male participants primarily focused on the benefit of mobiles for contacting 
relatives in Bundibugyo refugee transit camp for the purpose of accessing 
distant resources, stating for example,  
If my family wanted to send me money, they can’t. I left my 
goats in Bundibugyo, they are all there. I can’t ask my family to 
sell them, to send me the money. I have no way to get them. 
One FGD participant in Kisonga described the creative strategy used by 
refugees in Kyangwali to facilitate international transfers. He explained that in 
order to overcome the particular challenges associated with managing cross-
border transactions, a trusted agent at the border is relied upon to withdraw the 
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Ugandan mobile money transfer, physically cross the border, and make a new 
transfer within DRC, 
…we send it (an m-money transfer) to family in Bundibugyo17, 
then they walk with it and take it across and send it on to the 
people. They take something out, and send what is left on to 
the people we want… 
Other participants in the group nodded and an animated discussion ensued. 
Several participants’ contributed to the discussion, with three indicating that 
they had personally made an informal, transnational, m-money transfer.   
In addition to the benefits for accessing and transferring financial assets, 
participants also described using mobile phones for the secure storage of 
financial assets. In Kisonga, a male FGD participant explained, “we discovered 
that it is possible to put our savings inside the phone”, describing this as a key 
benefit of mobile money services. Another group member elaborated, “When 
they are inside [the phone] they cannot be taken. But then we can take them out 
to do the needful”. Others in the group expressed dissent, and it transpired that 
other than the two initial speakers, few users take advantage of these storage 
opportunities. FGD participants explained that storing money within mobile 
money services is not a common practice within the settlement as access to 
mobile money is available in only one village and unreliable liquidity prevents 
users from withdrawing money, as one participant described, “sometimes you 
cannot have access to your savings. If the agent does not always have it for 
you, even if you have it inside your account, then this thing is not possible”. For 
refugees and migrants residing in insecure environments, the security benefits 
associated with mobile phones for the secure storage of financial assets in 
theory are considerable. However, the data suggests that these benefits are 
limited in practice by considerations of access and reliability of service provision 
in resource-poor areas. 
6.3.2.2 Security benefits during emergencies 
In addition to general benefits of mobile phones for users’ personal security in 
general, participants widely described important security benefits during 
                                            
17 A town in Western Uganda bordering DRC, near the Bubukwanga Refugee Transit Centre  
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emergency and crisis situations. In fact, the second most common security 
benefit associated with mobile phones according to displaced participants in 
Uganda (equally by male and female participants) concerns their utility during 
emergency situations. About a fifth of the qualitative responses provided by 
survey participants to explain feeling ‘somewhat’ or ‘very insecure’ without a 
mobile phone were coded as ‘emergencies’, which includes comments such as, 
“phones help in communicating an emergency”, and, “mostly in case of 
problems, I call easily and know I will get helped”. These comments describe 
various benefits specifically related to the use of mobile phones during 
emergency or crisis situations, including financial assistance, physical aid and 
emotional support. 
Survey participants’ were asked to describe their experiences of using mobile 
telephony during crises, and 27% (n=56) of the survey sample responded to 
this question. These responses were categorised and are presented in figure 
22, excluding three participants who provided general comments rather than 
describing experiences. Of participants who described their experiences, 74% 
reporting using mobile phones to transmit warnings to members of their social 
networks of impending violence or to coordinate safe exit from a crisis-affected 
area. For example, one survey participant explained, “I called people who 
remained back in Congo and asked them to run, which they did and they were 
able to be saved, now they are safe”. Another stated, “I remember my uncle 
used to mobilise and inform people on the phone about the war, since he was 
the chief of that area”. Another reported, “I remember I was the only one with a 
phone in my village and when war started in other villages I was called upon to 
inform people about the war, and we ran away”. One survey participant 
described receiving a warning via SMS which originated from within the M23 
rebel group. He explained, “I escaped death through information from a friend 
who was alerted by a fellow friend who belonged to the rebel group that was 
coming to destroy our village”. These informal social networks were regarded as 
valuable for accessing current information about emerging threats, and these 
examples demonstrate that mobile phones facilitate the flow of information 
across social groups, as well as within them. For example, the participant who 
received a warning message originating within the rebel group was able to do 
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so as a result of the informal social network that included both perpetrators and 
potential victims. 
 
Figure 22: Stories from Uganda on the use of mobile phones during crises 
Around one fifth of respondents described their use of mobile phones during 
crises through stories of accessing assistance, such as, “during floods … I used 
my mobile to call friends and relatives in order to come rescue me”, “during a 
fire outbreak three months ago at a neighbour’s place, I used my phone to call 
police”, and “in the Bududa landslide18, one of my friends that was buried in the 
house by mud called saying he was still alive even when the rescue efforts had 
been almost given up, and he was saved”. During FGDs these themes also 
emerged. Female participants in Kyangwali described key values of mobile 
phones for enhancing physical and emotional security, enabling them to access 
help and assistance. For example one female participant in Kisonga explained, 
“if you get in an accident or there is trouble you can call for help”. When 
referring to calling for help, participants universally described accessing 
assistance from their personal social networks, but formal crime reporting was 
not spontaneously mentioned by any participant, as addressed in the 
subsequent section. 
Returning to the benefits of mobile phones during emergencies, the remainder 
of respondents described using mobile phones to coordinate and share 
                                            
18 Landslides have occurred in Eastern Uganda both in 2010 and 2012, destroying villages and 
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information about the escalation or de-escalation of crisis, for example, “to 
communicate to others how the crisis is in my area and how it is where they 
are”, “I told relatives it is safe where I am, and they also left and joined us here” 
and, “ I wrote numbers of relatives and when I reached Uganda I called and told 
them where I am, and they looked for this place and they were brought to the 
same camp, and now we are together here”.  
These findings corroborate the findings of other studies that suggest that mobile 
phones can enhance users’ physical security, providing people with a means to 
access and provide informal assistance during times of need, and will be 
examined in relation to these in Chapter Seven.  
The survey and FGD data reveals that informal uses of mobile telephony 
provide a range of security benefits for migrants and refugees in both Kampala 
and Kyangwali settlement, and are valued for accessing physical assistance, 
psychological support and financial assets. Participants described using mobile 
phone-enabled communications to protect the lives and livelihoods of friends 
and relatives, share information about impending threats, and remain in contact 
with friends and relatives dispersed by war.  Financial benefits were more 
commonly described in Kampala, while displaced populations in rural areas, 
and particularly women, were more likely to discuss the use of mobile phones 
for accessing psychological and emergency support. 
6.3.2.3 Crime reporting and crime prevention 
The study also identified formal services utilising mobile phones for reporting 
and responding to crime. Two formal services using mobile phones were 
provided for refugees living in Kyangwali settlement during the period of this 
study. The International Red Cross (IRC) service provided one national and one 
international phone call to each resident every three months (IRC 
Representative, personal communication), and the American Refugee 
Committee (ARC) gender-based violence (GBV) hotline provided a free, 24 
hour service for victims of GBV in the settlement (see figure 23). Although 
limited information is available on these mechanisms in the public domain, an 
evaluation report on the GBV hotline published by the OECD describes the 
initiative as highly successful,  “100% of calls to the hotline seeking GBV direct 
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or referral services (were) responded to, a total of 3,145 calls responded to 
between September 2012-May 2013” (OECD, 2013, p. 57).  
 
FGD participants expressed awareness of the GBV service, although due to the 
number of participants and challenges of translation, it is impossible to estimate 
how many. One participant in each group mentioned the hotline and the rest 
nodded and commented in Kicongo or other local dialects. Amongst mobile 
owners and sharers among the survey sample, only 7% (n= 11) reported 
awareness of any mobile platforms or services for crisis-affected populations. A 
further 7% responded “I don’t know”, while 86% of respondents reported that 
they were not aware of any formal services using mobile phones. 
Of the few survey participants who reported awareness of mobile services, 
more than half of these described general services available to all mobile users, 
such as mobile banking and access to news and current affairs. Only three 
survey participants described specific crisis-response services; two mentioned 
the ARC GBV hotline, and one described having, “the doctor’s number 
concerned with maternity issues”. However, additional information about the 
use of the GBV reporting hotline can be gleaned from responses to other survey 
questions. When asked to describe an experience of using a mobile phone 
during a crisis, one participant explained that he had used the hotline to contact 
police for a non GBV-related incident, 
One day in Kagoma village, two men were fighting. Then I had 
nothing to do, I just beeped ARC hotline. They called me back 
 
Figure 23: Photograph of ARC GBV Hotline poster, taken by author in ARC HQ, Kyangwali Settlement 
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and I told them the incident, and they helped me to inform 
police. 
This example suggests that mobile phone users in the settlement are willing to 
utilise formal crime reporting services. Furthermore, in the absence of a formal 
mechanism for reporting crime, mobile phone users who witness crime are 
using the GBV service for reporting non-GBV related crime. An ARC 
representative interviewed in Kyangwali Refugee Settlement corroborates this, 
commenting that refugees regularly use the GBV service for non-GBV related 
purposes: 
Many call for assistance to this number. There is a response 
mechanism, if the call is legitimate, we can contact the police, 
then we will go together to respond to the incident. 
According to the ARC representative interviewed, for legitimate GBV incidents 
the response mechanism involves the immediate joint deployment of on-call 
ARC staff and police officers. However information was not provided on the 
number of calls made to this service which are GBV-related, and the number of 
users who utilise the hotline to report other times of crime. The study found low 
rates of mobile phone ownership and use among women; the key beneficiary 
group the GBV hotline aims to support. This suggests that many target users of 
the service (women) may be unable to access the GBV hotline. Furthermore, in 
light of the inherently intimate nature of GBV, mobile telephony may not be the 
most effective tool for a GBV-response mechanism. It seems likely that help 
from friends and neighbours may be a more immediate and accessible form of 
assistance for vulnerable women, although it was not appropriate to discuss this 
sensitive topic during the study.  
While declining to comment on the number of women using the service to report 
GBV-related crime, the ARC representative interviewed described drunks 
calling to abuse the free service, 
…sometimes they are calling just to abuse us, for some laughs. 
These people are wasting our time, but they are drunks. There 
is nothing to do, it is expected. The risk of abuse is high… 
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During the fieldwork, it was noteworthy that residents of the settlement lacked 
reliable, two-way communications platforms to express their concerns to service 
providers. No general crime reporting mechanisms were available, and no 
formal channels were provided to enable residents to report crime or access 
assistance. With the exception of an ambulance service providing medical 
assistance, the GBV hotline was, at the time of this research, the main formal 
means of directly contacting service providers. It was the only mechanism 
designed for users to report crime, despite which it was designed solely for use 
by women affected by GBV. As noted, data collected for this study indicates 
that the effectiveness of the GBV hotline is likely to be hampered by the low 
levels of mobile phone access and ownership among women in the settlement, 
poor signal coverage, lack of power to recharge mobile phone batteries and the 
lack of alternative two-way communication mechanisms for reporting other 
crime and security concerns.. These impediments also reduce the effectiveness 
of informal mechanisms through which mobile phones may enhance users’ 
security. For example, during the FGD in Malembo one young man stated, 
“MTN network is very poor here, we have to walk far to make a call”. This 
comment was met with expressions of assent from others in the group, nodding 
and pointing in the direction they would walk to search for reception. Another 
(male) FGD participant in Malembo commented,  
We must travel at least one kilometre to search for signal. In 
emergencies we need to call for help but cannot. Even today 
there was a problem like that, a woman had need of an 
ambulance for her child but there was no way. In emergencies 
we do call on the Chairman, or call on our neighbours. 
A comment made by the Chairman during an interview addresses the 
implications of this isolation, 
Malembo is far away and communication is a big problem. My 
job is to ensure that the refugees in Malembo have access to 
their full rights. People are dying here because they cannot 
communicate – they have phone credit, there is an ambulance 
but they cannot contact them, so their families have died. 
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An evaluation report conducted on the GBV hotline service in 2013 does not 
acknowledge the limited ownership and access of mobile tools and weak mobile 
signal coverage as impediments to the effectiveness of the service, focusing 
instead on institutional level capacity and the response mechanisms, such as 
the availability of fuel and transportation needed to respond to calls (OECD 
2013). While the response component is critical, awareness of and access to 
this mobile-enabled service are necessary preconditions for its effectiveness in 
addressing gender-based violence. In the meantime, displaced mobile users 
and their communities remain disconnected from formal security services and 
are reliant on personal networks for support and information. 
These findings suggest that these displaced populations recognise the potential 
value of mobile telephony for enabling lifesaving communications, financial 
transfers, psycho-social support, and access to emergency assistance for 
mobile users and their wider communities. However, these benefits are widely 
associated with informal social networks rather than formal reporting and 
response mechanisms, and are impeded by logistical conditions that reduce 
their access to mobile-enabled benefits.  
6.3.3 Crime and security threats identified in Uganda 
The previous section describes the security benefits associated with mobile 
phone ownership and use according to study participants in Uganda. Security 
benefits associated with the informal use of mobile phones were identified, 
particularly during emergencies and crises. It examined formal mechanisms 
designed to respond to crime, and outlined also the challenges associated with 
accessing formal and informal benefits.  
The present section presents the data regarding crime and security threats that 
were reported by displaced participants in Uganda. Although the majority of 
mobile users among the survey sample reported that they would feel insecure 
without a phone, and FGD participants described positive relationships between 
mobile telephony and personal security, the fieldwork also revealed widespread 
associations between mobile telephony, crime, and insecurity. A comment 
made by one participant at the end of the survey exemplifies this. When asked if 
he had any further comments to record, he stated, “mobile phones are not the 
most effective means of communication because they are the tools that most 
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encourage crime rates in the world”. This comment typifies the widespread 
ambivalence associated with mobile telephony, despite the widely recognised 
benefits for users.  
In order to examine the crime and security threats associated with mobile 
phones, study participants in Uganda were asked about their experiences and 
perceptions of specific threats, and also to what extent they agreed with 
statements about this topic. During the survey, participants were asked whether 
they agreed or disagreed, and to what extent, with the statement, “Criminals are 
using mobile phones to harass and defraud people”. Almost 90% of mobile 
phone owners and users who answered this question (n=134) either agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement (figure 24); indicative of widespread 
awareness of the misuse of mobile phones among the survey sample.  
 
This finding is substantiated by responses to specific questions about the 
experience of mobile-perpetrated fraud, violence, and harassment. Over half 
(52%) of mobile phone owners and users who participated in the survey report 
being victims.  
 
Figure 24:  Degree of agreement with the statement "criminals are using mobile phones to harass and 
defraud people" reported by the survey sample in Uganda 
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Further quantitative and qualitative data was collected on specific crime threats 
experienced through responses to closed survey questions, and narrative 
descriptions of experiences of crime reported in both responses to open survey 
questions and during the FGDs. The subsequent sections investigate the crime 
threats identified in Uganda.  
6.3.3.1 Threats and violence  
As described in the previous chapter, mobile phone networks were widely 
implicated in the dissemination of hate-speech and the escalation of violence in 
neighbouring Kenya. Existing literature does not describe associations between 
mobile telephony and the organisation or escalation of violence in Uganda. 
Accordingly, it was unclear whether or not users in Uganda, specifically 
displaced users, would be affected by the dissemination of threats and the 
organisation of violence associated with mobile telephony. However, the data 
collected from displaced users in Uganda suggests that mobile phones are 
used to disseminate threats and to coordinate violence. 
According to the survey data, around one third (30%) of mobile phone owners 
and users in the sample had received threats through their mobile phones. 
Survey participants were also asked to provide examples of any threats they 
had received. The majority of recipients provided further information, such as, 
“Someone sent me a message that if ‘I meet you I will kill you’”, “I used to 
receive SMS from an unknown person abusing and threatening to kill me”, 
“there was somebody who would call me to threaten me until I threw away the 
SIM card”, and, “I was threatened via mobile, but the police failed to catch the 
person who was threatening me…” Many of these comments described the 
receipt of multiple threatening messages, and a common theme emerging from 
these comments concerns the anonymity of the sender. It is noteworthy that 
none of the recipients who provided further information mentioned that the 
threats originated from a known sender, although some did not specify the 
source. Around a third of these comments describe threatening messages 
received from ‘an unknown person’. 
During the FGDs, participants also discussed the receipt of threats. For 
example a FGD participant in Kisonga stated, 
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I get some threats [via mobile] but they are not meant for me, 
they are [typed] in SMS and my people would know I cannot 
read these. So they can’t be for me… 
This male participant described receiving threats for which he believes he is not 
the intended recipient, as the sender does not take into account his illiteracy. 
His comment is indicative of a widespread attitude demonstrated by other 
participants; if the sender does not know me, the message is not intended for 
me. Similarly, several FGD participants described receiving messages in 
English or French, being unable to comprehend their content, and therefore 
disregarding it. For example, in Malembo one participant explained, “I get so 
many [SMS] in French in Congo, but it’s okay, they are not for me anyway 
because I don’t speak French”. From these examples, it may be hypothesised 
that that messages that are evidently not intended for the recipient are 
disregarded as irrelevant, regardless of their content. These messages may be 
sent to these recipients in error, or may contain threatening or fraudulent 
content, but for recipients who cannot comprehend their content they do not 
appear to present a source of concern. Interestingly, this suggests that poor 
education and illiteracy may actually protect users from potential crime threats 
utilising SMS. 
In addition to describing their receipt of SMS and calls containing threatening 
content, study participants also expressed concern around the use of mobile 
phones for the coordination of violence. This was not discussed during the 
FGDs or surveys directly as the topic was considered too sensitive for this 
study. However, findings may be extrapolated from responses to other survey 
questions. One survey question asked participants to provide an example of 
their own use of a mobile phone during a crisis. Although most described using 
mobile phones to coordinate with family and friends, share warnings and call for 
assistance (as described previously), one Congolese survey participant in 
Kyangwali described the use by rebel groups. He stated, “I used to hear armed 
men use their phones to communicate to themselves and their people”. This 
provides an isolated and anecdotal example of the misuse of mobile networks 
for the coordination of violence. Further investigation would be needed to 
address this topic in any depth.  
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6.3.3.2 Fraud and financial scams 
During both the survey and FGDs, fraud and financial scams were a recurring 
topic of interest to participants. When asked about their experiences of scams, 
over a third of mobile phone owners and users in the survey sample (n=42) 
reported being victims of scam messages or calls. Survey participants were 
also asked to provide further narrative data about their experiences of receiving 
scam messages. These comments included, “they say I have won money and I 
need to pay some money in order to access what I have already won from the 
company”, “I got a message that you have won money in a certain draw yet you 
never participated in it” and, “I got a message from Kenya that I won money. I 
followed, but it was not true. They also wanted my account number”. Analysis of 
these qualitative data indicate that financial scams experienced by study 
participants commonly utilize this ‘prize winning’ formula; informing participants 
that they have won a free gift or a sum of money. For participants in resource-
poor settings, such as rural Kyangwali, the opportunity to access resources is 
enticing. Both FGD and survey participants described their experiences of 
victimization to these types of fraud. 
Although the survey did not include specific questions asking participants about 
their experiences of victimization to mobile phone scams, several survey 
respondents in Kyangwali nevertheless provided qualitative information about 
these experiences. These responses were not prompted by survey 
administrators, and were recorded in different sections of the survey including 
the final comments and an open question about their general experience of 
crime associated with mobile phones. For example, one survey respondent 
described being a victim of fraud and losing mobile credit,  
They first sent me an SMS that I won 5 million, later called me 
to load some money (15,000UGX) to get the money. I did it, but 
the money did not come. They took mine instead…  
Another described wasted resources associated with travelling to a distant town 
in order to collect his promised prize. He explained, “They said that I have won 
money and I went to Hoima, I spent a lot of money and yet it was a lie”. 
The topic of mobile phones and financial fraud was common among study 
participants in both the survey and FGDs. Around half of the survey sample 
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provided additional comments (about a range of topics) at the end of the survey, 
giving further detail about particular survey responses and highlighting specific 
concerns. Of participants who provided these additional comments, over one 
third referred to fraud and financial scams. For example, one survey respondent 
described the expense incurred as a victim of fraud, 
I have realised there are a lot of con people, they deceived me 
that I won a car and I lost a lot of money trying to claim the car, 
but there was nothing. 
Another comment states,  
Messages are sent to me that I have won a prize, then they say 
I have to buy a voucher of airtime and I send to be able to 
receive a prize. I don't like that, they should stop. 
More general comments such as, “People lie to us that we have won money, 
yet it is not true” were also common in this comments section of the survey.  
Other examples provided by participants reveal the ways in which they 
identified the message content as fraudulent and avoided victimization. For 
example, one survey respondent in Kyangwali described avoiding falling victim 
to a mobile phone scam after sharing its content with neighbours and 
discovering their experiences of victimization to similar messages in the past. In 
this example, more experienced community members were able to warn this 
mobile phone user, and prevent his victimization. He noted, “[my experience 
was] receiving a message that I won $1,000. I called to find out details and they 
told me a lot of stories. In the village I was advised not to go because those are 
thieves”. This suggests that where other, more experienced mobile phone users 
are able to share their experiences with less experienced users, vulnerability to 
scams can be mitigated. This is particularly relevant in this case study, as the 
financial scams described by users all utilize a similar ‘prize winning’ formula. 
Another related issue that frequently recurred concerned the unexplained loss 
of mobile phone credit. This was the second most frequently emerging negative 
consequence of mobile telephony in the final comments section of the survey, 
mentioned by about a fifth of survey participants (18%). These comments 
included, “I top-up airtime and I find it disappears without making a call”, “I have 
223 
 
experienced that sometimes I put airtime in my friends’ phone and the money 
disappears without me making any call”, and “My airtime disappears whenever I 
load. I think they cheat us in Kyangwali”.  
During FGDs, participants also described inexplicable losses of mobile phone 
credit, which they attributed to mobile scams. In Kisonga, the most established 
of the three villages, FGD participants had resided in Kyangwali settlement for 
up to 17 years. Mobile ownership in this group was higher than other FGDs (13 
owners of 19 participants). All the mobile phone owners in this FGD described 
experiencing unexplained losses of mobile credit. Most did not provide specific 
information about the timing and frequency of these losses, but one participant 
described this loss of credit occurring upon opening certain scam messages, 
stating “You open it, and you lose all the money in your account”. In Malembo, 
few FGD participants owned mobile handsets. Despite this, participants 
expressed awareness of the risks of financial scams associated with mobile 
use, and their communications on the subject indicated that it was a common 
topic of discussion within the village. For example, one male participant 
described the experience of a friend who had fallen victim to a mobile phone 
scam and been beaten and robbed, 
Fraud on mobiles is really common. One guy here was called 
and they said he had won 2 million. He went to Hoima to 
collect, to a place where … they beat him and stole everything. 
This example demonstrates that mobile-enabled crime threats intersect with 
physical environments, creating chains of opportunity for crime and enabling 
criminals to utilise virtual connectivity to lure victims into vulnerable physical 
settings to commit traditional crimes. 
Other group members expressed their assent, and another commented, “They 
need to raise awareness of fraud like this”. In Kentome FGD participants also 
recounted an event that had occurred in their village. As the story was told by 
several interlocutors and partially translated, no direct transcript was collected. 
In summary, one mobile phone owner had received an SMS informing him of 
winning a large sum of money, which required a deposit to access. The man 
approached friends with whom he shared the handset for help. Several of these 
men (two of whom were in the FGD) pooled their resources to collect the 
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amount required to pay the deposit, believing this would enable them to receive 
the prize and agreeing to share it between them. However, once they uploaded 
the mobile credit to the value of the deposit, the credit disappeared and they 
discovered they had jointly fallen victim to a scam. Communal ownership and 
sharing may both increase and reduce vulnerability. In the example above, 
sharing increased the number of victims and the value of the assets stolen. In 
the other examples provided here, potential victims were protected by more 
experienced users, who share their experiences and reduce the likelihood of 
other members of their social networks from becoming victims. 
A related area of concern for fraud and financial scams concerns mobile money. 
Mobile money is intended to facilitate direct transfers: The sender uploads 
money with an agent who transfers the money, minus a small fee, to the 
intended recipient who is then able to withdraw the money from a local agent. 
However, analysis of the study data suggests that these services are not 
regarded as entirely reliable. In the survey comments, participants made 
references to ‘cheating’ service providers and operators. For example, one 
participant stated, “mobile money agents cheat, because I lost my money sent 
in mobile phone without any explanation how the money disappeared in my 
account”.  
In addition to traditional uses of mobile money services for transferring money 
from one user to another within the country, participants also described an 
innovative, informal transnational system of money transfer. As described in the 
previous section, this informal system utilises mobile money services in 
combination with human intermediary who forms a physical component of the 
chain by manually transferring the money across the border into neighbouring 
countries. Participants did not describe experiencing financial scams during 
these transnational transfers, but it is worth noting that such complex transfers 
inevitably introduce additional risks compared to a direct transaction. Examining 
the stages involved in international transfers reveal several potential points at 
which fraud could occur: The sender uploads money to an intermediary in the 
same country as the sender, who withdraws the money, removes a portion, 
makes a currency exchange and then physically crosses the border into the 
country of the intended recipient where he uploads the money and transfers it 
on to the final recipient. Although the present study did not collect further data 
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on these complex transnational transactions, participants’ responses indicate 
that these transfers are commonplace. Further investigation is needed to 
illuminate associated opportunities and vulnerabilities for crime within these 
transactions. 
6.3.3.3 False information 
In addition to the threats and financial scams described in previous sections, the 
data analysis also revealed that displaced mobile phone owners and users in 
Uganda experience widespread receipt of false information through calls and 
SMS. These experiences were reported to be more common than threats and 
scams, with almost half of survey participants owning or sharing a mobile phone 
reporting receipt of false information. Examining the narrative data provided by 
survey participants reveals that false information was more personalised than 
the generalised scams and threats described. For example, “I was told on the 
phone that I lost some relatives, but it was a lie” and, “About death of relatives 
who did not escape with me, and later I realised they are not dead”.  Many 
participants also described widespread dissemination of rumours and false 
information with non-specific comments such as, “There is a lot of false 
information spread through mobiles”. FGD participants in Kyangwali described 
their environment as characterised by a scarcity of information. In Malembo 
FGD participants explained, “We get information and news from home from new 
arrivals to the camp”, referring to incoming convoys. Others described the use 
of megaphones by service providers, and few participants reported access to 
radios. For example, during an interview with the Chairperson of one of the 
convoys of refugees settled in Kentome village, describing the communications 
systems within the settlement, he pointed to a hut in the village with a long 
distance radio mast attached with reeds. He explained,  
… this picks up Radio O’icha in Congo. They [the villagers] 
don’t really trust mobile, but they do trust the radio, because 
there is a lot of false information spread through mobiles. Lots 
of messages saying a relative needs you, but they are not 
true… 
In the context of widespread misinformation, and in the absence of sources of 
verification for information received, mobile phones provide a valuable function. 
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However, the widespread dissemination of false information reduces the 
reliability of incoming information received through SMS in particular. As one 
FGD participant in Kisonga explained, mobile phone calls are more reliable, “for 
getting a response to your messages, it is two way”. Other participants in this 
group expressed agreement with this statement. Another participant in Kisonga 
explained that he valued his mobile phone as a means, “to get information from 
different people and sources to be sure it is correct. I can hear his voice to be 
sure”.  
The prevalence of false information circulating through mobile networks, in 
combination with widespread awareness of scams and financial fraud, may also 
undermine the credibility of other information transmitted through this channel. 
The quotes provided above illuminate ways in which users may compare 
information received through mobile phones with other sources and channels to 
verify its credibility. This may also account for the survey finding indicating that 
among participants who had previously used a mobile phone for communication 
during a crisis (n=77), phone calls were used by more than two thirds of the 
sample, while SMS are used by fewer than 10% (see figure 25).  
 
Figure 25: Main usage of mobile telephones during crisis according to survey participants in 
Uganda 
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6.3.3.4 Theft of handsets 
The final security concern associated with mobile phones identified by study 
participants in Uganda is handset theft. Although this topic was not directly 
addressed in the survey (as this study was initially concerned to examine 
networked mobile phone crimes) the comments section provided participants 
with an opportunity to introduce any other related (or unrelated in some cases) 
concerns regarding mobile phones. Six survey participants mentioned the theft 
of handsets, commenting for example, “I had a phone when I was in Congo but 
it was stolen during the crisis”, “I had a mobile phone but it was stolen with my 
handbag two months ago” and, “I had a phone in Rwanda but someone cheated 
me and took it”. In addition to the comments section of the survey, the topic of 
handset theft also emerged during the FGD in Kentome. Explaining his 
reluctance to own a mobile phone, one participant stated, 
There is no point to having one anyway, we have to carry it 
always as it is not safe inside here (gestures at dwellings) and 
then you can be a victim if someone wants to take it… 
Within the settlement, refugees are provided with basic needs: a container for 
water, cooking utensils, a tarpaulin with which to construct shelters (UNHCR, 
2015). Physical security is limited: dwellings cannot be locked, and most 
residents have no valuable, portable possessions. Mobile phones may therefore 
represent a valuable crime target, and ownership of a mobile phone may render 
individuals particularly vulnerable to acquisitive and violent crimes. This is 
examined in depth in Chapter Seven. 
6.3.4 The prevention of mobile phone crime 
In addition to examining their perceptions and experiences of the threats and 
benefits associated with mobile phones, participants in Uganda were also asked 
about their attitudes to SIM registration and monitoring of mobile phones for the 
prevention of mobile phone crime.  
Similar mechanisms are in place in Uganda as in Kenya for the prevention of 
the misuse of mobile networks, including mandatory SIM card registration 
introduced on 1st March 2012. There is also reported to be monitoring of mobile 
communications, although limited information is available about the extent or 
targets of this monitoring (Uganda Communications Commission, 2012).  
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The survey did not include questions specifically requesting information about 
the perpetrators of scams or the sources of false information. Nevertheless, the 
data revealed interesting findings about participants’ attitudes to responsibility 
for both perpetrating, and preventing, mobile phone crime. Survey participants 
who attributed a source to the crime and security threats they had received 
through mobile phones either described these as anonymous or originating from 
mobile phone operators, except one who attributed the threats to a known 
source, describing “threats received from a known person, a relative, over land 
issues”.  
Mobile network operators were perceived to be responsible for several of the 
security risks associated with mobile phones in Uganda. Study participants 
commonly described operators ‘cheating’, stating for example, “There is 
cheating by mobile phone operators - they overcharge calls and sometimes cut 
your money when you have not made a call”, and “Mobile phone service 
providers deduct our airtime without us using it and when you call customer 
care, they do not return the money”. This theme of ‘cheating’ by mobile phone 
operators also emerged elsewhere in the survey data. For example, in narrative 
responses to a question about the experience of mobile phone crime, one 
survey participant described being informed, “That I have won money and I 
went to Hoima, I spent a lot of money and yet it was a lie. It was from Safaricom 
Kenya”. While this recipient attributed the fraud to a foreign mobile phone 
company, other fraudulent messages purported to originate from domestic 
carriers. 
During the FGD in Kisonga this theme also emerged. One male participant 
commented,  
…sometimes they send you a message and it says from Airtel, 
and you open it and you lose all the money in your account. 
People are really blaming the operators here for stealing their 
money 
This comment was met with general agreement among members of the group. 
It appears that some study participants believe mobile network operators to be 
complicit in perpetrating financial scams targeting refugees, and blame 
operators for hacking their mobile phone credit accounts. 
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Recognising the attribution of responsibility to mobile phone operators, attitudes 
to SIM registration and monitoring were examined through a series of survey 
questions using a Likert scale range of options. However, responses to the 
survey questions using Likert scales reveal anomalous results. This is 
examined in depth in 7.7, proposing that these types of attitude survey may be 
inappropriate in the locations of data collection, and in developing world 
contexts characterised by perceived inequalities of power. Furthermore, where 
the statements proposed opposing views and required participants to agree or 
disagree with a negative statement (e.g. registration will have no impact on 
crime), it is conceivable that either errors in translation or misunderstanding of 
the question may further limit the reliability of these data. Furthermore, some of 
the statements provided in the survey are structured as negatives, for example, 
“registering SIM cards will have no impact on crime”. These may easily have 
been mistranslated, and it would be advisable to avoid the use of such negative 
statements in future studies where translation into multiple languages is 
anticipated. Acknowledging the limits to the reliability of these data, they are 
nevertheless presented and examined here. 
Survey participants were asked to state their level of agreement with the 
statement, “Registering SIM cards will have no impact on crime”. Responses to 
this survey question were divided, as figure 26 shows. 
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Figure 26: Participant responses to the statement "registering SIM cards will have no impact on 
crime" in Uganda 
More participants agreed with the statement that registering SIM cards would 
have no impact on crime than disagreed with this statement. No reasons were 
provided for these attitudes, however, and these data do not provide sufficient 
information to facilitate detailed analysis. It may be that the wording of the 
question was not clearly translated, or this finding (which contrasts with the 
findings showing high levels of support for SIM registration) may reflect cultural 
inhibitions against expressing disagreement. These issues are discussed in 
Section 7.7, reflecting on the suitability of the survey questions and the survey 
tool for this study. 
More straightforward questions were asked to assess whether or not 
participants supported the monitoring of mobile phone communications. These 
findings reveal high rates of support for monitoring mobile phone networks, 
indicating that 92% of participants support monitoring while only 6% oppose it, 
and 2% declined to respond to this question. The FGD data supports this 
findings, with the majority of FGD participants expressing strong support for 
monitoring. No objections or concerns were raised during the FGDs, in contrast 
with Kenya where participants broadly supported monitoring but nevertheless 
remained concerned about their associated privacy rights. 
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Participants in Uganda were also asked who they believed should be 
responsible for preventing the misuse of mobile phone networks. In responses 
to qualitative survey questions, survey responses indicated that participants 
viewed operators as best equipped to address mobile crime threats, suggesting 
that they should support and even finance police operations to prevent and 
respond to mobile-enabled crime, for example, “theft of mobile phones should 
be tracked at no cost, maybe the police should be paid by the company in order 
to help track for customers freely”, “sometimes mobile phone regulators don't 
help to fight crime - the thugs are smarter” and, “mobile phone operators should 
enhance their ability of tracking lost phones more sufficiently”. However, 
examining attitudes to monitoring of mobile networks by the police, the state 
and by mobile network operators reveals little difference between these entities 
(see figure 27). While rates of support are high for monitoring by the police, 
state and MNOs, 61.3% (n=119) of the sample support monitoring by all three. 
Only ten survey participants in Uganda did not support monitoring by any of 
these three organisations. 
 
Figure 27: Attitudes to monitoring by the police, the state and by mobile network operators among 
participants in Uganda 
In the comments section, several survey participants also mentioned their 
opinions on agencies responsible for the prevention of mobile phone crime 
commenting for example, “I was threatened via mobile but the police failed to 
catch the person who was threatening me. There is no security for mobile users 
by the government”, “the state should have a full responsibility to track down 
people who use their phones for carrying out dubious activities such as money 
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frauds and terrorism” and, “the government should do something to help people 
or stop people who defraud using mobile phones”.  
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter presents the background and primary data associated with the 
second case study investigated in this thesis: Uganda. The first half of the 
chapter examined the background of the situation of refugees and migrants in 
Uganda, and addressed the relationship between displacement and mobile 
telephony. Examining next the study findings, the patterns of mobile phone 
ownership, use and sharing were examining, reflecting on the data regarding 
the relationship between these patterns and experiences of crime and crime 
prevention. Next the specific security benefits identified by study participants 
were addressed, suggesting that mobile phones are widely valued for 
enhancing users’ security through connectivity with social networks, providing 
early warning and response functions and a safety net during emergencies and 
crises. These data also indicate that formal mechanisms using mobile phones 
to enhance user security remain limited in scope and are not widely used.  
Subsequently, the crime and security threats experienced by study participants 
in Uganda were examined, revealing that many users had received false 
information, and receipt of threats and financial scams was also common. 
Support from more experienced users is found to reduce vulnerability to these 
threats. The security and crime threats associated with mobile telephony were 
revealed to impact handset owners, users and non-users, with implications for 
their physical and financial insecurity.  
Finally, preventative mechanisms for reducing mobile phone crime in Uganda 
were investigated, revealing widespread support for the monitoring of mobile 
networks to prevent their misuse, and mixed attitudes to questions of 
responsibility for the prevention of mobile-enabled crime.  
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the background literature and theoretical frameworks presented in 
previous chapters, in combination with the primary data from the two case 
studies, this chapter analyses the relationship between mobile phones and 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention addressing the question,  
What are the implications of the increasing penetration of mobile phones in developing 
world settings for opportunities for crime and its prevention?  
Specifically, this thesis presents and defends the argument that mobile phones 
create crime opportunities by changing the ratio of effort, risk, and reward 
associated with both the commission of crime, and with its prevention in 
developing world settings. The aims of the thesis are: 
1. Identify the ways in which mobile phones inhibit crime in developing 
world settings, drawing on opportunity theories of crime; 
2. Identify the ways in which mobile phones create opportunities for crime in 
developing world settings; 
3. Identify social, cultural and situational conditions informing access to 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention associated with mobile 
phones in developing world settings; 
4. Identify, analyse and categorise mobile-phone related crime and security 
threats across the two case studies; 
5. Examine the application of situational crime prevention techniques to the 
prevention of crime associated with mobile phones, specifically as crime 
targets and crime facilitators; 
6. Gain methodological insights into the application of opportunity theories 
of crime and situational crime prevention to mobile phone enabled crime 
in developing world settings.   
First, the chapter examines the ways in which mobile phones inhibit crime in 
developing world settings. These findings are structured according to conditions 
which reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the effort and risk, reducing 
the rewards and provocations, and removing excuses. 
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Secondly, the chapter addresses the crime opportunities associated with the 
increasing penetration of mobile phones in developing world settings. The 
conditions which increase opportunities for crime are also analysed according 
the effort, risk, reward, provocation, excuses framework. Once opportunities for 
crime and crime prevention have been identified, the social, cultural and 
situational conditions informing these opportunities in developing world settings 
are examined. 
Next, specific crime threats associated with mobile phones in the two case 
studies are identified and categorised. While mobile phones are broadly 
categorised as crime targets and crime facilitators, recognition of the hybrid 
nature of these threats, and the ways in which they contribute for opportunities 
for further crime commission, leads to the proposal of the new term m-crime, 
and the identification of an exploratory categorisation of specific m-crime 
threats. Situational techniques are then applied to the prevention of m-crime 
threats associated with handset theft and crime facilitation. These are structured 
according to techniques which increase effort and risk, reduce rewards and 
provocations, and remove excuses for m-crime. 
Finally, the chapter addresses the applicability of opportunity theories of crime 
to the study of mobile phone related crime in developing world settings. 
Specifically, the findings suggest that the rapid and widespread penetration of 
mobile phones in developing world settings has implications for the crime and 
security of mobile phone owners, users and non-users. Opportunity theories of 
crime provide useful tools to maximise the crime-inhibiting and security-
enhancing benefits of these tools. These approaches also provide frameworks 
for the development of techniques for the prevention of crime associated with 
mobile phones, drawing on the findings of the study.  
7.2 Mobile phones inhibit crime in developing world settings 
The first impacts of mobile telephony to be addressed in this chapter are the 
security-enhancing, and crime-inhibiting, benefits of these tools. It is widely 
recognised in the existing literature that mobile phones enable developing world 
communities to access and utilise their social networks, extending economic 
and emotional support systems (Abraham, 2007; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Jack & Suri, 2014; Overa, 2006; Souter, et al., 2005; 
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Tenhunen, 2008), and overcoming geographical barriers and weak 
infrastructures (Overa, 2006; Rafael, 2003; Rotberg & Aker, 2013). Mobile 
phone-enabled communications are particularly critical during crises and 
emergencies, and in conditions of insecurity in both the developed and 
developing world. Dutton and Nainoa (2002) analyse the transformation in 
public perceptions of mobile phones as ‘lifelines’ subsequent to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the USA. Coyle and Thornton (2007) find similar perceptions 
among mobile users affected by conflict in Lebanon, and Best (2011) highlights 
the critical value of mobile phones in conflict-affected countries such as Iraq and 
Liberia. Particularly in contexts where formal state service provision is weak, 
studies have lauded the benefits of mobile communications for enabling users 
to access informal networks of support, and facilitating access to information 
and resources (Best, 2011; Rafael, 2003; Rotberg & Aker, 2013). The security-
enhancing benefits associated with mobile phones are well recognised, 
particularly during crises and emergencies. The findings of this study provide 
further evidence for these widely documented benefits. However, their specific 
implications for crime prevention in developing world settings have not been 
widely researched. Furthermore, this analysis is unique in characterising these 
benefits according to the frameworks of SCP, and examining the structures of 
opportunity through which mobile phones function to enhance user security, and 
ultimately reduce crime. 
Returning to the study findings presented in the preceding chapters, mobile 
users in both case studies described a spectrum of security benefits associated 
with the mobile phone ownership and use. These range from facilitating 
communication with vulnerable family members during times of need, providing 
access to emergency resources and critical information, and enabling victims of 
crime to call for assistance from formal and informal sources. Examining these 
through the frameworks of SCP presented in Chapter Three, mobile phones are 
found to reduce the opportunities for crime in a range of ways. Specifically, 
mobile phones; 
 Increase the perceived effort of crime; 
 Increase the perceived risks of crime; 
 Reduce anticipated rewards of crime; 
 Reduce provocations that contribute to crime; 
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 Remove excuses for the commission of crime. 
Within each of these broad categories, specific ‘opportunity-reducing 
techniques’ (Clarke, 1997) are identified (see table 14 below), and are applied 
here to investigate and categorise the ways in which the increasing penetration 
of mobile phones in the developing world inhibits crime. These techniques are 
elaborated and addressed in full in the subsequent sections. 
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Table 14: Mechanisms through which mobile phones reduce opportunities for crime in developing world settings  
Increase perceived effort Increase perceived risks Reduce anticipated 
rewards 
Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
 
Target hardening 
- Enable users to share 
information about crime 
threats 
- Enable users to triangulate 
and verify information about 
crime threats 
 
Extend guardianship 
- Enhance connectivity to 
formal and informal security 
services  
-Enable users to seek 
assistance 
 
Assist natural surveillance  
- Enable users to warn other 
potential crime targets  
- Provide a real-time crime 
reporting mechanism  
 
Reduce anonymity 
-GPS locationing enables 
tracking and locating of 
offenders 
-SIM registration identifies 
individual users 
- Camera provides opportunity 
to photograph suspects 
- Digital recording function 
enables user to record audio 
files for use as evidence 
 
Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
- Fear of monitoring mobile 
phone content increases 
perceived risk of detection 
 
Remove targets  
- Users can store financial 
assets remotely, removing 
crime targets from insecure 
settings  
 
 
 
 
Reduce emotional arousal  
- Formal mobile enabled 
platforms can clarify rumours 
and misinformation, potentially 
reducing outbreaks of violence 
 
Neutralise peer pressure 
- PeaceSMS campaigns 
counteract incitements to 
violence   
 
Post instructions  
- Enable transmission of 
information about laws, e.g. 
informing users that hate-
speech is illegal 
 
Alert conscience 
- Sensitisation and awareness 
campaigns remind users to 
behave responsibly  
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7.2.1 Mobile phones increase the perceived effort of crime 
The findings of this study suggest that mobile phones increase the perceived 
effort associated with the commission of crime in developing world settings. 
These findings are analysed as examples of target hardening. Specifically, 
mobile phones enable users to share information about crime threats, and to 
triangulate and verify information received from other sources. These uses 
function to reduce opportunities for crime, particularly emerging violent crime 
such as that associated with election violence in Kenya and civil conflict in DRC. 
These also reduce opportunities for the commission of crimes involving 
deception, as mobile phones provide a two-way communication mechanism for 
users to verify or triangulate information received. Mobile phone users, and 
potentially also their communities, are therefore better able to avoid emerging 
crime threats. 
It is noteworthy that phone calls were found to more effective than SMS in 
triangulating information, as users are able to verify the identity of the source, 
and assess the reliability, of incoming information through voice calls.  
7.2.2 Mobile phones increase the perceived risk of crime 
According to the study findings, the increasing availability and use of mobile 
phones has broad implications for increasing the perceived risk associated with 
a range of traditional crimes in resource-poor settings. Study participants often 
described mobile phones, regardless of their practical applications for 
preventing and reporting crime, as a disincentive to criminals. Mobile phones 
were found to increase perceptions of risk associated with the commission of a 
wide range of crimes as they empower potential crime targets to respond and 
report crime in real time, both through formal and informal channels. 
Specifically, they are analysed to extend guardianship by enabling users to 
rapidly transmit warnings and information horizontally through social networks, 
increasing the risk of detection for criminals. For example, participants 
described receiving and transmitting warnings to friends, family members and 
neighbours about rebel group movements in DRC and outbreaks of political 
violence in Kenya.  
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Mobile phones also assist natural surveillance, enabling users to report crime 
informally to other users, or formally to the police or relevant authorities, 
increasing the risk of apprehension and punishment for offenders. Study data 
from Uganda suggests that these networked communications even enabled the 
transmission of warnings from within rebel groups, serving a powerful natural 
surveillance function. Previous studies have described the implications of 
mobile phones for increasing reporting, and potentially prevention, of a broad 
range of types of traditional, place-based crime (Klick, et al., 2012; Senarathne 
Tennakoon & Taras, 2012; Shapiro & Siegel, 2015; Shapiro & Weidmann, 
2012). Mobile phones provide users with instant connectivity to police forces, 
and enable users to report and respond to crime in real-time. Just as Taliban 
insurgents in Afghanistan fear that mobile phone networks will enable affected 
populations to report their movements to security forces (Shapiro & Weidmann, 
2012), study participants in Kenya report that crime has reduced as a result of 
the potential reporting capabilities enabled by mobile phones. For example, 
members of the public who witness a robbery in progress may report the crime 
to police, describe the perpetrators and their getaway vehicle, and may even be 
contacted later to provide supporting statements to increase the chance of 
successful prosecution. Study participants described the value of mobile 
phones for reporting a wide range of traditional crimes, such outbreaks of 
violence, sexual assault and robbery; and for increasing the chances of 
prosecution of offenders. The findings reveal widespread perceptions that these 
functions, whether or not they are utilised, increase the perceived risk 
associated with the commission of crime. In these ways, mobile phone-enabled 
crime reporting may also align with the SCP technique of enhancing natural 
surveillance; they enable users to communicate across horizontal networks, 
provide early warning information, and communicate about emerging threats, 
and this is likely to increase the real or perceived risk of detection for potential 
offenders. 
In developing world contexts characterised by information scarcity and poor 
transportation networks, these tools may provide particularly valuable crime 
reporting and prevention functions to remote and vulnerable populations, or 
where few alternatives are available. Previous studies have addressed the 
benefits of mobile phones in disasters (e.g. Meier, 2011a; Wall & Chery, 2012; 
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Wall & Robinson, 2008) and in weak states where formal service provision is 
poor (Best, 2011; Coyle & Thornton, 2007; Rotberg & Aker, 2013). Mobile 
phone users in this study also described lateral information-sharing and 
assistance-seeking during natural disasters. For example, users in Uganda 
described mobile phones providing access to life-saving assistance during a 
landslide, during floods and in an outbreak of fire. 
Evidently, mobile phones can only facilitate formal crime reporting when such 
reporting mechanisms are available. In both Kenya and Uganda, study 
participants described formal crime and insecurity reporting mechanisms 
provided by a range of organisations, including both state and non-state actors. 
However, in Uganda only 7% of the sample were available of any formal 
services, including crime reporting mechanisms, using mobile phones. In 
Kenya, participants described a range of crime reporting and response 
agencies using mobile phones, include hotlines provided by NGOs and 
government agencies. Some of these mobile-enabled systems provide on-call 
emergency assistance, analogous to 999 calls in the UK, albeit with a more 
limited mandate. These enable users to report particular illegal or anti-social 
behaviour and call for assistance. Examples include the GBV hotline in Uganda 
that facilitates user reporting of violence against women, and the UWIANO 
platform in Kenya that enables users to report outbreaks of political violence as 
well as digital crimes such as the dissemination hate-speech. The findings 
suggest that the utility of the available crime reporting mechanisms was 
constrained by their limited mandates in both contexts. Specifically, the GBV 
hotline provided by American Refugee Committee in Kyangwali refugee 
settlement19 is designed to enable women to report incidents of physical and 
sexual violence, and for affected women to request assistance. While the 
intention is laudable, study participants expressed concerns that no alternative 
mechanisms were available for reporting other types of crime, and women in 
Kyangwali reported low rates of mobile phone ownership and usage. 
Furthermore, none of the study participants reported using the GBV hotline 
service to report gender-related crime. Although it is beyond the scope of the 
present research to examine gender-based violence in cross-cultural contexts, it 
                                            
19 ARC provide a GBV hotline to provide referral and response services to survivors of GBV in 
Gulu, Kyangwali, Nakivale and Kyaka in Uganda. 
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is noteworthy that the majority of participants in Kyangwali are Congolese, and 
violence against women remains common in DRC (Meger, 2011). Marital rape 
was only criminalised in DRC as recently as 2011 (ibid), and the non-use of the 
GBV hotline reported by participants may therefore reflect deeper cultural 
beliefs regarding what constitutes a crime, rather than reflecting unwillingness 
or inability to utilise mobile-enabled crime reporting services in general. This is 
corroborated by interview data from interviews with service providers 
responsible for staffing the hotline, who described limited use of the service by 
women (the intended beneficiaries) and widespread use by men for reporting 
other types of crime, particularly violence. This suggests that demand for a 
mobile-enabled crime reporting mechanism is high. Furthermore, this may 
indicate that cultural factors, as well as technical limitations, logistical 
constraints and attitudes to formal reporting, inform the low rates of GBV 
reporting found among study participants. In this context, it may be 
hypothesised that the GBV hotline is therefore unlikely to reduce incidents of 
violence against women, but it may increase perceived risks associated with the 
commission of crime in general if offenders are aware that victims can report 
crime and call for assistance using this service. 
Crime reporting mechanisms were more commonly reported by participants in 
Kenya that in Uganda. The UWIANO platform, described in Chapter Five, 
provides a free SMS service to enable citizens to report violence and hate-
speech using their mobile phones in Kenya. It also disseminates messages 
promoting peaceful elections and national unity. The UWIANO platform 
provides an anonymous service for users to report both mobile-enabled crimes 
and physical outbreaks of violence, extending natural surveillance. Clarke 
(1997) also describes enlisting the help of the public as an effective, non-
technical method to strengthen formal surveillance, and the UWIANO platform 
may be analysed as an example of such a surveillance technique.  
Mobile phones may also function to reduce the anonymity of offenders following 
the mandatory registration of SIM cards in both countries, thereby increasing 
opportunities for detection and successful prosecution of crimes committed in 
both physical and networked environments. This was described by participants 
in Kenya, in response to widespread reporting of high-profile prosecutions 
utilising mobile phone records as admissible evidence. It was not described by 
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participants in Uganda, however. SIM registration and perceptions of monitoring 
were also widely regarded to have reduced the dissemination of hate-speech, 
inappropriate and false messages in Kenya, indicative that the reduced 
anonymity functions to reduce offending.  
A further mechanism through which mobile phones were reported to reduce 
offender anonymity was through the GPS function, regarded by participants to 
increase potential detection and locating of offenders. This was also described 
in Kenya but not in Uganda. An example provided by a Kenyan FGD participant 
was the enhanced capacity of the police to locate child kidnappers, although it 
is unclear whether such functions are used by Kenyan police service. However, 
regardless of actual use, the perception that mobile phones increase the 
visibility of offenders effectively increases the perceived risks associated with 
the commission of crime, and is therefore likely to reduce offending. These 
findings suggest that mobile telephony serves to extend both natural and formal 
surveillance (crime reporting) and guardianship (crime response), and 
simultaneously reduce the anonymity of offenders; all of which are likely to 
increase the risk associated with committing crime.  
Critically however, despite acknowledging these potential benefits, analysis of 
the primary data reveals that in both Kenya and Uganda, none of the study 
participants had reported crime using formal mechanisms such as the UWIANO 
platform or the GBV hotline, but relied on informal social networks for 
emergency support. While this was described as a choice by Kenyan FGD 
participants, in Uganda it is likely to be influenced by the low awareness of 
formal mechanisms for crime reporting using mobile phones. Thus, although 
mobile phone users and broader community members recognise that mobile 
phones have the potential to increase the opportunities for detecting and 
reporting crime in theory, in practice there are several preconditions that inform 
their ability and willingness to utilise mobile phones for crime reporting, as 
described in section 7.4 of this chapter.  
In developing world settings, it is also relevant to note that basic handsets are 
increasingly supplanted by more advanced models with Internet capabilities, 
voice recording and camera functions (GSMA, 2014). This is likely to facilitate 
further anonymity-reducing benefits for the prevention of crime. Specifically, 
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users will be able to photograph or digitally record evidence of crimes, and 
access online services to report crime and access assistance. 
Situational measures recognise the importance of perceptions in the prevention 
of criminal activities. Media reporting around SIM registration and the 
associated monitoring of mobile phone communications, while lacking 
specificity, allude to the detection and prevention of hate-speech that may 
increase users’ perceptions of the risks associated with their dissemination, 
regardless of any real increase in risk. This publicity may therefore have 
introduced crime-reducing effects without increasing the actual risk associated 
with using mobile phones to coordinate or commit crime. However, analysis of 
the data also reveals an interesting corollary of these crime prevention 
mechanisms aiming to increase detection of crime. In particular, the perception 
that mobile phone networks are monitored to prevent misuse is reported to have 
resulted in mobile users regulating their own behaviour. Thus the findings 
suggest that the increased perception of risk associated with mobile phone 
monitoring is sufficient incentive to catalyse wider behavioural change among 
the general population.  
Examining responses describing behavioural changes associated with attitudes 
to monitoring are illuminating, as participants describe shifts in anti-social 
content away from mobile phone networks onto anonymous online platforms 
and leaflet campaigns. These may reflect evidence of tactical displacement 
(Felson & Clarke, 1998) of hate-speech into other communication channels. 
Participants in Kenya also described the transmission of hate-speech messages 
with a ‘hidden meaning’, that superficially appear neutral but contain veiled 
threats or carefully worded insults. These may represent examples of offender 
adaptation (Ekblom, 1999), Interestingly, one fifth of Kenyan survey participants 
acknowledged altering their own mobile phone use habits as a result of the 
reduced anonymity associated with mobile communications, indicative of wider 
adaptation by everyday users of these tools. FGD participants also described 
adjusting their own behaviour to minimise the risk of wrong-doing, such as 
meeting in person to discuss political views or to organise political activities, or 
‘taking care’ in personal communications. Related patterns of self-censorship 
have emerged in Ethiopia as a consequence of government monitoring of 
mobile phone use, according to a Human Rights Watch (2014) report. Thus the 
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widespread perception that mobile communications are closely monitored 
appears to have the effect of shifting potentially sensitive content away from 
mobile networks and onto communication channels viewed as less scrutinised.  
7.2.3 Mobile phones reduce the rewards of crime 
Within this category of preventative techniques an unexpected finding emerged. 
This concerns the use of mobile telephony to remove targets from insecure 
environments of acquisitive crimes. Clarke (2007) described the installation of a 
card reader to reduce theft of donations from a church in Spain as an example 
of target removal. This is analogous to the use of mobile phone networks to 
remove financial assets from homes in developing world settings. This was 
widely reported by FGD participants in Kyangwali settlement in Uganda, and to 
a lesser extent also by users residing in urban slums in Kenya. Specifically, 
mobile phone users described the value of mobile phones for providing secure 
storage of financial assets. Users reported uploading cash savings onto digital 
m-money services in order to remove these savings from their insecure 
environments. From the perspective of SCP, m-banking provides these 
displaced users with a savings facility in the context of physical vulnerability and 
insecure dwellings. For mobile users living in insecure dwellings, the secure 
‘virtual’ storage facility of m-banking enables users to relocate their savings into 
less vulnerable digital settings, and simultaneously enhances their own 
personal security by removing a valuable crime target that they would otherwise 
be required to secure within their dwelling or on their person. M-banking 
services are designed to facilitate financial transfers, not to secure savings (see 
Section 2.3.1). However, this innovative application as virtual storage facilities 
enables mobile phone users to remove economic assets from unguarded, 
insecure dwellings, reducing the rewards associated with other types of 
acquisitive and property crime.  
7.2.4 Mobile phones reduce the provocations for committing crime 
The category of preventative techniques termed ‘reduce provocations’ contains 
techniques aims at reducing or neutralising disputes and frustrations in order to 
reduce crime that may emerge in response to these strong emotional states. 
Mobile telephony has been widely associated with the escalation, and de-
escalation, of violence in Kenya (CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero, 
2012; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; KNCHR, 2006; Osborn, 2008) and elsewhere 
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(e.g. Bailard, 2015; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013; Warren, 2015), as described 
in Chapters Five and Two respectively. It follows that mechanisms that can 
catalyse mobile phones to reduce or prevent outbreaks of violence are likely to 
be effective mechanisms for reducing crime. 
In Kenya, mobile telephony is strategically leveraged for crime prevention as a 
mechanism to reduce the potential for conflict associated with external 
conditions, such as the peaceSMS campaigns to deflect or diffuse disputes 
around election periods. Wortley (2001) has argued that certain situational 
conditions may induce or prompt illegal or anti-social behaviour, termed 
precipitating factors. The widespread ethno-political violence experienced in 
Kenya may be interpreted as such a situational condition. Another way to 
examine this could be the analogy of ‘broken windows’, whereby visible 
manifestations of low-level disorder may create criminogenic conditions that 
encourage further anti-social and criminal behaviour (Kelling & Coles, 1998). 
Extending this analogy to mobile networks, the widespread dissemination of 
hate-speech SMS may represent such a visible manifestation of social disorder, 
creating criminogenic conditions and contributing to anti-social behaviour such 
as the widespread violence characterising the 2007-8 post-election period. In 
geographical settings, Kelling and Coles (1998) suggest enhancing the visibility 
of police presence using foot patrols. Parallels can be drawn between these foot 
patrols and the widespread peaceSMS campaigns promulgated in Kenya, 
designed to provide regular reminders to behave responsibly and associated 
with calming tensions and reassuring mobile users. Peace SMS may be 
interpreted as an example of utilising mobile phone networks to reduce the 
provocations for violence, and the findings suggest that these are widely 
deployed during election periods. Participants in Kenya described widespread 
receipt of PeaceSMS, including messages promoting national unity and 
encouragements to behave in a socially responsible manner, and the majority 
interpreted these as reassuring. These platforms were also utilised to 
disseminate clarifications of false information and combat the spread of rumours 
and ‘mischief’. These may be variously interpreted within the categories of avoid 
disputes, reduce emotional arousal, and/or neutralise peer pressure. The 
findings support the aims of the peaceSMS campaigns, indicating that the 
dissemination of peaceful content through mobile channels may contribute to a 
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reduction in violence more broadly. In addition to the peaceSMS campaigns 
aiming to de-escalate tensions, the introduction of legislation criminalising in 
Kenya was also reported to effectively reduce the dissemination of hate-speech 
and reduce the violence associated with these communications. 
Extending this argument, it may be postulated that in resource poor settings, 
mobile phone networks provide a valuable communication mechanism for wider 
crime prevention efforts. Mobile phones provide a cost-effective means to 
communicate with populations and transmit accurate information about crime 
and crime prevention. Just as humanitarian agencies leverage mobile phone 
tools for the pursuit of humanitarian objectives during crises and emergencies 
(see Section 2.4.2), security and police forces could use mobile phones to 
share information about crime with otherwise inaccessible populations.  
7.2.5 Mobile phones remove excuses for crime 
The final category of prevention techniques that were identified in the study 
findings is the removal of excuses for crime. It has been noted that when 
potential offenders are unable to make credible excuses for committing crime, 
this can effectively reduce offending (Clarke & Homel, 1997). Where rules are 
unclear or ambiguous, individuals are likely to take advantage of this ambiguity 
and commit crimes. Several crime prevention mechanisms utilising mobile 
telephony in Kenya and Uganda may be analysed according to the remove 
excuses category of SCP techniques. These include services (such as 
components of the UWIANO platform, or the Si Si Ni Amani campaign) 
reminding users to behave responsibly and obey the law, and those reminding 
users about what constitutes illegal and anti-social behaviour. Within the 
‘remove excuses’ category, examples of crime prevention mechanism identified 
may be sub-categorised into those that alert the conscience and assist 
compliance of potential offenders. For example, the pro-peace SMS 
disseminated by organisations in Kenya are designed to alert the conscience of 
mobile users and remind them to exercise restraint in their communications and 
actions. These messages encourage national unity, promote peace and remind 
users that transmitting hate-speech is now illegal.  
Furthermore, the perceived effectiveness of these mechanism, which users 
reported finding reassuring and helpful, may be capitalised to leverage mobile 
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phone networks for further crime prevention applications. For example, SMS 
messages disseminating rule reminders of new or existing laws could effectively 
target users who lack access to other forms of ICT and may be unaware of 
broader legal changes and the implementation of national laws. This could be 
particularly useful in developing world settings. The scarcity of alternative 
communication channels renders mobile phones a valuable means for 
communicating rule reminders with populations, particularly in rural areas. 
Furthermore, mechanisms disseminating information about new or existing laws 
through mobile phone networks could also benefit from cultural patterns of 
information sharing between users and non-users of mobile technology. These 
sharing practices could potentially increase the range of information 
transmission beyond primary users of mobile phones.  
7.3 Mobile phones create opportunities for crime in developing 
world settings 
Opportunity theories of crime suggest that crime opportunities are created 
through the patterns of everyday life, and furthermore that social and 
technological changes are likely to create new opportunities for crime (Ekblom 
& Tilley, 2000; Farrell, 2015; Laycock, 2004; Newman & Clarke, 2003). In 
developing world contexts, it is also essential to recognise the importance of 
social, cultural and situational factors in informing opportunities for crime and 
crime prevention associated with mobile phones, as summarised in Section 7.4. 
In developing settings world it has been predicted that criminals will develop 
innovative strategies to exploit mobile technology (Livingstone, 2013; Shaw & 
Reitano, 2013). The study findings suggest that mobile phones facilitate the 
commission of a wide range of crimes by providing opportunities characterised 
by low effort, low risk and high reward. Mobile phones enable would-be 
offenders to maintain physical distance and remain anonymous, while the pool 
of potential victims in continually expanding with increasing mobile penetration. 
The increasing opportunities for crime associated with mobile phones may 
therefore be usefully conceptualised through frameworks of opportunity crime 
frameworks, particularly RAT (Cohen & Felson, 1979).  
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7.3.1 Mobile phones reduce the effort of crime 
Mobile phones reduce the effort of crime in developing world settings in several 
ways. The mechanisms through which mobile phones reduce the effort of crime 
are summarised below. 
i. Increase availability of crime targets. 
In resource-poor, developing world settings, personal and home security 
measures are often weak or absent, and ownership of valuable mobile handsets 
renders users particularly vulnerable to theft and violent acquisitive crimes. In 
both the rural villages in Uganda and slums in Kenya where data were 
collected, it was observed that street lighting was not present and many homes 
lacked basic security features such as door and window locks. These conditions 
of poor physical security are likely to reduce the effort associated with the theft 
of mobile handsets from individuals and dwellings. The increasing ownership of 
mobile handsets in the developing world is therefore likely to increase the 
availability of crime targets, in settings where physical security is weak. 
ii. Increase access to victims. 
In developing world settings, the widespread availability of mobile phones 
increases the pool of potential victims accessible by offenders. Mobile 
telephony has expanded rapidly in developing world settings, as demonstrated 
in Chapter Two.  
Furthermore, the findings suggest that mobile phones do not simply increase 
access to individual users. In contexts of information scarcity, such as the 
Kyangwali settlement in Uganda, mobile phone owners were found to be 
sources of information for entire communities, contributing to both positive and 
negative outcomes for crime and security. This sharing of information is widely 
recognised to contribute to positive development and humanitarian outcomes 
(Wall & Chery, 2012; Wall & Robinson, 2008). However, previous studies 
generally fail to account for the impact of the sharing of false or misleading 
information on joint victimisation to crime. In Kyangwali, a group of individuals 
sharing information received through one mobile handset fell jointly victim to a 
scam that resulted in them pooling their resources and the subsequent theft of 
these shared assets. This affected both the individual financial capacity of each 
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victim, and simultaneously reduced the capacity of the group to provide an 
informal support network for each other, described in previous studies as 
‘informal insurance policies’ (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Jack & Suri, 2014). Thus 
multiple users were victimised through a scam perpetrated through a single 
handset, with potentially widespread consequences. 
iii. Increase ease of coordination and organisation of crime. 
Examining the available literature on the implications of mobile phones in 
developing world settings, previous studies acknowledge the value of mobile 
telephony for reducing the effort associated with the organisation and 
implementation of non-violent collective action. Benefits include enabling users 
to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protests, 
monitor elections, scrutinize government and deepen participation in political 
processes (Diamond, 2010; Rheingold, 2002, Rotberg and Aker, 2013). These 
same functions, according to the findings of this study, contribute to mobile 
phones increasing opportunities by reducing the effort associated with the 
commission of crime. In study findings from Kenya and Uganda, users describe 
less democratic applications of these tools, including widespread transmission 
of gossip, scams, threats and false information. The viral spread of hate-speech 
may be examined as a form of (anti-social) collective action, and is a widely 
publicised phenomenon in the existing literature (CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & 
Gutierrez-Romero, 2012; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; KNCHR, 2006; Osborn, 
2008). The same features that reduce the effort associated with the 
organisation of collective action may also render mobile phone networks a low-
effort environment for the facilitation of networked and organised crime.  
7.3.2 Mobile phones reduce the risk of crime 
Mobile phones also reduce the risks associated with committing crimes in 
developing world settings through the following mechanisms: 
i. Mobile communications enable users to disguise identities. 
Potential offenders are able to target victims remotely and disguise their 
identities, reducing the risk of detection while simultaneously enabling them to 
pose as trusted individuals or organisations. Many messages identified as 
scams by participants in both case studies purported to originate from 
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legitimate, credible sources such as MNOs, with study participants in Uganda 
frequently referring to ‘cheating’ and ‘stealing’ by these organisations. Mobile 
communications enable criminals to mask their identities or assume false 
identities, posing as legitimate sources and reducing recipients’ ability to assess 
the credibility of threats. This reduces opportunities for detecting and punishing 
offenders. 
ii. Mobile communications enable users to conceal the evidence of 
crime. 
Participants in the study described criminals destroying SIMs card after the 
completion of successful scams in order to conceal the identity of the offender. 
The temporary link established between victim and perpetrator is easily severed 
through the destruction of the SIM card and/or mobile handset, therefore 
reducing the perceived risk of detection and punishment.  
7.3.3 Mobile phones increase the rewards of crime 
The increasing prevalence of mobile phones in the developing world is 
associated with increasing the availability of suitable crime targets in contexts of 
poor physical security, and furthermore these acquisitive crimes facilitate the 
commission of a wide range of digital crimes. Thus handset theft offers financial 
rewards, and mobile phones also facilitate other types of crime with both 
financial and non-financial rewards. 
i. Handsets are valuable crime targets. 
The technological ‘leapfrogging’ phenomenon (Castells, et al., 2007; Sharma & 
Gillet, 2014) described in Chapter Two creates conditions in which mobile 
telephones emerge as a uniquely widespread, relatively valuable crime target, 
in contexts where relatively few high-value consumer goods are available 
(Sidebottom, 2015). The rapid and widespread penetration of mobile telephony 
in developing world settings may therefore be regarded as analogous to the 
increase in consumer goods in the post-war period that catalysed increases in 
rates of acquisitive crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979), in combination with the 
associated shifts in the patterns of everyday life. Mobile phones are valuable, 
portable devices and attractive crime targets, both in Western and non-Western 
settings. They fulfil many of the criteria of the VIVA (Felson, 1998) and 
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CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) characteristics of ‘hot products’. Their increasing 
prevalence is associated with increasing rates of thefts and robberies across 
Europe (Farrell, 2015; Harrington & Mayhew, 2001; Mailley, et al., 2008), as 
described in Chapter Three. In developing world settings, high value consumer 
goods are rare, and mobile phones are increasingly common. It is therefore 
likely that mobile phones are likely to be popular crime targets, and that 
ownership of mobile phones increases vulnerability to robbery, burglary and 
other acquisitive crime in developing world settings.  
Furthermore, it was observed that mobile phones are regarded as prestige 
items in both Kenya and Uganda, in addition to their practical value as 
communication tools. Speculating on observations made during the fieldwork, it 
was notable that many mobile users (particularly in Kyangwali) conspicuously 
display mobile handsets whilst securing them to their bodies, wearing them on 
lanyards around their necks like items of jewellery or carrying them openly 
rather than concealing them in pockets or bags.  In contexts where few high 
value goods are owned, mobile phones may be used to signify the owners’ 
relative wealth and status. However, in insecure environments, conspicuously 
displayed high-value goods such as mobile phones may increase owners’ 
likelihood of crime victimisation. The study does not address the frequency with 
which conspicuously displayed handsets are stolen compared to concealed 
handsets, although future studies could investigate this.  
ii. Theft of handsets provides further opportunities for crime. 
Emerging frequently in participant responses to open survey questions and 
during FGD discussions in both Kenya and Uganda, handset theft was reported 
to occur both independently and as a consequence of other crimes facilitated by 
mobile phones, particularly scams. This interactivity with other types of mobile-
facilitated crime is particularly relevant for the present analysis. Specifically, 
users report being deceived by fraudulent messages encouraging them to travel 
to isolated or distant locations. Upon arrival, they are attacked and robbed of 
their mobile phones and other goods. Thus physical and digital vulnerabilities 
intersect, as mobile phones both facilitate, and are targets of, traditional types of 
acquisitive crime. Furthermore, handset theft may facilitate the commission of 
other types crime, such as the acquisition and misuse of the data contained 
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within the mobile handset. Stolen handsets therefore provide further rewards 
including access to data contained within the handset and access to other 
potential crime targets. Motivated offenders can utilise the content of stolen 
handsets to access personal data stored in these devices, target users’ social 
networks, and potentially access financial resources. Study participants did not 
describe concerns regarding the theft of data, but potentially the digital storage 
functions of mobile handsets may introduce new risks for mobile users if 
handsets are stolen.  
Newman and Clarke (2003) have applied the CRAVED characteristics to 
examine information as a hot product within the e-commerce environment. 
Many of the examples they provide, such as software piracy and counterfeiting, 
and not relevant for this analysis, but Newman and Clarke (2003) alo 
acknowledge identity theft that targets personal data contained within 
databases or customer records. Mobile phones in the developing world may 
also contain personal data which has value as a crime target. Whitehead and 
Farrell (2008) have also noted threats associated with the theft of user identities 
and financial information, specifically examining advanced handsets. In 
developing world settings, related threats may concern data theft from a range 
of handset types, however, and even basic handsets provide data storage 
capabilities. Burrell (2010) has noted that the centralisation of personal data 
associated with mobile handsets is a unique phenomenon in the developing 
world. Extending this argument, it may be posited that this centralisation of 
information may create new opportunities for data theft. The participants of this 
study described using mobile phones for the storage of personal information 
ranging from personal contacts, documents, images, and music. The data 
storage opportunities provided by mobile phones were highly valued, even the 
storage of basic contact information. For example, participants in Uganda 
reported widespread loss and damage of paper documents as a result of forced 
migration and extreme weather conditions. Mobile phones enable users to 
centralise and store important information, and were described as an effective 
mechanism to overcome the fragility of paper documents in these settings.  
Shared (or stolen) handsets may contain valuable data including personally 
identifying information, PIN codes and passwords, contact details of friends and 
family members, and may also provide a mechanism for motivated offenders to 
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assume the identity of the original handset owner. Using the data stored within 
the handset, and targeting victims who may recognise the telephone number 
and therefore trust in the identity of the sender, the study findings reveal that 
these traditional crimes can effectively facilitate the commission of digital 
crimes. Previous studies have also noted that mobile phones are often used for 
the secure storage of financial assets by users seeking to conceal savings from 
other family members, and for financial transfers during emergencies 
(Blumenstock, et al., 2011; Duncombe, 2012a; Morawczynski, 2009; 
Morawczynski & Pickens, 2009). Data theft has the potential to be a rewarding 
type of crime associated with mobile phones in developing world settings. 
iii. M-banking may increase the rewards of crime. 
The study findings also revealed many security benefits associated with m-
banking, which provides users with access to distant and communally-managed 
resources, such as livestock tended by distant kin and reduces costly, unsafe, 
and inconvenient journeys to liquidate assets. The benefits identified for 
migrants are particularly important in light of the increasing centrality of 
economic self-reliance in discourses around refugees and migrants described 
by Jacobsen (2005) and Omata (2012), and in Uganda study participants 
valued m-banking, although access to m-banking services was low in Kyangwali 
settlement. However, the anonymity associated with mobile communications 
facilitates deception, and the findings of this study suggest that m-banking also 
provides a mechanism through which criminals can extract resources from their 
victims. Participants described erroneously transferring money to criminals 
impersonating a range of legitimate recipients, ranging from friends and family 
members to network operators. Informal, transnational money transfers such as 
those described by participants in Uganda may also increase opportunities for 
victimisation. This informal system is reliant on a trusted intermediary to whom 
an m-money transfer is sent, and who then withdraws the funds, exchanges the 
currency, physically crosses an international border and uploads the funds onto 
a different national m-money service in order to send the transfer on to the 
intended final recipient. This process creates a chain of opportunities for crime, 
potentially increasing the vulnerability of sender, recipient, and intermediary. 
These cultural conditions influence patterns of opportunity for crime associated 
with mobile phones. Sharing behaviours in particular may either create or inhibit 
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opportunities for crime, and these complex dynamics deserve further 
investigation to identify appropriate, culturally-sensitive crime prevention 
strategies. 
iv. Sharing behaviours increase access to rewards. 
In contrast to Western settings where individuals own and utilise both handsets 
and SIM cards independently, previous studies have demonstrated that sharing 
practices are common in resource-poor developing world settings (Aker & Mbiti, 
2010; Burrell, 2010; James, 2011; 2014; James & Vesteeg, 2007; Tenhunen, 
2008). Macro-level analyses of mobile phone penetration and use figures 
obscure local practices such as handset and informal resource sharing. These 
secondary mobile users therefore remain invisible in many academic enquiries, 
as their usage is embedded within communal level practices. With the exception 
of Burrell (2010) who notes risks associated with protecting data in shared 
handsets, the crime and security threats and benefits associated with practices 
of handset sharing remain largely unacknowledged. However, the findings of 
this study suggest that an unrecognised corollary of these practices may be 
unique constellations of opportunity for, and vulnerability to, mobile phone crime 
differentially affecting owners, users and sharers of handsets. The study 
findings also suggest that the impacts of mobile-enabled crimes may extend 
beyond individual users, such as the victimisation of entire communities to 
mobile-enabled scams facilitated through traditional practices of resource 
pooling described by participants in Kyangwali. This demonstrates that 
ownership of a mobile phone is not a necessary precondition for victimisation. 
Furthermore, in contexts where handset sharing is common (as identified in 
Kyangwali settlement), mobile handsets may be used as storage devices by 
multiple users, amplifying the potential risks of data theft. This may be a fruitful 
area for further study. 
7.3.4 Mobile phones provoke crime and remove excuses 
Mobile phones may also be analysed to provoke or remove excuses for crime 
and antisocial behaviour, as mobile phone-enabled communications are not 
constrained by traditional behavioural norms. 
Mobile telephony was also perceived by participants in both case studies to 
provide new opportunities for socialisation beyond traditional boundaries, as 
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noted in previous studies (Archambault, 2013; Castells, et al., 2007; Jeffrey & 
Doron, 2013; Ling, 2004; Porter, 2012; Tenhunen, 2008). For example, in India, 
Tenhunen (2008) described mobile telephony enabling users to bypass 
traditional authorities and communicate outside of the bounds of accepted 
social norms. This enables rural mobile users to access financial support from 
new sources, and facilitates the coordination of extra-marital affairs. While this 
enhanced connectivity is often described as a valuable benefit of mobile 
phones, the findings of this and previous studies reveals that this connectivity 
may be perceived as a threat to traditional social stability and order. For 
example, church leaders in Kenya describe the use of mobile phones facilitating 
the coordination of, and increasing the frequency of, extra-marital affairs, while 
many participants expressed concern about the identity of the originator of calls 
received. It may therefore be conjectured that mobile telephony provides low-
effort (and low cost) opportunities for users to connect with both personal social 
networks, and potential offenders. Furthermore, the structure of mobile 
networks creates novel criminogenic conditions in the developing world that 
may provoke criminality under certain conditions. The anonymity and distance 
from victims, for example, contrasts with normal social relationships in 
traditionally close knit communities. In contexts where inter-personal 
communications are restricted to neighbours and kin networks, mobile phones 
facilitate access to distant strangers. For example, study participants described 
making new friends and contacts with whom they share no pre-existing ties. 
Studies described in Chapter Two demonstrate how mobile phones enable 
users to access distant networks and to bypass social and economic constraints 
of their physical environment. Aker and Mbiti (2010) describe how mobile 
phones enable users to bypass traditional relationships of patronage, Tenhunen 
(2008) describes increased access to new virtual friends, and Archambault 
(2013) and Jeffrey and Doron (2013) highlight the risk of social disorder 
associated with this extension of social ties. This extension of sociality beyond 
traditional boundaries may reduce the effectiveness of behavioural norms 
governing inter-personal relations, and potentially provoke anti-social behaviour. 
In light of this analysis, the dissemination of hate-speech may be analysed as a 
manifestation of disorder. Receipt of hate-speech may therefore provoke of 
encourage mobile phone users to further disseminate antisocial or inappropriate 
content through mobile phone networks.  
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7.4 Social, cultural and situational conditions inform opportunities 
for crime and crime prevention  
This analysis of opportunities for crime and crime prevention in developing 
world settings would be incomplete without acknowledging the importance of 
the social, cultural and situational conditions. These conditions influence 
structures of opportunity for crime and inform the attitudes and behaviour of 
developing world populations. Furthermore, they are likely to influence the 
effectiveness of crime prevention techniques in these settings. Accordingly, this 
section outlines the conditions identified in the case studies, summarises the 
ways in which they inform access to opportunities for both crime and crime 
prevention, and signposts to the section of the thesis where they are discussed 
in more detail. Inevitably, these comprise an incomplete compendium based on 
the case studies and fieldwork, but are provided here in recognition of the 
importance of acknowledging such conditions for studies of crime and crime 
prevention in developing world settings. 
7.4.1 Resource-poor settings 
As described in Chapter Two, developing world settings are often characterised 
by information scarcity, and scholars have noted a connectivity gap, or ‘digital 
divide’ between populations with access to communications technologies and 
those without (Castells, et al. 2007; Maitland 1984). In these settings, mobile 
phones offer valuable communication opportunities for traditionally 
disconnected populations (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Castells, et al., 2007; Ling & 
Horst, 2011; Porter, 2012). A wide range of factors inform access to mobile 
phones in developing world settings, as addressed in Chapter Two, and it is 
important to recognise the implications of these conditions for opportunities for 
crime and crime prevention associated with mobile phones. Specifically:  
i. Resource poor settings are likely to be characterised by different 
constellations of opportunity for crime. 
The previous sections have addressed this topic in depth, but it is important to 
recognise that developing world settings are likely to be characterised by 
different crime opportunities. While Mailley el al.’s (2008) Mobile Phone Theft 
Index provides a ranking of theft by handset model in the UK, no such index has 
been created for handset theft in the developing world. Moreover, in resource-
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poor contexts users value particular functionality, and accordingly the popularity 
of different handset models is likely to be variable. For example, the torch and 
radio functions were highly valued by study participants, particularly in contexts 
where cabled electricity is unavailable and access to information is limited. 
Furthermore, the conditions in which handset theft occurs are likely to differ in 
developing world settings. The Index developed by Mailley et al. (2008) 
included snatch-theft, theft from the person, theft from public places, and also 
burglaries and theft from motor vehicles where mobile handsets were taken. In 
developing world settings limited data are available on the location of handset 
thefts, but it may be postulated that they are likely to be different. For example, 
theft from motor vehicles will be limited where car ownership is low, while weak 
personal security measures may contribute to increased theft from dwellings. A 
specific index of mobile phone theft in developing world settings would serve 
great analytical value for the development of preventative measures. However, 
Mailley et al.’s (2008) methods used recorded crime data on handset theft, 
which is unlikely to be available for analysis in many developing world settings, 
and future studies will need to develop innovative methods to overcome this. 
ii. Information scarcity and ‘leapfrogging’ contribute to crime 
opportunities. 
Previous studies have argued that inequalities associated with mobile phone 
ownership and use may maintain and entrench existing inequalities (Abraham, 
2009; Duncombe, 2012b; Jagun, et al., 2008; Porter, 2012; Souter, et al., 2005), 
and these may include inequalities of vulnerability. It follows that vulnerability to 
the crime and security threats associated with mobile phones is conditional, in 
part, on users’ relative experience with this technology. Mobile phone 
technology is often described as ‘leapfrogging’ older communication 
mechanisms in the developing world (Castells, et al., 2007; Sharma & Gillet, 
2014), whereby communications technologies largely bypass other, more 
regulated forms of electronic media. A corollary of this ‘leapfrogging’ 
phenomena for crime and security is that individuals who lack experience with 
other forms of digital communications (such as television and computing) but 
have access to personal mobile phone handsets may be less equipped to 
assess the reliability of the content they receive. Such users may be particularly 
vulnerable targets for crime. With their previous experience of communication 
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technologies limited to (formal, regulated) broadcast media, new mobile users in 
the developing world may are less likely to identify the risks associated with 
(informal, unregulated) mobile phones and more likely to trust the content they 
receive through these devices. This ‘naïve user hypothesis’ suggests that new 
users are unfamiliar with the risks and have not yet developed a critical 
approach to analysing the credibility of information received through mobile 
telephony. The findings of this study suggest that novice users fall victim to 
mobile scams that more experienced users are better equipped to detect and 
avoid, particularly financial scams.   
iii. Mobile network coverage informs access to security benefits and 
creates opportunities for crime. 
Fundamentally, network coverage informs users’ ability to report and prevent 
crime using mobile phones. In Kyangwali settlement for example, users 
reported that poor network coverage20  impeded their ability to call for 
assistance during emergencies. Where mobile phone coverage is unavailable, 
communities are not able to benefit from security-enhancing opportunities they 
provide. Areas lacking coverage may also be strategically utilised by criminals, 
as Hahn (2012) notes in Burkina Faso. In Hahn’s (2012) study, offenders 
selectively commit crimes (in this case highway robbery) in areas of the 
countryside where signal coverage is poor to prevent users from reporting 
crimes or calling for assistance while a robbery is in progress. When used 
strategically, denying access to mobile networks may effectively reduce crime in 
places (e.g. inhibiting the coordination of violence) and networked crimes (e.g. 
m-deception). However, as noted in 7.6.3.1, signal jammers strategically 
employed in crime hotspots such as Kenyan prisons may effectively reduce 
crime threats associated with mobile phones. In previous studies, selective 
network blackouts have been utilised to reduce opportunities for terrorist groups 
and civil activists (Gohdes, 2015; Morozov, 2011; Richtel, 2011; Southwood, 
2011; Vodafone, 2011) to organise their activities.  
iv. Access to electricity is a prerequisite for accessing security benefits. 
                                            
20 The expansion of the settlement was discussed during a subsequent informal discussion with 
the Chief Executive Officer of MTN, the largest mobile service provider in Uganda. The 
preliminary findings revealed high demand for mobile communications and m-banking services 
within the settlement, which prompted the dispatch of a team to conduct a feasibility study.  
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In developing world settings, particularly rural and resource-constrained 
environments, the limited availability of power21 to charge mobile phone 
handsets restricts access to crime reporting opportunities. Many of the areas 
where data were collected in Kenya and Uganda lack mains electricity supplies, 
and reliance on generators is common in urban areas while solar charging was 
widespread in rural areas. In Kyangwali settlement limited access to electricity, 
and the prohibitive costs associated with recharging handsets, were found to 
limit users’ access to mechanisms such as the GBV hotline. A corollary of this 
for predicting future trends is that the battery life of advanced smartphones is 
often brief, which may limit uptake of advanced handsets, and associated 
opportunities for crime, in areas where access to electricity is limited. 
v. Financial constraints inform access to crime prevention benefits, and 
reduce the detection of crime. 
Although addressing widespread issues of poverty and economic inequality are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that mobile phone owners and 
users must have access to sufficient financial resources to make outgoing calls 
to report crime. This condition may exclude a body of low-income mobile phone 
users with disadvantaged patterns of usage, such as those reliant on one-bell 
techniques (Horst & Miller, 2006) or primarily recipients of calls and messages 
from high income users (Abraham, 2009). The GBV hotline in Kyangwali 
settlement provides a call-back service to overcome this constraint, allowing 
users to ‘beep’ the hotline to request a phone call. 
The ability to make outgoing calls nevertheless informs access to both formal 
and informal security benefits. Where users are reliant on others to return calls 
the immediacy of mobile communications is reduced. Furthermore, financially 
empowered users are in a better position to triangulate incoming information by 
calling other members of their social network, or verify content with the original 
sender.  
vi. Insecure settings contribute to crime opportunities. 
                                            
21 Electricity in the settlement is provided by generators in urban centres with limited availability 
of solar power charging in rural areas. 
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Where physical security measures are weak and homes and public spaces 
poorly protected, crime targets are particularly vulnerable. In insecure settings, 
mobile phones, as CRAVED targets, are likely to both create new opportunities 
for acquisitive crime (handset theft) and increase associated crime such as 
burglary and robbery. It is beyond the scope of this study to address all the 
component of physical insecurity in developing world settings, although it would 
be an interesting topic for further investigation. Based on observational data 
from the two periods of fieldwork, street lighting was largely absent and many 
homes in slums and rural areas lacked window and door locks. The constitution 
of many homes from natural materials such as leaves, straw and mud is also 
likely to reduce security, as these barriers may easily be bypassed. In 
Kyangwali refugee settlement, many homes lacked doors and relied on only a 
piece of fabric to cover the entrance. In these settings, mobile phones were 
among the only high value goods observed (see also Section 7.3.1).  
vii. Issues of dependency and addiction to mobile phones may emerge in 
developing world settings 
This study did not set out to address psychological dependency or technological 
addiction, nor do the methods enable rigorous examination of these issues in 
the two case studies. However, it is important to acknowledge that unexpected 
findings emerged in Uganda, and the questions they raise may warrant further 
investigation by future researchers. These concern mobile phone users’ 
explanations for feelings of insecurity when they do not have access to their 
mobile phone. As described in 6.3.2.1, one third of survey respondents in 
Uganda described their feelings in terms of need or addiction. In the present 
study, these findings are analysed as examples of the security benefits 
associated with the mobile phone connectivity. This aligns with the analyses of 
previous studies addressing the value of mobile phones in emergencies and 
crises (Coyle & Meier, 2009; ICRC, 2011; IFRC, 2005; Wall & Robinson, 2008; 
Wall, 2012). However, in Western contexts, mobile phones are increasingly 
associated with psychological risks such as dependency (Baron, 2010, Baym, 
2011), characterised by Baym (2011) as the ‘dark side’ of mobile phones. To 
the author’s knowledge, in developing world settings these risks have not been 
widely acknowledged or investigated. Future research could investigate the 
psychological implications of mobile connectivity in developing world settings, 
261 
 
which may also interact with opportunities for crime and security. This may be a 
fruitful area of study for psychologists, crime scientists and cognitive 
anthropologists. 
7.4.2 Language, literacy and meaning 
Previous studies have demonstrated that education informs mobile phone use, 
with illiteracy a particular impediment to mobile usage (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
GSMA, 2012; 2014; Tenhunen, 2008). Participants spoke a wide range of 
languages across the two case studies, and both language and literacy were 
found to inform their experiences of crime and crime prevention associated with 
mobile phones. Language is also related to ethnicity, nationality and tribal 
affiliations.  
i. Language (and ethnicity) informs the interpretation of meaning of 
received SMS. 
The findings suggest that hate-speech and SMS often target particular 
recipients, containing ‘hidden meanings’ and veiled threats which are applicable 
to particular targets and may not be interpreted by speakers of other languages. 
Thus the same message may have a different meaning for recipients who 
understand the subtleties of the language in which it is transmitted, or for 
particular ethnic or political groups who recognise the intended meaning of the 
message. Legislative crime prevention initiatives in Kenya account for this, 
requiring MNOs to transmit bulk outgoing messages only in English and 
Kiswahili (See Section 5.2.2).  
ii. Illiteracy may reduce crime opportunities. 
Illiteracy or poor levels of education are widely described as an impediment to 
mobile phone usage. However, the findings of this study suggest that illiteracy 
may actually function to reduce victimisation and protect users from m- crime 
threats. Where crime threats are transmitted through SMS rather than 
telephone calls, or use an unfamiliar language illiterate recipients are unable to 
comprehend the written content of these messages. This alerts the recipient to 
the likelihood that the sender is not known to them. Illiterate study participants 
reported that when receiving SMS, they often assume they are not the intended 
recipient. This leads them to either disregard the message content, or request 
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assistance in interpreting it from other members of their community, increasing 
the chance of more experienced or educated users detecting fraudulent 
content.  
iii. Distinguishing between hate-speech, humour and political debate is 
challenging. 
The findings demonstrate that mobile phones are used for a wide range of 
informal communications in developing world settings. Moreover, recipients’ 
interpretation of particular transmissions as offensive, anti-social or illegal 
depends on many factors, informed by both the content and source of the 
message and interpretation of the law. Chapter Five introduces the challenges 
associated with defining hate-speech in Kenya, and Section 5.3.2.1 identifies 
the challenges associated with researching it in this study, examined further in 
7.6.3. Studies investigating crime in developing world settings should recognise 
the culturally-specific interpretation of appropriate and inappropriate behaviours. 
In this study, the findings demonstrate that boundaries between humour, 
political debate and offensive content are blurred. Mobile phones provide users 
with a mechanism to communicate informally and extend patterns of 
communication which characterise humour, banter and political debate into 
digital terrains (Horst, 2006; Spitulnik, 2002). It is important to recognise that the 
development of appropriate behavioural norms informing digital 
communications is a cultural as well as a legal process.  
7.4.3 Social networks  
Social networks are valuable resources for developing world populations to 
secure resources and access support, as described in Chapter Two. Mobile 
telephones enhance users’ access to social networks, and these also inform 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention. Furthermore, acknowledging the 
widely recognised inequalities of access and use between and within 
demographic and socio-economic groups in developing world settings, 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention associated with mobile telephony 
are likely to be unevenly distributed between mobile owners, users and even 
non-users.  
i. Social networks provide users with informal access to support, but 
may reduce opportunities for formal crime prevention.  
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While participants described formal reporting of crime as rare, they described 
widespread informal reporting of crime and security threats. Examples include 
calling for help during natural disasters such as mudslides and extreme weather 
conditions, and coordinating escape plans during M23 rebel action in DRC, as 
described in Chapter Six. Previous studies have lauded these informal benefits, 
describing for example applications of mobile telephony for coordinating 
assistance during periods of conflict in Lebanon (Coyle & Thornton, 2007), 
Liberia and Iraq (Best, 2011) during emergencies in Ghana (Overa, 2006), India 
(Tenhunen, 2008) and even during 9/11 in the USA (Dutton & Nainoa, 2002). 
The findings of this study suggest that these benefits are also widely recognised 
among mobile users in East African settings, indicating that mobile phones 
facilitate communication and coordination between horizontal support networks, 
providing users with valuable opportunities to overcome insecurity and weak 
infrastructure to access informal assistance during crises.  
However, this reliance on inter-personal horizontal networks for support in the 
event of crime or insecurity has both benefits and drawbacks. These informal 
functions, while they may be effective mechanisms to mobilise assistance for 
victims of crime, do not function to increase natural surveillance and enhance 
crime reporting to authorities, nor do they extend the guardianship of formal 
security forces or reduce the anonymity of offenders. Thus, while participants 
express satisfaction with, and use of, such informal security-enhancing 
functions of mobile phones, they are unlikely to contribute to crime reduction 
through increasing the risks of formal sanctions associated with crime.  
In developing world settings, however, formal mechanisms may be unavailable, 
ineffective or implemented by organisations regarded as untrustworthy, as 
addressed in 7.4.6. 
ii. Informal information sharing through mobile phones can increase 
opportunities for crime prevention. 
In contexts where information received through mobile phones is shared, as 
among the Congolese study participants in Kyangwali Settlement, associated 
security benefits are experienced by wider communities than just handset 
owners or users. For example, early warning information transmitted through 
mobile phone calls and SMS was reported to be widely shared and re-
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transmitted through word-of-mouth, enabling non-users to access and respond 
to information during emergencies. However, mobile phone owners are likely to 
be first to receive such information, and may selectively share information, or 
delay sharing information, with consequences for other members of their 
community. Ownership of a mobile phone therefore confers responsibility on 
developing world users in settings characterised by information scarcity. 
According to FGD and survey data, sharing of informal information received 
through mobile phones enabled communities to access information about 
impending threats, evade rebel groups, seek assistance, and coordinate escape 
plans and meeting places with friends and family members in Kenya and 
Uganda.  
iii. Information sharing can contribute to joint victimisation and increase 
the impact of false information and scams. 
Where false or fraudulent content received through mobile phones is shared 
with wider community members, this may contribute to joint victimisation and 
increase the availability of crime targets, as described in 7.3.1. 
iv. Mobile enabled financial transfers may increase opportunities for 
theft. 
Developing world users are often excluded from formal banking services. 
Mobile-enabled banking offers opportunities for these users to transfer financial 
assets and securely store savings. However, they also provide opportunities for 
deception and theft if users are manipulated in transferring funds to criminals, or 
if criminals are able to access funds by stealing access codes contained in 
handsets. These risks are also compounded by informal, transnational 
transfers, as described in section 7.3.3. 
7.4.4 Handset sharing  
Previous studies recognise that patterns of handset sharing are commonplace 
in developing world settings (e.g. (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Burrell, 2010; James, 
2011; 2014; James & Vesteeg, 2007; Tenhunen, 2008). Burrell (2010) 
acknowledges the rich and varied patterns of sharing practices in Uganda, 
distinguishing between different configurations of shared access. Although this 
type of fine-grained analysis is beyond the scope of the present study, the 
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findings of this study demonstrate that sharing behaviours introduce complex 
constellations of opportunity for crime and crime prevention. These are 
summarised here, and addressed in greater depth in Section 7.2 and 7.3. 
i. Handset sharing may increase the risk of data theft for owners and 
sharers. 
This has been examined in Section 7.3.3, although it was not reported by 
participants during this study. 
ii. Handset sharing may reduce timely access to security benefits of 
mobile phones. 
Victims of crime must have access to a handset at the critical moment when a 
crime is in progress or being witnessed, or when they require assistance. This 
condition may seem simple, yet it is likely to exclude mobile phone users who 
have only shared access to handsets. Handset owners retain authority and 
control over their own usage habits, deciding who, when, and where to use their 
handsets. Secondary users remain reliant on, and subservient to, handset 
owners who retain ultimate decision-making authority over the handset.  
iii. Handset sharing may reduce the effectiveness of preventative 
mechanisms e.g. SIM registration and monitoring. 
SIM cards must be registered to one individual. Accordingly, where handsets 
are shared, secondary users become invisible to formal authorities reliant on 
SIM registration or monitoring. 
iv. Handset sharing may increase the transparency of mobile 
communications. 
Where shared use of a handset occurs among members of a household, for 
example, this increases the chance of more experienced users detecting false 
or fraudulent content which may not be recognised by less experienced users. 
This also reduces the privacy of user communications. 
v. Handset sharers are less vulnerable to handset theft. 
Handset sharers may be less vulnerable to handset theft, as they do not retain 
control of handsets beyond the immediate act of usage. This may further reduce 
266 
 
their vulnerability to associated crimes such as burglary and robbery (Section 
7.3.3).  
7.4.5 Gender  
Previous studies recognise gender disparity in mobile phone access and use in 
developing world settings (e.g. GSMA, 2012, Porter, 2012). These reflect wider 
gendered inequalities in developing world settings, which are beyond the scope 
of this study to address. However, these inequalities of access and use are 
likely to contribute to women’s experiences of crime and crime prevention 
related to mobile phones. In this study, ownership in urban areas of Kenya were 
similar for men and women, although women in Uganda reported lower levels of 
access and use, and higher rates of sharing, than men. Women’s reported 
ownership in Kyangwali settlement was low. The findings indicate that women 
may and men use mobile phones differently to enhance their security and 
reduce crime in developing world settings, according to FGD data from Uganda 
(Section 6.3.2). Moreover, opportunities for crime differ between these groups. 
Crime prevention mechanisms should be developed which acknowledge and 
account for these differences in their design and implementation. 
i. Where women’s usage is lower, or controlled by men, they have less 
access to informal security benefits associated with mobile phones. 
As noted in 7.4.1 and 7.4.3, access to and ownership of mobile handsets 
informs access to security benefits. 
ii. Criminals may have less opportunity to target women through mobile 
phones where women’s use rates are lower. 
Women’s lower rates of mobile phone use may serve to protect them from 
crime threats transmitted through this medium. Similarly, these conditions may 
reduce their vulnerability to handset theft. 
7.4.6 Attitudes to the state and the law 
The findings suggest that attitudes to the police and the state critically inform 
users’ willingness to report crime and the effectiveness of formal crime 
prevention mechanisms. 
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i. Where trust in the state is low, formal crime reporting and prevention 
mechanisms using mobile phones are likely to be ineffective. 
The study findings revealed widespread mistrust in the organs of the state, 
particularly in Kenya, which inform users’ willingness to utilise crime reporting 
and prevention opportunities associated with mobile phones (see Section 
5.3.1). The majority of study participants in Kenya stated that even where 
mobile reporting mechanism are available, they do not report crime to the 
police, nor would they expect them to take action in response to reports of crime 
received through mobile phone networks. This contrasts with experiences 
described in Uganda, where participants expressed frustration at the 
inadequate provision of formal crime reporting and response mechanisms (see 
Section 6.3.4). Participants in Kenya expressed reluctance to report crime to 
police, and the FGD data suggests that this is related to widespread mistrust in 
both the capacity and intentions of the institutions of the state. Despite the 
theoretical benefits of connectivity to formal services, participants in Kenya 
remained sceptical about the effectiveness of reporting crime and expressed 
distrust in formal security agencies, citing past experiences of ineffectiveness, 
police corruption and even collusion with perpetrators of violence. This theme 
also permeates available literature, which has implicated the government and 
police forces in the coordination and commission of violence against particular 
ethnic groups during previous election periods (CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & 
Guittarez-Romero, 2012; Ghoshal, 2011; Rawlence & Albin-Lackey, 2008). 
Participants widely reported mistrust in, and fear of, security forces.  
ii. Lower rates of crime reporting contribute to weak evidence base of 
crime in developing world countries. 
Low rates of usage of formal crime reporting and prevention mechanisms has 
implications for research on crime in developing world settings. Poor reporting 
of crime reduces knowledge about the scale, type, location and timing of crime 
events. This is likely to reduce opportunities to develop appropriate, evidence-
based crime prevention mechanisms. Encouraging users to report crime using 
mobile phones therefore has broader implications for the evidence-base of 
crime in developing world settings. 
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iii. Developing world users may support crime prevention mechanisms 
targeting mobile phones even at the cost of personal privacy. 
Previous studies have noted with concern the increasing vulnerability of mobile 
users to formal state surveillance in a range of developing and developed world 
settings (Diamond, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Morozov, 2011; 
Southwood, 2011). These studies have traditionally viewed mobile phone 
surveillance as a mechanism to facilitate increasing state control and constrain 
individual freedoms.  
Despite participants’ expressed mistrust in security forces, an unexpected 
finding of this study concerns the widespread support for mobile phone 
monitoring and surveillance by study participants. The reasons provided 
suggest that participants value community security over individual privacy, and 
furthermore that individual privacy is conceptually positioned in opposition to 
social stability and security. This finding emerged in both Kenya and Uganda, 
and requires further investigation before firm conclusions may be drawn. 
Section 7.7 reflects on methodological challenges in developing world settings, 
and proposes suggestions for future research which may be relevant to 
examine this unexpected finding further. However, preliminary analysis 
suggests that in contexts characterised by widespread misuse of mobile 
networks, monitoring and surveillance is viewed by the majority as a liberating 
mechanism that enables law-abiding mobile users to communicate without fear, 
rather than an oppressive invasion of privacy. Monitoring and surveillance 
increase, if not the actual risks associated with perpetrating crimes, at least the 
perceived risks, and are associated with a reduction in criminal and anti-social 
behaviour across a range of crime types. 
It may be posited that the breakdown of social order associated with the viral 
spread of hate-speech and ensuing outbreaks of political violence during the 
2007-8 election period in Kenya contributed to these attitudes towards the 
control of mobile phone networks as public spaces. This also supports the 
proposition that mobile phones are becoming aligned with other formal 
communication channels, rather than viewed as purely private communication 
devices.  
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iv. Leveraging mobile phones for crime prevention depends on both the 
availability of, and public attitudes to, crime reporting mechanisms. 
Following the previous point, the findings also suggest that the mobile network 
environment can provides user with a mechanisms to bypass individual local 
police officers and stations (associated with the orchestration and perpetration 
of political violence during previous election periods) and report crime 
anonymously to state-level security agencies, for example using the UWIANO 
platform described in Chapter Five. Recognising the historical experiences of 
the East African region (discussed in Section 5.2), mobile phones may be 
leveraged to overcome the mistrust between members of the public and 
security forces. However, study participants in Kenya both expressed 
reluctance to visit a police station to report crime, and reported low awareness 
and use of other formal reporting mechanisms (Section 5.3.1.2), although 
comments during the FGDs indicate that some users value the connectivity to 
security forces associated with mobile phones. In Uganda, participants also 
expressed low awareness of formal crime reporting opportunities using mobile 
phones (Section 6.3.2.3), but they expressed a desire for increased connectivity 
with formal agencies to report and respond to crime. This may reflect different 
perceptions of the benevolence of the state among migrants and refugees in 
Uganda, where the policies of the state towards these groups are widely 
recognised as progressive (Akellow, 2009; Krause-Vilmar, 2011; Omata, 2012; 
Omata & Kaplan, 2013). 
v. Legal systems may lag behind emerging crime threats and threats to 
user privacy. 
As the increasing penetration of mobile phones facilitates the commission of 
new types of crime, legal systems must respond appropriately. This includes 
drafting laws, for example the response to hate-speech in Kenya which made it 
illegal to transmit offensive content in electronic form (described in Chapter 
Five). It is also important for developing countries to adopt and enforce 
appropriate legislation to protect the privacy rights of citizens (Crowe, 2013; 
Hosein & Nyst, 2013; Hussain, 2013; Munro, 2012; Nyst, 2013). Mobile phones 
may also provide a valuable mechanism to inform populations about these laws 
(see Section 7.2.5). Where legal protections are in place and users understand 
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their rights and responsibilities, this may inhibit crime and simultaneously 
promote formal crime reporting. 
7.5 M-crime: A new crime category 
For each of the types of crime identified in this study, mobile phones provide 
access to new crime targets or function as facilitators, and both of these 
applications may contribute to further crime opportunities. The hybrid nature of 
these threats adds complexity to classificatory schemes that propose exclusive 
categories. Examining cyber-crime classifications (Wall, 2005), the identified 
crimes do not fit cyber-crime categories. For example, traditional crimes 
according to Wall’s (2005) model, such as the organisation of violence, often 
utilise elements of hybrid crimes, such as deception. Furthermore, crimes 
classified as true cyber-crimes in Wall’s model, such as spamming, reportedly 
occur in both networked environments (e.g. social media) and in real-world 
settings (e.g. leaflet campaigns). Meanwhile, cyber-crime frameworks do not 
encompass handset theft, which may facilitate a wide range of networked and 
traditional crimes. For example, a stolen handset may be used to commit 
financial fraud or deceive other users whose details are stored in the handset. 
Deception perpetrated through mobile phone communications may lure victims 
into vulnerable situations, where they are robbed or beaten. Recognising the 
hybrid nature of these threats across both networked and situated environments 
enhances the applicability of situational prevention methods and frameworks, 
addressed later in this chapter, and facilitates assessment of their 
interconnectivity with other forms of crime. For example, while the phenomenon 
of ‘hate-speech’ was widespread during previous election periods, it is of 
diminishing concern to users as a direct result of the preventative efforts of 
public and private sector organisations, which is perceived to have 
simultaneously reduced other types of crime, while potentially displacing hate-
speech into other communication channels.  
Recognising the hybrid nature of the crime opportunities associated with mobile 
phones, it is proposed that mobile phone-enabled crimes, hereafter termed m-
crimes, form a distinct category of crime that requires specific analysis. The 
proposal of this term is intended to provide researchers with a common 
language to address mobile-enabled crime as a distinct conceptual category. 
Defining the scope of these m-crime threats is a critical prerequisite for the 
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advancement of this emerging body of knowledge. The category of m-crime is 
therefore proposed to include any illegal or anti-social activity facilitated or 
committed using mobile telephony. Anti-social activities are included in this 
definition in recognition that many of the m-crime threats identified in this study 
are not yet subject to legal classification, but are widely perceived to represent 
anti-social activities negatively affecting the security of mobile phone users. M-
crime is distinguished from cyber-crime as it is specifically perpetrated by and 
through mobile phone networks. The proposed definition of m-crime is 
purposely inclusive of threats facilitated by, and those committed using, mobile 
telephony. Many of the types of crime identified in this study bridge virtual and 
physical settings, and the boundaries of these domains are permeable. M-
crime, according to the study findings, may be perpetrated within physical or 
digital space, or in a combination of the two. Furthermore, m-crime may include 
both traditional crimes and digital crimes, or a combination of these. The key 
characteristic that differentiates m-crime from other types of crime is the central 
function of mobile telephones in creating the structures of opportunity for crime. 
For example, a crime committed in physical space, such as a robbery, but 
organised using mobile phone networks, is herein classified as an m-crime. The 
theft of a mobile handset may facilitate m-crime when the stolen handset is then 
used for other types of crime, for example the organisation of violence. 
However, handset theft is not categorised as an m-crime. 
Table 15 below provides a categorisation of the identified threats, identifies the 
crime targets and outlines associated threats.  
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Table 15: Categorising crime threats, targets and associated crime threats related to mobile phones in developing world settings 
Threat Target Associated threats 
 
Handset 
theft  
 
 Handset 
 Owner 
 Data 
 Financial 
 
 
 Robbery of mobile phone owners. 
 Burglary of owners’ homes. 
 Facilitates other networked crime, e.g. coordination of violence, deception, fraud, etc. 
 Facilitates theft of data stored within the handset, including contact details of other users, stored 
documents, passwords etc. 
 Facilitates access to financial assets through m-banking.  
 Sharing practices increase the vulnerability of data stored in mobile handsets. 
 Facilitates deception and the assumption of false identities that in turn facilitate the commission of 
other types of crime (see below). 
 
 
M-violence 
 
 User 
 Community 
 
 Organisation of violence and disorder. 
 Coordination of organised crime, civil conflict and terrorism. 
 Hate-speech associated with feelings of fear and anxiety: psychological impacts for recipient. 
 ‘Broken windows’: generalised manifestations of disorder provoke more crime. 
 
 
M-theft 
 
 Data 
 User 
 
 M-banking results in the storage of financial assets vulnerable to fraud and scams. 
 M-banking transactions facilitate rapid financial transfers. 
 Cross border transactions in which financial assets are physically moved from. one network to 
another may introduce additional opportunities for crime 
 
 
M-
deception 
 
 User 
 Community 
 
 Users may be manipulated into situations conducive for the commission of other types of crime. 
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The categories of m-violence, m-theft and m-deception proposed in this 
framework cannot be regarded as exclusive or bounded, but rather provide a 
basic scheme for the analysis of the identified threats. Each of these categories 
of m-crime threat are summarised below. 
7.5.1 Handset theft 
Handset theft is not classifiable as an m-crime threat, as it is a traditional crime 
committed in physical settings. However, it is widely recognised by participants 
to facilitate the commission of a range of m-crimes, discussed subsequently. 
Handset theft has already been discussed in depth in this chapter, for example 
in Section 7.3. 
7.5.2 M-violence 
The term m-violence is proposed to categorise m-crimes that facilitate or enable 
users to commit violence. This broadly includes communications classified as 
‘hate-speech’, which include a range of anti-social and criminal activities 
ranging from insults and threats to extortions to violence. Past studies have 
described the widespread circulation of threatening messages, hate-speech, 
and incitements to violence through radio broadcasts and mobile phone 
networks, particularly during election periods in Kenya (CIPEV, 2008; Dercon & 
Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; KNCHR, 2006; Osborn, 
2008). However, in this study the dissemination of threats and incitements to 
violence was no longer widespread according to study participants. However, a 
number of challenges were experienced that precluded the rigorous analysis of 
hate-speech dissemination and receipt during the fieldwork period prior to the 
2013 Presidential election, which are addressed in 7.7.  
M-violence is also used to categorise the organisation of violence that is widely 
reported to occur through mobile phone networks. Hate-speech may be 
interpreted as a manifestation of bullying facilitated by mobile networked-
communications, albeit a manifestation with potentially deadly consequences 
when implicated in outbreaks of violence as has been the case in Kenya. The 
transmission of false and misleading information may also be interpreted 
through the lens of psychological harm, but is nevertheless classified here as 
m-deception. These threats are likely to have distinct characteristics in 
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developing world settings (see 7.4) that require further investigation by future 
studies.  
The organisation of violence is a related category of crimes associated with 
mobile phones, and participants described the use of mobile phones for the 
coordination of insurgency by rebel militias in DRC and for the coordination of 
ethno-political violence in Kenya. M-violence may be used to classify crimes 
associated with social unrest, and these functions may be particularly important 
in contexts of information scarcity. These crimes were primarily committed in 
combination with elements of cyber-deception and theft. 
7.5.3 M-theft  
Crimes categorised as m-theft include a range of financial scams, to which 
participants in Uganda described widespread victimisation. These include 
sending money in the hope of accessing ‘prizes’, sending financial support to 
thieves posing as family members, and being manipulated into meeting 
fraudsters in nearby towns.  
Many crimes involving m-theft these are closely related to the category of m-
deception. For example, some cases categorised as m-deception were 
associated with theft and direct physical violence. Specifically, mobile users in 
Kyangwali settlement described being lured into vulnerable locations under the 
guise of collecting prizes, and subsequently being beaten and robbed of mobile 
handsets and other valuables. In this context, mobile telephony served as a 
mechanism for manipulating victims into physically vulnerable conditions to 
facilitate handset theft and other acquisitive and violent crimes.  
M-theft may occur as a consequence of, or a motivation for, handset theft. For 
example, the theft of data stored within the handset, which may facilitate access 
to m-banking services but also information such as users’ social networks, 
stored documents and photographs. Practices of handset sharing also 
compound the threat of m-theft. Several comments regarding ‘disappearing’ 
mobile credit may reflect examples of hacking, and sharing also informs the 
risks associated with data theft (see 7.4.4), which could also be analysed as m-
theft.  
275 
 
7.5.4 M-deception  
Threats classified as m-deception comprise a wide range of threats that entail 
components of deception. Analysis of the study findings suggests that mobile 
phones were perceived to provide a mechanism through which false information 
is widely disseminated. In Uganda, this commonly included intentional 
misinformation about the death of family members (see Section 6.3.3.3). In 
Kenya, FGD participants and interviewees described widespread dissemination 
of false rumours, for example about nearby massacres, which recipients 
interpreted as intending to escalate tensions and incite violent responses and 
counter-attacks from recipients during the 2007-8 election period (See section 
5.3.2.1). Study participants in Kenya and Uganda describe the widespread 
transmission of false information and the use of false identities using mobile 
phones. These include financial scams (categorised as m-theft) intended to 
extract resources from mobile users, and even their families and wider 
communities, and also the transmission of false information widely described as 
‘mischief’ which may also encompass components of m-violence and m-theft. 
7.6 The prevention of handset theft and m-crime in developing world 
settings 
In the previous sections of this chapter, specific crime-inhibiting and crime-
facilitating opportunities associated with mobile phones in developing world 
settings have been identified. Social, cultural and situational conditions 
informing these opportunities have been examined, and crime threats 
categorised. The present section explores the application of the effort, risk, 
reward model and the 25 SCP techniques (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) to 
examine existing crime prevention techniques, and to identify suitable new 
techniques to prevent handset theft and the use of mobile phones as crime 
facilitators in developing world settings.  The applicability of the opportunity 
reducing techniques characterising IN SAFE HANDS (Whitehead et al., 2008) 
are also examined in relation to the prevention of handset theft. 
Having previously used SCP to analyse the ways in which mobile phones 
contribute to the inhibition of crime, it is here applied to identify mechanisms 
that may inhibit m-crime. These preventative mechanisms aim to address the 
theft of handsets (mobile phones as crime targets) and m-crime (mobile phones 
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as crime facilitators) affecting mobile phone owners, users and their 
communities in developing world settings.  
7.6.1 Situational prevention of handset theft in developing world settings 
A range of preventative mechanisms designed to reduce opportunities for 
mobile handset theft were addressed in Chapter Three. In the present section, 
the focus concerns specific techniques which may be appropriate in developing 
world settings, with reference to the identified social, cultural and situational 
conditions informing crime opportunities. Table 16 (below) outlines the 
techniques which may be applied to reduce handset theft in developing world 
settings, according to the findings of this study. 
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Table 16: Preliminary application of the 25 techniques to reduce opportunities for handset theft in developing world settings 
Increase perceived effort Increase perceived risks Reduce anticipated 
rewards 
Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
Target harden 
- Increase security of public 
spaces e.g. street lighting 
(Cornish & Clarke 2003) 
- Increase security of 
individual homes e.g. install 
secure storage areas in 
dwellings, door and window 
locks (Cornish & Clarke 
2003) 
- use of lanyards to secure 
handset to user 
(Whitehead et al., 2008) 
 
Conceal targets 
- use of lanyards beneath 
clothing 
(Whitehead et al., 2008) 
-discourage conspicuous 
display of handsets 
(Whitehead et al., 2008) 
- Promote safe pockets 
(Whitehead et al., 2008) 
Reduce anonymity 
- Track lost and stolen 
mobiles (Whitehead et al., 
2008) 
Identify property 
- Handset marking 
(DiLondardo & Clarke, 
1986; Farrell, 2015) 
- Component marking 
(Kaplankiran et al., 2008) 
- Encourage users to 
register IMEI numbers 
(Farrell, 2015) 
 
Disrupt markets 
- Regulate markets (Sutton 
& Simmonds, 2004) 
- Encourage vendors to  
register handsets’ IMEI 
numbers where possible 
(Farrell, 2015) 
 
Deny benefits 
- Blacklist stolen handsets 
(Mailley, et al., 2006; 
Mailley, 2011) 
- Remote locking and 
airtime recovery (Farrell, 
2015) 
- PIN or password protect 
handsets (Farrell, 2015) 
 
Neutralise peer pressure 
- PeaceSMS campaigns 
Post instructions  
- Clear legal frameworks 
for punishment of offenders 
- Educate the public not to 
buy stolen handsets 
(Sutton & Simmonds, 
2004) 
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Examining the techniques in table 16 in further detail, increasing the effort 
associated with the commission acquisitive crimes in spatial locations is a 
traditional crime challenge, and one that may be addressed through a range of 
place-based methods. Both the background literature and primary data 
collected from the two case studies reveal mechanisms that are currently 
employed by mobile users and public and private agencies to increase the effort 
associated with mobile handset theft. These primarily comprise physical 
measures designed to harden particular targets and deflect known offenders. 
Target hardening measures aim to introduce physical barriers to increase the 
effort associated with accessing a particular crime target, and are particularly 
applicable to preventing mobile handset theft in developing world conditions. 
For example, in Uganda mobile phone owners widely employed the simple, low-
cost security measure of using lanyards. Lanyards were observed to be used in 
two ways. Some wearers displayed their mobile phone conspicuously on the 
exterior of their clothing, with mobile phones worn like an item of jewellery. 
Other mobile phone owners were observed to conceal the handset beneath 
clothing, with the lanyard securing the device to their person. This may be also 
analysed as a method of concealing targets, aiming to reduce the rewards of 
crime. Target harden may also provide an approach to effectively prevent the 
theft of data stored within mobile phone handsets, a particular issue described 
in Uganda among sharers of mobile handsets, and in Burrell’s (2010) study also 
conducted in Uganda. Encouraging or educating users on PIN or password 
protecting handsets may also potentially deny benefits or increase the effort 
associated with accessing user data on these devices, although the majority of 
mobile handsets owned and used by study participants are basic models 
without these security functions. 
The installation of secure storage areas for mobile devices within individual 
dwellings may be a further effective means to reduce handset theft from 
dwellings. However, such measures will only enhance the security of handsets 
within particular physical environments, and do not guard against handset theft 
beyond the threshold of individual homes. Furthermore, the temporary nature of 
many dwellings in rural areas of Africa may prevent the installation of secure 
storage. For example, dwellings in Kyangwali are comprised of local materials 
such as grass, mud and tarpaulins, and in the low-income areas of Nairobi and 
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Kampala the houses are built from mud bricks and sheet metal roofing. These 
materials provide easy access to criminals who may enter through walls or 
ceilings, even if doors and windows are secured. Within wider environments, 
other situational measures may be implemented to increase the effort 
associated with this acquisitive crime. For example, increasing the provision of 
street lighting may reduce the rates of robbery and handset theft (Cornish & 
Clarke 2003). No information was collected on the specific locations of handset 
thefts, however, which is an essential prerequisite for the development of such 
location-based target hardening measures. Further studies could investigate 
handset theft in developing world settings to identify specific situational 
vulnerabilities across contexts. 
Techniques which reduce the anonymity of offenders may also be effective 
ways to increase the risk associated with handset theft, such as remote tracking 
of offenders to facilitate apprehension and recovery of stolen goods. Although 
Kenyan study participants acknowledged that such techniques are theoretically 
possible, they were doubtful that police forces in Kenya would be able to access 
the necessary technology or skills to utilise such methods of crime prevention. 
SIM registration should facilitate access to information about the registered 
owners of SIM cards (although this technique will not help to identify shared 
users of SIM cards, nor SIM cards which have been re-sold) but would require 
timely and effective collaboration between MNOs and police forces to utilise this 
information to respond to reported crime, and handset theft is not likely to be 
regarded as a serious enough crime to justify the necessary use of resources. It 
is not clear whether potential offenders regard this as increasing the risk, and 
the findings from study participants are mixed.  
Several further methods were identified in Chapter Three which have been 
fruitfully applied in Western settings, and which could effectively reduce mobile 
handset theft in developing world contexts. These include handset marking and 
registration of IMEI numbers to identify property (Farrell, 2015). Encouraging 
users to register the IMEI numbers of stolen handsets may disrupt markets 
(ibid.), but only where traders are willing and able to access remote databases 
to verify the status of handsets (Sutton & Simmonds, 2004). However, 
measures proposed by Kaplankiran et al. (2008) such as calling on the police, 
vendors or potential customers to verify the IMEI against a registry of stolen 
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phone identities. In contexts where access to the internet is limited, crime 
reporting may be rare, vendors largely unregulated and awareness among 
customers low, this is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, blacklisting across 
networks would require international cooperation. Kaplankiran et al. also 
suggest random spot checks of users carrying stolen goods “to incentivize both 
sellers and customers to avoid stolen mobiles” (2008, p277). However, as 
registering IMEI numbers is a prerequisite of blacklisting, and several 
challenges have been identified which prevent this in developing world settings, 
such approaches are unlikely to be effective in these contexts. In developing 
world settings, particularly resource-poor rural areas, these are unlikely to be a 
feasible approach to crime prevention. Furthermore, little is known about the 
extent of IMEI reprogramming in developing world settings. In the UK, 
Kaplankiran et al. (2008) estimate that around 5% of handsets may be 
reprogrammed in the UK. If it is as widespread in developing world settings, 
preventing such reprogramming is a potential means for reducing handset theft. 
However, if IMEI numbers are not widely registered in developing world 
settings, reprogramming may not be a crime challenge in these settings.  
Remote locking and airtime recovery are other potential techniques which may 
reduce the rewards associated with handset theft (ibid), and would require 
involvement by MNOs. The feasibility of these approaches should be further 
investigated.  
Encouraging users to PIN or password protect handsets is a simple, non-
technical way to protect the data contained within handsets, although it may not 
prevent criminals from re-formatting and re-selling the handset. However, some 
basic handsets do not provide locking opportunities, and furthermore in contexts 
where sharing is common, passwords and PIN numbers may be known by 
several individuals, potentially reducing the effectiveness of these techniques. 
However, as advanced models become more widely available in developing 
world settings, and are used to store valuable personal data, PIN and password 
protecting handsets may be increasingly important to protect user data.   
No measures have been identified during this study to reduce provocations 
associated with handset theft. However, raising awareness of the 
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consequences and legal sanctions applicable to handset thieves may effectively 
remove excuses for this type of crime, and reduce its prevalence.  
7.6.2 Applying IN SAFE HANDS prevention strategies to mobile phone 
theft in developing world settings 
The IN SAFE HANDS characteristics are not applied to m-crime directly in this 
thesis. However, as noted, preventing handset theft may have implications for 
the reduction of m-crimes facilitated by stolen handsets. 
Applying the IN SAFE HANDS characteristics of secure designs (Whitehead et 
al., 2008) to mobile phone theft in developing world settings, the findings from 
Kenya and Uganda suggest that many of these characteristics may be 
meaningfully applied in these settings. Moreover, the primary data indicates that 
developing world users are already applying some of these techniques to 
address handset theft. Specifically, lanyards are used to secure handsets to 
users (the attached characteristic), and many users conceal devices (the hidden 
characteristic). However, the findings also show that attitudes to mobile phones 
as prestige goods leads some users to conspicuously display them, which may 
increase opportunities for theft. This suggests that encouraging concealment of 
handsets could reduce handset theft among developing world users. However, 
as the majority of developing world users use basic handsets, many of the built-
in anti-theft designs developed by the industry (automatic characteristics of 
secure designs), and options such as remote deactivation of stolen handsets 
(executable and necessary characteristics) are not widely available to these 
users. Less technical options addressing executable characteristics are also are 
proposed by Whitehead et al. (2008) such as text bombing; bombarding stole 
phones with a stream of messages which prevents normal use (Harrington & 
Mayhew, 2001). This method may be effective in developing world settings, 
although it is reliant on users’ reporting stolen handsets, and on the involvement 
of MNOs in crime prevention.  
Crime prevention options which use widely available materials, can be 
implemented at low-cost and are user-friendly and non-technical are likely to be 
more effective in developing world settings than sophisticated expensive 
solutions. For example characteristics which make mobile phones more findable 
include technical solutions such as tracking stolen handsets, and also simple 
282 
 
solutions such as calling the handset. Simply calling a stolen handset is likely to 
be a more widely available option for most users developing world settings. 
Table 17 below examines the applicability of Whitehead et al.’s (2008) 
characteristics of secure designs to mobile phones in developing world settings. 
This table includes primarily existing measures, excluding measures proposed 
by Whitehead et al. (2008) which comprise technological innovations beyond 
the scope of the present study, and which have limited relevance in resource-
poor settings among users’ with low technical capacity. 
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Table 17: Application of IN SAFE HANDS characteristics of secure design, drawing on Whitehead et al. (2008, p42) to mobile handset theft in developing world settings 
Characteristic Suggested anti-theft solutions Applicability in developing world settings 
Identifiable Products should be identifiable by their 
owner. a) Simple property marking 
b) Ultra-violet marking 
c) Microdots 
d) Unique soluble markets 
e) Identify-and-return labels 
f) Permanently personalised handset 
Simple property marking and identify-and-return labels could be effective. 
However, in resource-poor settings some options unlikely to be widely 
available, e.g. UV marking, microdots, soluble markers, etc. 
Neutral Anti-theft design features should not 
adversely affect users’ experiences 
(e.g. more difficult to use, other adverse 
consequences). 
Advisable particularly where handset owners are poorly educated, non-
literate or have low levels of technical ability. It is also important to 
research specific adverse consequences which may occur in developing 
world settings.  
Seen (to be 
protected) 
Promote deterrence by increasing 
perceived risk. 
See Section 7.6.1 and 6.3.2 for specific mechanisms of increasing risks of 
m-crime. 
Attached Spatially or electronically attach product 
to the desired location or owner. a) 
Attachment to the individual 
b) Fixed location handsets 
c) Temporary location-based fixtures 
Lanyards widely used in high risk settings e.g. Kyangwali Refugee 
Settlement.  
Where handsets are shared, encouraging users to use fixed-location 
handsets may reduce the risk of handset theft but decrease privacy for 
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d) Bespoke secure clothing and carry 
pouches 
sharers, with associated security concerns for this group. Temporary 
location based fixtures may provide an effective compromise. 
Promotion of safe pockets and wallets offers low-cost, implementable 
solution to reduce theft where tailoring of clothes is commonplace. 
Findable If lost or stolen, the product can be 
tracked or found.  
a) GSM tracking 
b) GPS tracking 
Basic handsets have no built-in tracking functionality, and smart phones 
are not widely used. Police capacity to track using GPS is limited, 
compounded by low rates of reporting. Calling stolen handsets provides a 
realistic option with limited effectiveness.  
Executable The product can be deactivated 
remotely. 
a) SIM blocking and IMEI-blacklisting of 
stolen phones 
b) Designing legislation to discourage 
reprogramming 
c) Text bombing 
SIM registration provides a range of options for remote SIM blocking. 
However, stolen handsets may not widely reported to police where 
security forces are not trusted.  Text bombing may also be ineffective in 
contexts where mobile phone users are accustomed to receiving dozens 
and even hundreds of spam messages each day. 
Hidden The product is hidden and not used 
conspicuously. 
a) Pockets or purses 
Some users conceal handsets, others conspicuously display them. 
Numerous users were observed using mobile phones in public places and 
on public transportation. 
Automatic  Protection is built-in, the default option, 
or automated.  
Built-in, automated protection e.g. PIN codes are not widely available on 
basic handsets. 
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a) Inbuilt key codes 
b) Biometrics 
 
Other expensive or technical solutions unlikely to widely available, e.g. 
biometrics. 
Necessary Information possessed by the owner is 
necessary to use the handset 
a) PIN codes, passwords 
b) Biometric identification  
Basic handsets common in developing world settings do not widely use 
PIN codes, biometric identification, etc. 
Detectable Tamper-proof design makes it obvious 
when handset is stolen 
a) Noisy bags 
 
Expensive and technical solutions, e.g. inbuilt anti-theft alarms, are 
unlikely to be accessible to most developing world users. 
Secure Protection should not be easily 
removable or hackable. 
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Whitehead et al. (2008) note the variability of their proposed design solutions, 
including both cheap, simple solutions and expensive and sophisticated ones. 
They also note that some require ‘universal’ application while others may be 
tailored to user needs on an ad hoc basis, and recognise that, “Some of the 
designs may have implications for legislation, policing, the practices of phone 
users, or for handset manufacturers or network providers” (Whitehead et al., 
2008, p 41). It is important to acknowledge the differences between the 
capacities of these stakeholders in Western and developing world settings, and 
between users’ attitudes to these different bodies which may inform their 
willingness to involve them in crime prevention. Users’ capacities are also likely 
to be informed by the social, cultural and situational conditions and contexts, 
addressed in Section 7.4. Where education and literacy rates are low, for 
example, mobile phone users cannot reasonably be expected to utilise security 
features which are provided as options in the settings of their device; automatic, 
built-in measures, or physical security techniques, are likely to be more 
appropriate. Where public trust in the intuitions of the state is low, particularly 
police and security forces, it may be anticipated that formal crime reporting to 
these agencies may be low. In such contexts, it may be more appropriate for 
MNOs (or other neutral organisations, perhaps NGOs) to collaborate with police 
and provide crime reporting services for mobile phone users, feeding this 
information back to police and formal security agencies of the state.  
7.6.3 Preventing the use of mobile phones as crime facilitators 
Examining next techniques aiming to reduce the use of mobile phones for 
facilitating crime, the majority of existing techniques identified in Kenya and 
Uganda aim to increase risks associated with m-crime. In Kenya, many of these 
are perceived to have emerged in response to the widespread transmission of 
hate-speech through mobile phone networks, although they are reported to 
have a wider diffusion of benefits effect, effectively reducing a range of m-
crimes. Other measures that aim to increase effort, reduce rewards and remove 
excuses are also examined here.  
The table below outlines the techniques which may be applied to reduce the 
use of mobile phones as crime facilitators in developing world settings. As noted 
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previously, due to the hybrid nature of these threats, the situational techniques 
identified to reduce handset theft also have relevance for reducing the use of 
mobile phones as crime facilitators. 
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Table 18: Preliminary application of the 25 techniques to reduce the use of mobile phones as crime facilitators in developing world settings 
Increase perceived effort Increase perceived risks Reduce anticipated 
rewards 
Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
Target Harden 
- Automated techniques 
such as: 
  - Phishing filters 
  - Firewalls 
 
Deflect offenders  
- Block mobile signals in 
crime hotspots (e.g. 
prisons) 
 
Control tools 
- Control access to 
handsets (e.g. in prisons) 
 
 
Extend guardianship 
- Regulation of bulk SMS 
- Remote tracking of 
offenders 
 
Assist natural 
surveillance  
- Provide informal m-crime 
reporting services 
- Reward vigilance 
- Educate users  
 
Reduce anonymity 
- Utilise caller-ID function 
- Encourage authentication 
by users  
- SIM Registration 
 
Utilise place managers 
- Encourage action by 
MNO anti-fraud teams 
 
Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
- regulation of bulk SMS 
- Monitoring systems e.g. 
keyword searches for 
violent or criminal content 
-M-crime reporting services 
Deny benefits 
- Fix identified 
vulnerabilities 
 
Neutralise peer pressure 
- Prevention of m-crime 
campaigns 
 
Set rules 
- Legal contract  for SIM 
establishing obligations of 
users 
 
Post instructions  
- Clear legal frameworks 
- encourage community 
leaders to share 
information with 
communities 
 
Alert conscience 
- Sensitisation campaigns 
about the wider impacts of 
m-crime on society 
- Publicise prosecutions of 
offenders 
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7.6.3.1 Increase the effort  
A key feature of m-crime is that it may be committed by offenders physically 
distant from the location of their victims, and mobile phone networks provide a 
low-effort, low-cost mechanism through which motivated offenders may interact 
with potential crime targets. This presents a challenge for measures that aim to 
increase the effort associated with committing m-crime. However, situational 
measures designed to deflect offenders can be implemented when the location 
of perpetrators is known. For example, in Kenya many study participants 
attributed fraudulent SMS to incarcerated convicts in local prisons. In 2011, an 
investigation conducted by mobile operator Safaricom22 substantiated this 
assumption, finding evidence that over 70% of fraudulent messages sent 
through mobile networks originate in prisons. As a consequence of this study, 
Safaricom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Kenya 
Prisons Service for the installation of signal blocking equipment in Kenyan 
prisons with the aim of reducing prisoner’s access to mobile networks. This 
mechanism was intended to prevent this body of motivated offenders from 
disseminating fraudulent and threatening calls and messages, and reducing 
their capacity to organise criminal activities in general (Karanja 2011, Okuttah 
2011). Although no reliable statistical evidence is available to substantiate the 
effectiveness of this SCP mechanism, according to study participants this 
resulted in a considerable reduction in the receipt of hate-speech, and received 
widespread public support. In this example, the introduction of a physically 
situated prevention mechanism in an identified hotspot was reported to reduce 
the perpetration of m-crimes and antisocial behaviour across mobile networks, 
creating a broad crime prevention impact.  
Similar targeted approaches reducing mobile signal coverage in crime hotspots 
have been described in previous studies. For example, the suspension of 
mobile phone networks in conflict zones (Shapiro and Weidmann, 2012; 
Vodafone, 2011) has been associated with reductions in the perpetration of 
violent attacks. However, such broad preventative mechanisms (jamming 
signals across entire communities) are simultaneously likely to reduce the 
                                            
22 Safaricom is a prominent mobile operator in Kenya 
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security benefits associated with mobile phones. Specifically, they may prevent 
mobile phone users from reporting crime or calling for assistance. Furthermore, 
the strategic use of network blackouts is generally associated with repressive 
state regimes (see Section 2.4.3), and implementing such techniques more 
widely that the controlled environment of a prison is not a feasible crime 
prevention technique in a democratic regime. Thus the identification and 
targeting of particular crime hotspots must be approached with caution in order 
to reduce the crime-facilitating opportunities provided by mobile phone without 
undermining its crime inhibiting potential, or undermining the rights of users.  
Other technical solutions such as hardening targets through implementing 
phishing filters or firewalls may be an effective measure to reduce m-crime 
threats, and have been effectively applied to reduce e-commerce crime 
(Newman & Clarke, 2003). These techniques may be effective in developing 
world settings if they are automated, but they are reliant on industry-level action 
to implement, which in turn is likely to require legislative action. Responsibility 
for implementing such prevention mechanisms is discussed in Section 7.6.4. 
Accepting that mobile phones are the tool through which m-crimes are 
facilitated, the category of control tools is relevant here, and has wider 
implications for the reduction of other forms of crime facilitated through mobile 
phones. However, mechanisms aiming to control tools, such as SIM card 
registration, simultaneously function to achieve other SCP techniques, such as 
increasing the risk associated with committing m-crime. Recognising that the 
boundaries between the preventative techniques are not fixed and mechanisms 
may be situated in more than one category, these measures are therefore 
analysed in the most relevant sections according to the mechanisms through 
which they reduce crime.   
7.6.3.2 Increase the risk 
Measure which increase the risk of mobile phone were found to be the most 
widespread, and were widely perceived to be effective at reducing crime. These 
measures correlate with SCP techniques designed to increase risk; extend 
guardianship, assist natural surveillance, reduce anonymity, utilise place 
managers and strengthen formal surveillance.  
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In the mobile network terrain, the personalised nature of communications 
precludes the application of crime prevention techniques that extend 
guardianship in the way, for example, a Neighbourhood Watch scheme may 
function to protect a physical space. However, in response to the misuse of 
mobile networks and the bulk transmission of inappropriate content, legal 
reform in Kenya now requires mobile network operators to review the content of 
bulk SMS prior to broadcasting (CCK, 2012).  According to study participants, 
this measure has garnered widespread support from the general public, and 
has increased perceptions of risk associated with the transmission of anti-social 
content. Accordingly, it may be regarded as an example of the application of the 
guardianship principle by mobile network operators; increasing the chances of 
detection, and potentially prosecution, of offenders. Remote tracking of 
offenders is also a potential technique which could be implemented by MNOs, 
but would require considerable collaboration with law enforcement authorities, 
and would also require users to report crime to police. 
M-crime reporting platforms, such as UWIANO described previously, provide 
users with m-crime reporting opportunities and may be categorised as SCP 
measures that assist natural surveillance, encouraging the vast and increasing 
body of mobile network users to report m-crime. These have already been 
discussed in terms of increasing the risk of a range of traditional crimes, such 
as organised violence, and may also be utilised to increase reporting of specific 
networked crimes. Where these warning mechanisms are associated with an 
effective response component, they may effectively increase the risk and 
thereby reduce m-crime. As noted previously, these are only likely to be 
effective in contexts where victims of crime have both the capacity and 
inclination to report crime to formal authorities. However, numerous challenges 
have been identified that may impede the effectiveness of these mechanisms, 
ranging from signal coverage and financial capacity to trust in service providers, 
as outlined in Section 7.4. 
Upon receipt of an SMS or mobile phone call, the recipient is reliant upon the 
content and alleged source of the message in order to assess its reliability or 
trustworthiness. Techniques aiming to reduce anonymity are therefore critical to 
increase the risk of detection associated with m-crime commission. Previous 
studies suggest that controlling the identity of mobile users can be an effective 
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crime prevention technique. Clarke (1990) demonstrates how the introduction of 
caller-ID reduced obscene phonecalls in New Jersey, and all mobile telephones 
include a caller-ID function. However, calls recieved from unknown numbers are 
not automatically recognised and users are able to selectively withold their 
mobile numbers, providing increased anonymity for motivated offenders. 
Encouraging users to seek authentification from message senders may also 
reduce crimes involving deception, although economic constraints on low-
income users may reduce their capacity to send outgoing messages to verify 
the identity of senders. As described previously, legislation seeking to curb the 
misuse of mobile networks has introduced the requirement to register SIM cards 
in an attempt to prevent the anonymous use of mobile networks and reduce 
mobile-enabled crime in both Kenya (IHRB, 2013) and Uganda (Uganda 
Communications Commission, 2012). The majority of survey and FGD 
participants in both case studies widely supported SIM registration, and in 
Kenya it was described as an effective mechanism for controlling the 
dissemination of hate-speech, scams, and other m-crime. In Uganda 
participants were divided in their attitudes to the effectiveness of SIM 
registration. Returning to Gow and Parisi’s (2008) and Jentzsch’s (2012) 
arguments that SIM registration is likely to be an ineffective crime prevention 
measure, these findings do not substantiate that prediction. Jentzsch predicts 
that weak identity verification procedures and the use of false or invalid identity 
documentation reduces the effectiveness of SIM registration, describing the lack 
of evidence for a relationship between mandatory registration and crime 
reduction. Although the findings of this study do not provide empirical evidence 
for the impact of registration on crime rates, they suggest that SIM registration 
is perceived by users in Kenya, and over half of users in Uganda, to be an 
effective mechanism for preventing m-crime. As a consequence of SIM 
registration, participants in Kenya describe adapting their use of mobile 
communications to avoid transmitting potentially sensitive content. They also 
describe a reduction in the volume of hate-speech and scams transmitted 
through these channels as a direct consequence of SIM registration. This 
indicates that SIM registration is perceived to increase risks associated with 
mobile misuse, contributing to its effectiveness as a crime prevention technique, 
even if the associated verification procedures are imperfect and even if it does 
not increase the risks in real terms. 
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Section 7.4.4 describes the ways in which the communal use of handsets may 
enhance opportunities for less experienced users to detect and avoid m-crime 
threats. Specifically, new mobile users rely on more experienced users to 
access warnings about fraudulent messages and scams, and the presence of a 
trusted, experienced users may reduce opportunities for crime victimisation.  
However, in contexts where the majority of people are inexperienced with 
mobile phones, sharing behaviours may function to multiply the negative 
consequences of the scam beyond the individual recipient. Recognising these 
opportunities and risks, techniques could be fruitfully developed to aid natural 
surveillance by encouraging users to share their experience through a range of 
communication forms, perhaps through community meetings, billboards, radio 
broadcasts or other awareness-raising activities.  
Mobile network operators’ anti-fraud teams may also be seen to function as 
place managers; providing a surveillance function over mobile network use. 
They may also strengthen formal surveillance by providing m-crime reporting 
services with associated response components. However, it is noteworthy that 
in the digital landscape, unlike in physical settings, any mechanisms that utilise 
surveillance are only likely to be effective crime prevention mechanisms when 
accompanied by successful awareness-raising campaigns. Unlike surveillance 
cameras or security guards, surveillance within mobile phone networks is 
invisible. Users must be aware of this surveillance in order for it to function to 
increase the perceived risk of detection. 
7.6.3.3 Reduce the rewards and provocations  
This study does not identify a wide range of techniques that could effectively 
reduce the rewards or the provocations associated with m-crime. In part, this is 
due to the focus of the study that does not address offender motivations, nor 
are offenders included in the study sample. More information is needed about 
the rewards associated with m-crime, and further study would be needed to 
investigate these rewards and the motivations of offenders. However, 
processes which deny benefits, for example fixing identified vulnerabilities, may 
be effective at reducing the rewards of m-crime. It may be hypothesised, based 
on the insights provided by victims of crime, that offenders may be motivated by 
greed or grievance. If this is the case, reducing the financial benefits may be an 
effective strategy to reduce some types of crime. Crime motivated by grievance 
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is likely to be more complex, however. Campaigns aiming to neutralise peer 
pressure, such as PeaceSMS campaigns, may reduce some types of 
networked crime, although limited data are available evaluating their 
effectiveness.  
7.6.3.4 Remove excuses  
The fifth category of situational techniques addresses the guilt and shame 
associated with criminal behaviour, aiming to remove the excuses made by 
offenders to ‘neutralise’ their actions (Clarke & Homel, 1997). This provides a 
useful framework for understanding some of the preventative action that has 
been taken in Kenya to address the dissemination of hate-speech through 
mobile phone networks. Legal frameworks defining and prohibiting hate-speech 
have been developed that set out rules of behaviour for users, and the study 
data suggests that these have been widely and effectively advertised and 
adhered to in Kenya.  
Operator service contracts also provide legal guidance for mobile users, and 
users are required to submit their personal information and sign an agreement 
prior to obtaining a SIM card. These preventative actions correspond with the 
set rules and post instructions categories of SCP techniques. In both Kenya and 
Uganda, users of SIM cards (in mobile phones and other electronic devices) 
must complete and sign a registration form for each active SIM card, provide a 
passport photograph and personal identification, and must acknowledge their 
acceptance of terms and conditions that include a provision for the termination 
of services and the submission of personal data to law enforcement authorities 
if the SIM card is used for unlawful or fraudulent activities. Ensuring that mobile 
users are aware of their legal and social obligations to communicate responsibly 
and avoid transmitting anti-social, pro-violence and other criminal content was 
perceived be study participants to be an effective crime prevention strategy, 
particularly in Kenya. However, study participants noted that SIM cards can also 
be bought from street vendors, who are reported to buy SIM cards in bulk for 
resale. SIM registration has now been widely implemented across Africa 
(Donovan & Martin, 2014), and may potentially reduce both national and 
transnational crime associated with mobile phones. 
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Furthermore, another an effective means to leverage this mechanism may be 
through community-level guardianship. Recognising the communal information-
sharing prevalent among displaced populations in Uganda in particular, 
community leaders may be suited to fulfil the function of capable guardians to 
protect users within mobile networks. In both Kenya and Uganda, the data 
suggest that religious leaders are trusted sources of information. Seeding 
information, such as warnings about particular scams, or advice about 
registering handset IMEI numbers, with such selected community-level 
guardians could provide an effective strategy to reduce m-crime victimisation, 
corresponding with the utilise place managers and post instructions categories 
of crime prevention techniques. Involving these respected leaders in wider 
preventative strategies may also increase the perceived risks associated with 
the perpetration of m-crime, reflecting traditional mechanisms for the 
maintenance of order. 
Although a widespread sensitisation campaign seems to have effectively raised 
awareness that transmitting hate-speech through mobile phone networks is a 
crime, study participants in Kenya expressed confusion about the precise 
definition of hate-speech. The data suggest that terminological ambiguities in 
the definition of specific illegal content encourages caution and self-restraint in 
mobile users.  In the absence of legal clarity and a precise definition of hate-
speech, some mobile users reported self-censoring their message content in 
order to ensure adherence to the law.  Furthermore, the FGD data reveals 
differences in attitudes to acceptable and unacceptable content for mobile 
phone communications. In particular, the categorical slippage between hate-
speech and humour may reduce the effectiveness of intended mechanisms to 
remove excuses. However, high-profile prosecutions of people accused of 
spreading hate-speech were cited as justifications for users to ‘take care’ in 
their communications, and can be analysed as examples of the alert conscience 
technique. 
In Ghana, Burrell (2008; 2011) notes that scamming by Internet users is re-
framed as a strategy of self-preservation or self-sufficiency, creating moral 
justifications for their actions. In contexts where tribal loyalties and ethnic 
affiliations create strong bonds, mobile-enabled crimes targeting member of 
other groups may seem morally justifiable by their perpetrators. Future studies 
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could fruitfully investigate the processes of moral justification applied to scams 
both perpetrated by, and targeting, developing world users. This could be 
particularly relevant to inform the development of further preventative 
techniques which aim to remove excuses for crime.  
Participants in the study also reported that community members increasingly 
use alternative communication channels to transmit potentially sensitive 
content, in response to the lack of clarity in what constitutes illegal content. 
Participants also acknowledged changing their own political communication 
strategies in response to the new legal frameworks prohibiting hate-speech 
through mobile networks, shifting transmissions of potentially sensitive 
information onto other more anonymous channels including personal 
conversations, group meetings, online platforms and leaflet campaigns, as 
described by several Kenyan study participants. This suggests that post 
instructions is an effective technique for encouraging appropriate user 
behaviour but that clarify and shared understanding of the boundaries of 
acceptable and unacceptable content are critical to prevent unintended 
displacement or adaptation by users concerned to ensure adherence to the law. 
This may be analysed as an example of displacement (Guerette & Bowers, 
2009) or adaptive behaviours (Ekblom, 1999).  
7.6.3.5 Displacement and adaptation 
It is worth noting that although participants expressed support for several of the 
techniques implemented to address hate-speech and m-crime threats, such as 
SIM registration and the surveillance of mobile communications, these 
strategies are nevertheless associated with catalysing broader shifts in political 
communications. The shift from the widespread transmission of hate-speech in 
mobile terrains to other communication mechanisms such as leaflet campaigns 
and online platforms may represent the displacement of m-crime and anti-social 
behaviour, and potentially political communications in general, away from the 
increasingly regulated virtual terrain of mobile networks into less regulated 
communication mechanisms. Within crime science, displacement is defined as 
“the relocation of a crime from one place, time, target, offense, tactic or offender 
to another as a result of some crime-prevention initiative" (Guerette & Bowers, 
2009, p. 1333). The relocation of potentially sensitive communications away 
from a regulated channel to unregulated channels may be interpreted as a 
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result of SIM registration and the perceived surveillance of mobile 
communications lends support to this analysis as a process of displacement, or 
may be analysed as a mechanism of adaptation to the changing dynamics of 
risk associated with use of mobile phones for the commission of crime (Ekblom, 
1999). Measures implemented to address hate-speech in Kenya, for example, 
were perceived to reduce mobile crime threats more broadly. This may 
represent an example of diffusion of benefits, supporting the argument 
proposed by Guerette and Bowers (2009) that diffusion of benefits is a more 
likely consequence of SCP initiatives than crime displacement. In this case, 
preventative measure implemented to address hate-speech have unintended 
consequence for the prevention of other types of crime. Further research is 
needed to examine the consequences of SIM registration and other mobile 
crime prevention initiatives, for which these findings may offer a valuable 
starting point. 
7.6.4 Responsibilities and capacities for preventing crime associated with 
mobile phones in developing world settings 
It is not a specific aim of this study to investigate the organisations and 
agencies responsible for the prevention of mobile phone related crime in 
developing world settings. However, in recognition of the implications of the 
study findings concerning the social, cultural and situational conditions in which 
it occurs, particularly those concerning attitudes to the state, some initial 
reflections are included here. 
In Europe, the police have become increasingly involved in the prevention of 
mobile phone thefts, for example by blacklisting stolen mobile phones (Mailley 
et al., 2006). According to the study findings, mobile users in Kenya have low 
expectations of police capacity to prevent mobile phone-related crime, and in 
Uganda participants did not identify any examples of police involvement in the 
prevention of recovery of handsets or other stolen assets associated with 
mobile phones. Identifying solutions which handset owners and users 
themselves can implement, and which take account of the differences between 
and within these groups, are likely to be the most effective in settings where 
users prefer to rely on themselves and their social networks than on formal 
authorities and prevention agencies. As trust in MNOs was also found to be 
high, market-based incentives (Farrell, 2015; Grabosky & Smith, 2009; Mailley, 
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2011; Roman & Farrell, 2002) may also be effective ways to stimulate crime 
prevention in these settings. Finally, none of the solutions emerging in Western 
settings involve collaboration with NGOs or humanitarian organisations. In 
developing world settings, the study findings suggest that the development and 
humanitarian sector may be important stakeholders in crime prevention 
initiatives, and thus their engagement is likely to enhance the effectiveness of 
further preventative measures in contexts where the capacity of the state, and 
trust in the state, is low (see Section 7.4.6).  
Returning to the analysis of crime associated with mobile phone networks as 
pollution (Farrell and Roman, 2006; Roman and Farrell, 2002; Newman, 2011) 
may be helpful here. Effective regulation is an essential component of crime 
prevention, and as long as the costs of crime are paid by individual users, there 
may be limited incentives for MNOs to take action to prevent them. Increasing 
the knowledge base on the threats associated with mobile phones in developing 
world settings is a crucial foundation for the development of techniques to 
prevent crime facilitated by mobile phones. Furthermore, Farrell (2015) 
acknowledges that challenges associated with detecting and preventing mobile 
enabled crimes are compounded by the globalised nature of mobile phone 
communications. Where mobile-enabled crimes are transnational and span 
multiple regulatory terrains, multinational MNOs may be better placed to 
implement effective regulation than individual states. The involvement of MNOs 
in preventing crime facilitated by mobile phones is also likely to be particularly 
critical in recognition of the mistrust in state security forces expressed by study 
participants. Further research will be needed to investigate responsibilities for 
the prevention of crime associated with mobile phones in developing world 
contexts. The reflections provided here may provide some initial direction for 
future studies.  
7.7 Researching crime across cultures 
This section of the thesis critically reflects upon the challenges and 
opportunities associated with researching crime in developing world settings. 
These reflections are based on the observations and field notes of the 
researcher, analysis of interviews with local survey administrators, and FGD 
and questionnaire data related to the methodology of the study. The interviews 
conducted with survey administrators subsequent to the data collection 
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(appendix 5) provide particularly valuable perspectives on the methodological 
challenges. Although the findings support the applicability of opportunity 
theories of crime in developing world settings, is important to recognise and 
acknowledge the limitations in scope and reliability of these data and suggest 
further methods through which this topic may be investigated in future.  
7.7.1 Data collection and adaptability in resource-poor settings 
The primary data informing this thesis were collected in developing world 
settings characterised by complex logistical and cultural conditions. Inevitably, a 
number of obstacles were experienced during this data collection process, 
particularly in the challenging environment of Kyangwali refugee settlement in 
Uganda. This was an unconventional context for the collection of primary data 
about crime, and some of the basic pre-conditions for the use of traditional data 
collection tools were not met.  
Conducting fieldwork in crisis-affected, developing world contexts is inherently 
challenging. For the individual researcher working alone in an unknown country, 
even the completion of everyday activities can be affected by unanticipated 
complications. Detailed advance planning is impeded by the paucity of 
information about available resources and conditions in the field prior to arrival, 
and upon arrival conditions evolve according to factors beyond the control of the 
researcher. During independent academic fieldwork in resource-poor settings, 
practices of data collection are therefore unlikely to proceed entirely according 
to plan. The collection of data for this study was no exception, and was 
characterised by both challenges and opportunities. In light of the particular 
fieldwork conditions of this study, a critical consideration during the collection of 
the primary data for this study was adaptability. The unpredictable and evolving 
circumstances in which the primary data were collected required a commitment 
to adaptability, and the adoption of a flexible research design that enabled the 
methodological tools to unfold and evolve as the research was conducted, 
facilitating an iterative process of data collection, reflection and refinement. The 
conventional tools and methods chosen for the study comprising interviews, 
surveys and FGDs, were necessarily revised according to the conditions in 
which they were implemented. Adapting to emerging challenges, and 
embracing novel opportunities, proved essential to the conduct of this fieldwork.  
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Reflecting first on the logistical challenges associated with collecting survey 
data in the selected fieldwork sites, numerous unforeseen complications 
emerged. Photocopying the survey tool is a pertinent example of this. A 
deceptively simple task easily achieved in most conventional settings, it soon 
became apparent that the office equipment available privately in both Kenya 
and Uganda is old, slow and prone to jamming. In Nairobi and Kampala, the 
task of photocopying several hundred pages was further hampered by frequent 
power cuts affecting entire city districts and lasting several hours apiece. In 
Kyangwali refugee settlement, and in the surrounding towns, neither 
photocopiers nor general office supplies were available. Locating copy shops in 
advance with onsite generators, and allocating a half-day period to this task, 
proved key. While some administrative challenges were anticipated, in practice 
these became unexpectedly frustrating and time-consuming, introducing 
unforeseen delays into the planned schedule.  
Other logistical challenges concerned timing the survey administration. For 
safety reasons the surveys were administered during daylight hours, although 
the equatorial locations of the case studies provided a shorter window of 
opportunity than would have been available in the UK. Poor weather conditions 
including torrential rainstorms further reduced the survey administration 
opportunities, despite conducting the fieldwork during dry season. Although 
these conditions added challenges to the data collection, the questionnaire data 
were nevertheless successfully collected in all planned fieldwork sites.  
Conducting the planned FGDs also proved logistically challenging, particularly 
in Kyangwali settlement. It was incorrectly assumed that an enclosed, private 
space in which to conduct FGDs would be available to hire. Upon arrival in the 
target villages in Kyangwali settlement, it became clear that no such spaces 
exist. Dwellings are small, impermanent, and unsuitable for research purposes, 
and group meetings are conducted in public marketplaces. Ultimately it was 
only possible to conduct one of the FGDs in an enclosed space in Kyangwali: a 
church in Kisonga, the most long-established village in the settlement. Two 
other FGDs were hosted in open, public settings that were not suited to the 
focus group method, necessitating methodological improvisation to account for 
these different conditions.  
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The duration of the fieldwork provided sufficient time to recruit and train local 
survey administrators, gain access to study participants, and administer the 
surveys. However, the brief duration of these trips did not provide sufficient 
opportunity to acclimatise to these environments, learn about local 
interpretations of mobile phones and crime, attitudes to police, the state and 
other authorities, attitudes to data collection, culturally patterned norms of 
behaviour, or local power dynamics. All of these factors influenced the quality 
and relevance of the data collected, and in particular the survey instruments. 
During the FGDs and interviews it was possible (and indeed necessary) to 
iteratively adapt the methodology according to local environmental and social 
conditions. The survey instrument, however, was developed and printed prior to 
administration, and once formalised it was not amenable to adaptation. 
Moreover, despite daily review and ongoing coding of the questionnaires, many 
of the weaknesses of these data did not emerge until the dataset was complete, 
by which point the researcher had returned to the UK and opportunities for 
further data collection were limited. This could have been mitigated by the 
allocation of more time to the planning and design of the survey in each of the 
target countries, enabling the terminology, question and answer formats, and 
structure to be more carefully tailored to local social and cultural conditions. It is 
also conceivable that the survey is simply an inadequate data collection tool for 
research of this kind in developing world settings, and should be replaced with a 
more appropriate instruments. 
7.7.2 Research methods in non-Western contexts 
In Western countries, questionnaires and interviews are a popular and familiar 
approach to data collection, despite their acknowledged limitations (see Chapter 
Four). We are accustomed to receiving requests to participate in surveys. 
Market researchers frequently conduct surveys in public spaces, students are 
required to collect survey data for assignments across a wide range of 
disciplines, and colleagues and friends may even use informal online surveys to 
arrange activities and events.  
However, in resource poor environments, surveys may be interpreted through 
different cultural lenses. Moreover, in non-Western settings, populations may be 
less familiar with these tools. Attitudes to strangers seeking to elicit, and record, 
information may be informed by different expectations and underlying 
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assumptions about the motivations of the researcher and the implications of 
participation. These factors may inform decisions to participate, or affect the 
reliability of data provided. Examples of both may be found in the data collected 
for this study. For example, during interviews local survey administrators in both 
Kenya and Uganda described observing systematic non-participation of 
particular ethnic groups. For example, in one survey administer in Uganda 
commented, 
…it was challenging. (Sudanese) People were very suspicious 
of me, they didn’t want to give me their information… they didn’t 
trust me, or trust what I was doing. People were not willing to 
give me some information. 
Reflecting further he explained that, “they didn’t want me to have the power”. 
Similar challenges are described in other studies. In fieldwork conducted on 
refugee livelihoods in Kampala, Nakivale, and Kyangwali refugee settlement, 
Omata and Kaplan (2013) observe similar patterns of non-participation among 
Eritreans, while Grabska (2006) describes challenges accessing Sudanese 
migrants in Cairo. In Kampala, Omata notes that,  
…the most daunting challenge during the mission was access 
to refugees, especially Eritreans and Rwandans who were 
extremely cautious about talking to 'strangers' …Even when 
they accepted to be interviewed, they were apparently reluctant 
to reveal detailed information about themselves. (Omata, 2012, 
p. 5)  
Findings from Kenya also shed light on the impact of inter-personal 
relationships between administrators and participants. Administrators reflected 
in particular on the impact of their ethnicity on people’s willingness to 
participate, and the candour with which they provided responses. One 
enumerator described participants’ changing demeanour subsequent to the 
disclosure of personal information, 
In Eldoret there were three or four people who asked my 
second name, which I think was not usual …But they really 
pushed it, for me to give my, to give them my second name. 
Which, after I did, they were like “oh, so you are a Luo” which 
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means from the other tribe, and I was like “yes” then … I think 
when answering my questions they were a bit careful on what 
they were saying.  
The relationship between ethnicity and participation was also mentioned during 
the interviews with survey administrators in Uganda. One administrator 
collecting data in a Congolese suburb of Kampala described the hospitality of 
the residents, revealing that they had provided both a translator and a traditional 
Congolese lunch. She explained, 
I needed a translator into Lingala so I found one and people 
were very kind. They made Congolese food for lunch, I ate with 
them… because I am Congolese, half Congolese, so they want 
to help me. 
This administrator reported a response rate of 100%, compared to a 40% 
response rate recorded by the administrator collecting data in a Sudanese 
suburb of Kampala. It may be postulated that ethnic or political identification 
with study participants increases access to these populations, and may inform 
the reliability of responses provided. These speculations cannot be verified or 
quantitated as no specific data are available on characteristics of non-
participants in this study. Researchers must be aware of these distinct sources 
of bias, and overcome them where possible through awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, these local conditions. However, examining the survey data in 
isolation, or relying on the aggregated response rates, may obscure these 
potential sources of bias.  
In addition to differences in participation, reflections on the fieldwork and 
analyses of the interviews with survey administrators also reveal differences in 
the openness with which participants responded to questions and participated in 
group discussions. Examining participants’ informal comments and non-verbal 
responses is particularly useful to contextualise the data and identify limitations 
in their reliability. In Kenya, administrators expressed reservations regarding the 
candour of some survey responses. For example one administrator reflected, 
“people were friendly but you can say in some cases there were reservations”. 
Describing their impressions of participants’ responses, they identified 
differences in the demeanour and body language of participants of different 
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ethnicities and in different locations. One survey administrators reflected on 
differences in participation between data collection locations, noting, 
…upcountry you could tell somebody really was not willing to 
give their information, but in Nairobi people were more willing. 
In some places that could be considered hotspots for the 
violence like in Eldoret, some people were really reserved.  
This administrator described his impression that particular survey questions 
were associated with participants’ reluctance commenting, “for (questions 
about) the tribe23, they are telling you “please, let’s skip that” and political 
affiliations they are telling you “let’s skip that”.” He also reflected that the 
previous experience of violence may have contributed to this reluctance, 
despite acknowledging the frequent emergence of similar topics during informal 
conversations, 
…when I came to talk to different parties later in the evening 
they are telling me there are still some reservations from people 
in the area because of the violence the last time, so people 
were unwilling to disclose that information because maybe of 
their fear of what could be happening… 
Thus specific local experiences may inform or bias data collected, even within 
the same country context. Recognising regional differences in participants’ 
engagement encourages reflection on the data reliability. For example, survey 
administrators speculated that study participants chose whether to participate or 
respond truthfully according to their assessment of the ethnic identity or political 
affiliation of the administrator. Recognising that bias in survey data is inevitable 
in Western and non-Western settings alike, these examples also invite reflection 
on the survey method, and its appropriateness for collecting data in such 
heterogeneous environments.  
Conducting post- data collection interviews in a one-to-one, informal setting 
provided a valuable opportunity to collect meta-data on the processes of data 
collection, revealing errors and inconsistencies otherwise obscured, and 
facilitating deeper reflections on the informal comments, body language, and 
                                            
23 Termed ‘ethnicity’ in the survey instrument. 
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demeanour of study participants otherwise obscured. For a Western researcher, 
interpreting and analysing non-verbal cues and behavioural signals in such 
different cultural contexts is extremely problematic. Body language appearing to 
show support for a statement may in fact reflect disagreement or doubt, and 
cultural norms may prevent the direct expression of personal beliefs and 
opinions about information given by some high-status group members. 
Facilitating and recoding these FGD discussions was extremely challenging, 
and it is highly likely that many of the nuances of the group dynamics were 
missed. Working with local research assistants can mitigate certain errors and 
forms of bias, but simultaneously introduce others. 
Despite the challenges, FGDs are particularly useful to observe (to some 
extent) group dynamics and explore communal experiences in developing world 
contexts. For example, the FGD data add depth to the survey findings, 
illuminating communal experiences of m-crime. FGD participants identified 
multiple victims of individual scams, and demonstrated distinctly different 
attitudes to the communal uses of mobile phones compared to those expressed 
individually in survey responses. Adapting the traditional FGD approach in 
response to local conditions, power dynamics and logistical constraints was 
essential to access these community-level vulnerabilities and to explore the 
ways in which patterns of shared use and information sharing inform the 
relationship between mobile telephony and crime in these contexts. Thus, 
although the facilitation of conventional FGDs proved challenging in the 
selected settings, they nevertheless provided valuable data to inform theory 
building for this study.  
7.7.3 Recording responses as a source of bias 
Digital recording of interviews is a common technique employed to facilitate 
subsequent transcription and rigorous data analysis in Western settings. 
However, in both the Kenya and Uganda case studies, the use of recording 
devices was not regarded by participants as a neutral data collection aide. 
Rather, these tools aroused suspicion with some interviewees, and transformed 
the nature of the interview for others; prompting them to adopt a presentation-
style address (see Appendix 8). After completing their speech, interview 
participants in Kenya signalled for the recording device to be deactivated, and 
were unwilling to answer questions or maintain informal conversations whilst 
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recording was underway. This resulted in interview data of limited value for the 
research purposes. Accordingly, it proved most appropriate to record the 
content of interviews through traditional note-taking, recognising that this 
prevents subsequent transcription and detailed content analysis.  
Similar challenges were noted during the survey, the format of which proved 
problematic for some participants. In the case of surveys, challenges also arose 
around recording data. As one administrator in Kampala noted, “they all wanted 
to fill it themselves”. This administrator inferred that this reduced the 
participation rate among literate Sudanese in particular. He explained, “I did 
them all (completed the surveys), you can see it. But I had less people because 
of that.” Another administrator described similar experiences,  
They really didn’t want, like, they wanted to do the 
questionnaire …. they said ‘we can take it and do it and bring it 
back’ but I said no, it is for me to do it with you…they felt like I 
was saying they were not well educated, could not read the 
questions without assistance. But I assured them it was the 
same for everyone, it was this type of questionnaire. They are 
not used to this, so they didn’t like it. 
Self-completion surveys were rejected as a method due to the anticipated high 
rates of illiteracy among study participants. However according to these 
administrators, this chosen method was perceived as patronising or 
disempowering by literate participants. Despite this potential weakness, the 
chosen method facilitated access to a wider range of participants than a self-
completion survey, including non-literate participants and non-English speakers. 
Nevertheless, these reflections provide insights into unanticipated challenges 
associated with recording primary data from research participants in non-
Western settings. 
7.7.4 Generalising from the study sample  
As described in Chapter Four, the survey was administered using convenience 
sampling, inviting the participation of every 6th passer-by. Recognising that this 
non-probabilistic strategy inevitably influenced the constitution of the sample, 
the local conditions precluded random sampling due to the absence of reliable 
population data or a comprehensive sampling frame. Convenience sampling 
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was nevertheless effective in urban settings across Kenya and in Kampala, with 
high response rates recorded. However, in rural Kyangwali, context-specific 
challenges emerged. In particular, the selection of suitable locations for the data 
collection was predicated on a set of assumptions about their accessibility. 
Sampling rural populations based on pragmatic, logistical considerations has 
been described as an enduring ‘roadside bias’ by Chambers (2008), which 
systematically biases data collection in developing world settings towards more 
accessible areas. Accordingly, urban populations and residents of towns and 
villages situated along major roads are more often sampled than those in 
remote rural areas. Although the study aimed to sample rural residents, 
particularly in Kyangwali, accessing urban towns and cities proved more 
straightforward and urban residents comprise the majority of the survey sample. 
In advance, from the remote vantage point of the university, the rural sampling 
strategy appeared feasible. Both logistical information available online and 
provided by organisations within Kyangwali settlement indicated that the 
selected villages were accessible by road, and distances appeared feasible. 
Upon arrival, however, it became clear that although the main gate was 
accessible by car, an all-terrain vehicle was required for travel within the 
settlement and none were available to rent nearby. Accordingly, villages that 
afforded vehicular access with relatively well-maintained roads were selected 
for inclusion in the study, reflecting an unintentional concession to Chamber’s 
(2008) ‘roadside bias’. Given the time constraints of the fieldwork, this strategy 
proved effective and enabled the collection of survey and FGD data from three 
villages within the settlement, although it inevitably reduced the representation 
of villagers living in more remote and inaccessible locations; potentially those 
most reliant on mobile telephony. 
A related sampling issue concerns the survey response rates. It is widely 
recognised that response rates in the developed world have been declining for 
decades (Bradburn, et al., 2004; Porter, et al., 2004), attributed largely to 
‘survey fatigue’ (Sharp & Frankel, 1983) and over reliance on student 
respondents (Porter, et al., 2004). It was anticipated that response rates for this 
study would be similar to those reported by other researchers, particularly those 
in East Africa. For example, during Donner’s (2006) survey-based research in 
Kigali, Rwanda, local Rwandan interviewers recorded a 55% response rate. In 
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contrast, the response rates recorded for the survey were high in both Kenya 
(87% in Nairobi, 88% in the Rift Valley) and Uganda (66% in Kampala, 96% in 
Kyangwali). In rural areas of Uganda, participants actively queued to be 
surveyed, resulting in a 100% response rate within some villages in Kyangwali 
settlement and in one suburb of Kampala. Even this figure conceals the 
enthusiasm with which the participants approached the research. While these 
high response rates appear convenient, in practice they introduced a novel 
challenge. It becomes very difficult to maintain a sampling strategy when 
administrators must reject participation from willing volunteers, as opposed to 
inviting participation from selected passers-by. Under these conditions, the 
planned strategy to reduce selection bias was not strictly adhered to. One 
explanation for these high response rates during the surveys is mis-reporting, or 
even intentional under-reporting, of non-responses. It is possible that, despite 
clear instructions, survey administrators may have neglected to record non-
responses, or selectively under-reported them. These speculations cannot be 
substantiated as limited evidence is available beyond the records of the survey 
administrators. However, the periods of survey questionnaire administration 
directly witnessed by the researcher corroborate the high response rates 
reported, and there is no doubt that the FGDs were extremely popular among 
residents of Kyangwali.  
It may be conjectured that participants’ motivations in developing world settings 
are distinct from those in Western contexts. Observing that the public have no 
obligation to participate in surveys, Bradburn, Seymour and Wansink (2004) 
note that the rewards are largely psychological: they describe these as the 
opportunity to share their opinion with a non-judgmental listener, to contribute to 
scientific knowledge, or just to assist the researcher. In the context of the 
refugee settlement, the associated gratifications may be more compelling. It 
may be hypothesised that in the absence of opportunities to express their 
opinions and share their experiences beyond their immediate communities, 
residents of target villages viewed participation in the study as a means to 
communicate with camp authorities, or to influence the provision of services. 
These motivations may have informed both the high response rates 
experienced during this study, and the content of these responses if participants 
perceived potential benefits associated with their responses. Great care was 
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taken to explain the purpose and affiliations of the research both prior to, and 
again during, each questionnaire administered. It is possible however that 
participants misunderstood or did not believe the explanations provided. 
Alternatively, participants may have viewed the research as a welcome 
distraction from their everyday activities within the settlement, or as a 
prestigious activity through which to communicate with outsides. Whilst 
intriguing, these speculations cannot be verified with the available information. 
Further research would be needed to investigate participant motivations across 
a range of non-Western settings, and such research could be valuable for a 
range of studies.  
Self-selection and high participant numbers also proved challenging during the 
FGDs, particularly as a result of the public locations in which they were 
conducted. Although a limited number of participants were formally invited to 
join each FGD, it proved impossible to restrict access. The public locations 
compounded the high rates of participation and the FGDs quickly became 
‘unfocused’ groups with a community meeting dynamic. In these settings, the 
structure and format of the FGDs inevitably departed from text-book 
recommendations. In order to elicit the best possible data under these 
unanticipated circumstances, it was necessary to develop creative, adaptive 
strategies. These are provided here both for the purposes of transparency, and 
in the event that these methods are of use to future researchers facing similar 
challenges. When it became clear that participant numbers could not be 
controlled, participants were encouraged to select a dozen ‘active’ members 
who would represent the majority, and the majority would communicate their 
views through these representatives. This compromise both facilitated a 
manageable discussion and reflected existing hierarchies within the settlement, 
wherein selected refugee representatives communicated directly with service 
providers. As far as possible, these representatives were representative of 
different sectors of the community, and included men, women, younger and 
older participants. However, within these adapted FGDs, traditional leaders and 
male community members seemed accustomed to representing the views and 
experiences of women and children, and facilitating participation proved 
challenging. This was managed by encouraging women and younger group 
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members to participate whilst remaining sensitive to traditional hierarchies and 
demonstrating respect for authority figures. 
7.7.5 Survey format and question design 
Examining next the specific design of the data collections instruments, future 
studies may also benefit from greater cultural awareness in designing tools for 
use in non-Western settings. In particular, the survey design utilised a range of 
question and answer formats that may not have been relevant or appropriate for 
the study participants. Specifically, the questions that utilised a Likert scale 
range of options proved problematic in settings where behavioural norms 
prevent disagreement, and particularly those characterised by inequalities of 
power between the researcher and their subjects, or between men and women. 
Reflecting on observations made during the fieldwork and the reflections of local 
survey administrators, participants in Kyangwali Settlement appeared reluctant 
to respond ‘disagree’ or ‘disagree strongly’ to survey questions providing these 
options. Although a pilot was conducted in Kampala, differences between urban 
migrants and rural refugees prevented the identification of such weaknesses in 
the survey design until after data collection had commenced. Future studies 
should recognise these risks, and endeavour to thoroughly pre-test surveys 
among a representative sample of respondents. For the purposes of this study, 
it is unclear whether participants’ responses to Likert-style survey questions 
reflect participants’ real opinions or merely the cultural conditioning that 
discourages expressing disagreement.  
The order of questions within the survey is also likely to inform the reliability of 
data collected and the responsiveness of participants to particular questions. 
The surveys used during this study included personal questions about the 
respondent at the start (e.g. education, age, etc.), which may have reduced 
participants’ responsiveness to subsequent questions. Initially, these questions 
were included at the end of the survey. During the training of survey 
administrators and during early interviews in which the survey was discussed, 
locals expressed concern about asking personal questions after participants 
had provided responses to the main body of the survey. Moreover, it was 
suggested that participants would not respond favourably if these questions 
were asked at the end, as this could be perceived as deception. To avoid this 
risk, questions about the respondent were included at the start of the survey. 
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However, it is not clear whether this was a wise strategy, or whether their 
inclusion at the start informed participants’ responses to the remainder of the 
survey. In future studies, it may be advisable to test whether demographic and 
other data about participants should be included at the start, or at the end, of 
surveys in particular developing world settings through, for example, 
administering two versions of the survey and comparing the results. For the 
purposes of this study this was not possible, but it is nevertheless important to 
acknowledge that the selected question order may have biased or otherwise 
informed participants’ responsiveness, and the veracity of the responses 
provided. 
Finally, the survey aimed to collect retrospective data and past experiences of 
crime and crime prevention. It relied, however, on simple questions and the only 
recall-enhancing technique was to refer to the previous election period. Future 
studies could utilise a range of techniques to enhance accuracy of recall, such 
as using retrieval cues or referring to a timeline of historical events. Lessons 
may be learned from previous studies of sexual victimisation, which 
demonstrate that questions that used graphic language to describe the 
elements of a crime may effectively cue respondents to recall incidents of 
victimisation (Fisher, 2009). Any techniques used would also need to be 
sensitive to cultural contexts, and avoid ethnic or political bias. For example, 
while referencing a particular election period or development initiative to provide 
a historical cue, the researcher may inadvertently communicate a particular 
political or ethnic affiliation, which may in turn bias participant responses. In 
retrospect, it may not have been advisable to refer to the previous election 
period, as this was characterised by widespread violence and rumours of 
corruption.  
7.7.6 Translation and (mis)interpretation 
The primary data informing this study were collected in countries where English 
is an official language. Nevertheless, language barriers provided unexpected 
challenges during the fieldwork, particularly for the administration of surveys 
and the facilitation of FGDs in Uganda. During FGDs conducted in Uganda, it 
was necessary to control the pace of the discussions in order to enable the 
translation of topics and questions, and responses from some group members. 
While some contributions were provided in English or French, and could be 
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understood and recorded directly by the researcher, other participants used 
local dialects which required translation. At times, they even required translation 
first into another local language, and subsequently into English, introducing 
many opportunities for intentional or unintentional mistranslation. During the 
survey language barriers also arose. In Kenya, many participants in slum areas 
speak an informal dialect known as Sheng, while in Uganda many participants 
were only familiar with local languages. While these challenges were overcome, 
to some extent, by using translated versions of the tools where necessary, 
these practices also introduced opportunities for mistranslation of questions, 
misunderstanding of meaning, and misreporting of responses. 
Future researchers are advised to consider potential language barriers in 
advance and take measures to ensure local survey administrators are fluent in, 
and all instruments are thoroughly translated into, all relevant languages. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that official languages are not necessarily spoken 
by all residents of a country, particularly those residing in rural areas. It is 
particularly important to translate key terms and concepts. During this study, it is 
possible that key terms were misinterpreted, or inconsistently interpreted, by 
participants. In particular, ‘security’ benefits described by study participants 
include a broad range of social, psychological and economic benefits. Although 
these data are presented in Chapters Five and Six and inform the analysis 
presented in Chapter Seven, the broad interpretation of key terms reduced the 
relevance of some study findings, which do not directly relate to experiences of 
crime or crime prevention (e.g. findings around addiction to technology). Future 
studies should anticipate such challenges, and ensure that key terms and data 
collection instruments are accurately translated before commencing data 
collections.  
A further consideration concerns the interpretation of particular terminology 
which may not have universal meaning for all participants. In particular, study 
participants expressed a wide range of opinions on exactly what constitutes 
‘hate-speech’. The findings revealed that mobile phone users analyse and 
interpret their receipt of particular mobile content as political information, hate-
speech, gossip or humour, according to culturally-specific frames of reference. 
Traditional data collection instruments such as surveys are likely inappropriate 
for investigating concepts which are fundamentally ambiguous, and extended 
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periods of fieldwork may be necessary to investigate such complex issues. In 
particular, hate-speech proved extremely challenging to research, eluding a 
consistent definition and identifiable attributes. Rather, the findings suggest that 
the concept encompasses a spectrum of communications, whose meaning and 
interpretation are informed by inter-personal relationships, perceived intent, 
contextual cues, humour, and timing, rather than a quality of particular words or 
phrases. Calls and messages received through mobile networks are interpreted 
as threatening or antisocial by recipients according to the conditions and 
contexts in which it is received, rather than just the content of the message. 
Messages regarded as humorous when transmitted between close friends may 
be inappropriate, offensive, or even threatening when sent outside of particular 
communities of mobile users. Previous studies have described the lack of 
definitional clarity around this term as an impediment to academic engagement 
(IHRB, 2013; Osborn, 2008; Somerville, 2011), and even government 
spokespersons have acknowledged that the applicability of this term to mobile 
phone content is highly context dependent (Odongo, 2012). The categorical 
slippage between communications categorised as hate-speech, and those that 
encompass political commentary and even humour, is likely to reduce the 
reliability of the data collected, and supports the assertion that alternative 
methods should be used to investigate such issues, particularly with regard to 
the development of appropriate methods of prevention which do not infringe on 
other forms of communication such as humour and political debate. 
7.7.7 Building relationships with organisations 
The process of data collection for this study was facilitated through collaboration 
with public and private sector organisations. The difficulties associated with the 
collection of primary data in such challenging contexts would have been far 
more extensive without the support and assistance of these organisations. In 
order to conduct the fieldwork and collect the primary data for the study it was 
necessary to build effective relationships with a number of key stakeholders. 
Particularly in Uganda, these relationships provided permission to access 
otherwise inaccessible communities, as well as enhancing the credibility of the 
study and ensuring the safety of the researcher. Collaborating with UNHCR 
provided access to reliable and responsible translators who had prior 
experience of working with foreign research teams and data collection methods, 
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were confident to approach individuals and groups and sensitive to local 
contexts and power dynamics. It was also critical to respect the established 
organisational procedures and processes to avoid undermining their credibility. 
For instance, it was customary to provide the translators with a small token 
remuneration and refreshments in return for their services, but not to provide 
any incentive for FGD participants. Failure to follow these established 
procedures would risk undermining the agencies working within the settlement, 
raising expectations of additional remuneration during future research or 
damaging relationships between the refugees and service providers. Following 
established procedures and demonstrating respect for the service providers 
operating within the settlement secured their support and mitigated potential 
damage to the reputation of future scholars by association.  
In addition to building relationships with organisations, officials and 
gatekeepers, local community leaders are an essential and powerful resource 
for the researcher. In Nairobi and Kyangwali, local religious leaders were 
approached and their informed consent was secured prior to data collection. 
These procedures demonstrated respect for local traditions, and gaining the 
support of local leaders also enhanced the credibility of the research. They are 
likely, however, to have introduced degrees of bias into the data collected. 
Although study participants were informed about the affiliations and aims of the 
research, the involvement of organisations and local leaders may have informed 
their responses to the study and their responses to the data collection 
instruments. For the purposes of future studies investigating related topics in 
developing world settings, a longer period of engagement and associated 
processes of trust building would likely enhance the reliability of the data. 
7.7.8 Lessons for future research 
Acknowledging and reflecting on the limitations associated with the design of 
the study and data collection reveals numerous weaknesses which future 
studies should seek to learn from. Some components of the study design 
facilitate reflection on these weaknesses, for example conducting post data-
collection interviews with the local administrators offers a valuable mechanism 
through which these weaknesses may be glimpsed, if not fully understood.  
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In particular, the limited duration of the fieldwork component of this research 
imposed unfortunate constraints on the quantity and quality of data collected. 
Future studies would benefit from more extended fieldwork, taking time to gain 
local knowledge on the core issues, learn about local cultural and environmental 
conditions, and gain the trust and respect of local populations and stakeholders 
(particularly local leaders) prior to data collection. Ideally, researchers should be 
fluent in at least one local language. Where translation of data collection 
instruments or data is required, adequate time should be allocated to ensure 
that translation is thorough and clear, and questions and key terms retain their 
intended meaning. Where possible, local terminology should be adopted to 
ensure that misunderstandings are reduced and key concepts are clearly 
operationalized. Future researchers should also take time to familiarise 
themselves with the new environment, learning how to overcome logistical 
challenges as well as learning about behavioural norms and cultural differences 
which may inform participants’ attitudes and responses to the topic of 
investigation and the tools of data collection.   
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the traditional data collection instruments 
used, such as the surveys and FGDs, may need to be more carefully designed 
and tailored to specific cultural conditions in order to capture reliable data in 
non-Western settings. Although large quantities of survey data were collected, 
coded and analysed from both case studies, these data are of limited analytic 
value. Ultimately, this reflects methodological weaknesses in the design and 
implementation of the fieldwork, and misunderstanding of the specific cultural 
context in which it was conducted. Where participants are unfamiliar with the 
question-and-answer format of a survey, or with the open and equal 
participation required for a FGD, this unfamiliarity is likely to inform the 
effectiveness of the approach and the quality of the data collected. The use of 
participatory methods, such as those developed by Chambers (1983; 2008) 
may enhance the relevance of data collection in resource-poor settings. For 
example, the use of participatory mapping (ibid) could enable researchers to 
access data about the location of crime events even among illiterate 
populations where facilitating one-to-one or small group meetings is 
challenging. Ethnographic-style fieldwork, using participant observation to 
augment tools such as interviews and surveys, would also add great value to 
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future studies addressing attitudes to, and perceptions of, crime and crime 
prevention in developing world settings.  
Acknowledging the challenges and the unique opportunities experienced during 
the conduct of fieldwork, these methods nevertheless provided access to 
otherwise inaccessible data on the perceptions and experiences of crisis-
affected, developing world mobile users and their communities.  
7.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the application of opportunity crime theory and 
situational crime prevention techniques to mobile phone-related crime in 
developing world settings. Security benefits include the reduction or prevention 
of various types of crime, including robbery, violent crime and kidnapping, 
although study participants relied more on access to informal than formal 
networks to access these benefits. Mobile phones inhibit crime by increasing 
the perceived risk and effort, while reducing the anticipated rewards, 
provocations and excuses associated with the commission of crime. However, 
these same frameworks also explain how mobile phones facilitate crime. The 
chapter also examined the virtual convergence of potential targets and 
motivated offenders through mobile phone communications, examining social, 
cultural and situational conditions which increase opportunities for crime in 
developing world settings, particularly patterns of information and handset 
sharing. The study supports analyses of mobile phones as attractive crime 
targets, and effective crime facilitators. The term m-crime was also proposed in 
this chapter to the hybrid threats associated with mobile phones. Finally, the 
chapter reflected on the weaknesses of the selected data collection and 
analysis methods, concluding with a critical examination of these challenges, 
identifying lessons for future research, and proposing alternative methods for 
further research into this topic.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions  
8.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of this thesis reflects on the implications of the study findings 
for mobile telephony, security and crime in developing world settings, and for 
the applicability of opportunity crime frameworks in non-Western contexts.  
It remains to reflect on the implications of these findings for both theory and 
practice, and identify avenues for further research. Accordingly, this chapter 
summarises the original contributions of the study and acknowledges the 
limitations of the data collection, analysis and theory building. It further outlines 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the study findings, 
proposing directions for future research.  
8.2 Contributions of the study 
This thesis comprises an investigation into the crime inhibiting, and crime 
facilitating, implications of the rapid and widespread expansion of mobile 
telephony in developing world settings. 
The findings lend support to the relevance of opportunity theories for the 
analysis and prevention of crime in resource-poor, developing world settings. 
They suggest, moreover, that situational measures can reduce crime in these 
contexts. Furthermore, they demonstrate that analyses of the impacts of mobile 
telephony in developing world settings are incomplete without acknowledging 
the crime and security implications of these tools for users.  
The main research contributions of this study are as follows: 
1. Mobile phones inhibit crime and have the potential to contribute to 
crime prevention:  
Mobile phones create new opportunities for crime reporting, detection and 
prevention. In particular, mobile phones increase the perceived risk associated 
with the commission of crime by extending guardianship and assisting natural 
surveillance in developing world settings. They also increase the perceived 
effort, reduce rewards, and may be used to reduce provocations and excuses 
for crime in developing world settings. However, uses for formal crime reporting 
remain limited, and most users rely on informal networks for support. Attitudes 
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to the capacity and benevolence of the state, as well as other social, cultural 
and situational conditions, inform user decisions to use mobile phones to report 
and prevent crime.  
2. Mobile phones create new opportunities for crime in developing 
world settings:  
Analysis of the findings reveals that mobile telephony simultaneously increases 
crime opportunities and contributes to insecurity in developing world settings, as 
crime facilitators and crime targets. The previous chapter outlines a number of 
ways in which mobile phones reduce the effort and risk, and increase the 
rewards, associated with crime in developing world settings. Furthermore, 
mobile phone networks may be used to provoke and/or remove excuses for 
crime in these settings. 
3. Social, cultural and situational conditions inform access to 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention:  
Social and situational conditions in developing world settings inform access 
crime prevention opportunities, and create unique constellations of opportunity 
for crime. These include dynamics of gender, literacy and language as well as 
practices of handset sharing, social networks and attitudes to the state. These 
conditions critically inform the effectiveness of crime prevention mechanisms 
utilising mobile telephony, and inform the vulnerability of particular groups to 
acquisitive and networked crime associated with mobile phones. 
4. Mobile phones create new, hybrid m-crime threats:  
The study identifies, analyses, and develops a preliminary categorisation of the 
perceived crime and security threats associated with mobile telephony in the 
two case studies. These comprise handset theft, m-violence, m-theft and m=-
deception. These crime threats are found to be essentially hybrid and 
interconnected, each facilitating further crimes. Accordingly the overarching 
term 'm-crime’ is proposed to describe, “Any illegal or anti-social activity 
facilitated or committed using mobile telephony”.  
5. Opportunity theories of crime and SCP techniques are applicable to 
the prevention of mobile phone crime:  
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The study examines the application of opportunity theories of crime and the 25 
techniques of SCP (Cornish & Clarke, 2003) to the analysis and prevention of 
mobile-enabled crime threats in developing world settings. Opportunity theories 
of crime provide a powerful explanatory tool for examining socio-technical 
processes of change in these settings, while the application of the effort, risk, 
reward, provocations, and excuses framework effectively facilitates the 
identification and categorisation of existing and potential crime prevention 
mechanisms associated with mobile telephony.  
6. New methods are needed to investigate these opportunity 
structures, m-crime threats and potential prevention mechanisms 
further: 
Reflecting on methods of this his study reveal both challenges and opportunities 
for the investigation of opportunities for crime and crime prevention in 
developing world settings. These reflections facilitate the examination of the 
wider suitability of short-term fieldwork and the use of traditional research 
instruments such as survey, interview and FGD data in developing world 
settings, and the proposal of more suitable approaches for future research. 
During the course of this research, one academic journal article was published: 
 Martin-Shields, C. & Stones, E., 2014. Smart Phones and Social 
Bonds: Communication Technology and Interethnic Cooperation 
in Kenya. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 9(3), pp. 
50-64. 
In addition to these contributions, developing collaboration with public and 
private sector bodies also added value to the findings, potentially enhancing 
their applicability to the resolution of real-world challenges. The research 
resulted in the publication and dissemination of two industry reports by GSMA, 
containing actionable recommendations for mobile network operators to 
contribute to the protection and empowerment of crisis and disaster-affected 
populations:  
 Disaster Response: Guidelines for Establishing Effective Collaboration 
between Mobile Network Operators and Government Agencies 
 Disaster Response: Mobile Money for the Displaced.  
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The study also resulted in direct, material benefits for participants and 
communities comprising the case study in Uganda. The preliminary findings of 
the fieldwork were shared with the Chief Executive Officer of the largest mobile 
phone network operator in Uganda. In response to the identified demand for 
enhanced mobile coverage and increased provision of mobile money services, 
a feasibility assessment was commissioned to enhance mobile service 
provision in Kyangwali settlement. This subsequently resulted in the installation 
of a new mobile phone tower in the settlement, enhancing connectivity for 
users. 
8.3 Limitations of the study 
Researching crime in mobile networks is challenging due to the paucity of data 
in the public domain and the invisible nature of these crime opportunities and 
threats. However, the link between poor socio-economic development and 
crime, conflict, and insecurity is acknowledged (World Bank, 2011). This study 
comprises an exploratory investigation into a new topic of enquiry; the 
relationship between crime, security, and mobile telephony in the developing 
world. Limited background information is available on this new area of study, 
and consequently the literature presented herein emerges from a wide range of 
academic disciplines, industry publications and humanitarian and development 
reports. Furthermore, using data collected from two case studies, the analysis 
does not present a comprehensive list of all crime and security threats 
associated with mobile telephony, nor does it identify all the mechanisms 
through which these threats might be mitigated. Rather it comprises an 
exploratory investigation into crime threats and prevention mechanisms 
associated with mobile phones in developing world settings, from the 
perspective of opportunity crime theory. The findings presented and analysed in 
this thesis provide only a snapshot of the interconnections between mobile 
telephony and crime and security within unique circumstances in a particular 
historical moment, and offer a point of departure for the wider analysis of mobile 
telephony and crime. These circumstances are in constant flux, as mobile 
penetration figures continue to increase rapidly (ITU, 2014), new users engage 
with the technology, and more advanced handsets become available. 
Throughout these processes of change, new opportunities are likely to emerge 
for these tools to contribute to enhancing, and reducing, the security of users. It 
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is therefore important to keep pace with these emerging m-crime threats and 
predict future threats, in order to develop preventative measures to address 
them.  
In addition to limitations in the scope of the study, methodological constraints 
discussed in the previous chapter also affect the reliability and replicability of 
the data. Inevitably, the fieldwork was subject to temporal and financial 
limitations and the sample sizes used in this study are relatively modest and 
non-probabilistic, reducing the precision and generalizability of the results. 
Furthermore, the survey and FGD methods in particular were subject to a 
number of contextual constraints, acknowledged and elaborated in Chapter 
Seven. These include cultural and linguistic barriers and misunderstandings, 
concerns regarding the veracity of participant responses, and biases introduced 
during the process of data collection. The survey and FGD methods may be 
fundamentally inappropriate tools for the collection of data on individual 
experiences of crime and attitudes to mobile telephony, particularly where social 
and cultural inequalities and behavioural norms inform participation. Cultural 
contexts were insufficiently considered in the design of this study.  Future 
studies should tailor data collection instruments more closely to the 
environmental conditions, social contexts and cultural norms of the sample. 
Specifically, individual surveys may be inappropriate for collecting data from 
users in communal cultures, and a more appropriate unit or analysis may be the 
household or indeed the village. Survey questions utilising Likert-style response 
categories may also be ineffective in cultures where individuals are unwilling to 
disagree with perceived authority figures, and inequalities of power therefore 
result in unreliable responses. Mixed FGDs are also inadvisable where 
inequalities of power prevent equal participation, for example by women in 
Kyangwali. Practically, it is not possible to facilitate FGDs (as traditionally 
conceptualised) in open settings where participant numbers and types cannot 
be controlled. Acknowledging the limitations of these data, however, they 
nevertheless comprise a unique dataset collected under challenging conditions, 
and provide a means to examine the perceptions and experience of otherwise 
inaccessible research subjects.  
Ultimately, this study produces new knowledge concerning the relationship 
between mobile telephony and crime and security in the developing world, 
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proposes the development of new terminology and a new theoretical model of 
m-crime, and illuminates new opportunities for further research, with potentially 
valuable implications for public and private sector policy and practice. 
8.4 Theoretical implications of the study 
The economic, social, and political impacts of mobile telephony in the 
developing world have received considerable attention from disciplines 
including communication studies, information science, computer science, 
sociology, anthropology, design, political science, public policy, and economics 
(Donner, 2008). However, engagement with the ways in which mobile phones 
may facilitate or inhibit crime and insecurity, create new crime opportunities and 
compound existing vulnerabilities is a valuable and understudied area of 
research. While online crime and fraudulent activities are well documented 
(albeit in developing world settings), the relationship between crime and mobile 
telephony has been largely overlooked. In developing world contexts, mobile 
phone penetration is increasing rapidly, and it is therefore essential to identify 
and investigate the associated crime facilitating, and crime inhibiting, 
opportunities associated with these tools. 
Applying opportunity crime perspectives and SCP techniques to crime in 
developing world settings is a novel application of these theories. Developed in 
the USA and UK, and applied primarily in Western settings, the findings of this 
study suggest that these theories are generalizable to studies of crime non-
Western settings. However, the findings of this study indicate that effort, risk, 
reward, provocations and excuses framework is useful for understanding both 
opportunities for crime and crime prevention in East Africa. Moreover, 
opportunity theories of crime are particularly useful to contribute to a better 
understanding of the changing conditions in which crime occurs in developing 
world settings. Processes of social-technical change in particular provide new 
crime opportunities, and these are often overlooked in studies examining 
developmental and humanitarian benefits and impacts. The increasing 
availability of consumer goods in resource-poor settings are likely to provide 
new crime targets, compounded by conditions of poor physical security. Just as 
Cohen and Felson (1979) identified increasing opportunities for crime 
associated with economic prosperity, consumerism and women’s engagement 
in the workforce following WWII post-war period, the developing world is 
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currently undergoing broad processes of social and economic change. The 
findings of this study suggest that both new crime threats are likely to emerge, 
and new victims become accessible, as mobile penetration increases amongst 
developing world communities. It is critical for future studies to move beyond 
analyses of the widely recognised benefits of mobile telephony and to 
acknowledge the related crime and security threats.  
Acknowledging these new opportunity structures is the first step towards 
designing preventative measures to reduce or inhibit crime in developing world 
settings.  SCP is a valuable mechanism through which to assess existing 
techniques of crime prevention, and to identify potential measures which could 
be adopted to reduce or prevent a wide range of crimes. Recognising the social 
and cultural differences in non-Western settings, a core strength of SCP is the 
recognition of the importance of context. Examining the effectiveness of crime 
prevention techniques, SCP acknowledges that measure that work in one place 
do not necessarily work in another. Furthermore, this approach acknowledges 
that perceptions of effort, risk and reward inform offender-decision making, and 
therefore identifying and raising awareness of existing preventative measures 
may effectively reduce crime, with minimal costs. Moreover, populations in 
isolated and rural communities, and displaced populations, may be particularly 
vulnerable to crime and thus it is critical to engage with social, situational and 
cultural conditions which inform their perceptions and experiences of crime and 
crime prevention, acknowledging inevitable challenges of accessing reliable 
data. These conditions include literacy, information scarcity, inexperience, 
practices of handset sharing and the physical security of dwellings, to name but 
a few. In particular, future studies should acknowledge the complex 
constellations of sharing behaviours, and investigate the implications of these 
behaviours for crime and crime prevention to identify intervention points and 
guide the development of culturally appropriate prevention mechanisms for use 
in non-Western settings. Furthermore, the definitional challenges associated 
with categorising particular content as ‘hate-speech’ suggest that further 
engagement with cultural practices will be essential to explore the boundaries 
between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in non-Western settings, in 
this case between legitimate political communications, humour and offensive 
content. 
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New theoretical tools are needed to explore the impact of new communications 
technologies on crime in the developing world, where these technologies 
introduce a range of new criminogenic opportunities. The proposal of the new 
conceptual category of m-crime, and the application and modification of existing 
cyber-crime categorisations presented in this thesis, provide a foundation for 
the development of new theoretical tools with which to address these 
challenges. Recognising the emergence of m-crime as a response to the 
changing crime opportunities associated with the increasing penetration of 
mobile telephony, this study proposes that SCP provides a useful set of 
techniques for analysing and addressing m-crime threats. Further research is 
needed to develop the preliminary classification of m-crime threats revealed 
through the examination of two case studies in this thesis. Although this 
classification provides a guide for future research, it catalogues only the threats 
identified during this study, inevitably comprising an incomplete compendium. It 
is also noteworthy that as more advanced handset models become popular in 
Africa (GSMA, 2015), changing capabilities associated with these models are 
likely to bring new opportunities for crime and crime prevention. For example, 
cameras and digital recording may enhance users’ ability to collect evidence of 
crimes, and Internet access may increase opportunities for crime reporting. The 
high value of the models may however increase handset theft. Horizon 
scanning will be needed to identify potential crime threats and crime prevention 
opportunities, and develop techniques to mitigate or leverage these. 
Further studies could examine the types of criminal misuse associated with 
mobile telephony across country contexts, for example comparing these 
findings with research conducted in other parts of Africa, or with the 
experiences of developing world populations in Asia or Latin America where 
mobile phone penetration varies, and access and use patterns are mediated 
and constrained by different social, economic and political conditions. Additional 
research is also needed to develop each m-crime category further, to identify 
and catalogue other m-crime threats, and to examine the specific risks 
associated with emerging mobile technologies and tools, such as m-banking 
and particular ICTD projects and initiatives. Developing a mobile Phone Theft 
Index, as developed by Mailley et al. (2008) in the UK, would be a valuable tool 
to inform prevention techniques addressing handset theft, recognising the 
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challenges associated with accessing the necessary data in developing world 
contexts. 
SCP techniques have been effectively implemented to reduce numerous types 
of crime, and this study outlines situational prevention mechanisms that may be 
perceived to reduce or inhibit particular m-crime threats and the misuse of 
mobile phone networks in developing world settings. The findings suggest that 
mechanisms that increase the perceived risk associated with m-crime are 
widely regarded to be effective. However, further investigation is needed to 
evaluate m-crime prevention measures in more depth, and to identify evidence 
of displacement and offender adaptation. Specifically, studies could further 
investigate SIM registration, monitoring mobile content, and specific m-crime 
reporting mechanisms. Future studies should consider also the potential for the 
diffusion of benefits and identify mechanisms to maximise the crime inhibiting 
features of mobile telephony.  
Examining the conditions in which handset thefts commonly occur could also 
inform the development and application of situational techniques to address this 
crime threat. The study findings suggest that prisons are perceived to be m-
crime hotspots, as mobile phones provide incarcerated prisoners with 
opportunities to overcome physical constraints and access crime targets. This 
finding is supported by research conducted in Kenya (Karanja 2011, Okuttah 
2011), and would be an interesting avenue for further research. Although mobile 
technology creates opportunities to extend criminal behaviour into digital arenas 
and beyond traditional environmental settings, perpetrators remain physically 
situated in these settings, facilitating the application of environmental prevention 
measures. Future research could develop this argument by evaluating the 
effectiveness of specific measures, such as the signal blocking mechanisms 
implemented within prisons on the reduction of particular types of m-crime. A 
challenge associated with this geographical disconnection between offenders 
and victims is the transnational nature of some m-crime threats. Future studies 
could also investigate the extent to which national mobile phone networks 
provide opportunities for the commission of crimes originating from perpetrators 
beyond the country’s borders, or examine the risks and benefits associated with 
informal patterns of transnational resource sharing, as identified among 
displaced populations in Kyangwali. 
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While this study focuses on the experiences and perceptions of mobile users as 
victims of m-crime, further studies could address the changing opportunities for 
crime associated with mobile telephony from the perspective of offenders, 
examining the factors influencing their decisions, actions, and motivations. 
Methodologically challenging to access, research targeting the perpetrators of 
m-crime could provide valuable insights into their assessment of crime 
opportunities associated with mobile phones. This would require the 
development of new methodologies to identify and access these research 
subjects. Burrell’s (2012) investigation of the moral justifications of young 
peoples’ engagement with cyber-crime in Ghana may provide a useful 
foundation for further research into this understudied area.  
Further research could also utilise time series data to examine trends, or use 
computer modelling technologies to map (and potentially predict) patterns in m-
crime. Such studies could perhaps explore correlations between particular types 
of m-crime and regulatory terrains, or the impact of high profile prosecutions 
and media campaigns on m-crime outbreaks. The dissemination of rumour and 
false information is particularly suitable for investigation using these research 
methods, recognising the challenges associated with accessing data about 
these threats. Gaining the support of mobile network operators could provide 
valuable information on the reporting of scams and fraudulent messages, 
providing a means to overcome these challenges. 
Having illuminated several avenues for further study that could be fruitfully 
pursued, this thesis concludes with the proposal that the increasing penetration 
of mobile telephony in the developing world is likely to create new opportunities 
both for crime, and for crime prevention. Recognising this, the current historical 
moment provides unprecedented opportunities for the prevention of emerging 
m-crime threats. We must remain mindful, however, of the implications of these 
prevention mechanisms, and ensure that techniques implemented to protect 
mobile users and their communities do not infringe upon their fundamental 
rights. According to study participants, users are aware of the increasing 
opportunities for crime associated with mobile telephony, and broadly support 
initiatives designed to reduce crime and protect mobile users. The findings 
around attitudes to monitoring and surveillance reveal complex perceptions of 
mobile phone networks as simultaneously public and private spaces. 
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Nevertheless, as penetration rates in the developing world continue to increase, 
establishing situational and environmental mechanisms to prevent the criminal 
misuse of mobile networks is essential to protect mobile phone owners, users, 
and their communities. It is hoped that these findings both ignite interest in the 
topic of m-crime and security across a range of academic disciplines, and 
contribute to enhanced awareness of these issues beyond the academic 
community – comprising as it does a call to action for policy-makers and the 
private sector, as well as the development practitioner community.  
8.5 Practical implications of the study  
Addressing mobile phone related crime threats is likely to require the 
engagement and cooperation of multiple stakeholders, including mobile phone 
users and their communities, and both public and private sector organisations. 
Furthermore, organisations and institutions seeking to leverage mobile tools 
and platforms for development and crisis-response applications should be 
aware of the implications of these changing opportunities for crime and 
insecurity.  
In order to detect and prevent the associated crime and security threats 
requires legal frameworks, tools and instruments that can only be developed if 
these threats and associated crime opportunities are well understood. Since 
misuse of mobile networks for the coordination of violence and extremism has 
increasingly been recognised (see Chapter Two), advances have been made in 
the regulation of mobile networks and the development of preventative 
mechanisms. Legal frameworks controlling the dissemination of anti-social 
content, monitoring of bulk SMS content, the mandatory registration of SIM 
cards and the widespread peaceSMS campaigns are all examples of these 
measures. Furthermore, globalisation and migration situate m-crime within a 
dynamic and transnational virtual arena, unrestricted by territorial boundaries. In 
the absence of international legal frameworks, mobile telephony can function to 
bring together victims and criminals located in different legal jurisdictions, 
reducing the potential for the detection and prosecution of perpetrators. 
Transnational and global strategies implemented in tandem with addressing 
spatially- and virtually-situated ‘hotspots’ of crime are therefore needed to 
provide a complementary, multi-layered approach to address these emerging 
crime threats (Farrell, 2015).  
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A further implication of the study findings concerns the credibility issues 
associated with the widespread receipt of false and anti-social information 
purporting to originate from reputable organisations, particularly MNOs, which 
may undermine potential security and simultaneously have commercial 
implications for the organisations implicated in the crimes. Increasing the 
capacity of mobile users to identify legitimate content and verify the credentials 
of senders may reduce these threats and protect organisational reputations. 
Corroborating information using alternative channels of communication may 
also be an effective strategy to enhance the credibly of mobile campaigns, for 
example using radio broadcasts.  
Mobile phones present also both a unique set of challenges and opportunities 
for law enforcement. Reflecting on the effectiveness of existing situational 
strategies to combat crime associated with mobile telephony, several 
approaches appear promising. Firstly, the findings suggest that SIM registration 
is perceived to be an effective measure, reducing the dissemination of hate-
speech and associated outbreaks of violence in Kenya since the 2007-8 
election period. A striking finding of the study is that the majority of study 
participants in Kenya and Uganda expressed support for the monitoring of 
mobile communications. While further research is needed to investigate this 
further, the findings also suggest that perceptions that mobile phone networks 
are monitored (regardless of the actual extent of monitoring) effectively function 
to deter hate-speech, and furthermore are associated with reductions in a range 
of m-crime types. These findings provide support for the conclusion that raising 
awareness among mobile phone users that their calls and messages may be 
monitored for anti-social content is likely to have wider implications for reducing 
a range of types of crime (a diffusion of benefits effect). Furthermore, the 
findings also suggest that the general public may broadly support mobile phone 
monitoring in these settings, provided monitoring does not interfere with their 
everyday uses of these tools.  
The findings also suggest that mobile users are developing adaptive behaviours 
in shifting hate-speech onto other, unregulated, communication channels such 
as leaflets, word of mouth, and online platforms. It is also possible that 
offenders may develop adaptive strategies in reaction to perceptions that mobile 
phone networks are monitored. Further research examining the strategies of 
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everyday users may be more accessible than targeting offenders, but may 
nevertheless help to guide analyses of the strategies likely to be developed by 
offenders.  
As technology advances, new opportunities for crime and means of expressing 
anti-social beliefs and attitudes are likely to emerge. This suggests that 
addressing the co-evolution of m-crime threats requires ongoing research and 
adaptive prevention strategies. Ekblom (1999) recommends that academic 
studies should reinforce learning paths to inform practice. In this case, collecting 
information on vulnerabilities and methods of offending is valuable if this is fed 
back to designers and engineers to help them ‘think thief’ and design out crime. 
The development of a networked m-crime lab or platform could provide a 
valuable opportunity to consolidate existing theory, practice and user-level data, 
providing information for stakeholders to minimise vulnerabilities and raise 
awareness of existing (and effective) prevention initiatives. 
Furthermore, the study findings suggest that the crime-inhibiting potential of 
mobile phones is currently being under-utilised in developing world contexts. 
Users and their communities rely primarily on informal mechanisms, and formal 
mechanisms are insufficiently tailored in recognition of users’ needs and 
capacities. For example, the GBV hotline in Uganda is provided for women to 
report cases of GBV, in a context where women’s ownership of mobile phones 
is low, their use inhibited by poor network coverage and limited access to phone 
credit. Furthermore, there are no mechanisms for reporting crime in general in 
the contexts where the GBV hotline is provided, resulting in its widespread use 
for these purposes. Identifying and responding to user needs and capacities 
could increase the scale and relevance of such mobile-enabled crime 
prevention initiatives. Despite the paucity of data on mobile handset theft in 
developing world contexts, techniques developed in the UK and other Western 
settings may be fruitfully applied to the identification of broad preventative 
strategies. In developing world settings, the most relevant of these solutions are 
likely to be those by which the owner of the handset can secure the device and 
prevent theft from occurring. Crime reporting in the developing world is likely to 
be low, for reasons outlined previously (See Section 7.4.6). Furthermore, 
solutions which rely on tracking handsets after they have been stolen, or remote 
deactivation, are likely to require technical capacity beyond that of often 
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overburdened and underequipped police forces in developing world settings. 
Specifically, solutions such as GSM and GPS tracking, and expensive 
technology such as locks using biometrics, are likely to be more applicable to 
the prevention of advanced handsets in Western contexts than in developing 
world settings. Popular prevention methods identified in the case studies 
support this. Mobile phone users in Uganda adopt methods such as attaching 
the phone to the owner using lanyards and carry pouches. Moreover, promoting 
simple, low-cost wearable solutions such as concealed pockets could further 
reduce phone theft in these contexts, and could also boost developing world 
economies if manufactured and sold by local tailors 
While further research is needed to investigate and situate these findings within 
broader contexts and to examine in further depth the opportunities and threats 
identified, the study reveals that mobile phones have valuable potential for 
crime prevention, and that efforts must be made to prevent these tools from 
contributing to new crime opportunities in developing world settings. 
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Appendix 5: Transcripts of recorded interviews with 
survey administrators in Kenya 
Interview # Sex Age Ethnicity Location 
     
1 Male 23 Luhya Kibera 
2  Female 24 Kamba Mathare 
3  Male 27 Luhya Kibera 
    Nakuru 
    Naivasha 
    Eldoret 
4  Male 25 Kisii Kangaware 
5  Male 26 Luhya Kangaware 
6  Male 23 Luhya Mathare 
7 Male 24 Kamba Eastleigh 
8  Male 29 Kisii Eastleigh 
9  Male 30 Kisii Nakuru 
    Naivasha 
    Eldoret 
10  Male 24 Luo Nakuru 
    Naivasha 
    Eldoret 
 
Interview 1: 
Liz: Thank you for taking part, it was very much appreciated. Can you tell me 
your name please? 
Z: Z_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: Ok, and who were you working with? Who was your team partner? 
Z: E, I was working with E_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: With E, ok. And where were you working? 
Z: We were working in Kibera slums, the largest slums in Kenya 
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Liz: And how did you find the experience of conducting this research? 
Z: It was quite a learning experience. You get to meet all the people, and learn 
some new stuff. Some were cooperative, some were less cooperative, but at 
least we got some information from them. 
Liz: and what were your overall impressions of their feedback, what was the 
feeling on the ground? 
Z:  Um, the feeling on the ground… It really depended on the age group. 
Liz: The age group? 
Z: Yeah, the age group. Older people they are feeling about the general 
questions we were asking, they thought it was a bit political, they had very 
different opinions. So, most of the people, like the older ones, they were saying, 
they are hoping to have a peaceful election this year compared to the one they 
had last time. 
Liz: And what did the young people think? 
Z: The young people were like 50/50. Some of them think say they think there 
will be violence, some of them not, it was going to be peaceful. And you also 
had like other people… there was a question asking about if you got affected 
with the election violence in 2007. You mostly had stories from people, some 
were sad, others who say they lost their friends, family, people were killed, their 
property was looted.  
Liz: Oh gosh. Has the experience of administering the questionnaires and 
heading peoples’ stories, has it changes your attitude maybe to the use of 
mobile phones for spreading information? 
Z: Yeah it’s changed my attitude, that… Before the post-election violence in 
2007 the government wasn’t really monitoring how people were sending SMS, 
the kind of SMS people were sending, but now the government is really 
involved in monitoring the kind of messages you send to people, you really have 
to be careful the kind of messages you send. Again, like, what I heard from 
people, now that the government is really hard on that, on sending of SMS, 
some people are going to the internet, like on Facebook and twitter, and now 
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there’s a lot of hate messages that are sent through Facebook, political 
messages, that kind of stuff. ‘Cause they know if they use their mobile phones 
they will definitely get tracked down but it’s not easy to be tracked down using 
the internet. 
Liz: Do they use their mobile phones to access the internet? 
Z: Yes, they are still using their phones but now they are going on the internet, 
they are not texting. You can still write hate-speech ‘cause, people on 
Facebook, people don’t put their real names. So some people are using that to 
spread hate messages, to spread hate-speech. Not that are no hate messages 
that are going around now – there are hate messages that are going around 
now. But not through SMS. 
Liz: In 2007 many participants recall receiving hate messages? 
Z: Yeah, there are people who were received hate messages 
Liz: What was your most memorable experience? 
Z: When we had to meet, like, the older guys who were born in the 1950s, the 
1960s, they give you a bit of details about life, how things used to be then 
compared to now, how they wish things would change, and stay peaceful, the 
way it used to be. 
Liz: Did they think it was related to mobile phones, to faster communication? 
Why did they think it changed? 
Z: A lot of people think it changed that way because of the mobile phones; 
people are using mobile phones to spread hate speech and sending other 
people inciting SMS that way and it evolves to violence. But back then there 
were very few people with mobile phones so it was very very rare to find people 
sending each other hate-speeches. But mobile phones is there, internet is 
there, everyone can do it, it spreads really really fast. Now most Kenyans have 
access to the internet or mobile phones. 
Liz: That’s great, thank you very much  
Interview 2: 
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Liz: Ok first could you tell me your name please? 
J: I’m J_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: Ok, and who were you working with? 
J: I was working with S_____ (anonymised). 
Liz: In which area? 
J: In Mathare 
Liz: And how did you find the experience? 
J: It was a nice experience, yeah, because I met different people who had 
different explanations concerning the questionnaire  
Liz: Ok and what were your overall impressions of the feeling on the ground? 
J: There is tension because of politics, especially because of what happened 
back in 2007 
Liz: Yes.  And did you find that people are concerned about their mobile phone 
use, around the election? 
J: Concerned how? 
Liz: For example the question about monitoring, were many people concerned 
about monitoring? 
J: Oh no, they don’t mind.  
Liz: Really?  
J: Yeah, because they don’t want people to spread hate, hate-speech through 
their phones 
Liz: and were you surprised about any of the responses? 
J: Yeah. When I was asking about the, who they were supporting, others, they 
didn’t want to tell me because they thought I was sent by a politician 
Liz: Ah ok. What was the most memorable experience? Was there anything 
particularly surprising or memorable? 
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J: Um, I’m not sure (Shrugs) 
Liz: No? Ok, did you have any challenges? 
J: Yeah. Most of them they were saying the questions, they are too long, and 
others were asking for incentives, if I have money to give them, and others were 
in a hurry. 
Liz: And has the experience of hearing so many perspectives and different 
opinions, has it changed the way you see mobile phones around the elections 
J: Yes. Yeah, because I think the government will continue monitoring the 
phones so that hate-speech, it won’t spread. 
Liz: Do you think that’s a good thing? 
J: It’s a good thing. 
Liz: Is there anything else you want to say? 
J: Yeah, sometimes it was hard finding someone to interview. Some of them 
they were refusing me. Only that. 
Liz: That’s normal, I think, in social research 
J: Yeah (Laughs) 
Liz: Ok, thank you very much. 
 
Interview 3: 
Liz: Thanks for taking part. Can you tell me your name please? 
E: (incomprehensible) 
Liz: Can you speak louder please, for the recording? 
E: E_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: In which area? 
E: Kibera.   
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Liz: Kibera, ok. How did you find the experience? 
E: It was interesting, people were willing to give out responses without any fear. 
Liz: Ok, what were your overall impressions of their responses? 
E: It was a bit cool, and I was, I think I’m impressed with the way they gave out 
their answers without any fear in them 
Liz: So were you expecting them to be afraid? 
Eric: Yeah, I was expecting them to be afraid at least because it was something 
to do with the elections, something to do with security 
Liz: So were there any responses that surprised you? 
E: Not at all. 
Liz: No? 
E: Yeah. 
Liz: Ok. Do you think the experience of hearing so many different opinions has 
changed the way you feel about these questions? 
E: Yes, because on the ground people are feeling that they are not secure 
enough in the forthcoming general elections.  So, I think, I was surprised to find 
that. Maybe if the government don’t, if the government doesn’t beef up the 
security before the elections there will be a repeat, that will repeat again of what 
happened in 2007. 
Interview 4: 
Liz: I’m going to ask you a few questions if that’s ok? 
E: Yeah 
Liz: Ok first what’s your name? 
E: E_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: Who were you working with? 
E: I was working with G_____ (anonymised) 
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Liz: And whereabouts?  
E: Kangaware 
Liz: And how did you find the experience? 
E: I found it challenging, a bit (incomprehensible).  
Liz: And why do you think that was? 
E: Because some of them, uh, they thought it was a bit more political, political 
questions, and it’s a political environment 
Liz: Ok. And what were your overall impressions, of the people that did 
respond? 
E: Yeah, like to me, when I started, a number of people I first approached, 
responded quite well they were quite warm. 
Liz: And what was the feeling on the ground? 
E: It was nice, a good experience, seeing how they feel as well. 
Liz: Were there any responses that surprised you? 
E: Not really, but uhh, it was ok. 
Liz: Ok what was the most memorable response, were there any responses 
that stood out? 
E: Uhh. 
Liz: Any of the questions, anything that stood out? 
E: Oh yeah, it was about, at the back of the questionnaire there was a place for 
any comments, and someone said that (incomprehensible) 
Liz: Ah nice. Has the experience of conducting the questionnaire changed your 
opinion? 
E: Yeah. 
Liz: Yeah? Like what?  
E:  I found that people are quite open, and it was a good experience. 
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Liz: Ok thank you very much 
Interview 5: 
Liz: Hi, can you tell me your name please? 
G: My name is G_____ (anonymised), yeah, and I’ve been conducting these 
interviews in Kangaware, in Nairobi the past few days, and it was quite lovely 
work and I feel quite lucky to be in this research. 
Liz: Ok nice, so what was your overall impressions of the feeling on the 
ground? 
G: The feeling on the ground wasn’t that bad. We encountered various 
challenges but we were able to find a solution to the problem because some of 
the people were not willing to give out their information, some of them they are 
not willing to be interviewed because this period in Kenya there is political 
tension because of the coming elections, so people find if you are trying to 
interview them about the elections, and they don’t want to give away who, the 
candidate they are supporting and their party, so it was quite a challenge, but 
we were able to find some people who were willing, and were able to tackle the 
questionnaires 
Liz: …and were you surprised by any of their responses? 
G: Yeah. Because the area I went to it was prone to one particular party, but um 
was surprised to find, like, other people who were supporting other, other 
political parties.  
Liz: Um, what was...  Has the experience of administering the questionnaire 
affected your outlook on the way that mobile phones are used during the 
election and prior to the election? 
G: hmm, maybe… The only thing I would say, maybe the comparison, maybe, 
how it affected me is that… most of the people who were willing to give out their 
information, they did not want to go to, to give out any information, especially 
the mobile phone so people may think you want that information for your 
personal gain so I was thinking… maybe, the effects of the mobile phone, they 
are quite much but people are not willing to give out the information cause they 
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were thinking negatively what you are doing. So it’s quite a challenge, maybe 
you have to explain to them more about the research so that people may be 
able to understand you and give out the information.  
Liz: So how did you explain the aims of the research, how did you introduce 
yourself? 
G: Yeah, I introduced myself as a researcher, that I am helping out one of the 
students in the (reaches for back pocket) let me just get the, from the University 
College London, that she is doing a PhD so we are doing this research for the 
benefit of, so we are not doing it for the benefit of the country, so we are doing it 
for the university college of London PhD programmes, and that is how I 
introduced myself. And I am one of the researchers because she is conducting 
the research in Kenya, that is why she has come and she needs help, so I am 
helping her to get information for the benefit of her PhD. 
Liz: Ok thanks, is there anything else you want to say on... for the record? 
G: It was quite a lovely time, ‘cause I really love research, yeah, um, ok. Just, it 
was a special experience to be able to help in this research and I wish you best 
of luck in it. 
Interview 6: 
Liz: Could you tell me your name please? 
S: My name is S_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: Ok, and where were you working? 
S: I was working in Mathare 
Liz: who were you working with? 
S: with J_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: How did you find the experience overall? 
S: It was a little bit hard but we managed to finish it 
Liz: Ok, what were the challenges you experienced? 
381 
 
S: Um, ok for example the drunkards, who can be up into your face and you just 
continue. 
Liz: Ok wow – but there’s no danger? 
S: No, there is no danger. 
Liz: Ok good! And what were your overall impressions of the feeling on the 
ground, in the area? 
S: the ghetto people, they don’t used to understand you. So you can make them 
understand before you… Maybe they don’t understand English, so you can 
interpret 
Liz: Ok. Were you surprised by any of the responses? 
S: No 
Liz: No? Ok. Were there any responses that were particularly memorable? 
S: to me? 
Liz: Yes. 
S: Yes 
Liz: For example…? 
S: Ok. Why are you taking my phone number? Why are you collecting it? To 
whom? 
Liz: Ok and did you explain it was optional to give a phone number? 
S: Yeah if we take the telephone number then we tell that we can contact you if 
you like. 
Liz: Ok. Um, and has the experience of hearing all the different opinions on the 
ground, has it changed your opinion or has it make you think about things 
differently? 
S: No, not really. 
Liz: No? Ok. And what do you think, in general? How do you think mobile 
phones will be used around this coming election? 
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(loud background noise) 
S: Sorry? 
Liz: How do you feel about... do you think a lot of hate speech is bring spread? 
Or do you think there are a lot of peace messages compared to 2007?  
S: there was more, because, I mean this is the area that was affected so there 
are people that have suffered. 
Liz: Ok, thank you. 
Interview 7: 
Liz: Ok so could you tell me your name please?  
JM: My name is J_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: Ok and who were you working with? 
JM: I was working with J_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: ok, in which district? Which area?  
JM: in Eastleigh area 
Liz: and how did you find the experience? 
JM: at first it was difficult to start, but with time it got easy because I got to know 
what to ask people so that they can accept to do the interview ummm… and 
some people just, ok some people were a bit shy, cause they thought it was 
something to gauge their intelligence but you have to show them that it’s not 
that. 
Liz: right. And what were your overall impressions of the general feeling? 
JM: of people? 
Liz: yes.  
JM: Most people are afraid to give out information about themselves 
Liz: really? 
JM:  oh yeah. 
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Liz: Ok, and what, umm, what was the general feeling about the use of mobile 
phones? 
JM: Ok rephrase the question please? 
Liz: Ok, we can cut and edit that haha. 
JM: Ok sure (laughs) 
Liz: I’ll ask a different question. 
JM: Ok 
Liz: were you surprised by any of the responses 
JM: Yeah, at times I was surprised. 
Liz: Yeah? For example? 
JM: some people, there’s a guy I interviewed today in the morning, he totally 
doesn’t trust anybody, even his friends, he totally doesn’t trust anybody. 
Liz: Really? Wow.  
JM: Yeah, so he doesn’t trust any message he gets, anything he reads or heard 
on TV, he doesn’t trust anything 
Liz: Interesting. And did anybody have no friends? 
JM: hmmm… No! 
Liz: (laughs) what was the most memorable experience? 
JM: It happened today in the morning still, some guy had to meet me by his 
stuff so I can interview him, so I had to buy two eggs, boiled eggs, so that I 
could interview him, I  know you said we should not (incomprehensible) but I 
had to. 
Liz: (laughs) that’s funny. 
JM: Yeah! 
Liz: and um, what was the general feeling toward the elections? Are people 
afraid, are they excited…? 
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JM: People are afraid, they think, they are afraid to show that they are receiving 
any messages, ok, most people are optimistic that things should go well but 
they are afraid that things might not go well, because even if it is not being 
spread by SMS, there is talk about violence and stuff, yeah 
Liz: Ok and what is the general feeling about SMS 
JM: SMS? Ok, mostly reporting that they are not receiving any, apart from 
maybe IEBC, and from friends, no, they are not receiving anything from friends 
Liz: ok, and were they concerned about hate speech 
JM: Yeah, they are all concerned about it. Especially back in 07, they were 
concerned about it a lot then 
Liz: Ok. Is there anything else you want to say on record?  
JM: hmm, I hope things go well after the elections and remain peaceful. And I 
enjoyed the whole experience, it was good! 
Interview 8: 
Liz: Ok could you tell me your name please? 
GA: I’m G_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: ok, and where, where you working?  
GA: I was working in (incomprehensible) area of Nairobi, whereby I was at 
Eastleigh, in Kamoja estates 
Liz: Ok that’s great, and who were you working with?  
GA: I was working with… do I specify the tribes? 
Liz: Your research partner. 
GA: Oh, J_____ (anonymised) 
Liz: ok, great. And what did you find, how was your overall impression of the 
research project? 
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GA: ok at first, before I started the research, basing on the questions that were 
in the research paper (survey) I didn’t expect to get the response I got in the 
first place 
Liz: Oh, ok. 
GA: Maybe if I may start with how many people were willing to be interviewed. 
Liz: Yes? 
GA: Yeah, I can say that maybe in every three people I that I talked to, at least 
one was responding, which was very good. There’s also a very huge Somali 
population in Eastleigh and almost all of them, the ones I was talking to, 
responded really well.  
Liz: Excellent. Ok, and what surprised you about their responses? 
GA: Um, there is the issue of asking someone his or her ethnic background and 
political affiliation, asking for contacts, a lot of people were giving me that, which 
was quite impressive. 
Liz: Ok. 
GA: Yeah. 
Liz: … And what was the most memorable response to any question? Did you 
have any responses that stood out? 
GA: I cannot say there was… because, ah, in this area you’ll find that it wasn’t 
really affected by the post-election violence, so most of the response or much of 
it was kind of similar.  
Liz: What were the challenges that you experienced conducting the research? 
GA: The challenges I can say was, umm, maybe… Ok we have the Somali and 
the locals. Now, the local were a bit difficult to get information, unlike the 
Somalis which were very willing to talk, yeah, they even give you their business 
premises or where you can get them.  Yeah, they really were responding well to 
that, so that was a bit interesting, and it was sad, the other part, as in the locals 
were not that free to give that information 
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Liz: Ok. And did their responses change the way you felt about SMS or election 
violence? 
GA: I can say that because it was the area itself, it wasn’t adversely affected by 
the chaos so I didn’t expect a lot. I lived there for many years, but I don’t live 
there now and I wasn’t living there when the violence erupted, so I don’t think 
that I got something that I didn’t expect 
Liz: Ok perfect, any final remarks? 
GA: the research went well, that’s it 
Liz: Ok great, thank you very much 
GA: Ok you’re welcome  
Interview 9: 
H:  My name is H_____ (anonymised). So I was helping Liz with the research in 
terms of supervision and coordination. Apparently it all went well, so I’ll take a 
question.  
Liz: So how did you find the attitude of the people you interviewed in Nairobi 
versus upcountry? Were people receptive? 
H: People were friendly but you can say in some cases there were reservations. 
Also upcountry, where you could tell somebody really was not willing to give 
their information but in Nairobi people were more willing. In some places that 
could be considered hotspots for the violence like in Eldoret, some people were 
really reserved. So, like, for some questions, they can easily tell you “no, let’s 
skip that”. Also for the tribe, they are telling you “please, let’s skip that” and 
political affiliations they are telling you “let’s skip that” when I came to talk to 
different parties later in the evening they are telling me there are still some 
reservations from people in the area because of the violence the last time, so 
people were unwilling to disclose that information because maybe of their fear 
of what could be happening, but then they could say confidently they are willing 
to vote and they are trying to get peace but you can see they are still scared. 
About the SMS I cannot say they were really coming forth with the right 
information. Some percentage were still not disclosing what is going on, or went 
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on in 2007 mostly. About the forthcoming, I can say that a lot of peace SMS 
was registered, yeah and according to my share of the questionnaires I didn’t 
get anybody who reported something violence or threatening for the 
forthcoming election, but some had it in the last election. 
Liz: You mentioned something before in Nakuru, about people and how they 
reacted to you, do you remember? They asked you, you asked them what 
ethnicity they were, they wanted to ask you right away. 
H: Oh yeah, I think it was a bit of scepticism, some people wanted to whether 
you are willing to divulge your share of information before they give you theirs. I 
can say in Nakuru and Naivasha people were more willing to engage in political 
conversation without any aggression or chance for conflict. I can tell them I am 
from this party, they also tell me theirs and then we talk about it and discuss 
about politics. Also in Naivasha there were some, three men who, we discussed 
a lot about politics, so that shows that some sort of maturity is coming up 
towards this election that can easily show you there is no violence as much, but 
about Eldoret I can say there is still some reservations. But in Eldoret I can say 
there are still some reservations, people are not so willing to discuss further, all 
the information they were giving… you can see when someone is being 
watchful of what they say, like, if they give their political affiliation they may be in 
danger, or may be, like, targeted. 
Liz: Was there any particular thing that surprised you during this whole 
process? 
H: That stop we had where we saw some university students preaching peace, I 
think that showed how much people are willing to get out of your way and move 
on. It was a good show. I met a lady who said she lost her husband and she 
was in that event, was it at Cheptika? Those university students. So the lady 
was also a youth leader who was among the people that is caring about that 
initiative, and she could freely talk about what she lost. That somehow showed 
me that people are willing to heal over what happened before, and the 
possibility of it happening again is not so much 
Liz: do you feel like your opinion has changed, or has been affected by this 
research, like by anything you found out about mobile phones, about using SMS 
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for violence or peace, has there been anything that has altered any of your 
opinions on this topic? 
H: Yes I told you before, I think people are moving away from SMS, the next 
target of hate-speech will be social media and I think it should be controlled 
because people just come up posting anything and some people have so many 
followers it gains weight but it’s just hearsay, the next thing everybody is using 
that as if it must be true and you never know what effect it will have.. like during 
‘07 it got to a time when mainstream media got closed down so the option we 
have after that was social media, so if social media is not controlled and 
mainstream media is actually controlled by the government so the effects from 
social media can actually be worse than from SMS. That’s what I could gather 
from the research. 
Liz: Thank you 
Interview 10 
Liz: Ok, so state your name 
E: Hi camera! Ok I’m E_____ (anonymised), I was helping Liz with the research 
and, yeah.  
Liz: how did you find the attitudes of people that responded to the 
questionnaires? 
E: The attitudes were different. I didn’t do the surveys in Nairobi but I did them 
upcountry.  The towns were not so big but each and every town people had 
different views and opinions. Starting with Naivasha, people were not so willing 
to disclose or speak freely about what they thought about my questions, 
especially when I got to the political sections, or questions about their parties or 
their political affiliations, I think that was the really hard question for people to 
answer. But I was really surprised with, uh, nobody would care if the 
government looked into their SMS’s, they were all willing and open to do that. In 
Nakuru most people I interviewed I gathered came from that region. Most 
people were so proud, and so willing to tell me about their political affiliation and 
their parties. Yeah I think in Nakuru I think people were so friendly and spoke 
freely of their views and their opinions. In Eldoret, a couple of them were. In 
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Eldoret I happened to interview a police officer which I thought was so 
interesting. According to him, he was so willing he even gave me his number, 
that when we do the same research, like, to ask maybe in June or July if we are 
going to do the same research, if he could participate. About the SMS, the 
government looking into that, he was so open with it, I would say 100% 
supportive. 
Liz: Was there anything really memorable to you that anyone you interviewed 
talked to you about, a really memorable moment? 
E: I think there was a guy that I interviewed in Naivasha, he didn’t say it, per 
say, but his expression, he was so scared… He even told me, I noted it down, 
that come the March elections he’ll definitely go back to his rural home, he won’t 
stay in Naivasha. Apart from that no I don’t think there was anything 
extraordinary that we recorded.   
H: (interrupts) did anyone try to beat you up? (laughter) 
E: No, everyone was so friendly and I think they wouldn’t have considered 
that… considering I was bigger than them! (laughter) so they were a little bit 
cooperative! (laughter) 
Liz: During these questionnaires and this research, do you think it has affected 
your opinion at all about mobile phones and SMS affecting peace or violence? 
H: Before I answer that I think there’s maybe one moment I was almost 
skipping. In Eldoret there were three or four people who asked my second 
name, which I think was not usual, because I had already told them about the 
survey and they not, they were free to say whatever they want and I was not 
going to record their name or their contact information, but they really pushed it, 
for me to give me, to give them my second name. Which, after I did, they were 
like “oh, so you are a Luo” which means from the other tribe, and I was like 
“yes” then I think to them, or according to me, I think when answering my 
questions they were a bit careful on what they were saying. My opinion 
changing? or perceptions, about what? 
Liz: about mobile phones or SMS spreading violence or promoting peace. 
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E: This time round I don’t think anyone will use the mobile phone or the SMS 
because 99% of people I interviewed were willing, and they were so open, they 
were ok with the government checking their SMS. So I guess, nobody will try 
and use SMS as a medium to organise anything evil or anything illegal.  And 
most of them said that it wouldn’t, like, it wouldn’t affect the way they are using 
their mobile phones. So I think its ok. But one more thing. All the people I 
interviewed said that politicians are not allowed to campaign, or politic, using 
mobile phones, they were against that, like, 100% against it. 
Liz: Oh and what did you say about Naivasha, when you asked people about 
threating content on their phones, you mentioned something about that. 
E: Oh yes, about Naivasha, people were not so open and most of them were 
reserved with their answers but according to their expression when you asked 
such kind of question, the question to do with have they received threatening 
SMS they would, like, hang back a little, they would say “no”…which, that didn’t 
come out so convincing. So, according to my opinion I think they had or they 
have received such kind of SMS but they are not so willing to talk about it to 
strangers 
Liz: Ok thank you! 
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Appendix 6: Research Assistant Training Session 
Outline 
Local researchers were trained over the course of half-day sessions in both 
Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda. These training sessions comprised first 
an introduction to the research and discussion of the fieldwork objectives, 
methodology and tools, and second included opportunities to practice 
administering surveys and overcoming potential challenges. These sessions 
also included discussion of each of the survey questions, pragmatic 
suggestions for techniques of administering the surveys, and advice about the 
collection of additional information such as response rates. An overview of 
these training sessions is provided here. 
1. Introductions: Why are we here? 
After an initial round of introductions and small talk, survey administrators were 
introduced to the research aims and provided opportunities to discuss the both 
the field of research and the purpose of the survey data collection. This aimed 
to ensure their familiarity with the topic, and to equip them to respond any 
questions or concerns which might be raised by participants or potential 
participants.  
2. Sampling: Who are we surveying? 
The sampling strategy employed was to invite every 6th passer-by to participate 
in the survey. Administrators were encouraged to discuss the idea of sampling 
participants to represent wider populations and to consider the reasons for 
selectively sampling rather than targeting particular ‘types’ of people, or inviting 
every passer-by. As they discussed the benefits and weaknesses of this 
approach, they were able to raise potential concerns about response rates and 
anticipated problems with accessing particular groups, and these issues were 
addressed as they arose.  
3. The approach: How do we invite participation? 
The administrators were provided with the participant information sheets 
(Appendix 7) which include a brief summary introduction of the research are 
were designed to be read aloud. These were discussed as a group. This part of 
the training also included general advice on dress, demeanour, and body 
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language, expectation management, and appropriate ways to deal with 
rejection. 
4. Administration: How do we get the data? 
Administrators were provided with copies of the questionnaires and encouraged 
to read through and discuss them with each other. Key terms were examined 
and defined, and any definitional issues which arose were clarified at this stage. 
The survey questions were discussed in order and general tips and advice 
provided. These included issues of language and translation; ensuring that 
administrators understood the meaning of questions clearly and were able to 
rephrase or translate these as necessary while retaining standardised 
meanings. 
5. Testing the survey: Trial and error 
In pairs, the survey administrators were provided the opportunity to test their 
approach, introduction and survey technique on each other and on a 
convenience sample of the general public, before discussing their experiences 
and feeding back to the group. This provided opportunities to identify difficult 
questions, weak or confusing wording, and unclear directions.  
6. Conclusions 
In the final part of the training session, administrators were encouraged to 
consider their personal safety and security as paramount and were instructed to 
check-in regularly and to conduct surveys in pairs.  
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Appendix 7: Participant Information Sheets 
 
Good day and thank you for your participation in this study. My name is 
________, I am conducting a survey on behalf of Liz Stones - a doctoral 
researcher in Security Science at University College London. The aims of the 
study are to understand how mobile networks may contribute to violent or 
peaceful outcomes. If you decide to participate in this study, I will ask you a series 
of questions about your mobile phone use and your opinions about mobile 
telephony.  
Your responses to these questions are valuable. The research will be published 
through the university and potentially through academic papers, and may 
presented international conferences. Your name and other personally identifying 
information will not be disclosed in any publications. 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and your decision of whether 
or not to participate will not prejudice your future relations with the University 
College London. If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time. If you have any questions now, please feel free to ask 
them. If you have any additional questions at a later time, I will be happy to answer 
them. Any queries about this study may be directed to Kati Carter at UCL 
SECReT, 35 Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9EZ or k.carter@ucl.ac.uk.  
Sincerely, 
 
Liz Stones 
Doctoral Researcher 
 
UCL Department of Security and Crime Science 
University College London  
35 Tavistock Square 
London 
WC1H 9EZ  
Email: Elizabeth.stones.10@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix 8: Interview Transcripts Kenya 
1. Country Director, EISA 
My name is F_____ (anonymised), I am the country director of the Electoral 
Institute for Africa, EISA in short. We will be having an election two or three 
weeks from now and it’s going to be an election that is unique and 
unprecedented in our history, with so many things happening. One, we have 
increased elective officers, we have the provisions for the Presidential run-off, 
and we have so many parties and so many people contesting this election. We 
are optimistic that despite the disputed 2007 election and 2008 post-election 
violence, measures that have been put in place should be able to guarantee 
free, fair and peaceful elections. There are a number of things that will need to 
be done and a number of reforms that have been put in place including a new 
Constitution and election laws. We also have a new IEBC, election 
management body, but as I’ve often told them we hope that the time is not for 
complacency. We need to be very vigilant and we need to do everything that we 
possibly can to ensure that we have a peaceful process. The campaign is 
happening but there are also sufficient deterrents, particularly hate-speech is 
lower than it was in 2010, 2007 election and 2005 post-election violence so we 
are very confident that we’ll have a peaceful election process. 
2. Vice-chairman, Peacenet 
My name is W_____ (anonymised), I am the vice-chairman of Peacenet which 
is a network of peace organisations in Kenya. We have divided into 11 regions, 
we have a national board and I am part of that national board. Our focus is 
preaching a culture of peace in Kenya through the grass roots approach 
because we have a lot of local partners at the grassroots level. We can talk 
about Mombasa, we are there, in Kenema, nearly every part of Kenya we have 
a Peacenet member. So we are basically a networking organisation. In Eldoret 
where we are today I am the vice chairman of the region and we bring together 
about 7 countries. About the peace situation we are talking about in three 
weeks exactly from today we have the election and I’ll tell you today comparing 
this period and the period prior to the 2007 election, I would say this is the most 
peaceful one because we have not had any indicators of violence or conflicts, 
people are just going about their business, traders are not having any 
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nightmares and preparing to leave unlike in 2007 when people were closing 
early, others were going on holiday to the country because the situation in the 
country was very hard. Because the stakes were also very high, because the 
PNU was battling with ODM, we were really scared. Everybody was the majority 
in this particular area they were supporting ODM. There were a lot of fears 
circulated all over the country that PNU was working together with the 
government to rig the election, so there was a lot of fears in ODM that ballot 
boxes were being moved all over the country so that they would be able to us 
that to rig the elections so to speak. So there was this atmosphere of fear, all 
the hate-speech, politicians were talking very tough. So, I would say that at that 
time it was very very bad.  This time it’s not too bad, people are just going about 
their business and a pointer to the very peaceful elections is the primary party 
elections are very very peaceful, people are just going to polling stations and in 
this region there was not a single incident so I would say that is a very positive 
sign. 
3. CEO, Peacenet  
My name is S_____ (anonymised), I am the CEO of Peace and Development 
Network, PeaceNet. This is a network of peace-building organisations that are 
interested in ensuring there is peace in this country. Not just during the 
elections, but also at all times. We envisage a time that the Kenyan people can 
live in harmony and peace and sustain a culture of peace and development. 
So during this time of elections, my appeal on behalf of my organisation is that 
Kenyans should know how to make use of what they have positively. If it’s a 
mobile phone that you have, don’t use it to spread hate messages, don’t use it 
to incite other people. It’s all right to have opinions and even campaign for your 
people, but make sure that whatever you do it does not then infringe on the 
rights of the other people, or maybe cause harm or other people to get hurt. So 
it’s ok to have positions, its ok to think what you think, that’s your right, and 
that’s how you’re going to vote on March 4th. So let people use the mobile 
phones wisely to spread messages of peace, and also to report any incidences 
of violence or any mobilisation for violence. You can text such messages to 108 
and that will go to a place where there are people who are going to analyse the 
messages and appropriate action will be taken. So if you notice any mobilisation 
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for violence maybe people planning or talking that they want to cause violence, 
then you send a text message. It is safe, nobody will be exposed by, you know, 
sending a text message to that number. It’s because we all love Kenya and we 
want Kenya to be a peaceful place, so whatever action will be taken it will not 
be exposed or revealed who has given us the message but we will just take 
appropriate action in the interests of peace and security for our country. So, 
Kenyan’s let’s go and vote! And let’s do it nicely!  
 
 
 
 
 
